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This thesis analyzes the regulations pertaining to the economic aspects of 
international air transport from the perspectives of law and policy. The subject 
of this analysis is Northeast Asia (defined in this study as China, Japan and 
Korea), and the focal point is a regional approach to liberalizing the 
international air transport market.  
International air transport is currently undergoing dynamic regulatory 
changes. Once, the airline industry was one of the most protected industries 
and was strongly marked by nationalistic sentiment. Today, however, it is 
largely in the process of liberalization, which can be measured by the 
relaxation of market access and ownership and control. While bilateral air 
services agreements are the principal instruments for liberalizing international 
air transport, regional approaches have also emerged in most parts of the 
world.  
Thus far, progress on regional liberalization has been slower in 
Northeast Asia than other regions, particularly Southeast Asia, where 
substantial progress has been achieved. Although the aero-political 
calculations that impede liberalization are commonplace all over the world, 
this impediment is more severely entrenched in Northeast Asia in addition to 
non-aviation-related barriers. However, there are ample arguments in favor of 
Northeast Asian open skies and telltale signs of positive changes. Furthermore, 
the airline industry itself is pushing for Northeast Asian open skies. 
In essence, this thesis investigates the legal and policy aspects of air 
transport liberalization in the Northeast Asian market and prescribes solutions 
for Northeast Asian open skies. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to Northeast Asian Open Skies 
 
1.1 Overview 
International air transport is currently undergoing a regulatory 
transformation. From its birth at the beginning of the 20th century, the airline 
industry was tightly regulated by governments with a strong tradition of 
protectionism. In the past few decades, however, protectionism in the airline 
industry has steadily declined, giving way to a new era of regulation. Indeed, 
the airline industry is largely in the process of liberalization. 
Although ―liberalization‖ can be used in various fields, economic 
liberalization is the most common application of the term and a focal area of 
this study. Economic liberalization generally refers to fewer government 
regulations on the economy, allowing for greater participation by private 
entities.
1
 Thus, it can be measured in terms of policy changes that increase the 
scope of the market for allocating goods and services.
2
  
Liberalization in international air transport can be measured by the level 
of relaxation of the two main legal hurdles: 1) market access and 2) ownership 
and control restrictions. Removing these two legal hurdles lies at the heart of 
any meaningful policy of liberalizing international air transport services.
3
 
                                           
1
 For more detailed explanation, see Mehmet Odekon, Encyclopedia of World Poverty 
(Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2006) at 292 (noting that ―ECONOMIC 
LIBERLIZATION refers to the removal of both price and non-price barriers to the functioning 
of markets in the economy. In a liberalized economy, decisions are made in and by the markets, 
as dictated by free market forces, that is, supply and demand conditions. The idea behind 
support of economic liberalization is that in an economy where all the markets (output, input, 
financial, and external) are liberalized, prices set by supply and demand reflect the true 
resource and opportunity costs of factors of production and allocate resources in the most 
efficient way, providing the most effective and efficient solution to the problem of scarcity.‖). 
2
 Francesco Giavazzi & Guido Tabellini, ―Economic and Political Liberalizations‖ (2005) 52 
Journal of Monetary Economics 1297 at 1300. 
3
 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, ―Prospects for a Single Aviation Market in Southeast Asia‖ (2009) 34 
2 
Broadly, if a state embarks on market access relaxation, it would remove or 
reduce the hurdles that curtail the ability of other states‘ airlines to operate in 
its markets. On its part, ownership and control relaxation entails that state 
loosening restrictions on foreigners‘ participation in its airlines.   
Historically, international air transport has mainly been governed by 
protectively written bilateral air services agreements with states stipulating 
mutual restrictions on market access and ownership and control. These include 
the designation of airlines by other states (which airlines and how many 
airlines may operate the agreed services), nationality requirements of 
designated airlines (ownership and control requirements), the routes which 
designated airlines are entitled to fly, frequency (caps on the number of flights 
flown over a given time period), and capacity (predetermined limits on the 
amount of passengers and/or cargo carried).
4
 (The details of these restrictions 
will be provided in Chapter 3: Market Access Issues in Northeast Asia, and 
Chapter 4: Ownership and Control Issues in Northeast Asia.) 
Over the past few decades, however, liberalization of market access and 
ownership/control restrictions for international air transport has spread over 
most of the world, with variations in style and substance. (See below section 
1.4 Economic Liberalization in International Air Transport.) Despite this, the 
bilateral approach between pairs of states remains dominant not only in rigidly 
regulated agreements but also substantially liberalized agreements. While 
bilateral air services agreements are the principal instruments for regulating 
many aspects of international air transportation, regional approaches to air 
                                                                                                              
Ann. Air & Sp. L. 253 at 267 [Tan, ―Prospects for SAM‖]. 
4
 See Isabella H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law, 9th ed. revised by 
Pablo Mendes de Leon (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2012) at 48.  
3 
transport liberalization that employ multilateral negotiation and decision-
making are emerging or have already emerged in most parts of the world. (For 
a detailed discussion, see Chapter 2: Comparative Analysis of Regional 
Liberalization Models.) 
Indeed, liberalized intra-regional air transport services are currently in 
operation in North America, Africa (divided into several sub-regions), Latin 
America, the states of the Arab League, islands in the Pacific, and the 




In Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 
implemented a substantial amount of regional liberalization.
6
 With a high 
degree of community awareness in Southeast Asia, including identity-building 
and legal institutionalization, the regional liberalization of air services has 
been negotiated in the context of ASEAN‘s larger economic integration. 
Northeast Asia, the focal area of this study, is no exception for the 
application of the regional approach to air transport liberalization. The leading 
Northeast Asian aviation powers (defined in this study as China, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea [―Korea‖ hereinafter]) entered into negotiations on regional 
liberalization in 2006. However, while there has been some progress since the 
initiative in the region, negotiations for regional liberalization have not moved 
forward as much as was expected, and as yet there has been no concrete 
discussion of a regional open skies agreement. This thesis primarily aims to 
investigate multilateral arrangements for Northeast Asian open skies. 
                                           
5
 This model, EU Single Aviation Market, is elaborated in section 2.2 The EU Single Aviation 
Market Model.  
6
 See section 2.3 The ASEAN Single Aviation Market Model. 
4 
There is no universally accepted definition for ―open skies,‖ the key 
concept in this study.
7
 In a broad sense, ―open skies‖ is a policy concept that 
calls for the liberalization of international air transport. In a legal context, 
―open skies‖ typically means an ―open skies agreement,‖ which is to say an air 
services agreement that liberalizes the rules governing international aviation 
markets and minimizes government intervention.
8
 In a more limited sense, 
―Open Skies‖ refers to the U.S. model of an open skies agreement, which 
relaxes restrictions to market access more than the typical open skies 
agreement. (This difference will be discussed below in section 1.4.3 General 
Trends of Economic Liberalization in International Air Transport.)  
For the purposes of this thesis, I distinguish the terms ―open skies‖ and 
―open skies agreement.‖ That is, ―open skies‖ means a policy concept that 
entails or promises to entail relaxing restrictions on market access and 
ownership and control, while ―open skies agreement‖ means a concrete treaty 
between states that lays out the details of air transport liberalization. The U.S. 
model of an open skies agreement will be specifically mentioned as such 
rather than calling it ―Open Skies.‖ 
Once again, relaxing restrictions on market access and ownership and 
control are the key barometers of liberalization in international air transport. In 
order to understand market access in international air transport, it is necessary 
to understand the concept of ―freedoms of the air.‖ In fact, freedoms of the air 
(the privileges that one state accords to the carriers of other states to conduct 
                                           
7
 Jason Bonin noted that even Brian Havel‘s influential book Beyond Open Skies does not 
provide a definition for ―open skies.‖ See Jason R. Bonin, International Air Transport 
Liberalization in East Asia: A Regional Approach to Reform (Ph.D Thesis, National 
University of Singapore, 2013) [unpublished] at 8. 
8
 Charles E. Schlumberger, Open Skies for Africa Implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision 
(Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2010) at 6. 
5 
activities over that state‘s sovereign airspace)9 are frequently referred to in 
international air transport. The nine freedoms of the air are illustrated as below: 
 
Figure 1-1 The Nine Freedoms of the Air
10
 
                                           
9
 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, ―Liberalizing Aviation in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Impact of the EU 
Horizontal Mandate‖ (2006) 31 Air & Sp. L. 432 at 433 [Tan, ―Horizontal Mandate‖].  
10
 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Manual on the Regulation of 
International Air Transport, ICAO Doc. 9626 (2nd ed. 2004) at 4. [ICAO, ―Regulation‖]; The 
first five freedoms have their origins in the International Air Transport Agreement 1944 and 
the International Air Services Transit Agreement 1944. The rest of the freedoms (the sixth 
freedom to the ninth freedom) are not based in international instruments; however, they are 
well-established concepts in practice, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
6 
1st Freedom - For the aircraft of State A to overfly the territory of State 
B; 
2nd Freedom - For the aircraft of State A to make technical stops in the 
territory of State B; 
3rd Freedom - For the aircraft of State A to embark passengers and 
cargo in State A and disembark them in State B; 
4th Freedom - For the aircraft of State A to embark passengers and cargo 
in State B and disembark them in State A; 
5th Freedom - For the aircraft of State A, from a service originating in 
State A, to embark passengers and cargo in State B and disembark them 
in State C; 
6th Freedom - For the aircraft of State A to embark passengers and cargo 
in State B, reroute them through State A, and disembark them in State C 
(this is essentially a combination of 3rd–4th freedoms); 
7th Freedom - For the aircraft of State A to embark and disembark 
passengers and cargo between State B and State C without a stop in 
State A; 
8th Freedom - For the aircraft of State A, from a service originating in 
State A, to embark passengers and cargo in State B and disembark them 
in another point in State B (consecutive cabotage); 
9th Freedom - For the aircraft of State A, from a service originating in 
State B, to embark and disembark passengers and cargo between two 
points within State B (stand-alone cabotage).
11
 
                                                                                                              
characterizes these freedoms as so-called.  
11
 Bonin, supra note 7 at 81-85.  
7 
While the first five freedoms have their origins in international 
instruments
12
 adopted at the International Civil Aviation Conference in 1944 
(Chicago Conference), the rest of the freedoms (the sixth freedom to the ninth 
freedom) were developed outside of international instruments. Nevertheless, 
they are well-established concepts in practice. In 1944, a year before the end 
of World War II, states gathered in Chicago to discuss the principles and 
methods to be followed for the adoption of a new aviation convention.
13
 As a 
consequence, the Chicago Conference of 1944 successfully adopted an 
overarching treaty for international air law, the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), which also created the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
Nonetheless, states failed to agree on how to govern the multilateral 
exchange of commercial rights (i.e. the third freedom onwards) for 
international air transport. The most noticeable conflict of interests occurred 
between the U.S., which favored maximum flexibility and minimal regulation 
of air transport, and the U.K., which wished to protect its vast colonial air 
spaces all around the globe.
14
 Michael Milde notes the rationale for the 
difference: 
 
The United States developed during the war mammoth industrial 
capacity to build large bomber aircraft—a technology easily convertible 
to civilian use; the United Kingdom‘s industry produced efficient fighter 
                                           
12
 Namely, International Air Services Transit Agreement, signed at Chicago, 7 December 
1944; International Air Transport Agreement, signed at Chicago, 7 December 1944. 
13
 See Proceedings of the International Conference on Civil Aviation, Chicago, 1 November – 
7 December 1944 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1948) vol. I 
at 11-13. [U.S. Dept. of State, ―Proceedings‖].  
14
 Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO, 2d ed. (Utrecht: Eleven International 
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aircraft but lagged behind in the production of large air transport 





Much of the Chicago Conference turned on the question of whether 
states would allow each other some or the entire first ―five freedoms.‖16 Not 
surprisingly, American negotiators called for a multilateral granting of all five 
freedoms without restrictions.
17
 The multilateral system desired by the US, if 
approved, would have allowed US carriers to fly between two international 
points outside the US on services originating in the US with no limitations on 
capacity. This would provide US carriers with unlimited access to foreign 




Moreover, U.S. carriers had gained control of almost 72 percent of 
global air commerce with their technological expertise, while British carriers 
only had control of about 12 percent of the market, and much of European 
manufacturing infrastructure had been destroyed by the war.
19
 Due in large 
part to the frightening prospect of unrestrained competition with the dominant 
U.S. carriers on international routes, participants in the Chicago Conference 
were unable to reach a meaningful compromise on economic regulatory 
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 This is illustrated by Article 6 of the Chicago Convention, which 
confirms that there is no universal freedom of international air transport and 
that ―special permission or other authorization‖ is required for international air 
transport. 
 
Article 6 – Scheduled Air Services 
No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the 
territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or 
other authorization of that State, and in accordance with the terms of 
such permission or authorization. 
 
Article 6 of the Chicago Convention prohibits scheduled international air 
service operations ―over‖ or ―into‖ the territory of a contracting state. This 
means that the Convention does not even permit the first freedom—the 
freedom of overflight, which does not grant any commercial rights—not to 
mention all the commercial rights beginning with the third freedom. Instead, 
the Chicago Conference adopted two instruments dealing with the exchange of 
traffic rights: the International Air Services Transit Agreement and the 
International Air Services Transport Agreement (discussed in the next section 
1.2 Multilateral Air Law Treaties). 
After the states attending the Chicago Conference failed to agree upon a 
comprehensive multilateral solution to economic regulation of the 
international civil aviation industry, it became clear that bilateral negotiations 
between individual states were the only viable option for determining route 
                                           
20
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assignments, frequencies, capacities, and fares.
21
 Indeed, all commercial 
rights for international air transport since 1944 have been negotiated largely 
on a bilateral basis. It is worth noting that although the bilateral method of 
exchange was not rooted in the Chicago Convention, one of the collateral 
resolutions adopted in the Chicago Conference, Resolution VIII Standard 
Form of Agreement for Provisional Air Routes, recommended a model 




More importantly, the U.S. and the U.K. succeeded in reaching a 
bilateral agreement acceptable to both in 1946 in Bermuda despite their vastly 
different views on economic air transport at the Chicago Conference.
23
 This 
protectively written bilateral air services agreement between the U.S. and the 
U.K., the so-called Bermuda type 1 agreement, became the prototype for many 
bilateral air transport agreements throughout the world.
24
 
In the early 1990s, a new perspective on bilateral air services agreements 
was introduced through the so-called open skies agreements. The pioneering 
agreement was concluded between the U.S. and the Netherlands in 1992. The 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) identified the basic elements that 
constitute the essential components of open skies bilateral air transport 
agreements. These are, inter alia, 1) open entry on all routes, 2) unrestricted 
capacity and frequency on all routes, and 3) unrestricted route and traffic 
rights, that is, the right to operate service between any points including no 
restrictions on intermediate and beyond points, or the right to carry fifth 
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 In essence, the US open skies model promised unlimited 
economic rights, i.e. the third, fourth and fifth freedoms. Since 1992, more 
states have started to change their aviation policies from a protectionist to a 
more liberalized stance, although the changes have still arisen mostly from 
bilateral agreements. 
Along with market access liberalization, relaxation of ownership and 
control requirements is the other significant legal hurdle for air transport 
liberalization. The ownership and control restriction is the traditional 
requirement that an airline must be substantially owned and effectively 
controlled by nationals of the state which designates it for international air 
transport and under whose flag the airline is operated.
26
 In other words, 
foreign ownership in an airline designated by a particular state is restricted, 
typically to less than 50% ownership (These issues are elaborated upon in 
Chapter 4: Ownership and Control Issues in Northeast Asia.) 
While some of the more liberalized approaches have been introduced, 
e.g. the principal place of business/incorporation formula 27  and effective 
regulatory control,
28
 traditional ownership and control restrictions are still 
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firmly entrenched in national laws as well as in most air services agreements. 
One response to these rigid governmental regulations has been airline alliances, 
which were formed in part to maximize airlines‘ business opportunities. In an 
industry in which mergers are often difficult because of ownership and control 
restrictions, alliances are a suboptimal choice that airlines resort to. (For a 
detailed discussion, see Chapter 5: Airline Alliances in Northeast Asia.) 
In the context of regional liberalization, the concept of ―community 
carrier‖ has been developed (such as in the E.U. and ASEAN). This concept 
means that ownership and control of air carriers in the member states of a 
given community no longer necessarily mean national ownership and control, 
but instead have been redefined as community ownership and control.
29
 (This 
will be further discussed in Chapter 2: Comparative Analysis of Regional 
Liberalization Models.) 
While many regional liberalization models have substantially relaxed 
market access or ownership and control restrictions (or both) in various 
ways,
30
 no meaningful progress has been made in Northeast Asia on a 
regional approach to liberalization, except some liberalization of market 
access via bilateral air services agreements. This is regrettable, since Northeast 
Asia has tremendous potential for regional liberalization. For instance, the 
Centre for Aviation (CAPA) has estimated that opening up regional markets in 
China, Japan, and Korea would have the potential for incremental growth of 
300 million short-haul passengers.
31
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In fact, Northeast Asia is one of the few regions where a stable, 
developed economy co-exists with enormous potential for further growth. 
Although the level of political tensions among the three states – China, Japan 
and Korea - fluctuates, they regard each other as important economic partners 
and share the goal of promoting peace and common prosperity in the region.
32
 
Hence, negotiations for regional liberalization will and must continue. There 
have been two suggestions for how to approach Northeast Asian open skies: 
the bilateral approach and the trilateral approach.
33
 The bilateral approach 
emphasizes bilateral air services agreements between countries in the region. 
In other words, this involves establishing three bilateral open skies agreements 
between China and Korea, Korea and Japan, and Japan and China.
34
 Notably, 
this bilateral approach would only focus on easing market access. 
The trilateral approach involves taking gradual steps to create Northeast 
Asian open skies among the three countries negotiating together. Here, 
attention should be drawn to several principles that the other regional 
liberalization models teach about market access relaxation: i) cargo services 
are more easily liberalized than passenger services; ii) third and fourth 
freedom flights can be liberalized stage by stage, first allowing limited 
designated points, then capital cities, and finally unlimited designated points; 
and iii) rights for fifth freedom flights and beyond are typically discussed only 
after third and fourth freedom flights have been established.  
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Liberalizing ownership and control restrictions can be discussed as a 
final step to form Northeast Asian open skies. Alternately, ownership and 
control reform could precede or otherwise be tied to the earlier stages of 
market access reform.
35
 It is noteworthy that ASEAN adopted the community 
carrier concept in the 2009 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air Services 
by relaxing traditional ownership and control restrictions before fully 
liberalizing market access. 
All these steps require a concrete timeline and robust framework. 
Interestingly, China, Japan and Korea signed and ratified the Agreement on 
the Establishment of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) in 2010, and 
TCS was officially inaugurated in 2011. Ideally, TCS could provide a 
framework for regional liberalization of air transport in Northeast Asia. (This 
will be discussed in Chapter 6: Towards Northeast Asian Open Skies.) 
Regional liberalization proceeds slowly even when one member state of 
the region fails to join an agreement. If that member state happens to be an 
important regional player, the impact is even more substantial.
36
 However, 
this deadlock can be mitigated by airline-led liberalization. Indeed, a potential 
game changer in Northeast Asian open skies is the airline industry. This is 
because air carriers themselves can have a considerable impact on 
liberalization, particularly by means of alliances. (This will be dealt with in 
Chapter 5: Airline Alliances in Northeast Asia.) 
If all the states but one have concluded open skies agreements in the 
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relevant market and if furthermore, business activities among their national 
carriers have enjoyed antitrust immunity to the level of integrated joint 
ventures, the remaining party that has yet to join regional liberalization will be 
comparatively isolated, and their national carriers will be placed at a 
substantial disadvantage. 
The scenario described above may become a reality in Northeast Asia if 
China continues to protect its air transport market. Korea, Japan, and the U.S. 
have concluded open skies agreements, and, more importantly, their national 
air carriers have received antitrust immunity for co-operation among 
themselves. China, on the contrary, has not concluded any open skies 
agreement with the three states, thus preventing any Chinese carrier from 
receiving antitrust immunity. Actively providing airline alliances with antitrust 
immunity could eventually lead to a breakthrough in discussions about 
Northeast Asian open skies. This will form the basis of analysis in Chapter 5: 
Airline Alliances in Northeast Asia. 
As a background, this thesis will first review the history of economic 
regulation of international air transport. 
 
1.2 Multilateral Air Law Treaties 
Air law is a legal area known for its rapid development. Given that the 
first controlled and powered airplane took to the air around the turn of the 20
th
 
century, the real history of air law spans less than 120 years. To be sure, 
scholarly discussion about air law predated this, including the seminal work 
De Jure Principis Aereo in 1687, which argued that the air belongs to 
16 
everyone but reserves special rights for rulers.
37
 
However, until human flight became subject to some degree of control, 
there was little need for legal regulation.
38
 The complex relationship of 
conflicting interests that air law must deal with only started to become 
apparent in the twentieth century. As long-haul (and therefore trans-boundary) 
carriage became feasible and common, the need for international air law 
became evident. 
The first multilateral attempt to make laws for international aviation was 
the Paris Conference of 1910, which laid the foundation for the Convention 
Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (the Paris Convention of 
1919),
39
 the first multilateral public air law treaty. A few years later, the First 
International Conference on Air Law established the Comitè International 
Technique d‘Experts Juridiques Aeriens (CITEJA) in 1925, and the CITEJA‘s 
proposal was adopted during the Second Conference on Private Air Law in 
Warsaw, Poland, in 1929. This was the Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (the Warsaw 
Convention), the first multilateral private air law treaty and the predecessor of 
the current Montreal Convention of 1999.
40
 
While World War II was still raging on the European and Pacific fronts, 
the allies were earnestly preparing for their peacetime needs, and regulating 
postwar air transport was perceived to be an urgent priority.
41
 Accordingly, 
the International Civil Aviation Conference was held in Chicago in 1944, 
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producing the Chicago Convention. The Chicago Convention set forth the 
fundamental principles of international civil aviation and established the 
ICAO, a specialized agency of the United Nations. The ICAO began 
operations in 1947, when the Chicago Convention entered into force. Since 
then, the ICAO has developed extensive rules for international law related to 
aviation. Major multilateral air law treaties that the ICAO has sponsored can 
be broadly categorized as shown in the diagram below: 
 
 
Figure 1-2 Major Multilateral Air Law Treaties
42
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Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention 1944); Convention on 
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18 
Generally, states have demonstrated their willingness to comply with the 
rules of international law, as evidenced by the large number of contracting 
states to these air law treaties.
43
 Indeed, international air law is recognized as 
a field of international law in which states find it relatively easy to cooperate 
and coordinate.
44
 Considering the international and foreign nature
45
 of air 
transport, coordination is logically necessary. Coordinating through 




However, two kinds of multilateral air law treaties have not received 
strong support from most states: economic air transport treaties and third party 
liability treaties (see Figure 1-2). In the area of third party liability (treaties 
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dealing with how to provide compensation for damage – physical damage 
caused by an aircraft or parts thereof on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in 
flight), the Rome Convention of 1952 and the Montreal Protocol of 1978 are 
considered lame treaties since only 49 member states and 12 member states 
have ratified them, respectively (none of which have a strong presence in 
international air transportation).
47
 While two more third party liability 
treaties
48
 were adopted in 2009, they have not received much support from 




One fundamental reason why states have showed little enthusiasm for 
third-party liability treaties is the common understanding that the damage in 
question is governed by the law of the state where the damage occurred (lex 
loci damni), which makes it easy to establish the applicable law or 
jurisdiction.
50
 In other words, most states believe that there is little need, if 
any, to establish international air law governing third-party liability since their 
domestic laws can adequately deal with the issue. 
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The lack of interest in the economic air transport treaties, however, 
cannot be explained by this rationale. Economic air transport treaties entail 
granting the airlines of each state party the privilege of carrying passengers, 
cargo, or a combination of both to, from, over, and beyond their respective 
territories.
51
 In this area, robust international coordination between states is 
required for international air transport. As noted above, although state 
representatives at the Chicago Conference in 1944 had sought to include the 
area of economic air transport within the Chicago Convention itself, they 
could not reach agreement about the scope of the freedoms of the air. 
Instead, states at the Chicago Conference adopted two separate and 
distinct instruments (as mentioned above): the International Air Services 
Transit Agreement (often called the ―Transit Agreement‖ or ―two freedoms 
agreement‖) and the International Air Services Transport Agreement (also 
called the ―Transport Agreement‖ or ―five freedoms agreement‖). Since the 
Transit Agreement does not grant any commercial rights (only dealing with the 
freedoms of overflight (the first freedom) and technical landing (the second 
freedom)), the number of contracting states is relatively high: 130 states.
52
  
On the other hand, the number of contracting states to the Transport 
Agreement (dealing with the first five freedoms) is just 11,
53
 meaning that the 
Transport Agreement has had little practical significance. The unpopularity of 
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the Transport Agreement has had to do with the economic protectionism that 
the majority of states have practiced to shield their airlines from competition. 
More specifically, the inclusion of the fifth freedom was the fundamental 
reason why a majority of states never accepted the Transport Agreement. The 
failure of the Transport Agreement proved that states are naturally reluctant to 
grant the fifth freedom to other states in a multilateral fashion, as doing so 
would subject their own carriers and protected markets to more competition. 
China, Japan, and Korea are not that different from the majority trend. 
All three are parties to most major multilateral air law treaties except the 
economic air transport treaties and the third party liability treaties. One 
noteworthy fact is that Japan and Korea are contracting parties to the Transit 
Agreement, while China is not. Indeed, the fact that some of the largest states, 
including China, are not parties to the agreement has been pointed out as one 
of its major defects.
54
 
Together with the Transport Agreement, the ICAO has made several 
other attempts to initiate global multilateral governance of economic air 
transport.
55
 However, it has yet to create international rules that a majority of 
countries are willing to adopt related to economic air transport. This prompts 
the question of why the area of economic air transport is exceptional compared 
to other areas of multilateral air law despite the clear need for international 
coordination and cooperation. This question—one of the key questions of this 
thesis—will be discussed in the following section. 
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1.3 Exceptionalism in Economic Air Transport 
1.3.1 Historical Background 
Discussion at the Chicago Conference in 1944 focused, among other 
things, on how states could reach a multilateral agreement on the safety and 
economics of international civil aviation.
56
 While a multilateral agreement of 
this sort was achieved in the area of safety, the Chicago Conference failed to 
reach a consensus on a multilateral means of economic regulation with regard 
to the commercial aspects of international air transport. Article 6 of the 
Chicago Convention made it clear that granting traffic rights was contingent 
on special permission or other authorization by the partner state, inducing 
states to deal with those aspects primarily through bilateral air services 
agreements. 
As noted, the vast divide between the positions of liberalized and 
protectionist advocates was the primary reason, but not the only reason, for 
this failure. The short timeframe of the Chicago Conference is believed to be 
another important reason why the economic aspect was not included in the 
Chicago Convention. The Chicago Conference took place between November 
1, 1944, and December 7, 1944, and the Chicago Convention was successfully 
adopted during this time. Considering that the Chicago Conference essentially 
had to create everything from scratch (that is, there were no preliminary 
meetings, no draft convention,
57
 and no Secretariat to prepare for the 
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conference), it is remarkable that such a comprehensive convention could have 
been adopted in such a short period. 
Indeed, the Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference 
(1944) reveal the frustration felt by delegates as they concluded the protracted 
discussions about the economic sphere of international civil aviation.
58
 
Considering the deadlock that would have been impossible to overcome in the 
available time, adopting the Transit Agreement and the Transport Agreement 
separately from the Chicago Convention was a skillful ―way out‖ of the 
impasse.
59
 However, as noted above, the Transport Agreement has been a 
failure, with only 11 contracting states. Even the U.S., a proponent of the 
agreement during the Chicago Conference, withdrew from it in 1946.
60
 The 
U.S. concluded at an early stage that poor adoption of the Transport 




In 1946, American and British negotiators met in Bermuda in an attempt 
to reconcile their respective aviation policies and succeeded in reaching a 
compromise, the so-called Bermuda I agreement.
62
 This agreement was 
important not only because it represented a compromise between the two most 
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important aviation powers of the time, but also because it served as a 
precedent for the subsequent agreements made by many other countries.
63
 
Following the failure in Chicago and the success in Bermuda, the bilateral 
treaty became regarded as the principal diplomatic and political vehicle for the 
exchange of traffic rights.
64
 Reportedly, more than 4,000 bilateral air services 




1.3.2 ICAO or WTO: Institutional Problems? 
The ICAO has tried to regain its leadership role in the economic aspects 
of international air transport. Since the late 1970s, when ―deregulation‖ and 
―liberalization‖ became key words in the area of international air transport (a 
topic that will be discussed in the next section: 1.4 Economic Liberalization), 
the ICAO has held six Air Transport Conferences: in 1977, 1980, 1985, 1994, 
2003 and 2013. While these conferences addressed then-pending issues and 
proposed necessary guidelines,
66
 they were nothing more than forums for 
discussion and information sharing. 
A significant point is that the ICAO does not possess any regulatory 
authority with respect to economic air transport (unlike its strong mandate in 
the field of air navigation and technical matters), and therefore it cannot do 
more than provide a forum for debate and draft guidance materials without any 
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However, the reason why economic air transport is an exception in 
multilateral air law governance cannot be explained in institutional terms 
alone. That is to say, it is not because ICAO lacks regulatory authority. There 
was a new opportunity in the 1990s with the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) under the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, the 
WTO has confirmed that WTO law will not revoke or otherwise affect 




There are four reasons why coverage of air transport services was 
avoided when GATS was finalized in 1994. First, the Uruguay Round 
negotiators understood that international air transport was governed by an 
intricate system of bilateral agreements that was based on a balanced and 
reciprocal exchange of rights between states.
69
 Second, the principles of non-
discrimination under the WTO system (unconditional mandatory most-favored 
nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment) contrasted with the existing 
bilateralism in air transport based on bilateral reciprocity, and it was widely 
held at the time that putting MFN into place could hold back the ongoing 
process of liberalization of air transport between like-minded states.
70
 Third, 
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neither states nor national airlines wished to see a dual regulatory regime 
emerge for air traffic rights, in which some states applied the GATS 
obligations while others held to existing bilateral arrangements.
71
 Fourth, it 
was the general view that, if new trade concepts were to be applied to air 
transport, the ICAO was best qualified to pursue this—in other words, that 
aviation rather than trade interests should continue to play the predominant 
role at the state level.
72
 
In short, the WTO conceded that the ICAO is the organization that 
should lead the multilateral approach to international air transport. This 
conclusion unavoidably faces the harsh reality that the ICAO does not possess 
any regulatory authority over the economic aspects of air transport. 
Multilateralism has not failed because of uncertainty about which 
institution should be responsible for it. States want to keep control of and 
remain flexible in the political and economic policy-making process so long as 
such decisions do not violate legal or moral principles (jus cogens, for 
example). In addition, a multilateral approach could lead states to surrender 
their negotiating positions without the freedom to differentiate their approach 




1.3.3. Nationalism  
It is not uncommon for governments to want to protect their national 
airlines, and each time they negotiate air services agreements with other states, 
they calculate what their national airlines stand to gain or lose. In the view of 
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 See Tan, ―Horizontal Mandate‖, supra note 9 at 438-439. 
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Peter Forsyth, the traditional approach to air services negotiation has been 
steeped in mercantilist notions; negotiations were excessively airline-centric, 
and little attention was given to the passenger.
74
 
 Close links between airlines and aviation authorities are nothing new or 
unusual.
75
 Since airlines are large, labor-intensive employers and can generate 
large profits (and tax revenues), governments are tempted to continue 
shielding them from competition, particularly when they regard foreign 
carriers as being more competitive.
76
 In recent years, a number of countries 
seem increasingly willing to remove bilateral restrictions and thereby expose 
national airlines to greater competition.
77
 Yet protectionism still prevails in 
the aviation market. 
Arguments grounded in national security are still made to justify 
protectionism although the weight of such arguments has decreased 
dramatically since the post-war period. A more substantial reason, which 
cannot be fully justified economically, is nationalism, or the sentimental 
attachment to national air carriers. In many cases, the biggest and oldest air 
carrier in each country is named after its home country,
78
 and flag carriers 
have long been symbols of national pride, especially in developing countries.
79
 
Michael Paris observed the deeply rooted nationalism in aviation in his 
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 To name a few, Air France, British Airways, Air Canada, American Airlines, Singapore 
Airlines, Korean Air, Japan Airlines, Air China, Air India, Thai Air, Malaysian Airlines, Qatar 
Airways, and Air New Zealand. 
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book From the Wright Brothers to Top Gun: Aviation, Nationalism and 
Popular Cinema: 
 
The development of an aviation industry… and the founding of national 
airlines all played their part in promoting a positive and technologically 
dynamic image of the state: an important means of enhancing national 
prestige and status… Aeronautical progress was one means by which the 
state could demonstrate progress and achievement, a way of fostering 




Although the extent of the sentimental attachment to national air carriers 
has been diminishing in a more globalized society, it has not disappeared 
entirely. This notion plays an important role in states‘ preference for bilateral 
regulation in international air transport since bilateral regulation enables states 
to control the level of competition that their national carriers will face. 
None of the Northeast Asian aviation powers are exceptions to the 
sentimental attachment to national air carriers. Though the degree of this 
attachment differs and change has been occurring in recent years (see Chapter 
3), China, Japan, and Korea have been accused of using aviation policy to 
protect their national carriers.
81
 In particular, China‘s special treatment of Air 
China is no secret. As Peter Harbison, chairman of the Centre for Aviation, 
                                           
80
 Michael Paris, From the Wright Brothers to Top Gun: Aviation, Nationalism, and Popular 
Cinema (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) at 88. 
81
 Although it cannot be characterized reasonably as contemporary, see e.g. Tae Hoon Oum & 
Yeong Heok Lee, ―The Northeast Asian Air Transport Network: Is There a Possibility of 
Creating Open Skies in the Region?‖ (2002) 8 J. Air Trans. Man. 325 at 327 (noting that ―[t]he 
Japanese government‘s overriding concern is in protecting its flag carriers from competition‖ 
and at 328 ―(For Koreans) the need to adopt a more liberal approach towards foreign carriers 
clashes with the current needs to look after the short-term interests of its flag carriers.‖). 
29 




This favoritism was also confirmed by Li Jiaxiang, Vice-Minister and 
Deputy Secretary of the Leading Party Group of the Ministry of Transport and 
Director of the General Administration of Civil Aviation, a very influential 
aviation policymaker in China.
83
 Li Jiaxiang candidly explained his dream of 
transforming Air China into an ―international mega carrier‖ in his 2008 book 
Route to Fly.
84
 In the book, he argues that the banner of open skies—―equal 
competition, equal treatment and equal benefits‖—actually disguises a reality 
of unfairness, inequality and disproportional benefits.
85
 In the same vein, Li 
implies his approval of protectionism for Chinese national carriers.
86
  
Regardless of whether it is intended to support liberalization or 
protectionism, all regulation involves regulatory process, regulatory structure 
and regulatory content.
87
 It is undisputed that regulatory content, or the 
particular matters that are being regulated, has been considerably changing 
over the past two decades. Though these changes differ in style and substance, 
air transport liberalization has spread all over the world. Indeed, the relevant 
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1.4 Economic Liberalization in International Air Transport 
1.4.1 Scope: Relaxation of “Market Access” and “Ownership and 
 Control” Restrictions 
As noted, liberalization is a complex concept that is commonly used in 
various fields. In the context of international air transport, liberalization can be 
measured by the level of relaxation of the two main legal hurdles: 1) market 
access and 2) ownership and control restrictions. 
The Chicago Convention 1944 recognizes that each state has complete 
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and that states 
can therefore impose limitations on the flight of foreign aircraft through their 
airspace.
89
 Although the freedoms of the air are frequently referred to in 
international air transport, none of these freedoms are genuinely free. The 
following example may better illustrate the characteristics of these freedoms. 
Assume that Korean Air (KE) wishes to carry passengers from Seoul to 
Los Angeles. To take advantage of the most efficient route, KE aircraft will 
need to operate over Japan. In most cases, KE aircraft will simply fly over 
Japan without landing (first freedom). Sometimes, KE aircraft may stop in 
Tokyo for the purpose of refueling or maintenance (second freedom). Since 
both Korea and Japan are contracting parties to the Transit Agreement (two 
freedoms agreement), Korea (the state with which Korean Air is registered) 
does not have to ask Japan for permission for overflights or technical landings. 
If Korean Air wishes to fly to Paris from Seoul and operates over China, 
however, Korea has to seek permission from China through a bilateral 
agreement since China is not a contracting party to the Transit Agreement. 
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The freedoms of the air that are commercial in nature start with the third 
freedom. Returning to our example, once the KE aircraft arrives in Los 
Angeles, Korean Air will want to disembark its passengers (third freedom). 
The third freedom by itself would be economically impractical if the aircraft 
were to return home empty.
90
 Thus, Korean Air will want to embark 
passengers destined for Seoul in Los Angeles (fourth freedom). The third and 
fourth freedoms are governed by a bilateral air services agreement between 
Korea and the U.S. If Korean Air wishes to carry passengers from Tokyo to 
Los Angeles and vice versa, it will require additional permission (fifth 
freedom) from all states concerned: Korea, Japan, and the U.S. through a 
series of bilateral agreements. 
Hence, the freedoms of the air can only become genuinely free through 
liberal bilateral (or regional) air services agreements, which open up the 
airspace of the parties concerned to the operation of international air services 
by the carriers of other states.
91
 The level of openness in the international air 
services agreements determines the level of market access. 
Broadly speaking, protective air services agreements allow limited 
third/fourth freedom flights (direct flights between the home country and a 
foreign country by national air carriers of the home country) for passengers 
and cargo while liberalized air services agreements allow unlimited 
third/fourth freedom flights for passengers and cargo. Some liberalized air 
services agreements allow unlimited fifth freedom flights (flights between two 
foreign countries by national air carriers originating in their home country). 
A simple comparison of the number of flights and operating airlines in 
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capital cities in Northeast Asia can hint at the different output resulting from 
the level of openness in international air services agreements. For instance, 
during the second week of June 2015, seven different airlines operated 374 
passenger flights per week on the route between Seoul (Incheon Airport and 
Gimpo Airport) and Tokyo (Narita Airport and Haneda Airport) while four 
different airlines operated only 176 passenger flights per week on the route 
between Seoul (Incheon Airport and Gimpo Airport) and Beijing (Beijing 
Capital Airport).
92
 This is largely due to the fact that Japan and Korea 
concluded a liberalized air services agreement while the air services agreement 
between China and Korea is a protective one which limits the number of 
third/fourth freedom flights. 
The other base on which liberalization rests is relaxing ownership and 
control restrictions. Essentially, ownership and control restrictions are 
embedded in the forms of an ―internal lock‖ (domestic law) as well as an 
―external lock‖ (air services agreements).93 To be specific, the internal lock is 
each country‘s domestic legislation requiring national ownership and control 
of its air carriers while the external lock is the nationality clause included in all 
air services agreements.
94
 The most common form of restriction relates to the 
―substantial ownership and effective control‖ nationality clause that 
commonly appears in bilateral air services agreements. This clause mandates 
that the majority ownership in an airline must reside in the nationals of the 
state designating that airline (This issue will be discussed in Chapter 4: 
Ownership and Control Issues in Northeast Asia.) 
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Such restrictions have their origins in U.S. domestic law. The U.S. Air 
Commerce Act of 1926 became the first law to require that 51% of voting 
stock at U.S. air carriers be held by U.S. citizens and that 66% of the members 
of the board of directors be U.S. citizens. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 
increased from 51% to 75% the amount of an airline's voting stock that must 
be in the hands of U.S. nationals for the carrier to qualify as a U.S. operator. 
The 25% cap on foreign voting equity in U.S. airlines is still in effect today.95 
The U.S. government has explained that there are four main reasons why 
it has limited ownership and control of its airlines to American citizens: the 
need to protect the fledgling U.S. airline industry, the desire to regulate 
international air services through bilateral agreements, safety concerns about 
foreign aircraft gaining access to U.S. airspace, and military reliance on 
civilian airlines to supplement airlift capacity.
96
  
The issue of ownership and control restrictions was first raised in 
multilateral discussions during the Chicago Conference.97 Wanting to block 
enemy states (principally Germany) from establishing airlines in Latin 
America to operate into U.S. airspace, U.S. officials sought the right to 
prohibit carriers from operating when their substantial ownership and effective 
control raised questions of a political nature or threatened national security.98 
Although these restrictions were not included in the Chicago Convention, they 
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were articulated in both the Transit Agreement and the Transport Agreement 
as follows:  
 
Each contracting State reserves the right to withhold or revoke a 
certificate or permit to an air transport enterprise of another State in 
any case where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and 
effective control are vested in nationals of a contracting State, or in 
case of failure of such air transport enterprise to comply with the laws 
of the State over which it operates, or to perform its obligations under 
this Agreement.99 
 
More importantly, states started to require the ownership and control 
restrictions based on the above provision in each of their bilateral air services 
agreements.
100
 Indeed, the first bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the 
U.K. in 1946 (Bermuda type 1 Agreement) included language about the 
substantial ownership and effective control of air carriers.101 A majority of 
states have viewed the Bermuda type 1 as the standard bilateral air services 
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In recent times, attempts have been made to liberalize ownership and 
control restrictions. Broadly, the new developments can be divided into four 
categories: 1) multilateral/plurilateral regulatory reform, 2) regional reform, 3) 
bilateral preferential concessions, and 4) unilateral (and voluntary) relaxation. 
(These issues are thoroughly discussed in Chapter 4.) 
Ownership and control restrictions are intertwined with market access 
restrictions. States, however, do not necessarily coordinate their positions on 
these two legal pivots. For example, although the U.S. has been proactive in 
liberalizing market access both multilaterally and bilaterally, U.S. domestic 
law contains stricter ownership rules (75% of voting stock owned by nationals) 
than most states (51% owned by nationals), and the traditional ownership and 





1.4.2 Economic Impact of Air Transport Liberalization 
Liberalization has often entailed deregulation, especially the reduction 
of state ownership (privatization) and of structural controls.
104
 Empirical 
research has shown that, in many industries, deregulation leads to lower prices 
for consumers, higher quality of service, and greater access to services, 
including greater adoption by consumers, in part due to increased competition 
among providers, lower prices and higher levels of investment.
105
 In the same 
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vein, a large body of research has shown that liberalizing air transport has a 
considerable positive impact on the economy.
106
 
In a nutshell, liberalization of air transport has generally fostered 
greater competition, resulting in lower fares for travelers, more people 
traveling, more choices in airlines and routes for passengers, and improved 
services levels (e.g. higher frequencies).
107
 As to the impact on the wider 
economy, liberalization leads to increased air service levels and lower fares 
(which in turn boost the volume of traffic).
108
 This can bring about increased 
economic growth and employment as illustrated below.
109
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―Aviation Sector: additional economic activity in the aviation sector is generated by the 
servicing, management and maintenance of the additional air services. This includes 
activities at airlines, airports, air navigation and other businesses that support the 
aviation sector. The impact can ‗spin-off‘ into the wider economy (called indirect or 
multiplier impacts) – e.g., food wholesalers that supply food for catering on flights, 
trucking companies that move goods to and from the airport, refineries processing oil 
for jet fuel, etc. 
Tourism sector: air service facilitates the arrival of larger numbers of tourists to a 
region or country. This includes business as well as leisure tourists. The spending of 
these tourists can support a wide range of tourism-related businesses: hotels, 
restaurants, theaters, car rentals, etc. Of course, air service also facilitates outbound 
tourism, which can be viewed reducing the amount of money spent in an economy. 
However, even outbound tourism involves spending in the home economy, on travel 
agents, taxis, etc. In any case, it is not necessarily the case that money spent by tourists 
flying abroad would be spent on tourism at home if there were no air service. 
Catalytic impacts: also known as wider economic benefits. Air transportation facilitates 
employment and economic development in the national and regional economy through 
increased trade, attracting new businesses to the region and encouraging investment. 
Industries and activities that would otherwise not exist in a region can be attracted by 
improved air transport connectivity. In particular, catalytic effects can include some or 
all of the following: 
- Trade effects- air transport liberalization opens new markets to many businesses as a 
37 
 




1.4.3 General Trends of Air Transport Liberalization 
As seen in the first bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the U.K. in 
1946 and numerous bilateral agreements subsequently concluded, international 
air transport was once governed by protectively written bilateral air services 
agreements. The first 30 years (1946-1975) were no doubt the ones with the 
most stringent international regulation of the economics of air transport.
111
 
Since the mid-1970s, however, the air transport industry has undergone 
a remarkable degree of deregulation. 1978, in particular, was deemed the year 
of deregulation in aviation history because of the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978 in the U.S. and the first liberalized bilateral air services agreement 
between the U.S. and the Netherlands. In 1992, the first open skies agreement 
was concluded between the same two countries. 
The U.S. DOT lists eleven components that should be encompassed in 
the U.S. open skies regime: 1) open entry on all routes, 2) unrestricted 
capacity and frequency on all routes, 3) unrestricted route and traffic rights (or 
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full fifth freedom access), 4) double-disapproval pricing in third and fourth 
freedom markets, 5) liberal charter arrangements, 6) liberal cargo regimes, 7) 
conversion and remittance arrangements, 8) open code-sharing opportunities, 
9) self-handling provisions (granting a carrier the right to provide its own 
support operations), 10) pro-competitive provisions on commercial 




Notably, the U.S. model of an open skies agreement includes unlimited 
market access rights for the fifth freedom.
113
 Typically, however, air services 
agreements granting largely unrestricted market access rights to the third and 
fourth freedoms alone are already considered to be open skies agreements. 
From 1992 to 2012, more than 400 open skies agreements (which of course 
vary in their details and extent of openness) were concluded by 145 states, 
representing 76% of the ICAO membership.
114
 
Among the Northeast Asian aviation powers, Korea has been the most 
active in reaching open skies agreements. As of December 2013, Korea had 
concluded 39 open skies agreements (including cargo-only agreements).
115
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Korea has reached open skies agreements with major economies like the U.S., 
Japan, and Canada as well as medium and smaller economies. 
Japan substantially changed its aviation policy in 2007 from 
protectionism to liberalization, declaring itself the ―Asian Gateway.‖ 
Accordingly, in August 2007, Japan concluded its first open skies agreement 
with Korea, permitting unlimited third and fourth freedom passenger and 
cargo flights for all designated points except airports in Tokyo.
116
 Since then, 
Japan has been very proactive in entering open skies agreements. Japan 
concluded an open skies agreement with the U.S. in 2009 and a quasi-open 
skies agreement with China in 2012. (The agreement between Japan and China 
will be discussed in Chapter 3.) According to a publicly available source, 
Japan had signed open skies agreements with 27 states.
117
 
The only significant open skies agreement that China has concluded thus 
far is the 2010 ASEAN–China Air Transport Agreement.118 The agreement 
offers unlimited third/fourth freedom access between the ASEAN States and 
China. As noted above, China also reached a quasi-open skies agreement with 
Japan, allowing designated carriers from the two countries to operate an 
unlimited number of passenger and cargo flights between any Chinese and 
Japanese cities except Beijing, Shanghai, and Tokyo. Though China has been 
taking the least liberalized stance among the Northeast Asian states, China is 
expected to slowly come to adopt a progressive approach to making its market 
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more accessible for international air transport.
119
 
The process and structure of international air transport regulation have 
three distinct venues—national, bilateral, and multilateral.120 While no one 
disputes that bilateral air services agreements are still the principal instruments 
for regulating the economic sphere of international air transportation, the 
regional approach is becoming increasingly common and will be the central 




1.5 Regional Liberalization 
1.5.1 Definition 
In a larger context, regional liberalization is part of multilateral 
liberalization. Indeed, ―multilateral‖ literally means ―in which three or more 
groups, nations, etc. take part‖ or ―having many sides or parts.‖122 Thus, any 
agreement involving more than two state parties (e.g. a regional agreement) is, 
by definition, a multilateral agreement.
123
 More specifically, however, 
multilateral approaches in international air transport involving liberalization 
can be divided into the global multilateral approach (full multilateralism), the 
plurilateral approach (phased multilateralism), and the regional approach. 
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The global multilateral approach entails a truly international level 
playing field
124
 and could be achieved in a number of possible fora, including 
aviation-specific worldwide diplomatic conferences under the ICAO and the 
WTO.
125
 The key principles of global multilateralism are equal rights and 
obligations, non-discrimination, and the participation as equals of many 
countries regardless of their size or share of international air transport.
126
 
The plurilateral approach (or phased multilateralism) involves a gradual 
branching out from a core of like-minded states that establish a fully 
liberalized air transport market among themselves.
127
 Generally, a plurilateral 
agreement is an agreement negotiated between a limited number of states with 
a particular interest in the subject matter.
128
 In the international air transport 
sector, the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of Air Transportation 
(MALIAT) is a representative plurilateral agreement. (MALIAT will be 
reviewed in Chapter 2). Phased multilateralism would allow like-minded 
member states to come together fairly quickly and avoid forcing reluctant 
states into a rapid change in policy.
129
 
The regional approach is the core of this study and has distinct features 
as opposed to the first two multilateral approaches. Regional liberalization is 
different from global multilateral liberalization (full multilateralism) in the 
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sense that its membership is limited to the states in a certain region. Also, 
while the plurilateral approach is open to any other states, regional 
liberalization is typically based on closed membership for various reasons: 
political and economic union, physical proximity, political and economic 
organization, and so on. 
 
1.5.2 Rationale for the Regional Approach in International Air Transport 
In 2013, ICAO acknowledged that more than a dozen agreements for 
liberalization of intra-regional air transport services are in effect.
130
 There are 
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also less formalized groups in which discussion about regional liberalization 
has begun without achieving any substantial results. Indeed, the various 
regional approaches are at different stages of development and implementation, 




It is important to remember that bilateralism is still the principal 
instrument for liberalizing international air transport. However, the emergence 
of regional liberalization prompts the questions of why this approach is 
becoming more common and why some states that are not willing to accept 
the global multilateral approach take a more flexible position on the regional 
approach. 
Various global multilateral approaches have been initiated, but none of 
them have been wholly successful. As previously discussed, the failure of 
global multilateral liberalization is not an institutional problem; rather, it stems 
from the fact that states want to keep control of and remain flexible in their 
negotiating positions on international air transport.
132
 Hence, global 
multilateralism still plays a limited role in the economic sphere of 
international air transport. The Sixth Worldwide ICAO Air Transport 
Conference (2013), a highly anticipated once-a-decade event, again proved 
that states are not ready – or willing – to harmonize their economic air 
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An analogy with the global trading system may partly explain the 
challenges of the global multilateral approach. While a global multilateral 
system would ideally maximize benefits by exploiting the competitive 
advantages of all countries, thereby passing these benefits on to the consumer, 
the hard reality is that states do not altruistically place the global welfare and 
common interest over their own immediate self-interest.
134
 The Doha Round 
stalemate is often cited to call into question the WTO‘s role as a global 
multilateral forum for negotiating 21st century trade agreements, and an 
increasing focus is being placed on regional trade deals.
135
 
Indeed, the role of global multilateralism is inherently limited on policy 
issues which are normatively neutral. As Ronald Dworkin noted, policy is 
different from ―principle‖ in that, whereas principles concern justice, fairness, 
and other aspects of morality, policy has to do with social, political, and 
economic goals.
136
 Dworkin added that, although goals tend to be 
improvements, some goals are negative in that they stipulate that some present 
feature is to be protected from adverse change.
137
 
A. LeRoy Bennett succinctly summarized the seven reasons for states to 
prefer the regional approach over the universal (global multilateral) approach. 
The first three reasons are worth ruminating on in this discussion about the 
regional liberalization of international air transport: 
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1) There is a natural tendency toward regionalism based on the 
homogeneity of interests, traditions, and values within small groups of 
neighboring states. 
2) Political, economic, and social integration is more easily attained among 
fewer states within a limited geographic area than on a global basis. 
3) Regional economic cooperation provides more efficient economic units 





In fact, the adoption of regional liberalization has been an alternative to 
regulatory change and adjustment for many states.
139
 Generally, regional 
agreements can be more detailed and have more chances of being 
implemented than global multilateral treaties. The mix of fewer states, greater 
coincidence of interests, and particularly high levels of economic integration 
and interdependence make for more practicable forms of regional 
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 It is clear that regional treaties permit more of the flexibility 
and control that states are so reluctant to lose. In addition, they allow states to 
pursue their common interest. 
Apart from the internal economic benefits resulting from air transport 
liberalization (i.e. new and better air services, traffic growth, economic growth, 
job growth, and so on), external relations have been mentioned as an important 
benefit of regional liberalization for developing countries (or smaller countries) 
as well as developed countries.
141
  
The external relations vis-à-vis third countries and regions is a clear 
advantage of the regional approach since the member states in the same 
regional group can ―reap the benefits of a stronger negotiating position 
enabling their airlines to compete on more favorable terms in the international 
market place‖.142 This advantageous position would not be possible if each 
state in the same regional group individually negotiated (for example, market 
access issues) with a stronger economy outside of the region. In a nutshell, 
smaller countries in the same region can cooperate to form a stronger aviation 
community that can compete with other stronger states, blocs of states, or 
regions. Similarly, regional liberalization is a way for developed countries to 
improve their negotiating position with other strong regions or states. 
 
1.5.3 Progress in Regional Liberalization 
The ICAO Secretariat presented global quantitative indicators for 
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evaluating the degree of air transport liberalization in 2010 and 2013.
143
 The 
major findings of the analysis indicate that there has been a steady 
development of air transport liberalization since the mid-1990s.
144
 In 2012, 
about 35 percent of the country pairs with non-stop scheduled passenger 
services and about 58 per cent of the frequencies offered were between 
countries that have embraced liberalization (compared with about 22 and 42 
percent, respectively, a decade ago).
145
 Much of this liberalization was 
achieved through bilateral means.  
This analysis also confirms that the degree of liberalization varies 
widely among different regions. Generally speaking, Europe and North 
America show a more liberal picture while the Asia-Pacific region has been 
slow to adopt this trend.
146
 
Importantly, liberalization achieved at the intra-regional level (i.e. within 
the same region) has moved ahead of the inter-regional level due to the 
expansion of regional/plurilateral liberal air services agreements (leading to a 
big jump in intra-regional passenger movement numbers between 2000–2001 
and 2004–2005).147 
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 ICAO, ―Regulatory Overview‖, supra note 130 at A-3; ICAO, however, noted the 
incompleteness of the analysis by stating that ―[I]t is recognized that the selected liberalized 
ASAs, especially the regional/plurilateral ones, have heterogeneities in terms of the degree of 
―openness‖ in their provisions, and effective/actual implementation in practice. However, 
quantifying such differences is difficult and unwarranted due to insufficient details available 






 Ibid.; ICAO noted that ―[A]greements/arrangements which liberalize Third, Fourth and 
Fifth Freedoms in respect of scheduled passenger services amongst the parties to the 
agreement, were selected as ―regional/plurilateral liberal ASAs.‖ 
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1.5.4 Challenges to Regional Liberalization 
Despite ample justifications and encouraging progress, regional 
liberalization continues to face considerable challenges. The most significant 
challenge comes from the fact that regional liberalization with multiple 
member states (e.g. 10 states in ASEAN and 22 states in the League of Arab 
States (the Arab League)) is essentially multilateral liberalization on a smaller 
scale. Hence, regional liberalization cannot avoid the problems of multilateral 
approaches, i.e. states with bigger markets but less competitive air carriers that 
are not willing to participate in the arrangement. Except the European Union 
(EU), which is equipped with a mandatory enforcement mechanism, nearly all 
regional liberalization models have a similar setback: namely, the biggest 
economy is typically resistant to regional liberalization. 
                                           
148
 Ibid. at A-5. 
49 
The reluctance of Indonesia, the biggest economy and aviation market in 
Southeast Asia, to participate fully in the ASEAN Single Aviation Market 
(SAM) continues
149
; states with larger markets in the Arab League such as 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia have not ratified the Damascus Agreement toward an 
Arab Single Aviation Market
150
; and China is not willing to create an intra-
Northeast Asian single aviation market. All of these issues will be reviewed in 
the following sections. The reluctance of these states is unquestionably based 
on ―the primacy of aero-politics and geography in the complex calculations of 
governments and their airlines.‖151 As Alan Tan says, 
 
The reality is that in a grouping of countries with vastly divergent 
population and geographical sizes and with airlines of varying strengths, 
the entity with a small population and limited points but with formidable 
airlines will likely benefit the most from liberalisation agreements, 





Despite the insurmountable obstacle, the number of regional open skies 
agreements and participating states continues to grow. Generally, the regional 
approach to air transport counterbalances the shortcomings of the bilateral 
markets while making it possible to achieve (to some extent) the liberalization 
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of market access and of ownership/control rules.  
For air carriers, the regional approach would allow more flexibility, 
easing their multi-country operations in the region. However, the fact is that 
the regional approach is still a form of regulation. Even a completely single 
aviation market—the EU single aviation market, for example—cannot fully 
satisfy air carriers‘ business-oriented desires. Although regional liberalization 
can provide a better business opportunity than sets of bilateral air services 
agreements, by no means does it provide a satisfactory business environment 
for airlines. Because of existing legal barriers in international air transport 
(that is, restrictions on market access and on ownership and control) as well as 
economic incentives (such as increasing revenue and reducing costs), airlines 
cooperate under the name of ―alliances.‖  
 
1.6 Airline Alliances 
1.6.1 Rationale for Airline Alliances 
The limitations of state-led liberalization have led the airlines to turn to 
private agreements among themselves. In particular, they have formed 
alliances that represent ―a flexible organizational form offering rapid growth 
potentials,‖ the kind of potentials enjoyed by firms in other sectors.153 
Three multinational global alliances—Skyteam, Star Alliance and 
Oneworld—are well-known to the public. They offer integrated global 
coverage through the networks of their member airlines. Indeed, the key 
business motivation for airline alliances starts from the simple fact that ―no 
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single airline‘s network encompasses all possible ‗point A to point B‘ 
combinations.‖154  While airlines differ in many ways—including pricing 
policies, fleet mix, and production process, which involves ticketing, baggage 
handling, and passenger catering—they all share this fundamental 
limitation.
155
 As a result, many passengers are required to ―interline,‖ or 
change an airline during their journey.
156
 
―Code-sharing‖ is a more advanced form of cooperation among airlines. 
In fact, it is the cornerstone of most airline alliances.
157
 Code-sharing refers to 
including the flights of one airline in the schedules of its partner airlines; 
through a code-sharing arrangement, an airline can expand its network without 
having to service additional flights.
158
 Clearly, this business practice offers 
airlines three major benefits. First, it is cost-efficient, since airlines are able to 
provide connections to foreign cities through their partner airlines without 
using their own aircraft. Second, it represents a means of circumventing the 
route access restrictions that affect non-open skies agreements.
159
 In some 
cases, however, code-sharing is allowed only if the underlying traffic right is 
available to the foreign carrier.
160
 Third, it allows foreign carriers to make 
inroads into another nation‘s domestic market without violating foreign 
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ownership and market access restrictions.
161
 
Indeed, airline alliances were at least partially formed to maximize 
airlines‘ business opportunities in response to rigid governmental regulation. 
In particular, the inability of airlines to merge across borders (due to 
ownership and control restrictions – see more in Chapter 5 on Airline 
Alliances in Northeast Asia) was an important reason to form alliances. Since 
the 1990s, airline executives have been pursuing global strategies for 
cooperation and integration, strategies that seek to loosen the grip of the legal 
restraints imposed by bilateral diplomacy.
162
 
There are three major types of code-share agreements: parallel operation 
on a trunk route, unilateral operation on a trunk route, and behind and beyond 
route (see Figure 1-5).
163
 Of the three, parallel operation on a trunk route can 
counterbalance restricted intergovernmental agreements by sharing (and de 
facto increasing) frequency and capacity in the given routes. 
An example of this is flights between Beijing and Seoul operated by 
China Southern and Korean Air, which have each other‘s codes as well as their 
own. Due to the restricted market access allowed by the China-Korea air 
services agreement (under which traffic rights are still distributed to each air 
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carrier by their respective governments), both China Southern and Korean Air 
have reached their maximum frequency and capacity and could not expand 
any more on their own. By means of a code-share agreement, however, they 
can indirectly increase their frequency and capacity on the Beijing-Seoul route. 
This practice is clearly beneficial to airlines that cannot increase frequency 








1.6.2 Antitrust Immunity 
While a basic level of cooperation is required by members of an airline 
alliance (generally involving standard code-share agreements), some alliance 
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members also seek higher levels of cooperation to enhance the benefits of the 
alliance.
165
 Indeed, there is a broad spectrum of cooperation by alliance 
partners, ranging from basic, arms-length arrangements to highly integrated 
joint ventures.
166
 The level of airline cooperation is broadly described below: 
 
Figure 1-6 Spectrum of Alliance Cooperation167 
 
As shown above, alliance members cooperate in many areas; however, 
they remain competitors until the middle stage of cooperation. For instance, 
airlines in code-share agreements still compete with each other to maximize 
their profits. That is to say, each airline tries to sell its own tickets for the 
sector(s) it operates. 
However, highly integrated joint ventures obviate the question of which 
air carrier‘s tickets are being sold since the carriers share the revenues and 
profits in the end. In highly integrated joint ventures, alliance partners are 
effectively indifferent about which of them provides the actual ―metal‖ (that is, 
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the plane) on particular routes.
168
 (Metal neutrality will be examined below in 
section 1.5.3 on Metal Neutrality and more thoroughly in Chapter 5: Airline 
Alliances in Northeast Asia.) Such a high degree of alliance cooperation 
inevitably prompts governmental intervention since it can become anti-
competitive.  
In fact, highly integrated airline alliances involve two pillars of 
government regulations (or deregulations). One pillar is liberalization. This 
has been the major factor behind the formation of airline alliances, and these 
alliances have developed in response to the opportunities provided by 
liberalization initiatives.
169
 The other pillar of regulation is competition law. 
Generally, competition law prohibits conduct that interferes with free 
competition in the marketplace.  
Although a number of studies confirm that airline alliances benefit the 
consumers and carriers concerned,
170
 the business activities of airline 
alliances may result in market allocation, capacity restriction, restriction on 
schedules, high fares and price fixing, all of which may negatively impact 
consumers. If the airlines participating in the alliance possess dominant 
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positions in the allocated market, the impact can be much more significant. 
In principle, these types of activities must be prevented. However, if the 
benefits that an airline alliance provides consumers outweigh the alleged anti-
competitiveness of the alliance, the competition authorities may grant antitrust 
immunity. Antitrust immunity refers to ―immunity from the provisions of 
antitrust legislation that would otherwise prevent certain forms of co-operation 
as illegal anti-competitive activities.‖171  
National competition authorities in countries with developed legal 
systems generally have laws in place dealing with antitrust immunity. In order 
to assess the competitive effects of a given alliance, competition authorities 
must engage in a fact-finding inquiry to determine the structure, scope, and 
overlap created by each transaction.
172
 
Most national and regional authorities responsible for granting antitrust 
immunity opine that an open skies agreement is the precondition for the 
approval of antitrust immunity for an airline alliance.
173
 Obviously, this is a 
reasonable requirement. Granting antitrust immunity for airlines in a market 
where market access is restricted would sharply reduce competition by 
limiting the actual number of market players (airlines). This would only 
benefit the airlines that were provided immunity. On the other hand, an ―open 
skies‖ environment would allow for unlimited entry by a multitude of airlines, 
thus reducing the anti-competitive concerns arising from the granting of 
antitrust immunity.   
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U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer argued for the importance of 
potential competition in the airline industry, that is, the awareness that airlines 





[T]he nearer the potential competitor and the easier it is to enter a 
particular city pair, the greater the threat of entry and the closer to the 
competitive level prices are likely to be. Given the importance of 
potential competition, every unnecessary removal of a significant carrier 
as an independent entry-threatening entity gratuitously raises the 




By this logic, an open skies agreement that allows unrestricted market 
access to other airlines should be implemented in the market in question 
before antitrust immunity is granted to a particular airline alliance. More 
interestingly, antitrust immunity for an airline alliance of which a foreign 
carrier is a member can be an incentive to conclude an open skies agreement 
with the home state of that carrier. Historically, the first antitrust immunity 
granted by the U.S. DOT with regard to airline alliances (Northwest-KLM in 
January 1993) was part of the U.S.‘s first open skies agreement negotiated 
with the Netherlands in 1992.
176
 Gillespie and Richard noted how antitrust 
immunity influenced the open skies agreement: 
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 Mifsud, supra note 168 at 121. 
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[M]any grants of antitrust immunity to international alliances were used 
in large part to further foreign policy goals, such as Open Skies 
Agreements. Grants of antitrust immunity presumably provided 
assurances to a country‘s policymakers that decisions within an alliance 
would be made in the joint interests of all participating carriers, 




1.6.3 Metal Neutrality  
While the benefits of airline alliances have been proven, their effect on 
competition is less clear.
178
 In particular, it is argued that a significant part of 
the efficiencies generated by airline alliances do not necessarily require 
immunity as they can already be realized by interline or code-share 
agreements.
179
 In response to criticisms that antitrust immunity had led to 
reduced competition, the U.S. DOT, which has limited authority to grant 
immunity from the U.S. antitrust law to airlines to improve international air 
service, has recently added a new condition for antitrust immunity: metal 
neutrality. Metal neutrality means ―a commercial environment in which joint 
venture partners have common economic incentives to promote the success of 
the alliance over their individual corporate interests.‖180  
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 William Gillespie & Oliver M. Richard, ―Antitrust Immunity Grants to Joint Venture 
Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alliances‖ (2012) 78 Antitrust Law Journal 
443. 
178
 See the US GAO, supra note 158.  
179
 Bilotkach & Hüschelrath, supra note 154 at 272. 
180
 U.S. DOT, Joint Application of Air Canada, The Austrian Group, British Midland Airways 
Ltd, Continental Airlines, Inc., Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Polskie Linie Lotniecze LOT S.A., 
Scandinavian Airlines System, Swiss international Air Lines Ltd., TAP Air Portugal, and 
United Air Lines, Inc. to Amend Order 2007-2-16 under 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308 and 41309 so as 
to Approve and Confer Antitrust Immunity, Dkt No DOTOST- 2008-0234-0253, Order 2009-
7-10, Final Order (10 July 2009). 
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In the trans-Pacific market, and especially in Northeast Asia, the U.S. 
DOT‘s 2010 decision to accord antitrust immunity and require metal neutrality 
led to new regulatory developments. American Airlines and Japan Airlines 
(JAL) received antitrust immunity from the U.S. DOT on November 10, 2010, 
for their proposed joint venture (JV), while United Airlines and All Nippon 
Airways (ANA) received similar antitrust immunity on the same date. 
However, a significant limitation on the trans-Pacific JVs between these U.S. 
and Japanese carriers is that U.S. carriers cannot access codeshare services on 
ANA and JAL to China since China prevents airlines from a third country (i.e. 
the U.S.) from code-sharing on these routes. (The details will be discussed in 
Chapter 3: Market Access Issues in Northeast Asia).
181
  
Interestingly, the Delta-Korean Air antitrust immunity, which was 
granted in 2002, did not have the metal neutrality requirement. Although the 
DOT allowed joint ventures between Delta and Korean Air, a metal neutral 
joint venture was not a prerequisite for granting antitrust immunity.
182
 Due to 
the new environment, Delta and Korean Air recently started to explore closer 
cooperation, which could include establishing a JV with metal neutrality.
183
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A far more interesting development is the possibility of Chinese carriers 
entering into joint venture agreements with their U.S. alliance partners. In fact, 
media reports confirm a ―Mexican stand-off‖ in which China Southern‘s offer 
to Delta to form a JV would clash with the U.S. DOT‘s policy of only 
approving JV antitrust immunities where open skies agreements already exist 
(in this case, between the U.S. and China).184 Paul Mifsud predicts that Delta‘s 
experience with metal neutral joint ventures could be put to use if its Chinese 
partner could successfully press its government to adopt an open skies 
agreement with the U.S.
185
 Nothing can be certain at this stage, but it is highly 
interesting to see how airline alliances can impact the dynamics of air services 
agreements to which China, Japan and Korea are parties.  
 
1.7 Object and Structure of the Thesis 
The primary object of my thesis is to analyze possible regional and 
bilateral approaches to liberalizing market access and ownership and control 
restrictions in Northeast Asia and to propose the steps that need to be taken to 
achieve Northeast Asian open skies, including a possible ―trilateral‖ solution 
among the three states.
186
 A secondary object is to take a step back from the 
orthodox position that intergovernmental agreements (e.g. air services 
agreements) solely determine the level of air transport liberalization and to 
argue instead that air carriers themselves can enter into private agreements 
such as alliances that can have a substantial impact on liberalization.  
After the general introduction to Northeast Asian open skies presented in 
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 Multilateral, trilateral, regional – the three terms have essentially the same meaning in the 
special context of Northeast Asia. For more, see section 2.5 Regional Liberalization in 
Northeast Asia. 
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this chapter, Chapter 2: Comparative Analysis of Regional Liberalization 
Models analyzes different regional approaches for air transport liberalization. 
It first examines the rationales for regional liberalization. The chapter will 
discuss examples of regional liberalization, ranging from regions whose 
member states are still pursuing the common vision of liberalizing their 
markets to those that have fully achieved integrated single aviation markets. In 
the process, the chapter will assess in detail the developments in the EU 
(including its agreements with the U.S.) and in ASEAN (including its 
agreement with China), critically analyzing them from two angles: benefits 
and challenges. In this context, both the justifications for and barriers to 
Northeast Asian open skies are discussed, along with an outline of progress in 
the discussion about Northeast Asian open skies.  
Chapter 3: Market Access Issues in Northeast Asia begins with a detailed 
outline of the market access issue in international air transport. After 
describing national policies on market access in Northeast Asia, this chapter 
identifies specific market access issues in Northeast Asia on the national, 
bilateral, and regional levels. Specifically, the questions of what is preventing 
the liberalization of access in the Northeast Asian market, including aero-
political impediments (and particularly the position of China), and what can 
initiate market access liberalization in Northeast Asia are discussed. In 
particular, the role of low-cost carriers (LCCs) in moving forward the 
liberalization agenda for market access is analyzed.  
Chapter 4: Ownership and Control Issues in Northeast Asia parallels the 
previous chapter because ownership and control restrictions are the other 
significant legal hurdle to air transport liberalization. The origin of the legal 
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framework for ownership and control is examined first. After exploring 
national law and policy on ownership and control restrictions in Northeast 
Asia, various mechanisms for liberalizing ownership and control in Northeast 
Asia on the multilateral, regional, bilateral, and national levels are examined. 
Following that, airlines‘ response to ownership and control restrictions are 
discussed.  
Chapter 5: Airline Alliances in Northeast Asia begins by investigating 
the rationales for airline alliances. While introducing various industry 
practices, Chapter 5 explains that airline alliances play an important role in 
overcoming, albeit not completely, the restrictions on market access and 
ownership and control in the air transport market. It then identifies in what 
ways and to what extent airline alliances in Northeast Asia have developed. 
After pointing out that the business activities of airline alliances can be anti-
competitive, Chapter 5 explains the need to ensure that airline alliances 
comply with competition /antitrust law in order to safeguard fair and free 
competition in the air transport market. Chapter 5 further addresses under what 
circumstances antitrust immunity is given to airline alliances. After discussing 
the origin and rationale of antitrust immunity, this chapter elaborates on how 
national and regional competition authorities discuss and decide whether to 
grant antitrust immunity to an airline alliance. Chapter 5 then deals with how 
antitrust immunity for airline alliances can reshape the dynamics of Northeast 
Asian open skies.  
Chapter 6: Towards Northeast Asian Open Skies: Liberalization by the 
Airline Industry and States provides a prescriptive analysis of what is needed 
to bring about Northeast Asian open skies. After summarizing the key findings 
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of the thesis, this chapter proposes short-term (through 2020), mid-term 





























The various regional liberalization models that exist are at different 
stages of development and implementation. Among these, the single aviation 
market (SAM) is the most advanced model of regional liberalization. As the 
term illustrates, multiple aviation markets that are usually segmented by states 
are becoming one market under the concept of SAM. The EU created a SAM 
for the first time through adopting a series of legislative acts (discussed in the 
following section). 
However, the EU has not provided an official definition for SAM even 
though the term is commonly used by many bodies including the European 
Commission and EU member states.
1
 The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) SAM (discussed in the section 2.3) provides the following 
features of a SAM:  
 
- Some restrictions are removed for designated ASEAN carriers on the 
operation of passenger and freight transport and associated commercial 
activities within the states in the ASEAN region;  
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 See e.g. The European Commission homepage, online: 
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- a common policy is adopted for user charges, tariffs, competitive 
behavior and other forms of regulation; and 
- majority ownership and effective control of designated carriers is 
vested in ASEAN states and or nationals in the aggregate.
2
 (otherwise 
known as the ―community carrier‖ concept) 
 
The EU Single Aviation Market is the most structured and consolidated 
model of any regional liberalization model seen thus far. Although the EU 
model is highly exceptional, it is worth studying how the EU adopted a single 
aviation market and what it has achieved through the EU SAM.
3
 In Asia, the 




In the following sections, the EU SAM and ASEAN SAM models 
(section 2.2 and section 2.3, respectively) will be fully analyzed in terms of 
three key liberalizing features: namely, market access, ownership and control, 
and external relations. Next, other regional liberalization models in the 
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 Ian Thomas, David Stone, Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Andrew Drysdale, & Phil McDermott, 
Developing ASEAN’s Single Aviation Market and Regional Air Services Arrangements with 
Dialogue Partners (CAPA Final Report, June 2008, REPSF II Project No. 07/003) at 13 
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 But see the criticism on its slow implementation, e.g. Alan Khee-Jin Tan, ―Clear take-off on 




Australia-New Zealand SAM, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)‘s 
Initiative, Arab League, Latin America, Pacific Islands, and Africa will be 
discussed mainly in terms of two key features: market access and ownership 
and control restrictions (section 2.4). Recognizing that regional liberalization 
of Northeast Asia is at a preliminary discussion stage, the brief history, 
justifications, and barriers will be examined in the last section (section 2.5). 
 
2.2 The EU Single Aviation Market Model 
2.2.1 Overview 
As the most integrated of any regional organization in the world, the EU 
is the gold standard for other regions seeking to move in a similar direction.
5
 
Among the four stages of economic integration – free trade area (zero tariffs 
between member countries and reduced non-tariff barriers)
6
, customs union 
(free trade area and common external tariffs)
7
, common market (customs 
union, free movement of capital and labor, and some policy harmonization)
8
, 
and economic union (common market and common economic policies and 
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 Fraser Cameron, ―The European Integration Model: What Relevance for Asia?‖ in G. John 
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(Kyoto: Shoukadoh Publishers, 2012) 33 at 33. 
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 For more, see Nicholas Moussis, Access to European Union: law, economics, policies, 16
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ed. (Rixensart: European Study Service, 2007) at 69-70 (noting that ―[A] free trade area is 
based on intergovernmental cooperation. In such an area, member countries abolish import 
duties and other customs barriers to the free movement of goods manufactured in the territory 
of their partners. However, each country retains its own external tariff and its customs policy 
vis-à-vis third countries. It also retains entirely its national sovereignty.‖). 
7
 See Ibid. at 70 (noting that ―[I]n a customs union, which is the first stage of the evolutionary 
multinational integration process, free movement concerns not only products manufactured in 
the territory of the partners, but all products, irrespective of origin, situated in the territory of 
the member countries. Furthermore, the latter lose their customs autonomy and apply a 
common external customs tariff to third countries.‖). 
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 See Ibid. (noting that ―[i]f the members would like to turn a customs union into a real 
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67 
institutions) – the EU is at the stage of economic union. 
Economic unions not only require coordinated monetary and fiscal 
policies but also key economic policies relating to, inter alia, the labor market 
and transportation.
9
 Since all countries in the economic union essentially 
share ―the same economic space,‖ operating conflicting policies in those areas 
is considered to be counter-productive.
10
 
The aviation sector in Europe has been directed by the EU‘s common 
economic policies, and therefore the EU Single Aviation Market is remarkably 
structured and consolidated compared to other regional liberalization models 
in the world. Although the EU has been referred to as the best model for 
regional liberalization in the air transport sector, it is important to note that the 
EU model is highly exceptional. 
Indeed, no other regional liberalization model can match the EU‘s level 
of systemic integration. Two key ideas that help explain the EU‘s successful 
regional liberalization are the institutions that have consolidated the process 
and the common European identity that has allowed the integration to take 
place without repulsion. 
The EU has solid institutions (executive, legislative and judicial bodies) 
that are involved in the decision-making process and have the authority to 
enforce those decisions. Known as ―the principal actors of European 
integration,‖11 these institutions comprise four main organs: the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union 
(formerly the Council of the Ministers, also informally known as the EU 
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, and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), formerly 
the European Court of Justice.
13
 Essentially, the ultimate enforcement of EU 
law has been entrusted to the CJEU, and the CJEU has had an extraordinary 
impact on the emergence of the EU SAM policy.
14
 (For more discussion, see 
below section 2.2.2.3 External Relations.) 
To be sure, it is not the object of this thesis to analyze European identity. 
However, it is important to note the rich literature that discusses the concept of 
European identity and to recognize the link between European identity and the 
growth of the EU, which is to say the success of European economic 
integration.
15
 While arguing that European identity does not necessarily 
decrease one‘s national identity or other kinds of identities, Claire Wallace and 
Kristin Stromsnes drew an interesting analogy between the European identity 
and the Euro coins – national on one side and standardized European on the 
other.
16
 In other words, the EU has successfully established (more accurately, 
consolidated) the concept of European identity without detracting from 
national identity. 
The first steps toward a common air transport policy did not surface 
until 1970 when the European Commission adopted a draft proposal for a 
Council Decision on common action in Community air transport.
17
 After that, 
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the Commission took several actions preparing for the development of 
community air transport services. The Commission recommended to the 
Council joint actions for improving the air service network of the Community 
in 1972. More significantly, the Commission released the memorandum 
Contribution of the European Communities to the Development of the Air 
Transport Services in 1979.
18
 
The possibility of creating a single aviation market started receiving 
more attention in the mid-1980s.
19
 The ECJ decision in the Nouvelles 
Frontiéres case (1986)
20
 created conditions that were favorable for taking an 
important step forward in liberalizing the air transport industry.
21
 Although 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome granted the EC the authority to create the framework 
of a common transport policy (Article 74),
22
 sea and air transport were 
originally categorized as exceptions that required unanimous approval from 
member states to implement a common transport policy (Article 84).
23
 
However, in the Nouvelles Frontiéres case, the ECJ held that ―Article 84 of the 
Treaty cannot be interpreted as excluding air transport from the general rules 
of the Treaty, including competition rules.‖24 
Another major impetus for the EU SAM was the Single European Act 
(signed in February 1986 and became effective in July 1987). Indeed, the 
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creation of the EU SAM was part of the move toward a single internal market 
across a wide range of economic activity, as embodied in the Single European 
Act.
25
 The Single European Act amended the Treaty of Rome and reinforced 
the EC‘s ability to direct common policies (including air transport policy) for 
the EC at large.
26
 
The EU officially liberalized its air transport sector through three 
―packages‖: the first in December 198727, the second in November 199028, and 
the third in January 1993.
29
 The first package started to relax the established 
rules. It was particularly significant that this package allowed any EU carrier 
to operate on major hub routes within the EU without restriction on the 
number of designated air carriers. It also provided EU air carriers with the 
right to operate 5th freedom services within EU member states at up to 30 
percent of total capacity. 
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The second package expanded the scope of liberalization. It gave all EU 
carriers the right to carry unlimited 3rd and 4th freedom flights between their 
home country and another EU member state and relaxed restrictions on 5th 
freedom services to up to 50 percent of total capacity. The first two packages 
were deliberately modest and incremental since the Commission and the EU 




The most important change came with the third package, which virtually 
created the EU Single Aviation Market. While the first two packages had 
relaxed the existing regime, ―the third package abandoned virtually all 
restrictions in favor of a fully-fledged open market regime‖. 31  The 
Commission envisioned that the third package would complete the 
liberalization of traffic rights from bilateral control, severing the link between 




In brief, while the EU air transportation market prior to 1987 was still 
heavily regulated and rigorously protected by individual member states, for 
the next decade through 1997, the market was significantly liberalized with the 
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First Package 
(From 1 January 
1988) 
Second Package 
(From 1 November 
1990) 
Third Package 
(From 1 January 1993) 
· 3rd/4th freedom 
to hub routes in 
the EU 
· 5th freedom 
traffic allowed up 
to 30% of capacity 
· 3rd/4th freedom 
between all airports 
in the EU 
· 5th freedom 
traffic allowed up to 
50% of capacity 
 
· Full access to all international 
and domestic routes within the EU 
(e.g. 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th 
freedoms) 
· 8th freedom is allowed for 50% 
of capacity  
· Cabotage is unrestricted 
(including 9th freedom) from 
April 1997 
· EU Concept of Community 
ownership and control replaces 
national ownership and control 
Table 2-1 Summary of Market Access and Ownership and Control 




2.2.2 Main Features  
2.2.2.1 Market Access 
It is worth reiterating that removing (or lowering) the two main legal 
hurdles (market access and ownership and control restrictions) are the most 
fundamental features of any liberalization effort for international air transport 
services. 
Market access was fully liberalized by EU Regulation 2408/92, a key 
measure of the third package. Once an air carrier is recognized as a 
―community carrier‖ (see discussion in the following section) and maintains 
the requirements thereof, it can fly any route within the EU with no 
restrictions on flights (e.g. 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th freedoms as well as domestic 
cabotage routes) or capacity with only a few exceptions. These exceptions 
include public service obligations, such as subsidized routes to remote, 
sparsely populated regions, and limitations on areas with serious congestion or 
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environmental problems. 
The third package also initially allowed a community carrier to operate 
consecutive cabotage services as extensions to service to or from their own 
state (the 8th freedom), unless the cabotage sector amounts to more than 50% 
of capacity. Since April 1997, however, EU member states‘ domestic markets 
have been completely open to any EU community carriers (the 9th freedom). 
This marked the completion of the third package. Full 7th, 8th, and 9th 
freedom rights yielded ―a comprehensive, uniform, and open route network 
across the entire airspace of the EU.‖34 An EU carrier can thus today connect 
any number of points within the EU without any economic restrictions as to 
frequency or capacity. 
 
2.2.2.2 Ownership and Control 
The third package introduced the concept of the ―community carrier‖ for 
the first time. As dictated by EU Regulation 2407/92 on the licensing of air 
carriers, EU member states grant an air carrier an operating license if the air 
carrier meets safety and finance requirements and is majority-owned and 
effectively controlled by EU member states and/or their nationals. Thus, 
ownership and control of air carriers in EU member states no longer 
necessarily means national ownership and control but has instead been 
redefined as EU ownership and control.
35
 
EU Regulation 2407/92 still requires the licensee to have its ―principal 
place of business‖ (this concept will be discussed in Chapter 4: Ownership and 
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and Policy‖].  
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Control Issues in Northeast Asia) located in the licensing member states and 
then ―multilateralizes‖ the nationality rule by requiring that EU member states 




From a business point of view, one of the practical results of EU 
Regulation 2407/92 was that an EU carrier from one EU member state could 
establish itself or a subsidiary air carrier or franchised air carrier in other EU 
member states. This is advantageous because outside the EU, joint venture 
airlines can only be formed between non-nationals and the local (national) 
interest in order to fulfill the ownership and control restrictions. In the EU, the 
nationals of any member state can cross national borders and freely establish 
airlines, even fully-owned ones, in any other member state. . 
 
2.2.2.3 External Relations 
Through the three packages, the EU became a common aviation market 
(the EU Single Aviation Market). However, common economic policies, an 
important feature of economic unions, were still developing even after the 
conclusion of the third package in 1997. In particular, a coordinated external 
aviation policy was not formulated until almost a decade later (see discussion 
below on the Open Skies cases). In fact, neither the adoption of a common air 
transport policy nor the emergence of a single aviation market persuaded EU 
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Since the creation of the EU SAM in 1992, the European Commission 
had consistently argued that member states should work through EU 
institutions to manage international air services because a coherent approach 
would benefit the EU as a whole.
38
 Moreover, the proliferation of open skies 
agreements between the US and individual EU states made the European 
Commission concerned that the EU was losing out when member states 
negotiated with the US on an individual level rather than as a bloc.
39
 EU 
member states, however, consistently resisted and successfully thwarted the 
Commission‘s efforts.40 
In 1998, the EU Commission started an infringement procedure against 
eight EU member states (seven EU member states that had signed open skies 
agreements with the US
41
 and the UK, which had been renegotiating the 
Bermuda 2 agreement with the US
42
). Soon after the member states 
reconfirmed in 2001 that they would not comply with the opinion of the 
Commission, the Commission finally brought a lawsuit against them before 
the European Court of Justice.
43
 
In essence, there were both legal and aero-political reasons for the legal 
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action. From a legal perspective, the EU‘s community carrier concept created 
potential conflicts with preexisting bilateral air services agreements between 
EU member states and non-EU member states. Bilateral air services 
agreements contain the ―ownership and control‖ provision (or nationality 
provision), giving a state (State B) the right to revoke the permit of an air 
carrier from the other state (State A) if that air carrier is not majority owned 
and effectively controlled by nationals of the state (State A).  
Thus, there was the danger that if an air carrier acquired a majority stake 
in a foreign air carrier, the foreign carrier‘s traffic rights could be lost on the 
basis of the nationality provisions in the bilateral agreements.
44
 In this 
scenario, an EU community carrier (owned, for instance, by four EU states 
with equal 25% shares) and designated by those four states could lose traffic 
rights arising from bilateral agreements between these states and non-EU 
states. Thus, explicit consent from the third party partner states was needed. 
(See below for a discussion of horizontal agreements.) 
While the above legal conflict was concerned with ownership and 
control, another important legal conflict involved market access. In the view 
of the European Commission, the nature of bilateral air services agreements 
and the individual manner in which these were negotiated (that is, only the two 
states in the bilateral agreement enjoy exclusive traffic rights) created conflicts 
with the unified regulations developed inside the Community.
45
 Jeffery Shane, 
former US Undersecretary of Transportation for Policy, US Department of 
Transportation, succinctly explained the logic as follows: 
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Since EU law, dating as far back as the Treaty of Rome, includes the 
right of establishment and national treatment for all Member States, any 
provision in which an EU Member State agrees to allow the United 
States to veto services by an airline owned or controlled by citizens of a 
second EU Member State represents discrimination by the first Member 
State against the second. In other words, Germany is not allowed to 
discriminate against the airlines of France by agreeing that the U.S. may 
reject services offered between Germany and the U.S. by any carrier that 
isn't substantially owned and effectively controlled by German citizens – 




In the above example provided by Shane, the end result would be that 
under the Germany-US bilateral air services agreement, Air France could not 
be designated by Germany to operate services between Germany and the 
United States. This aero-political issue was likely the most important reason 
why the European Commission took legal action against the member states. 
The Commission believed that negotiating an open skies agreement with the 
US at the community level (in other words, negotiating between the US and 
the EU as a whole) was ideal since a bloc approach could advance the full 
benefits of the EU Single Aviation Market.
47
 In this regard, the Commission 
interpreted the member states‘ individual approaches as a threat to the ideal of 
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the European common market.
48
 
The ECJ judgment was rendered on 5 November 2002, and this so-
called ―open skies judgment‖ marked the start of EC external aviation policy.49 
In the underlying cases
50
, the Commission accused the member states of 1) 
infringing the external competence of the European Union by entering into air 
services agreements with third countries and 2) infringing the EC treaty on the 
right of establishment through the nationality clause in their air services 
agreements with the US. 
With regard to the first argument, the ECJ held the EU Regulation in 
question ―[did] not govern the granting of traffic rights on intra-Community 
routes to non-Community carriers,‖51 allowing EU member states to grant 
―fifth freedom‖ rights to third countries. However, the ECJ importantly 
concluded that ―the Community has acquired exclusive competence (by the 
Regulation No. 2409/92) to enter into commitments with non-member 
countries relating to the [fifth] freedom of non-Community carriers to set fares 
and rates.‖52 
With regard to the second argument, the European Court of Justice 
concluded that the nationality restrictions infringed Article 43 of the EC Treaty 
                                           
48
 toe Laer, ibid. at 23. 
49
 EC, Commission, Communication from the Commission, Developing the agenda for the 
Community’s External Aviation Policy [2005] 
50
 Collectively Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, C-466/98 [2002] E.C.R. I-09427; Commission of the European 
Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark, C-467/98 [2002] E.C.R. I-09519; Commission of the 
European Communities v. Kingdom of Sweden, C-468/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-09575;Commission 
of the European Communities v. République de Finlande, C-469/98 [2002] E.C.R. I-09627; 
Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium, C-471/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-
09681; Commission of the European Communities v. Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, C-472/98, 
[2002] E.C.R. I-09741; Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria, C-
475/98 [2002] E.C.R. I-09797; Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic 
of Germany, C-476/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-09865. 
51
 Commission of the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, C-476/98, 
[2002] E.C.R. I-09865 [Commission v. Germany] at para. 117. 
52
 Ibid. at para. 124. 
79 
regarding the right of establishment
53
 (see Mr. Shane‘s explanation above) 
and that the relevant open skies agreements with the US and the UK-US air 
services agreement covered issues within the exclusive competence of the 
Commission.
54
 The second finding has had a dramatic impact since it 
essentially means that all air services agreements to which member states are 
parties contain an illegal nationality clause.
55
 
It is noteworthy to mention that the right of establishment under EU law 
entails permanent installation by the nationals of a member state in any other 
EU member state so as to pursue an economic activity in that state.
56
 The 
EU‘s understanding of the right of establishment is less strict than a ‗principal 
place of business‘ criterion,57 which will be discussed in Chapter 4. In essence, 
while an EU airline can have only one principal place of business, multiple 
establishments are allowed for an EU airline.
58
  
On 20 November 2002, soon after the open skies decision was rendered, 
the European Commission requested EU member states to terminate their 
bilateral air services agreements with the US and asked the Council of 
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European Union to authorize the Commission to open community negotiations 
with the US.
59
 On 5 June 2003, the Council of European Union finally 
authorized the Commission to resume negotiations with the US on a new 
transatlantic air transport agreement.
60
  
After much political wrangling, the European Commission also received 
authorization from the Council of European Union to enter into so-called 
―horizontal agreements‖ with non-EU states on 29 March 2005. 61  The 
horizontal agreement led non-EU states to recognize the EU ―community 
carrier‖ designation clause instead of the traditional nationality clause in all 
the bilateral air services agreements between EU member states and those 
non-EU states.
62
 However, unlike the agreement adopted with the US, the 
horizontal agreements did not affect the hard rights; that is, no additional 
traffic rights were created.
63
 
In fact, only with separate authorization to negotiate a comprehensive 
open skies agreement, the so-called ―vertical mandate,‖ can the European 
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Commission negotiate an overall air services agreement with a non-EU state.
64
 
Among the comprehensive agreements that the EU Commission has 
completed with so-called global partners, the EU-US Air Transport Agreement 
(2007) is extremely significant given the two parties‘ clout and size in 
international aviation. 
Indeed, the EU-US Air Transport Agreement (2007) is historic largely 
because it is a deal between two regions encompassing a geographic area with 
an estimated 60 percent of the world's air traffic.
65
 Martin Dresner 
summarizes the key elements of the EU-US Air Transport Agreement (2007): 
 
- The concept of ―EU Community airline‖ is recognized; 
- All US and EU airlines have the right to compete on all routes between 
the US and the EU, as well as on all fifth freedom routes; 
- The right for cargo airlines to operate 7th Freedom routes, including 
routes between EU countries for US cargo carriers is allowed; 
- No capacity or frequency restrictions are imposed; 





After the agreement took effect in March 2008, the US-EU second stage 
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 Although the EU and US agreed on a second-stage open 
skies agreement in March 2010, the scope of the changes is not significant.
68
 
In essence, the 2010 agreement allows additional liberalization of airline 
ownership and control but involves no important developments for market 
access issues. Furthermore, it is unlikely the second-stage open skies 
agreement will be implemented in the near future since it requires legislative 
changes about ownership restriction in the US. The legal reform on the 
ownership restriction is generally a daunting task (this will be discussed in the 
Chapter 4) and US labor groups, which have traditionally exerted a powerful 




That said, what the EU has achieved with the US in the Air Transport 
Agreement (2007) is remarkable. To sum up, because the EU forms an 
economic union with central institutions governing inter alia the aviation 
market, it was able to achieve liberalized market access, relax ownership and 
control regulations, and make unified external policies. 
 
2.2.3 Benefits of the EU Single Aviation Market 
Competition is the primary justification for liberalization, and 
competition is what allows the EU SAM to provide new and better services. 
For instance, the EU saw a 170 percent increase in intra-EU routes – and a 310 
                                           
67
 The Article 21 of the U.S.-EU Agreement 2007 specifies that ―[T]he Parties shall begin 
negotiations not later than 60 days after the date of provisional application of this Agreement, 
with the goal of developing the next stage expeditiously.‖ 
68
 The airline industry expressed its disappointment at the second agreement. See e.g. James 
Kanter & Nicola Clark, ―U.S. and E.U. Agree to Expand Open Skies Accord‖ The New York 
Times (25 March 2010), 
online :<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/business/global/26skies.html>. 
69
 See Dresner, supra note 66 at 437. 
83 
percent increase in routes with more than two carriers – between 1992 and 
2009 following the introduction of its Three Packages.
70
 More cities and 
remote regions are being served by air transport, with passengers enjoying 
greater choice of destinations and more direct flights.
71
 
The most significant development in the post-liberalization period is 
the emergence and growth of low-cost carriers (LCCs). While the capacity 
share of LCCs in the EU aviation market was just 1.6 percent in 1996, their 
share grew to 20.2 percent in 2003.
72
 Even more important is the pace of this 
growth. While the capacity controlled by legacy carriers has only grown an 
average of 1 percent each year from 2004 to 2013, LCCs‘ capacity in Europe 
has grown an average of 14 percent each year.
73
 The OAG FACTS 
(Frequency and Capacity Trend Statistics) report, which was released in May 
2013, shows that LCCs now control over 50% of both international and 
domestic markets in some EU states. 
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Figure 2-1 LCCs‘ Market Shares in Europe74 
 
The creation of the EU Single Aviation Market also facilitated the 
development of alliances among European airlines and later of outright 
mergers (e.g. Air France/KLM).
75
 (This will be further discussed in Chapter 4) 
There were various benefits on a macro-economy level, including 44 million 
additional passengers attributable to the new market regime (an increase of 33 
percent), 1.4 million full-time equivalent jobs resulting from liberalization, 
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2.2.4 Challenges to the EU Single Aviation Market 
Arguably, it can be said that the EU Single Aviation Market is complete. 
That is, all EU member states (currently 28 states) enjoy all nine freedoms 
within the Union without restrictions, and all EU community carriers (at least 
legally) can enjoy traffic rights resulting from bilateral air services agreements 
between any EU states and non-EU states without discrimination (for those 
non-EU states that have concluded vertical or horizontal agreements with the 
EU). By virtue of the EU-US Air Transport Agreement (2007), for instance, 
EU carriers can fly between any EU city and any US city with unlimited 
capacity, and a merger between EU carriers would not carry the risk of losing 
traffic rights since the US recognizes the EU community carrier clause. 
The fact that some non-EU states are not willing to sign EU ―horizontal‖ 
agreements
77
 is a remaining task for the EU. A more significant issue is that 
the EU Commission‘s power to act as a ―super-negotiator‖ on air services 
agreements with non-EU states on behalf of all EU member states is restricted 
since the Commission is still required to attain the so-called ―vertical mandate‖ 
from the Council of the EU.
78
 Therefore, EU member states continue to retain 
―the piecemeal system of bilateral air services agreements in their aero-
political relations with third countries‖ in most air services negotiations.79  
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Nonetheless, it is safe to say that the EU has achieved nearly all 
attainable goals. Hence, it is hard to pinpoint the work that still needs to be 
done to further consolidate regional liberalization within the EU. Nevertheless, 
some legal and policy-based challenges arising from the fully consolidated 
regional liberalization have been noticed. The most commonly cited legal 
challenge has to do with conflict between EU community law (the three 
packages) and Article 7 of the Chicago Convention, which is labeled as 
―cabotage.‖ 
Cabotage refers to domestic carriage (i.e. between two or more points 
within the same state) by foreign aircraft. The Chicago Convention‘s Article 
7
80
 stipulates in the second paragraph that ―[E]ach contracting State 
undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically grant any 
such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other State or an airline of any 
other State, and not to obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other 
State.‖  
Obviously, EU community law grants exclusive cabotage rights to EU 
carriers. Thus, EU law (especially, the Third Package permitting unrestricted 
cabotage from April 1997) arguably violates the second sentence of Article 7 
of the Chicago Convention since Article 7 prohibits discriminatory granting of 
cabotage rights.
81
 Although there have been attempts at the ICAO to amend 
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 and some respected scholars have argued that Article 7 requires 
clarification
83
, the ICAO did not see the urgent need to do so.
84
 
A more substantial challenge relates to arguments about policy. Since the 
development of regional trade blocs is criticized as a fragmentation of the 
WTO regime in trade law,
85
 the EU SAM, a fully consolidated regional 
liberalization model, could be interpreted as a deviation from the ideal of 
global multilateralism. However, since full multilateral liberalization with the 
―most favored nation‖ principle does not apply in international aviation,86 it is 
hard to criticize the outcome of the EU SAM. 
If a new global approach is adopted in the future, the EU‘s regional 
approach should harmonize with the global approach. Peter Haanappel warned 
that the failure of harmonization between worldwide and regional 
developments could lead to regional blocs adopting defensive, protectionist 
attitudes towards other blocs.
87
 Despite this concern, it is noteworthy that the 
EU has been actively promoting the global approach.
88
  
As of 1 November 2008, the third package was replaced by EU 
Regulation 1008/2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the 
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, and the EU internal market is now governed by this 
regulation.
90
 While Regulation 1008/2008 continues to provide the economic 
framework for air transport in the European Community, the EU has also 
made a great deal of effort toward further integration by forging the Single 
European Sky (SES). 
The SES is an initiative to reform the architecture of European air traffic 
management (ATM) in order to meet future capacity and safety needs at a 
European rather than a local level, thereby increasing the overall efficiency of 
the European air transport system.
91
 Daniel Calleja Crespo, former Director 
for Air Transport in the European Commission, and Timothy Fenoulhet, Head 
of the EU Liaison Office at Eurocontrol (see below for the  role of 
Eurocontrol), stated that the initiative to create the SES can be considered the 
―last frontier‖ in EU aviation.92 
The vision of SES was developed in 1999 when the EU Commission 
called for structural reform that would permit ―the creation of a single 
European sky by way of integrated management of airspace and the 
development of new concepts and procedures of air traffic management.‖93 
The SES was formally adopted in 2004, with the SES framework comprising 
four regulations.
94
 In 2009, the second package of the SES (Regulation 
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1070/2009) updated the four basic regulations (2004), commonly called the 
Single European Sky II. 
Eurocontrol is deeply involved in the SES. Established in 1960, 
Eurocontrol was the first organization tasked with air transport management 
on a regional level.
95
 Eurocontrol now contributes to both the regulatory and 
the technological aspects of the SES.
96
 Another goal that the EU is pursuing is 
technical harmonization in air transport, and the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA) is playing an important role in achieving this. The EASA has 
extended this role to include the key safety fields of aerodromes, air transport 
management, and air navigation services.
97
 
Having succeeded with economic integration, the EU is now forging a 
more advanced single market in order to take the EU SAM beyond economic 
integration. Overall, even though the EU single aviation market is complete 
internally (that is, market access is completely free and ownership and control 
restrictions are entirely removed), the EU continues to seek, among other 
things, more coordinated external aviation policy, more consolidated air 
transport control, and more uniform safety standards. 
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2.3 The ASEAN Single Aviation Market Model 
2.3.1 Overview 
ASEAN has designated air travel (or air transport) as one of the 12 
priority sectors for economic integration.
98
 Similarly, members of ASEAN 
share the view that air transport is an integral component in the proposed 
establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which is 
scheduled to come into effect in 2015.
99
 Therefore, negotiations on 
liberalizing air services have taken place in the context of ASEAN‘s larger 
economic integration. 
The push towards ASEAN regional liberalization has been incorporated 
in several declarations adopted by the organization.
100
 In 1995, ASEAN 
initiated discussion on ―open skies‖ at a leaders‘ summit held in Bangkok, 
Thailand. Since then, the idea of ASEAN open skies has been reinforced by 
meetings of the ASEAN transport ministers and various policy documents. In 
2002, the ASEAN Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Air Freight 




In 2004, the 10
th
 meeting of the ASEAN transport ministers adopted the 
Action Plan for ASEAN Air Transport Integration and Liberalization 2005–
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 See ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration of Priority Sectors done at Vientiane, 
Lao PDR, 29 November 2004. Originally there were 11 priority sectors; namely, agro-based 
products, air travel, automotives, e-ASEAN, electronics, fisheries, healthcare, rubber-based 
products, textiles and apparels, tourism and wood-based products; Logistics was added as a 
twelfth priority sector in 2006. See Thitipha Wattanapruttipaisan, ―Priority integration sectors: 





 See ASEAN, ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint Blueprint (Jakarta: ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2008), online: <http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf>. 
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2015 and the Roadmap for Integration of the Air Travel Sector (RIATS).
102
 
The Action Plan set the long-term goal of ASEAN regional liberalization as 
the ―conclusion of an ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air Services by 
2015 by significantly removing restrictions on market access so as to achieve a 
single air transport market.‖103 Concurrently, the Roadmap for Integration of 
the Air Travel Sector (RIATS) identified the following specific goals and 
target dates: 
Deadline Passenger Cargo 
2005 Unlimited 3rd and 4th freedom flights for all 
designated points within ASEAN sub-regions 
 
2006 - At least two designated points in each country in the 
ASEAN sub-regions 
- Unlimited 5th freedom traffic between designated 
points in the ASEAN sub-regions 
Unlimited 
3rd and 4th 
freedom 
flights 
2008 - At least two designated points in each country in the 
ASEAN sub-regions 







2010 - Unlimited 5th freedom flights between the capital 
cities by 2010 
 
Table 2-2 The ASEAN Roadmap for Integration of the Air Travel Sector  
 
The roadmap has been successfully incorporated into three formal legal 
agreements for the acceptance of ASEAN member states.
104
 The three 
agreements are the 2009 Multilateral Agreement on Air Services (MAAS)
105
, 
the 2009 Multilateral Agreement for Full Liberalization of Air Freight Services 
                                           
102
 Action Plan for ASEAN Air Transport Integration and Liberalization done at Phnom Penh, 
Cambodia, 23 November 2004. See The ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Documents Series 2004 
(Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2005) at 221–226. 
103
 Ibid. at 223. 
104
 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, ―Toward a Single Aviation Market in ASEAN: Regulatory Reform and 
Industry Challenges‖ 2013 Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) 










, and the 2010 Multilateral Agreement for Full Liberalization 
of Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS).
107
 
Although the Action Plan has not been fully implemented according to 
the suggested timetable (with several states missing the stipulated deadlines, 
as will be examined below), substantial liberalization has been realized in the 
region. The fact that ASEAN used a concrete action plan to push ahead with 
regional liberalization was instrumental in achieving meaningful results. 
 
2.3.2 Main Features 
2.3.2.1 Market Access 
Pursuant to the goals set out in the Action Plan for ASEAN Air 
Transport Integration and Liberalization 2005–2015 and RIATS, the 2009 
Multilateral Agreement on Air Services (MAAS) provided a step-by-step 
approach by laying out several implementing protocols that aim to ease market 
access liberalization in the region. 
Protocol Scope State 
Parties 




Limited impact, covering mainly 
secondary cities in growth areas (sub-
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 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalisation of Air Freight Services, done at 




  ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Full Liberalisation of Passenger Air Services, done at 




 Protocol 1 - Unlimited Third and Fourth Freedom Traffic Rights Within ASEAN Sub-
Region; Protocol 2 - Unlimited Fifth Freedom Traffic Rights Within ASEAN Sub-Region; 
Protocol 3 - Unlimited Third and Fourth Freedom Traffic Rights Between ASEAN Sub-
Regions; and Protocol 4 - Unlimited Fifth Freedom Traffic Rights Between ASEAN Sub-
Regions 
109
 Tan, ―SAM in ASEAN‖, supra note 104 at 4 (noting that ―[F]our such sub-regions have so 
far been identified (new sub-regions may be declared or existing ones expanded): the Brunei, 
93 
Protocol 5 Unlimited 3rd and 4th freedom between 
capital cities (A‘s carriers between A‘s 
capital and another capital) 
E.g. Thai Airways’ (TG) Bangkok-Hanoi 






Unlimited 5th freedom between capital 
cities (A‘s carriers from A‘s capital to C‘s 
capital via B‘s capital) 
E.g. TG’s Bangkok-Kuala Lumpur-




Table 2-3 The 2009 Multilateral Agreement on Air Services (MAAS)110 
 
Alan Tan describes the above gradual approach as ―ASEAN‘s 
incrementalist philosophy of starting with modest goals first and pursuing 
more ambitious relaxations at a later stage.‖111 Indeed, given that ASEAN has 
no central government or supranational institutions (unlike the EU) and that 
there are 10 states (more member states than is ideal for close negotiations), 
starting with liberalization in the border-area sub-regions (Protocols 1 to 4) 
was a sensible approach. 
However, since the designated points in the sub-regions covered by 
Protocols 1 to 4 are mostly secondary cities, the impact on air traffic volume 
has been negligible. The substantial air transport liberalization in ASEAN 
began with Protocol 5 since this step addresses unlimited 3rd and 4th freedom 
traffic rights between ASEAN capital cities. Further, Protocol 6 provides 
unlimited 5th freedom traffic rights between ASEAN capital cities. Since 
Indonesia ratified both Protocols 5 and 6 in May 2014, a long-awaited 
                                                                                                              
Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA); the Sub-
regional Cooperation in Air Transport among Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam 
(CLMV); the Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT); and the Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT)‖).  
110
 Centre for International Law (CIL), ―AVIATION, Lifting-The-Barriers Roundtables‖ 
(Preliminary paper presented to the 2013 Network ASEAN Forum, August 2013) at 4, online: 
<http://www.cariasean.org/pdf/Aviation-Prelim-Paper.pdf>. 
111
 Tan, ―SAM in ASEAN‖, supra note 104 at 6. 
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development, only the Philippines is currently not party to the Protocols. (See 
more discussion in section 2.3.4 Challenge) However, Protocol 6 would not 
have much commercial impact since the ASEAN capital cities are not very far 




The 2010 Multilateral Agreement for the Full Liberalization of 
Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS) was designed to supplement MAAS and 




Protocol Scope State 
Parties 
Protocol 1 Unlimited 3rd and 4th freedoms between all 
cities (A‘s carriers from A‘s capital to B‘s 
non-capital, A‘s non-capital to B‘s capital, 
and A‘s noncapital to B‘s non-capital) 





Protocol 2 Unlimited 5th freedom between all cities 
(except capital-capital-capital) 
E.g. TG Phuket-Ho Chi Minh-Cebu, Phuket-
Ho Chi Minh-Manila, Phuket-Hanoi-Cebu, 
Phuket-Hanoi-Manila, Bangkok-Hanoi-
Cebu, Bangkok- Ho Chi Minh-Manila, 




Table 2-4 The 2010 Multilateral Agreement for the Full Liberalization of 
Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS)114 
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 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, ―The ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air Services: En Route to 
Open Skies?‖ (2010) 16 Journal of Air Transport Management 289 at 290 [Tan, ―ASEAN 
Multilateral Agreement‖]; however, some air carriers are attempting to use 5th freedom rights 
as if they were 7
th
 freedom rights, which is not allowed under the ASEAN agreements. For 
instance, Malaysia-based AirAsia‘s application to operate 5th freedom flights departing from 
Kuala Lumpur to Yangon via Singapore is a de facto 7
th
 freedom because is the Singapore-
Yangon sector entails ―backtracking‖ traffic such that few passengers would actually use this 
flight to get from Kuala Lumpur to Yangon. The reality would be that the aircraft will unload 
all its passengers taken on in Kuala Lumpur when it arrives in Singapore and take on a fresh 
new load of passengers in Singapore bound for Yangon – an effective 7th freedom. See Alan 
Tan‘s presentation to the 2013 Network ASEAN Forum, 22 August 2013, online: 
<http://www.cariasean.org/pdf/RT/Aviation%20RT%20Presentation.pdf> at 16. The question 




 freedom is currently being 
discussed by the ASEAN member states.   
113
 Tan, ―SAM in ASEAN‖, supra note 104 at 8. 
114
 CIL, supra note 110 at 5. 
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Laos and, more substantially, Indonesia are not parties to MAFLPAS. 
The fact that Indonesia, the largest economy in ASEAN and the country with 
40 percent of the entire ASEAN population, has not accepted the 2010 
MAFLPAS and the 2009 Multilateral Agreement for the Full Liberalization of 
Air Freight Services (MAFLAFS, see below) is currently the biggest setback 
to the ASEAN Single Aviation Market. (This issue will be discussed in 2.3.4 
Challenges to the ASEAN SAM.) 
Protocol Scope State Parties 
Protocols 1  Unlimited 3rd, 4th, and 5th freedom 
between designated points 
E.g. Thai Airways Cargo’s Bangkok-
Clark, Bangkok-Vientiane-Hanoi routes 
All 10 member 
states except 
Indonesia 
Protocol 2 Unlimited 3rd, 4th, and 5th freedom 
between all points with international 
airports 
















 freedoms) are 
missing from the ASEAN regional agreements. Thus, from the perspective of 
market access, ASEAN is not a true single aviation market. The fact that the 
ASEAN SAM has not permitted the 7
th
 freedom has crucial implications both 
internally and externally. The question of allowing the 7
th
 freedom is 
presumably slated for post-2015 negotiations (further discussed in 2.3.2.3 
External Relations and 2.3.4 Challenge). 
 
2.3.2.2 Ownership and Control 
In the bilateral air services agreements between the individual ASEAN 




states, it is a common condition that designated carriers must be ―substantially 
owned and effectively controlled‖ by the designating state and/or its 
nationals.
116
 Interestingly, the 2009 Multilateral Agreement on Air Services 
(MAAS) and the 2010 Multilateral Agreement for the Full Liberalization of 
Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS) provide for a so-called ASEAN 
community carrier, which is similar to the EU community carrier or the 
Australia-New Zealand SAM carrier concepts. (This will be discussed in 
section 2.4.1 Australia-New Zealand Single Aviation Market.) 
MAAS and MALFAS provide that all contracting states have the right to 
designate multiple airlines to enjoy the relevant traffic rights so long as the 
airlines fulfill the following criteria on ownership and control: 
 
(a) substantial ownership and effective control of that airline are 
vested in the Contracting Party designating the airline, nationals of 
that Contracting Party, or both (Article 3(2)(a)(i); or 
(b) subject to acceptance by a Contracting Party receiving such 
application, the designated airline which is incorporated and has its 
principal place of business in the territory of the Contracting Party 
that designates the airline, is and remains substantially owned and 
effectively controlled by one or more ASEAN Member States and/or its 
nationals, and the Contracting Party designating the airline has and 
maintains effective regulatory control (Article 3(2)(a)(ii); or  
(c) subject to acceptance by a Contracting Party receiving such 
application, the designated airline is incorporated in and has its 
                                           
116
 Tan ―SAM in ASEAN‖, supra note 104 at 17. 
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principal place of business in the territory of the Contracting Party 
that designates the airline in which the Contracting Party designating 
the airline, has and maintains effective regulatory control of that 
airline, provided that such arrangements will not be equivalent to 
allowing airline(s) or its subsidiaries access to traffic rights not 
otherwise available to that airline(s) (Article 3(2)(a)(iii). 
 
Since Article 3(2)(a)(ii) provides that ownership and control requirement 
can be met by ―one or more ASEAN Member States and/or its nationals,‖ this 
lays the groundwork for what can be termed an ―ASEAN community 
carrier.‖117  Hence, an airline that is substantially owned and effectively 
controlled by ASEAN interests in the aggregate would fulfill the ownership 
and control requirement.
118
 For instance, a Cambodian-registered carrier need 
not be majority-owned by Cambodians; instead, it can be owned by 20% 
Cambodian, 20% Malaysian, and 11% Vietnamese interests.
119
 Thus, the 
majority ownership can be spread out among ASEAN interests as long as 
effective regulatory control remains with the Cambodian authorities.
120
 
Strictly speaking, Article 3(2)(a)(iii) says that there need not even be any 
Cambodian interests as long as the airline has its place of incorporation and 
principal place of business in Cambodia and the Cambodian government 
maintains effective regulatory control over it. (For a discussion of the 
difference between ―effective economic control‖ and ―effective regulatory 
control‖ which entails safety, security, and other important regulatory matters, 
                                           
117




 CIL, supra note 110 at 7. 
120
 Ibid.  
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see Chapter 4: Ownership and Control Issues in Northeast Asia.)  
The legal problem with the ASEAN community carriers is that there is a 
risk that the contracting state will reject the application of an ASEAN 
community carrier, even if the airline is substantially owned and effectively 
controlled by ASEAN interests.
121
 This is because Article 3(2)(a)(ii) starts 
with a prior condition: ―subject to acceptance by a Contracting Party receiving 
such application.‖ This means that there is no guarantee that an ASEAN 
community carrier will be able to access all countries in ASEAN, and this 
uncertainty is a manifest disadvantage for any such airline or for any investor 
planning to establish one.
122
 This legal challenge is another important feature 
of the ASEAN SAM that requires further liberalization in the post-2015 
negotiations. 
 
2.3.2.3 External Relations  
The ASEAN SAM has also attempted to establish a common external 
relations strategy for the grouping. This is significant given the fact that 
ASEAN does not have strong institutions with enforcement functions like the 
EU. Indeed, since the early stage of the ASEAN SAM, the member states have 
been aware of the need to establish some form of external common strategy 
vis-à-vis third countries and regions.
123
 
In 2007, ASEAN agreed with China to work toward an ASEAN-China 
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Regional Air Services Agreement at the 6th ASEAN-China Transport 
Ministers Meeting.
124
 Accordingly, the 2007 ASEAN-China Aviation 
Cooperation Framework was adopted with provisions for the gradual 
liberalization of cargo and passenger services.
125
 
It is worth noting that the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement was the 
explicit justification for the ASEAN-China Regional Air Services Agreement 
that was subsequently adopted in 2010. The 2007 ASEAN-China Aviation 
Cooperation Framework states that the ASEAN-China Regional Air Services 
Agreement should be concluded by 2010 ―to support the realisation of the 
ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement in 2010‖ and ―to implement the 
agreement thereafter in line with the establishment of the ASEAN-China 
FTA.‖126 
The ASEAN-China free trade area came into effect on 1 January 2010
127
 
and, not surprisingly, the Air Transport Agreement between ASEAN and China 
was adopted in November 2010.
128
 The ASEAN-China Air Transport 
Agreement and its Protocol 1 provide for unlimited 3rd and 4th freedom 
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 Gong Yu, ―U.S. - E.U. Open Skies Deal and Its Implication for the Liberalization of 
International Air Transport Services: A Chinese Perspective‖ (2009) 2 Journal of East Asia and 
International Law. 129 at 153. 
125
 See 2007 ASEAN-China Aviation Cooperation Framework, issued in Singapore on 2 
November 2007, para 6. ―6. The substantive elements of this ASEAN-China Regional Air 
Services Arrangement would include, but not limited to, provisions for gradual liberalisation 
of cargo services as well as passenger services: 1) removal of restrictions to the number of 
points in the route schedule; 2) no limitations on third and fourth freedom traffic rights 
between ASEAN and China; 3) no limitations on fifth freedom traffic rights between ASEAN 
and China; 4) no limitations on frequency and capacity, as well as the type of aircraft; 5) 






 For the discussion of ASEAN-China FTA, See e.g. Sarah Y. Tong & Catherine Chong, 
―CHINA-ASEAN Free Trade Area in 2010: A Regional Perspective‖, 2010 East Asia Institute, 
National University of Singapore, Background Brief No. 519, online: 
<http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB519.pdf>.  
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 For the details, see Alan Khee-Jin Tan, ―The 2010 ASEAN-China Air Transport 
Agreement: Placing the Cart before the Horse?‖ (2012) 37 Air & Space L. 35. [Tan, ―ASEAN-
China‖].  
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access for airlines on both sides and effectively supersede the capacity 
restrictions in the bilateral agreements that exist between the individual 
ASEAN states and China (the bilateral agreements are still in place – only the 
capacity is changed).
129
 The ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement is 




The interesting thing about this Agreement is the fact that the ASEAN 
states concluded it with China even without having forged a complete SAM 
within ASEAN first. Although the incomplete ASEAN Single Aviation Market 
leaves ASEAN carriers at a relative disadvantage to Chinese carriers (this will 
be discussed in 2.3.4. Challenge), it is clear that ASEAN regional 
liberalization has accomplished far more than 10 separate bilateral air services 
agreements between the 10 ASEAN member states and China would have 
otherwise achieved. In other words, ASEAN has proved that regional 
liberalization confers the advantage of a stronger negotiating position. 
 
2.3.3 Benefits of the ASEAN Single Aviation Market 
Since the ASEAN SAM is still being implemented, it is too early to fully 







 freedoms by 2015 has not been completed yet, 
and the 7
th





freedoms (cabotage operations) are not even on the negotiating table as a 
future agenda item. 
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 Tan, ibid. at 23. 
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Nonetheless, fairly relaxed regional liberalization has already led to 
distinctively positive results. Once again, the growth of low-cost carriers 
(LCCs) is noticeable. The LCC penetration rate in the Southeast Asian market 




Figure 2-2 LCCs‘ Share of Capacity within Southeast Asia132 
 
In terms of market access, except the non-capital cities in Indonesia and 
Laos and the Philippine capital, Manila, ASEAN carriers are free to fly from 
points in their home states to any other points in ASEAN and vice versa. This 
business environment is beneficial for LCCs that mainly focus on 3rd and 4th 
freedom traffic. Although the problem of slot shortages at congested airports 
such as Jakarta and Manila may hamper LCCs‘ operations (that is, landing and 
take-off slots are not available even on the open market), that is a separate 
                                           
131
 CAPA, ―Competition in Southeast Asia's low-cost airline sector heats up as capacity surges‖ 
(5 September 2013), online:<http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/competition-in-southeast-
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 CAPA, ―Southeast Asia low-cost airline fleet to expand by almost 20% in 2014. Are more 
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156726> (noting that the surge in penetration rate from 2011 to 2012 is driven by re-
classification of Lion Air from FSC to LCC). 
102 
issue from the openness of traffic rights (slot problems in Jakarta and Manila 
will be discussed in the following section.) 
LCCs are particularly well placed to target the surging middle class in 
Southeast Asia, since such carriers are focused primarily on short-haul markets 
and their lower fares make flying more affordable.
133
 Although there is no 
official distinction between short-haul and long-haul flights, a generally 
accepted industry convention is that short-haul flights are less than 3,000 km 
and can be operated by standard narrow-body aircraft (e.g. Boeing 737 and 
Airbus 320).
134
 LCCs derive their competitive advantage from the operational 
efficiencies in short-haul flights
135
, and most intra-ASEAN routes are shorter 
than 3,000 km. Thus, ASEAN has an ideal environment for LCCs, and six 
intra-ASEAN routes are ranked in the top 10 international LCC routes: 
Rank Origin Destination 
1 Singapore Changi Airport 
Jakarta Soekarno-Hatta International 
Airport 
2 Singapore Changi Airport Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
3 Dubai International Airport Kuwait International Airport 
4 Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
Bangkok Don Mueang International 
Airport 
5 Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
Jakarta Soekarno-Hatta International 
Airport 
6 Barcelona El Prat Airport London Gatwick Airport 
7 Dubai International Airport Doha Hamad International Airport 
8 
Manila Ninoy Aquino International 
Airport 
Singapore Changi Airport 
9 Singapore Changi Airport 
Bangkok Suvarnabhumi International 
Airport 
10 Dublin Airport London Stansted Airport 
Table 2-6 Top 10 International LCC Routes (2014)136 
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103 
As much as ASEAN regional liberalization has served as the catalyst 
leading to the growth of LCCs, the role of LCCs in ASEAN regional 
liberalization cannot be underestimated. The development of national LCCs 
helped change governments‘ mindset toward ASEAN regional liberalization. 
For instance, Malaysia, which used to be much less enthusiastic about regional 
liberalization, has joined all the ASEAN regional liberalization agreements. 
The success of Malaysia-based AirAsia has definitely affected the country‘s 
policy changes.  
In addition to the intra-ASEAN liberalization, the new ASEAN-China 
Air Transport Agreement provides an enormous opportunity for both LCCs 
and full-service carriers. Now ASEAN carriers have unlimited penetration into 
all of China (with the exception of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, points 
excluded in the ASEAN-China Agreement), which would have not been 
possible if the 10 states had negotiated with China separately, providing them 
with an important growth engine. 
Although there has been encouraging progress on the liberalization of 
market access, ownership and control restrictions are still in place in ASEAN. 
The concept of the ASEAN ―community carrier‖ was formulated under the 
ASEAN agreements, but there is a substantial restriction (that is, a state can 
exercise its veto) (Article 3 (2)(a)(ii) of MAAS and MALFAS).  
Indeed, an ASEAN community carrier with multiple ASEAN interests in 
the aggregate has never been established. In other words, the community 
carrier concept sounds good in theory, but it has not been put into practice. All 
                                                                                                              




the LCC joint ventures in recent years still use the old 51/49 model (that is, 
majority ownership by the local interest and minority ownership by the foreign 
parent airline). The table below summarizes the ownership and control 
structure of LCC joint ventures in ASEAN. A more thorough discussion of 
joint ventures can be found in Chapter 4: Ownership and Control Issues in 
Northeast Asia. 
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Malaysia Malindo Air National 
Aerospace and 
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Industries – 51%  




F&S Holdings – 
16%; TNR 
Holdings – 16%; 
Alfredo Yao – 
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Philippines AirAsia Zest AirAsia Inc. 
(Philippine 
AirAsia) – 49% 
and Alfredo Yao 
– 51%  
- 





Lion Air Group 
– 49%; 
Thailand Thai AirAsia X  
 
Tassapon 
Bijleveld  – 41% 
and Julpas 
Kruesopon – 10% 
AirAsia Berhad 
– 49%;  
Thailand NokScoot Nok Mangkang 
Co. Ltd. (wholly-
owned subsidiary 
of Nok Airlines) 
– 49% and 
Pueannammitr 
Scoot Pte. Ltd. – 
49% 
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Co. Ltd. - 2% 
Thailand Thai AirAsia  
 











Vietjet – 49% 
Singapore Jetstar Asia Westbrook 
Investments Pte. 
Ltd. - 51% 
Qantas Airways– 
49% 
Vietnam Jetstar Pacific Vietnam Airlines 
– 69% and 
Saigontourist 




Table 2-7 The Ownership and Control Structure of ASEAN LCC Joint 
Ventures 
  
Along with the tangible benefits, the intangible effect of regional 
liberalization must be considered. On a global level, various commercial 
approaches by airlines have been initiated to circumvent ownership and 
control restrictions. Examples of such approaches are establishing joint 
ventures with local interests. This joint venture model is an incorporated joint 
venture that forms a separate company (mostly initiated by LCCs). This model 
is different from the unincorporated joint venture model (normally conducted 
between full-service carriers such as the JAL/AA and ANA/UA joint ventures), 
which does not form a separate legally incorporated company. (This will be 
fully discussed in Chapter 4: Ownership and Control Issues in Northeast Asia).  
AirAsia pioneered the incorporated joint venture model in the region. In 
the case of AirAsia‘s subsidiaries in other ASEAN states (namely, Indonesia 
AirAsia, Thai AirAsia, and Philippines AirAsia), the local owners hold a 
106 
majority share, while the parent airline group only has a minority stake.
137
 
This adheres to the traditional 51/49 practice.
138
 However, the requirement of 
―effective control‖ is less clear since the managing expertise and strategic 
decisions may come from the parent foreign airline (the minority owner).
139
 
Typically, the local majority shareholders have no experience with aviation. 
A unique feature of LCC JVs in the region is that ASEAN governments 
have disregarded (or at least mitigated) the effective control test. In other 
words, ―effective control‖ inquiries have not been conducted strictly. (This 
will be further discussed in the Chapter 4) These joint ventures were only 
possible because ASEAN cooperation, liberalization, and integration were in 
progress. It is doubtful that the same joint ventures would have been possible 
if a totally foreign carrier (e.g. a US carrier) had proposed the subsidiaries to 
the local governments. 
On the macro-economy level, CAPA estimated that ASEAN SAM has 




2.3.4 Challenges to the ASEAN Single Aviation Market 
The biggest challenge faced by the ASEAN Single Aviation Market is 
rooted in the immense diversity of economic development and 
competitiveness of the national air carriers.
141
 The basic indicators in Table 2-
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138
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capital must be held by Filipino citizens. 
139
 Tan, ―SAM in ASEAN‖, supra note 104 at 18. 
140
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8 briefly show the diversity of ASEAN states. 
 



















5,769 406.2 70 16,117.5 39,678.7 
Cambodia 181,035 14,962.6 83 15,659.0 1,046.5 
Indonesia 1,860,360 248,818.1 134 862,567.9 3,466.7 
Lao PDR 236,800 6,644.0 28 10,002.0 1,505.4 
Malaysia 330,290 29,948.0 91 312,071.6 10,420.5 
Myanmar 676,577 61,573.8 91 56,408.0 916.1 
Philippines 300,000 99,384.5 331 269,024.6 2,706.9 
Singapore 715 5,399.2 7,550 297,945.8 55,183.3 
Thailand 513,120 68,251.0 133 387,534.1 5,678.1 
Viet Nam 330,951 89,708.9 271 171,219.3 1,908.6 
ASEAN 4,435,617 625,096.3 139 2,398,549.6 3,837.1 
Table 2-8 Basic ASEAN Indicators (2014) 
 
Airlines in the ASEAN have varying strengths and sizes. The fact that 
Laos, the Philippines and, most importantly, Indonesia have yet to implement 
full intra-ASEAN liberalization for even the 3rd, 4th and 5th freedoms has to 
do with the competitiveness of their national carriers. 
As the largest market in ASEAN, Indonesia‘s participation will virtually 
determine the effectiveness of the proposed ASEAN Single Aviation 
Market.
142
 In this regard, Indonesia‘s recent ratification of Protocols 5 and 6 
of the 2009 Multilateral Agreement on Air Services, which opened Jakarta to 
3rd, 4th, and 5th freedom traffic to and from other capital cities, is welcome 
news. (However, a separate but related problem is the scarcity of slots. Indeed, 
Jakarta‘s Soekarno-Hatta airport is heavily congested, with existing terminals 
                                                                                                              
have embryonic aviation industries, at best; and some have efficient, financially strong airlines, 
while others do not.‖). 
142
 See Batari Saraswati & Shinya Hanaoka, ―Aviation Policy in Indonesia and Its Relation to 
ASEAN Single Aviation Market‖ (2013) 9 Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society for 
Transportation Studies 2. 
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operating well above capacity (the airport has a capacity of 22 million 
passengers, but it served about 60 million passengers in 2014
143
), and the 
airport‘s two runways are fully utilized during peak hours.144 Airlines seeking 
to add flights at the Soekarno-Hatta airport have to operate in very unpopular 
periods such as prior to 6:00 a.m.
145
 Thus, Indonesia‘s ratification of 
Protocols 5 and 6 of the 2009 MAAS does not effectively change anything 
since few new flights can be launched from Jakarta. 
Similarly, the resistance of the Philippines regarding Protocols 5 and 6 
of the 2009 Multilateral Agreement on Air Services has to do with the 
country‘s aviation policy of restricting access to Manila‘s congested Ninoy 
Aquino International Airport while fully opening Clark Airport, which is 
located about 80 km from downtown Manila.
146
 Alan Tan is critical of this 
practice, arguing that ―linking slots to access rights is a negative precedent in 
that it encourages governments to use congestion and lack of slots as excuses 
to delay their adherence to regional commitments.‖147 
Another important weakness of the ASEAN SAM is that the 7th freedom 
and cabotage rights (8th and 9th freedoms) have not been discussed. This 
setback is aggravated by the new ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement. 
Now that ASEAN and China have agreed to unlimited 3rd and 4th freedom 
                                           
143
 Emirsyah Satar (CEO of Garuda Indonesia), ―The next biggest growth opportunities for 
Indonesia‘s airline market‖ (Address to the 7th Annual Aviation Outlook Asia Conference, 29 
October 2014) [unpublished]. 
144
 Saraswati & Hanaoka, supra note 142 at 5. 
145
 CAPA ―Jakarta Halim Airport re-opening frees Soekarno-Hatta slots for Citilink, Garuda, 
AirAsia, Lion Air‖ (12 January 2014), online: <http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/jakarta-
halim-airport-re-opening-frees-soekarno-hatta-slots-for-citilink-garuda-airasia-lion-air-
147479>; For instance, Mandala Airlines started flights at 4:30 a.m. in Jakarta because the 
carrier cannot get any airport slots later in the day. See Kyunghee Park & Jasmine Wang 




 See Tan, ―The Philippines‖, supra note 123. 
147
 Tan, ―SAM in ASEAN‖, supra note 104 at 4. 
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between the two regions, ―[The ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement] may 
create network imbalance as ASEAN airlines can fly to China only originally 
from points in their own territory, while China can connect any point in their 
domestic hinterland with any point in ASEAN.‖148  
The lesson that ASEAN can learn from the EU is that the unlimited 7
th
 
freedom is permitted by the EU‘s Third Package and the ECJ‘s ―open skies‖ 
decision so that EU airlines can operate from any EU point to any US point if 





 freedom operations for all airlines from both sides.‖149 
Logically, ASEAN needs to discuss the 7th freedom in order to redress the 
imbalance with China. 
At the same time, the inherent reluctance to 7
th
 freedom operations for 
passengers should not be overlooked. 7
th
 freedom for passengers is typically 
viewed as a serious threat to local air carriers.
150
 Most ASEAN states would 
not move toward relaxing the 7
th
 freedom without a tangible benefit for their 
national carriers or people. Given the circumstances, a modest introduction of 
7
th
 freedom operations (such as allowing 7
th
 freedom only when there were 
previously no direct flights) could be a way to initiate discussion.
151
 
Overall, the ASEAN Single Aviation Market model should be praised 
for its relatively speedy acceptance by member states and regarded as a fairly 
good and realistic example of what regional liberalization can achieve. 
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 Saraswati & Hanaoka, supra note 142 at 13. 
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 Tan ―SAM in ASEAN‖, supra note 104 at 24-25. 
150
 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, ―Prospects for a Single Aviation Market in Southeast Asia‖ (2009) 34 
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2.4 Other Regional Liberalization Models 
In this section, other regional liberalization models are discussed with a 
focus on the key features of market access and ownership and control 
restrictions, along with a brief discussion of the impediments to each regional 
liberalization model.  
 
2.4.1 Australia-New Zealand Single Aviation Market 
Clearly, the formation of the Australia-New Zealand Single Aviation 
Market corresponded to the bilateral approach given that there are only these 
two countries involved. However, it is worth pausing to examine how the 
Australia-New Zealand SAM has developed since it is a truly advanced model. 
Australia and New Zealand have been actively cooperating in many areas 
including air transportation because of their geographical proximity, shared 
colonial history and consequential regional interdependence.
152
 
The two countries signed the Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (CER) covering goods and services that came into effect in 1983 
and expanded this even further with the CER Trade in Services Protocol in 
1988. However, the CER never included civil aviation and, consequently, the 
liberalization of air transportation between Australia and New Zealand was 
dealt with through bilateral air services agreements.
153
 
The integration of air transportation between the two countries has been 
significantly affected by the deregulation of the domestic aviation market and 
                                           
152
 Jeffrey Goh, The Single Aviation Market of Australia and New Zealand (London: 
Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at 43. [Goh, ―Australia and New Zealand‖]. 
153
 CAPA, ―Final Report‖ supra note 2 at 52. 
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the privatization of national airlines.
154
 In Australia, the domestic aviation 
market was deregulated in 1990, and state-owned Qantas was fully privatized 
in 1995. In New Zealand, meanwhile, deregulation of the domestic market 
took place in 1983, and state-owned Air New Zealand (ANZ) became a 
private company in 1989.
155
 
In July 1992, Australia and New Zealand signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding aiming to create a single aviation market in three stages from 
1992 to 1994.
156
 Although the two countries had trouble adhering to the 
schedule outlined in the 1992 MOU,
157
 they did make some progress on 
domestic access issues later through the 1996 Single Aviation Market 
Arrangements. Finally, Australia and New Zealand signed a new Air Services 
Agreement in 2002 that replaced all previous arrangements.
158
 
Through the removal of all restrictions on air services between, within, 
and beyond the two countries for Australian and New Zealand airlines (thus, 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th freedoms for passenger and cargo 
flights and 7th freedom only for cargo flights), the 2002 Air Services 
Agreement created a single aviation market.  
However, the MoU signed by the two states in November 2000 provides 
that, in the event that Australia grants the airline(s) of a third party 7th 
freedom operations for passengers, both Australia and New Zealand would 
grant 7th freedom operations for passengers to the airline(s) of each party that 
                                           
154





 Similar to the EU‘s gradual approach, the original plan was to increase market access 
annually, culminating in the removal of all route and capacity restrictions between the two 
countries and full access to each other‘s domestic markets by 1994. 
157
 See CAPA, ―Final Report‖ supra note 2 at 52. 
158
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Air Services Arrangements; and the 1996 Single Aviation Market Arrangements. 
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have been designated under the agreement.
159
 For instance, if Singapore 
Airlines is allowed to operate 7th freedom flights from Australia (such as 
Sydney to Jakarta), Air New Zealand can do the same, and Qantas can start to 
operate 7th freedom flights from New Zealand (such as Auckland to Los 
Angeles). 
It is important to note that the 5
th
 freedom is not unlimited due to the 
involvement of third countries. For instance, since the air services agreement 
between Australia and Korea is not an open skies agreement (that is, there is a 




 freedom operations), Air New Zealand 
cannot exercise unlimited 5
th
 freedom (Auckland–Sydney–Seoul routes). By 
the same token, the 7
th
 freedom was excluded from the 2002 agreement. Thus, 
the relevant privileges are strictly limited to activities within the two countries. 





 freedoms), a difference arising simply because of the number of member 




 freedoms as 
long as the origins and destinations are within the EU single aviation market, 
the air services agreement between Australia and New Zealand only involves 
two countries and thus cannot deal with the traffic rights of third countries. 
The 2002 Air Services Agreement defines two types of airlines: namely, 
designated airlines
160
 and SAM airlines. While designated airlines can operate 
1st freedom to 6th freedom, 7th freedom (only for cargo) and 8th freedom, 
SAM airlines can operate 1st freedom to 4th freedom and have full cabotage 
rights (8th freedom and 9th freedom) in the other party‘s market.  The SAM 
                                           
159
 CAPA, ―Final Report‖ supra note 2 at 53. 
160
 See ibid at 53 (noting that designated airlines must be 1) incorporated and have its 
principal place of business in the territory of the Party concerned and 2) effectively controlled 
by that Party, its nationals or both.) 
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airline is conceptually similar to the EU community carrier. An airline is 
entitled to be a SAM airline if 1) it is majority owned and effectively 
controlled by nationals of either or both states (Australia and New Zealand), 2) 
the chairperson of the airline and at least two-thirds of its board members are 
nationals of either state, and 3) the head office is based in the territory of one 
of the states.  
The unique character of the Australia-New Zealand SAM might be 
related to non-intervention with respect to external relations. The privileges of 
the SAM airlines are strictly limited to activities within the two countries, and 
the Australia-New Zealand Air Services Agreement does not include 
provisions for horizontal agreement the way the EU arrangement does. In 
other words, despite the completion of an internal single aviation market, 





2.4.2 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)’s Initiative  
The 2001 APEC Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of 
International Air Transport (MALIAT) is a plurilateral agreement (that is, an 
agreement amongst several like-minded states that is open for others to join)
162
 
aiming for a multilateral open skies arrangement. MALIAT was the first 
modern multilateral open skies agreement that deals with both the main pillars 
of liberalization: relaxation of market access and of ownership and control. 
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The key features of MALIAT regarding market access are multiple 
airline designation, unrestricted route schedules, unrestricted traffic rights 
including fifth freedom passenger services and seventh freedom cargo services, 
and unrestricted capacity and frequency.
163
 (MALIAT‘s innovative approach 
to liberalizing the traditional ownership requirement restrictions will be 
discussed in Chapter 4: Ownership and Control Issues in Northeast Asia.) 
But contrary to early optimism, MALIAT has not been widely accepted. 
There are only nine contracting states to the agreement (most of which are not 
major economies except the US)
164
. Simply put, two of the main reasons for 
low acceptance were inherent in the very nature of MALIAT—it was 
multilateral, and it was liberal.
165
 More specifically, as Alan Tan points out, 
there are three multi-faceted reasons why most APEC economies have not 
ratified MALIAT: 1) countries like China are not prepared to enter into an 
―open skies‖ relationship with the US; 2) most APEC countries are not willing 
to abandon the ―substantial ownership‖ restriction (discussed in Chapter 4); 
and 3) the possibility of unlimited fifth freedom for the carriers of other 




Indeed, resistance to MALIAT has a great deal to do with its 
liberalization of fifth freedom routes and the presence of Singapore and the US 
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Transport in Asia‖ in David Duval, ed., Air Transport in the Asia Pacific (Burlington: Ashgate, 




 This means that any MALIAT party would have to 
grant, say, (since this is an example) Singapore Airlines full fifth-freedom 
services between its cities and the US, e.g. Singapore–Shanghai–LA or 
Singapore–Seoul–New York (all routes without capacity or frequency 
restrictions for Singapore Airlines). In return, Singapore, as a small market 
and because of its location in Southeast Asia, would not be able to offer the 
Northeast Asian airlines a viable fifth freedom operation to the U.S. Thus, 
states in the Asia-Pacific region with larger markets (that is, a bigger 




China, Japan, and Korea are member economies of APEC, but none of 
them is a contracting state to MALIAT, and for the above reasons, there is no 
sign that they are interested in the agreement.
169
 For such larger economies in 
APEC, the unlimited fifth freedom provision in MALIAT is something from 
which they have much to lose but little to gain. In fact, ―MALIAT‘s 
remarkable boldness in removing fifth freedom restriction ended up being its 
own undoing.‖170  
Two parties to MALIAT, New Zealand and the US, made an effort to 
keep the agreement relevant at the ICAO Sixth Worldwide Air Transport 
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 Indeed, the Transport Conference realistically 
represented the best opportunity in recent times for MALIAT to reach wider 
acceptance.
172
 But despite this effort, no substantial progress was made to 
further liberalize market access through MALIAT.
173
 Interestingly, however, 
attention was drawn to the fact that states may join MALIAT on a cargo-only 
basis.
174





2.4.3 Regional Liberalization in the League of Arab States 
The League of Arab States, which consists of 22 Arab countries located 
in the Middle East and Africa, has discussed liberalizing intra-regional air 
transport services. The Arab Civil Aviation Commission (ACAC) was 
established in June 1996 as a regional organization for coordination and 
cooperation in the area of aviation among Arab countries. The ACAC devised 
the Intra-Arab Freedoms of the Air Program in 2000 and prepared a timetable 
for gradual liberalization in four stages as follows: 
Phase / Starting Point Passenger Cargo 
Phase 1 / November 
2000 
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Phase 2 / March 2003 Deregulating 3rd and 4th freedom 
rights for passenger traffic by 
allocating capacity of 60% and 40% 
between the parties 
 
Phase 3 / March 2005 Unrestricted deregulation of 3rd and 
4th freedom rights for passenger 
traffic 
 
Phase 4 / March 2007 Deregulating 5th freedom rights  




In 2004, the League of Arab States adopted the Agreement for the 
Liberalization of Air Transport between the Arab States in Damascus, Syria. 
The Agreement required at least five countries‘ acceptance to come into effect, 




With regard to market access, the 2004 Damascus Agreement allows 
designated air carriers to enjoy unlimited 3rd, 4th, and 5th freedom flights 
among parties to the agreement.
178
 Whereas the ASEAN SAM took a gradual 
or incremental approach (from sub-region to whole region and from secondary 
cities to capital cities and eventually to all cities), the Damascus Agreement 
opted for swift change (including full 5th freedom from the beginning). 
In terms of ownership and control, the Damascus Agreement also allows 
for the creation of Arab ―community carriers‖179 in addition to traditional air 
carriers with substantial ownership and effective control reposed in the 
designating state or its nationals. Thus, there is the potential for forming new 
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regional carriers that are owned by a group of states or their nationals and 
serving points among these states.
180
 
Even though a fairly liberal regional agreement has been adopted, actual 
acceptance by states has been slow. According to publicly available sources, 
only eight countries (out of 22 countries in the Arab League) have ratified the 
Damascus Convention so far.
181
 One of the main reasons for the lack of state 
interest in the agreement is the unequal strengths of the various state-owned 
carriers in the region.
182
 Moreover, the competitive gap has been increasing 
between premier air carriers (Dubai-based Emirates, Abu Dhabi-based Etihad, 
and Doha-based Qatar Airways) and the other traditional flag carriers in the 
region. While those premier air carriers are making rapid progress with their 
competitive hub airports, new aircraft, and aggressive marketing campaigns, 
the other mostly state-owned traditional flag carriers such as Saudi Arabian 
Airlines, Egypt Air, Royal Jordanian Airlines and Royal Air Maroc are losing 
market share. 
Emirates, Etihad, and Qatar Airways are typical ―6th freedom‖ carriers. 
Put simply, 6
th
 freedom carriers effectively regard geographically strategic 
―hub‖ airports as a transit stop and make use of liberalized 3rd and 4th freedom 
rights to operate numerous ―spokes.‖183 As a result, many states with larger 




 freedom rights to smaller 
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states with good location and strong airlines. Together with resistance to the 
―6th freedom‖ carriers, the unlimited 5th freedom permitted by the Damascus 
Agreement is a great concern for bigger states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. If 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt ratify the Damascus Agreement, it means that 
Emirates and Etihad, two formidable airlines in the UAE, could operate trunk 
routes such as Dubai-Riyadh–Cairo or Abu Dhabi-Jeddah–Cairo, which would 
be undesirable for the relatively uncompetitive airlines Saudi Arabian Airlines 
and Egypt Air. 
Despite steady efforts to push the implementation of the Damascus 
Agreement
184
, the imbalance of aviation competitiveness in the region will not 
be redressed in the foreseeable future, which will remain an obstacle on the 
road to a single aviation market for Arab countries. 
 
2.4.4 Regional Liberalization in Latin America 
Latin America is a vast continent (Latin America and the Caribbean are 
approximately five times larger than the EU).
185
 Understandably, regional 
liberalization in Latin America has mainly developed on a sub-regional basis. 
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 Latin America and Caribbean (20.44 million sq km) and the European Union (4.32 million 
sq km). See online: <http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/compare/European-
Union/Latin-America-and-Caribbean>. 
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Broadly, three sub-regional groups have formed air transport agreements for 
intra-regional liberalization; namely, the Decision on Integration of Air 
Transport of the Andean Community (CAN, then Andean Pact) (1991); the 
Agreement on Sub-regional Air Services (Fortaleza Agreement) of the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) (1996); and the Air Transport 
Agreement of the Association of Caribbean States (2004). Apart from the sub-
regional agreements, the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC) 
has spearheaded the adoption of an ambitious open skies agreement covering 
the whole of Latin America. 
The Andean Community of Nations is currently composed of Bolivia, 
















Bolivia 1,098,580 10,556 30,600 2,867 
Columbia 1,138,910 48,320 378,100 7,825 
Ecuador 283,560 15,740 90,020 5,720 
Peru 1,285,220 30,380 202,300 6,659 
Andean 
Community 
3,806,270 104,996 701,020 5,757 
Table 2-10 Basic Indicators for Andean Community (2014) 
 
Since the adoption in 1991 of Decision 297, which provides the 
framework for regional air transport market liberalization, there has been 
gradual progress.
187
 In 2004, the Commission of the Andean Community of 
                                           
186
 The original Andean Pact was established in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
and Peru. In 1973, its sixth member, Venezuela joined the pact, but Chile withdrew in 1976. In 
2006, Venezuela announced its withdrawal.  
187
 See ICAO, ―Evolution of the Liberalization of the Services of Air Transport in the 
Services of Air Transport in the State Members of the Latin American Civil Aviation 
Commission – LACAC‖, ICAO Doc A36-WP/282 (21 September 2007) (Presented by the 
Latin American Civil Aviation Commission) at 3, online: 
121 
Nations issued Decision 582, which allows free market access for intra–sub-
regional air transport for airlines of member states.
188
 Advanced regional 
liberalization is taking place in the Andean Community including cabotage 
rights.
189
 While the initiatives have been ambitious, the limited number of 
countries involved limits its reach. Interestingly, there has been discussion 
about the possibility of negotiating as a group with MERCOSUR (see below) 
in order to broaden the scope to the entire South American region.
190
 
MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del Sur, or Southern Common Market) 
is a sub-regional bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. The Fortaleza Agreement (1996), the first agreement on air 
services negotiated by MERCOSUR countries, allows freedoms of the air for 
intra-regional traffic on routes which are not served by existing bilateral 
agreements.
191
 In addition to all the official MERCOSUR member states 
except Venezuela, three associated member states, Bolivia, Chile and Peru, are 
contracting states to the Fortaleza Agreement. 
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Argentina 2,780,400 43,669 536,155 12,778 
Bolivia 1,098,580 10,556 30,600 2,867 
Brazil 8,515,767 202,656 2,244,000  11,067 
Chile 756,096 17,819 264,095 14,911 
Paraguay 406,752 6,800 45,901 6,758 
Peru 1,285,220  30,380 202,300 6,659 












Table 2-11 Basic Indicators for the Parties of the Fortaleza Agreement  
 
The Fortaleza Agreement (1996) would seem to be a pivotal regional 
liberalization model in Latin America mainly because of its membership, 
which includes larger regional economies, Argentina and Brazil in particular, 
along with Chile, which is home to LAN, the biggest and most successful 
airline in the region. Nevertheless, it is fairly restrictive compared to the 
Andean Decisions. First, the Fortaleza Agreement only deals with the 1st to 
4th freedoms. Second, all bilateral agreements between member states are still 
in place and have not been replaced by a regional framework.
192
  
Given the many scattered islands of which it is composed, the Caribbean 
is an area that is particularly dependent on air transport.
193
 The Caribbean 
States Association (consisting of 28 states
194
) adopted the Air Transport 
Agreement among its members and associated states in 2004.
195
 The 
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Caribbean Air Transport Agreement (2004) is the basic instrument for 
liberalizing air services among its member states.
196
 Although traffic rights 
are fairly liberalized (granting the five freedoms of the air)
197
 and the concept 
of the Caribbean community carrier has been adopted
198
, the Caribbean Air 
Transport Agreement does not replace bilateral agreements between member 
states, just as with the Fortaleza Agreement.
199
  
More importantly, actual acceptance of the Agreement (that is, 
ratification) has been slow. According to publicly available sources, only eight 
states and two territories are contracting parties to the Caribbean Air Transport 
Agreement (2004).
200
 The fact that Cuba (the most populous island state in 
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 The Caribbean Air Transport Agreement (2004)  
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200
 See ICAO, ―Regional/Plurilateral Agreements and Arrangements for Liberalization‖ 
(updated 22 July 2009), online:< 
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Jamaica, Nicaragua**, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis*, Saint Lucia*, Saint 
124 
the Caribbean with approximately 11 million people) and Jamaica (2.7 million) 
are parties to the Agreement is hopeful. However, other populous and 
relatively rich states such as the Dominican Republic (9.7 million) and 
Trinidad and Tobago (1.3 million with more than US$20,000 GDP per capita) 
are missing from the agreement. Not surprisingly, Panama—home to Copa 
Airlines, the most competitive airline in the region—has ratified the Caribbean 
Air Transport Agreement (2004). Indeed, Panama‘s presence in the agreement, 
which would permit Copa Airlines to engage in unlimited five freedom 
operations in the region, seems to be the root cause of other states‘ hesitation 
to join the Caribbean Air Transport Agreement.
201
 
On the broad regional level (but not including the most Caribbean island 
states), the Ad Hoc Group of the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission 
(LACAC) (consisting of 22 member states
202
) was established in 2010 to draft 
and propose an open skies agreement for Latin America.
203
 The goal was a 
greater regional liberalization which can be achieved among Latin American 
countries as a whole rather than fragmented approach.
204
 LACAC member 
states embraced the draft agreement and enacted the Multilateral Open Skies 
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Agreement for Member States of the Latin American Civil Aviation 
Commission (LACAC Agreement) at the 14
th
 LACAC Ordinary Assembly in 
Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, in 2010.
205
  
The LACAC initiative embodies the most liberal position in the 
region.
206
 The LACAC Agreement explicitly allows unlimited traffic rights up 
to the 6th freedom.
207
 Also, member states can specify their level of openness 
by way of reserving separate paragraphs that grant the 7th freedom for cargo 
services alone, the 7th freedom for combined passenger and cargo services, 
and the right to cabotage.
208
  
The LACAC Agreement is open for ratification by all LACAC member 
states. However, acceptance has been slow, and many states have merely 
signed the agreement without ratifying it. The Latin American Civil Aviation 
Commission confirmed that nine states (namely, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and 
Uruguay) have signed the LACAC Agreement.
209
 According to publicly 
available sources, however, none of them have ratified the agreement yet.
210
 
Moreover, seven states (out of the nine signatories) have chosen to reserve 
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 ICAO, ―Developments in the Liberalization of International Air Transport Services in the 
Latin American Region‖ (5 March 2013) (Presented by LACAC), online: 
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Article 2 (Granting of Rights)
211
 of the agreement. Thus, although the 
LACAC agreement (2010) is ambitious, it has a long way to go before it can 
have a real impact on the region.  
In 2008, the Latin American states established the Union of South 
American Nations
212
 as part of the continuing process of South American 
integration. If Latin American states share the vision of forging an economic 
union and the role of the Union of South American Nations becomes more 
substantial, it is conceivable that more states will agree to accept the LACAC 
Agreement as part of economic integration. 
Meanwhile, more substantial liberalization has been carried out by 
airlines with respect to ownership and control restrictions. By way of 
establishing joint ventures with local interests (LAN Airlines‘ subsidiaries in 
Argentina, Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru) and creating holding companies for 
multiple airlines (LATAM Airlines Group S.A. for LAN Airlines and TAM 
Airlines and Avianca Holdings S.A. for Avianca and TACA Airlines), we are 
witnessing substantial relaxation of ownership and control rules. 
As AirAsia takes advantage of the intangible benefits of regional 
cooperation, liberalization, and integration in ASEAN (that is, the more 
relaxed ―effective control‖ inquiries, see section 2.3.3 Benefits of the ASEAN 
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Single Aviation Market), some Latin American airlines (particularly LAN 
Airlines) have also adroitly utilized these intangible benefits. (This will be 
further discussed in section 4.4 Airlines‘ Response to Ownership and Control 
Restrictions.)  
 
2.4.5 Regional Liberalization in the Pacific Islands 
At the request of the ministers of the Pacific Islands Forum in 1998, the 
Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement (PIASA) was developed and finally 
endorsed for signature at the 2003 Pacific Forum Leaders meeting.
213 
PIASA 
is designed to gradually replace the existing system of bilateral air services 
agreements between the 14 island members
214
 of the Pacific Islands Forum 
with one cooperative agreement to liberalize air services.
215
 By setting three 





Market Access Ownership and Control 
Six months after the 
agreement comes 
into force 
3rd, 4th and 6th freedoms 
are liberalized. 
Community carrier is 
allowed. 
Permits a state with no 
existing flag carrier to 
designate another country's 
airline, so long as its place of 
residence and principal place 
of business is in the territory 
of the designating state. 
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 Christopher Findlay, Peter Forsyth & John King, ―Developments in Pacific Islands‘ Air 
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Twelve months after 
the agreement comes 
into force 
5th freedom rights 
amongst the parties are 
liberalized. 
No change 
Thirty months after 
the agreement comes 
into force 
5th freedoms on routes to 
non-members of the 
agreement are open to all 
member airlines (subject 
to the bilateral agreements 
with the non-member 
states). Australia and New 
Zealand may accede to 
the agreement only at the 
beginning of the third 
phase. 
Extending the earlier use of 
place of residence and 
business to all member states 




The step-by-step scheme allows governments and airlines to adapt 
gradually as the system is introduced incrementally.
217
 Since the Pacific 
region is characterized by low density and remoteness, which make the routes 




PIASA took effect in October 2007. However, the non-adherence to the 
agreement by Fiji, the central node of the regional network
219
 and a relatively 
large economy in the region, is a crucial challenge for PIASA.
220
 Indeed, Fiji 
is the largest of the Pacific island states, the home of around 880,000 of the 
total 3.4 million people living in the region.
221
  
Fiji‘s reluctance to accept PIASA is largely due to the effect that the 
unlimited 5
th
 freedom granted by the agreement would have on the country‘s 
national carrier, Fiji Airways. Fiji has expressed its concern that Fiji Airways 






 See Findlay et al., supra note 213 at 168-169. 
219
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220
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(formerly Air Pacific), a Fiji state-owned company with a minority share held 
by Qantas, would suffer from the unrestricted access to 5
th
 freedom traffic that 
PIASA would provide to other airlines in the region.
222
 Even in a small 
market such as this one, the aero-political aspect of impediments continues to 
prevail. 
 
2.4.6 Regional Liberalization in Africa 
Although air transport plays an important role in the economic 
development of Africa by fostering trade and foreign investments, air services 
in the continent have long been restrictive and inefficient.
223
 In order to 
promote air transport liberalization in Africa, African ministers in charge of 
civil aviation met in Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast, in 1999, and adopted the 
Yamoussoukro Decision.
224
 Essentially, the Yamoussoukro Decision is ―the 
continental agreement with the aim of gradual liberalization of scheduled and 
non-scheduled intra-African air transport services.‖225 
With regard to market access, the Yamoussoukro Decision allows the 
multilateral exchange of up to 5th freedom air traffic rights between any 
member states on a simple notification.
226
 On airline ownership and control, 
Article 6 replaced the traditional ―substantial ownership and effective control‖ 
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with the concept of ―principal place of business and effective regulatory 
control‖. (This concept will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.) Members of 
the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) stated that ―the importance 
of this provision (Article 6) lies in the opportunities it creates for increased 
access to international foreign equity participation in African airlines and the 
possibility of encouraging the restructuring of African airlines through cross-
border capital injection and consolidations.‖227 
As a huge continent with numerous countries (54
228
), it was recognized 
early on that implementation of the Yamoussoukro Decision depended mainly 
on sub-regional initiatives in regional economic groupings.
229
 The East 
African Community (EAC), the common market for East South Africa 
(COMESA), and the South African Development Community (SADC) are 
examples of such regional economic groupings.
230
 
The vast majority of African states (including bigger economies like 
Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria) have already ratified 
the Yamoussoukro Decision
231
, but the Decision is not being put into practice. 
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 Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cap Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d‘Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Southern Sudan , 
Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe 
229
 Charles E. Schlumberger, Open Skies for Africa Implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision 
(Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2010) at 61. [Schlumberger, ―Open Skies for Africa‖]. 
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 See ICAO, ―Regional/Plurilateral Agreements and Arrangements for Liberalization‖ 
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Some countries are failing to implement certain elements of the Decision, 
whilst others are simply ignoring it by continuing to honor traditional 
restrictive bilateral air services agreements with other countries, which is a 
bigger problem.
232
 For instance, it has been reported that only 19 of Ethiopia‘s 
46 bilateral air services agreements with other African states are in accordance 
with the Yamoussoukro Decision.
233
 
The aero-political reasons for ignoring the Yamoussoukro Decision can 
be inferred from Charles Schlumberger‘s summary of the impacts of the 
Decision on the African air transport sector: 
 
- the relative strengthening of a limited number of stronger African 
carriers, such as Ethiopian Airlines and Kenya Airways, that reaped the 
benefits of their comparative advantages in terms of geographical 
location; financial, commercial and managerial strength; and access to 
intercontinental markets; 
- the marginalization of many already weak carriers, some of which 
ultimately disappeared, for instance, Air Tanzania, Nigerian Airways, 
and Cameroon Airlines; 
- the consolidation of networks through the phasing out of a number of 
low-density routes and growth of routes to and from the main hubs, most 
significant in East Africa; 
- the development of fifth freedom traffic, especially in regions and 
                                                                                                              
(updated 22 July 2009), online: 
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 Ibid at 39; see also Ibid at 58 (noting that ―Kenya temporarily refused Ethiopian Airlines 
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country pairs that lacked strong local carriers, often offered by dominant 
carriers at marginal cost, effectively resulting in pressure on regional 
fares, which is forcing locally-based third and fourth freedom carriers to 
accept lower fares; and 
- the significant development of sixth freedom traffic, fostered by the 
liberalization of third and fourth freedom capacities within Africa, and in 




Simply put, the Yamoussoukro Decision has created ―winners‖ and 
―losers‖ just as other regional liberalization models have. While Kenya and 
Ethiopia, for example, have benefited from regional liberalization, it has led to 
the disappearance of already weak national carriers in Nigeria, Cameroon, and 
Tanzania.  
The challenge of African regional liberalization is unique since the 
problem is not ―acceptance‖ but ―implementation.‖ Although there is a call for 
implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision
235
, it seems unlikely that the status 
quo, whereby African states rely on bilateral air services agreements rather 
than the Yamoussoukro Decision, will be altered in the near future. 
 
2.5 Regional Liberalization in Northeast Asia  
It is difficult to make any direct comparisons between the regional 
aviation markets discussed above and Northeast Asian regional liberalization. 
Those regional aviation markets are either well-established single aviation 
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markets or proposed single aviation markets with specific goals and a phased 
timeline. While there is wide variation in terms of actual acceptance, most 
regions have adopted some forms of agreement for intra-regional liberalization, 
often with the prodding of a regional organization like ASEAN or the Arab 
League. In contrast, regional liberalization in Northeast Asia is still at a 
preliminary discussion stage with no dedicated organization tasked with 
promoting the cause. 
 
2.5.1 History 
The possibility of regional liberalization in Northeast Asia was raised in 
the early 2000s.
236
 In June 2006, the prospect of Northeast Asian open skies 
was openly discussed by China, Japan and Korea for the first time when the 
1st International Symposium on Liberalizing Air Transport in Northeast Asia 
was held in Korea. The symposium brought together government policy 
makers, industry experts, and academics from the three countries. 
Participants at the symposium noted the recent substantial increase in 
commerce and tourism among the countries and agreed that creating Northeast 
Asian open skies would be ultimately advantageous for all three countries by 
increasing the movement of people and goods and reducing logistics costs. 
The Symposium was held for five consecutive years including the inaugural 
event: 2007 (Tokyo, Japan), 2008 (Guizhou, China), 2009 (Busan, Korea), and 
2010 (Osaka, Japan). However, the negotiations have not moved forward, and 
the regular annual symposium was halted in 2011. 
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On a bilateral level, there has been some progress since then such as the 
Korea-Japan open skies agreement in 2007 (which was partially triggered by 
the discussions for regional liberalization in Northeast Asia). In August 2012, 
China and Japan concluded a much more liberalized air services agreement 
allowing designated carriers to operate an unlimited number of passenger and 
cargo flights between any Chinese and Japanese cities except Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Tokyo. While this quasi open skies agreement did not include 
significantly expanded services to the major cities on each side (owing to slot 
restrictions), it opened the door for an explosion in services to and from 
secondary cities.
237
 With regard to China-Korea relations, the air services 
consultation in June 2006, which was held a week after the 1st International 
Symposium on Liberalizing Air Transport in Northeast Asia, led to some 
partial liberalization, such as opening up China‘s Shandong province. (See 
sections 3.2 National Policy on Market Access in International Air Transport 
and 3.3 Bilateral Positions on Market Access.) 
Nevertheless, the reality is that the speed and scope of Northeast Asian 
open skies have not kept up with expectations. At the moment, it is not 
possible to assert that substantial change is occurring. As discussed below, 
however, there are solid reasons to focus on Northeast Asian open skies. 
 
2.5.2 Justifications 
Broadly, there are five main factors that provide a justification for 
Northeast Asian open skies. First is the fact that China, Korea, and Japan rely 
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heavily on each other‘s markets and influence each other in significant ways. 
Take, for example, the export markets for China, Japan and Korea. For China, 
Japan and Korea ranked as the third and fourth largest export markets (after 
the US and Hong Kong) in 2012. For Japan, China and Korea ranked first and 
third. For Korea, China and Japan ranked first and third.
238
 
A similar picture can be seen in the number of foreign visitors. For 
China, Koreans and Japanese ranked first and second in terms of the number 
of visitors in 2013.
239
 For Japan, Korean and Chinese visitors ranked first and 
third (Taiwan being second).
240
 For Korea, Chinese and Japanese visitors 
ranked first and second.
241
 Importantly, while Chinese visitors in 2012 
represented 23 percent of all visitor arrivals to Korea, they accounted for 40 
percent of all inbound tourists to Korea in 2014.
242
 Given that there is no 
means of land transportation between the three countries and that the few sea 
routes (including Weihei, China, to Incheon, Korea, and Fukuoka, Japan, to 
Busan, Korea) have limited capacity and involve relatively significant travel 
time, air transport is the key means of inter-state travel in the region. 
Second, as explained above, aviation blocs are emerging or have already 
emerged in most regions of the world. Due to the advantages of regional 
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liberalization243 and the unpopularity of global multilateral agreements, it 
seems very likely that the regional approach will be adopted more commonly 
and that the scope of regional liberalization will increase. One possible 
outcome of such collaboration is the creation of an aviation bloc that can 
increase the bargaining power of the bloc‘s members when negotiating with 
other parties (whether states or aviation blocs). If China, Japan, and Korea 
succeed in forming an aviation bloc, they too will be better able to respond 
with one voice to unilateral actions from other aviation blocs or larger 
countries and effectively protect their common interests. 
Third, it is important to note that there are only three parties in these 
negotiations. This is an ideal number for efficient negotiations, and 
furthermore the three countries already have in place more than 50 trilateral 
consultative mechanisms on various matters including 18 ministerial meetings 
and over 100 cooperative projects in addition to the annual Trilateral 
Summit.244 In particular, the China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
has been under negotiation since 2012 for the countries‘ mutual economic 
benefit
245
, and the China-Japan-Korea Ministerial Conference on Transport 
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 Shannon Tiezzi, ―China-Japan-South Korea Hold FTA Talks Despite Political Tension‖ 
The Diplomat, (5 March 2014), online: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-japan-south-
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and Logistics has been held every two years since 2006.
246
 
Fourth, Northeast Asia is one of the few regions where a stable, 
developed economy coexists with enormous potential for economic growth. 
According to the World Bank, China‘s GDP in 2013 ranked number two in the 
world, Japan number three, and Korea number fourteen
247
, while the annual 
growth rate in 2013 was 7.7% in China, 1.5% in Japan and 3.0% in Korea.
248
 
The economic strengths of the three countries are fairly evenly matched. This 
is a comparatively advantageous environment since the experience of other 
aviation blocs shows that an imbalance in the economic competitiveness of the 
states involved creates too many obstacles to overcome. But Northeast Asian 
open skies, on the other hand, would enjoy considerable synergy. 
Last but not least, national carriers are by and large becoming more 
competitive, and LCCs are growing quickly in Northeast Asia. Seven legacy 
carriers in the region – namely, Air China, China Eastern, China Southern, 
Korean Air, Asiana Airlines, Japan Airlines, and All Nippon Airways (or ANA) 
– have positioned themselves as leading air carriers not only in Asia but also in 
the world. All of them are members of the branded global alliances (Skyteam, 
Star Alliance, and Oneworld) and generally have a high rank in fleet number, 
capacity and connectivity. (See the snapshot of the seven carriers) 
 
                                                                                                              
korea-hold-fta-talks-despite-political-tension>  (noting that ―South Korea‘s chief negotiator, 
Assistant Trade Minister Woo Tae-hee told, ―The three countries are well aware of the fact that 
the Korea-China-Japan FTA will stimulate the countries‘ economic growth while also 
contributing to regional integration.‖‖).  
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In addition, all three countries are witnessing the emergence and 




However, Northeast Asian open skies face complicated impediments, 
which include not only purely aviation-related issues but also political and 
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historical issues. Indeed, some Chinese scholars have suggested that political 




Conflicts rooted in political and historical disagreements are nothing 
new in the region. Tension still remains among the three states, and the 
antagonism continues. These are not negligible risk factors for sustainable 
developments in the Northeast Asian aviation market, and they are in, 
particular, major barriers for Northeast Asian open skies. For instance, when a 
territorial dispute flared up between China and Japan over uninhabited islands 
(Diaoyu in Chinese and Senkaku in Japanese) in September 2012, 18,800 
tickets for travel between the two countries with All Nippon Airways (which 
accounts for about 24% of the capacity in the China-Japan aviation market) 
were immediately cancelled.
251
 Subsequently, most air carriers operating 
between China and Japan cut their capacity.
252
 
With respect to more aviation-related issues, the asymmetry between the 
three states is a fundamental obstacle to Northeast Asian open skies. Broadly 
speaking, there are three aspects to this asymmetry: different geographical 




                                           
250
 Zheng Xingwu, ―China‘s Approaches to Aviation Market Liberalization in Northeast Asia: 
An Academic Viewpoint‖ in Yeon Myung Kim et al. eds., Negotiating Strategies for Creating 
a Liberalized Air Transport Bloc in Northeast Asia (Ilsan: Korea Transport Institute, 2009) 
295 at 321.  
251
 CAPA, ―China's territorial disputes with Japan and the Philippines see traffic dips‖ (21 





 Yeon Myung Kim & Sean Seungho Lee ―Chapter 9 Air Transport in Korea and Northeast 
Asia‖ in The Impacts and Benefits of Structural Reforms in the Transport, Energy and 
Telecommunications Sector (Singapore: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2011) 219 at 226. 
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The imbalance arising from geographical location becomes significant in 
the context of the lucrative China-US market. Both Japan and Korea are 
strategically located for the China-US market. Moreover, there is no open 
skies agreement between China and the US. Although the US has initiated 
negotiations with China about open skies, China shows no signs of moving 
toward an open skies agreement with the US in the near term.
254
 
Two stories are told to explain why China and the US have not reached 
an open skies agreement. China argues that since there are many unused 
frequencies for Chinese carriers, largely due to the visa restrictions on Chinese 
wanting to travel to the US, it does not feel the need to open up the China-US 
aviation market.
255
 Li Jiaxiang, an influential aviation policymaker in China, 
stated in his 2008 book Route to Fly that the US government‘s strict visa 
policies and complicated immigration procedures put Chinese airlines at a 
serious disadvantage. Li also put an emphasis on the 1:4 ratio of Chinese 
nationals going to the US to US nationals going to China in the US-China 
aviation market at the time.
256
 
However, China‘s ―one-route-one-airline policy‖ is also blamed for the 
low market share of Chinese carriers.
257
 This policy means that only one 
Chinese carrier is designated for each international route (though some 
changes have been noticed recently—see section 3.2.2.1 Protecting the Big 
Three Airlines). The policy is based on the national champion theory, which 
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presumes that ―with suppressed competition in domestic markets, firms can 
achieve large scales which enable them to obtain large market shares and 
profits in export markets.‖258 
In contrast with the Chinese plan, however, the one-route-one-airline 
policy has created more inefficiency and allowed foreign carriers to seize a 
greater market share on China–US routes. 259  Taking the Shanghai-Los 
Angeles route as one example, Delta will be the third US carrier to operate the 
route on a daily basis from July 2015, following United Airlines and American 
Airlines with one daily service each.
260
 However, China Eastern is the sole 
Chinese carrier operating one daily flight on the route according to the one-
route-one-airline policy. As a consequence, Chinese carriers on the route are 




Indeed, there are some sectors—including the airline industry—in which 
the national champion theory rarely plays out, and competition is the very 
thing that brings innovation and improvements in the long run.
262
 Although 
there are signs that China is adjusting its aviation policy (see section 3.2.2 
China), the country is unlikely to reassess its attitude toward open skies with 
the US in the near future.
263
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In the absence of a China-US open skies agreement, Northeast Asian 
open skies entailing the exchange or generous or unlimited third and fourth 
freedom rights could enable Japanese and Korean carriers to use Tokyo and 
Incheon as gateway hubs from China to North America and vice versa.
264
 
This is a major hurdle to Northeast Asian open skies as illustrated below: 
 
The Northeast Asia Air Transportation Bloc may divert more China-US 
traffic via China-Japan or China-Korea to US, which will reduce the 
amount of both air traffic and revenues of airlines from China. Thus the 
airlines from China may look at the bloc as an ‗I lose-you win‘ game, 
which must lead to strong opposition from those airlines. Furthermore 
the diversion will strengthen the East Asia hub positions of NRT (Tokyo) 
and ICN (Seoul), which could block the efforts of PEK (Beijing) and 
PVG (Shanghai) to become main hubs in East Asia. These airports may 
join in the opposition camp. Although there are prosperous bilateral 
aviation markets in this region, the unbalanced distribution of benefits 





The varying competitiveness of national carriers in Northeast Asia is 
another impediment. Although the gap of the competitiveness has been 
narrowed, China claims that Chinese air carriers‘ insufficient competitiveness 
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is a major barrier to reaching open skies agreements.
266
 It is important to note 
that Li Jiaxiang, Director of the General Administration of Civil Aviation, 
explained his dream of transforming Air China into an ―international super-
carrier‖ in his book Route to Fly.267 Given that Korean and Japanese carriers, 
especially Korean Air, actively supply the China-US market by 6th freedom 
operations (e.g. Beijing-Seoul-Los Angeles)
268
, Northeast Asian open skies 
might be seen as a threat to Air China‘s ambitions of becoming an 
international super carrier. 
Lastly is the issue of varying market sizes, which should come as no 
surprise. China has many more airports than Japan and Korea, and this number 
continues to increase.
269
 This may prompt Chinese carriers to be concerned 
that the network benefits of Northeast Asian open skies will primarily be 
enjoyed by Japanese and Korean airlines, as they will be able to connect more 




 2.5.4 Paths to Northeast Asian Open Skies 
Admittedly, we have yet to see any compromises made or substantial 
results achieved involving Northeast Asian open skies. While sufficient 
justification can be provided for Northeast Asian open skies, it is not yet 
adequate to overcome the serious impediments to liberalization in the region. 
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It is no secret that China, the biggest market and the least liberalized state, 
holds the key to Northeast Asian open skies. China still takes an extremely 
cautious stance in multilateral and regional approaches to air transport 
liberalization and is reluctant to engage in discussions about it. 
As explored in this chapter, it is no surprise that bigger players are 
resistant to the trend of regional liberalization. Some examples are Indonesia 
in ASEAN, Egypt and Saudi Arabia among the Arab states, Brazil in Latin 
America, Fiji among the Pacific islands, and Nigeria in Africa. In contrast, 
smaller countries with competitive airlines are the drivers of regional 
liberalization. Some examples of this are Singapore in ASEAN, UAE in the 
Arab region, Chile in Latin America, and Ethiopia in Africa. Clearly, they have 
more to gain than to lose in their respective regional liberalization groups. It 
will not be easy to mitigate the deeply embedded aero-political implications of 
regional liberalization. 
In the context of Northeast Asian open skies, the fact is that China has 
more to lose than Japan and Korea combined. We can easily imagine a three-
way dynamic. On one side is Korea, which is motivated to promote open skies; 
on the other is China, which is ambivalent to the idea; and somewhere in the 
middle is Japan, which has a bigger market than Korea but a smaller one than 
China. China‘s assessment about whether (and to what extent) it would benefit 
from regional liberalization in Northeast Asia is the most important factor 
determining the future of a single aviation market in Northeast Asia. 
Meanwhile, China, Japan, and Korea have started to cooperate closely 
on bilateral liberalization in recent years. In fact, one of the three bilateral 
agreements in the region, the Korea-Japan air service agreement, has already 
145 
established open skies, removing all restrictions on Tokyo‘s Narita airport in 
2013. Another bilateral air services agreement between China and Japan is a 
quasi-open skies agreement allowing unlimited 3rd and 4th freedom flights 
except to Beijing, Shanghai, and Tokyo. Thus, the China-Korea air services 
agreement is the only restrictive one among the three bilateral agreements in 
Northeast Asia. While Korea is keenly interested in reaching an open skies 
agreement with China, China is concerned that the formidable Korean Air and 
Asiana will dominate the market.
271
  
Interestingly, Beijing is beginning to appreciate the ―Air India 
Syndrome,‖ by which the Indian flag carrier was protected almost to death, 
letting other carriers become more efficient.
272
 Li Jiaxiang confirmed that the 
regulator plans to study new policies to promote low-cost carriers and also 
urged established airlines to learn from successful low-cost airlines to improve 
management standards and operating efficiency.
273
 (China‘s national aviation 
policy will be discussed in Chapter 3.) 
The future role of LCCs in Northeast Asia cannot be overstated. In 2013, 
LCCs accounted for only 9 percent of intra-Northeast Asia seats compared to 
over 50 percent in Southeast Asia.
274
 This stark difference indirectly shows 
the potential for LCCs in Northeast Asia. Most Northeast Asian LCCs are well 
established now, and more LCCs are in the process of entering the market. 
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 CAPA, ―North Asian LCC, Round 1: Inertia prevails over innovation in 2013‖ Airline 
Leader 18 (Aug-Sep 2013) 36 at 38.  
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(Chapter 3 will further examine LCCs in Northeast Asia.)    
In particular, China-based Spring Airlines is the largest LCC and is 
recognized as one of the most efficient LCCs in Northeast Asia.
275
 It has even 
started a Japanese subsidiary, Spring Airlines Japan (it will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.) Since the new Chinese LCC policy will likely include open skies 
on short-haul routes,
276
 this policy will have tremendous impact on the 
discussion of regional liberalization in Northeast Asia. 
Obviously, the seven major legacy carriers in Northeast Asia will 
continue to play an important role in Northeast Asian open skies. Fu and Oum 
assert that protecting China‘s big three airlines (the largest carriers in Asia and 
the largest carriers in the world within a decade) is like ―treating giants as 
babies.‖277 Once China works harder to reform its aviation policy, change is 
likely to come without delay. Meanwhile, the airline alliances in which 
Northeast Asian legacy carriers participate will play an important role in 




This chapter compared the different regional liberalization models from 
the legal and aero-political perspectives. As demonstrated in this chapter, 
discussions about regional open skies agreements are underway in most parts 
of the world, and regional liberalization is becoming increasingly common. 
This contrasts with the fact that not a single global multilateral approach to the 
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economic aspects of international air transport has ever been successfully 
implemented. 
However, it is clear that regional liberalization is not free from the 
―winners and losers‖ paradigm. Regional liberalization tends to be less 
appealing to bigger countries and more appealing to smaller countries with 
competitive airlines. Thus, in the process of promoting Northeast Asian open 
skies, we must bear in mind the aero-political challenges that liberalization 
commonly faces. 
From the next chapter, the focus will shift to Northeast Asia. Chapter 3: 
Market Access Issues in Northeast Asia will provide an in-depth analysis of 






Chapter 3: Market Access Issues in Northeast Asia 
 
3.1 Market Access Restrictions in International Air Transport 
3.1.1 Overview 
In the context of international trade, market access generally describes 
―the extent to which an imported good or service can compete in another 
market with goods or services made there.‖ 1  As previously discussed, 
however, international air transport has developed separately from general 
governance of international trade mainly because of its exceptional nature. 
Theoretically, one could ask whether the air transport sector is really that 
peculiar, given that air transport could be regarded as trade in services that 
include, among others, banking, telecommunications, and tourism. In fact, 
there is no convincing explanation (at least economically) as to why 
international air transport is so different and why it should be regarded as 
exceptional. But though the justifications for this status are groundless (or 
weak at best), the reality is that the airline industry is likely to retain its 
exceptional status. (See section 1.3 Exceptionalism in Economic Air 
Transport.) 
Nonetheless, understanding the definition of market access under 
international trade law, and especially the WTO‘s General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS), is worthwhile for comparing the similarities and 
differences in the elements of market access in air transport. In particular, 
GATS is recognized as having gone the furthest among the various WTO 
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agreements in seeking to overcome market access impediments caused by 
globalization and the rapid growth of trade in services.
2
 
Although GATS does not explicitly define market access, Article 16 
(Market Access) of GATS lists six types of measures that are prohibited in 
sectors where market access commitments are undertaken.
3
 Interestingly, the 
first three have significant implications for the market access elements of 
international air transport. These three measures—the number of service 
suppliers, the total value of service transactions, and the total number of 
service operations—conceptually match the international air transport 
elements of carrier designation, capacity, and frequency. 
Despite the notable similarities with general trade in services, it is an 
undeniable fact that air transport does have some unique aspects. This 
difference largely derives from the scope of ―market.‖ In air transport, the 
market is traditionally defined as each individual route that connects a point of 
origin to a point of destination (O&D city pair). Indeed, the concept of the 




 General Agreement on Trade in Services, 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S.183, art.16, 33 ILM 
1167 (entered into force 1 January 1995) [GATS].  
Art XVI Market Access 
2. In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a 
Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or on the 
basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as: 
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, 
monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test; 
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical 
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test; 
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service 
output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of quotas or the 
requirement of an economic needs test; 
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular 
service sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are necessary for, and directly 
related to, the supply of a specific service in the form of numerical quotas or the requirement 
of an economic needs test; 
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture through 
which a service supplier may supply a service; and 
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on 
foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment. 
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―freedom of the air,‖ the underlying framework for air transport market access 
that was discussed in Chapter 1, is based on the O&D city pair market 
classification. 
In the following sections, the elements of market access liberalization in 
international air transport will be elaborated. Prior to this explanation, 
however, it is important to grasp the relationship between market access and 
ownership and control requirements in the context of an air services agreement. 
(Ownership and control requirements have related but different implications 
for domestic laws that will be reviewed in Chapter 4.) 
In a nutshell, ownership and control requirements can be regarded as the 
precondition for market access. The crucial prerequisite for market access is 
whether an air carrier is entitled to operate in the market. Since ownership and 
control requirements are essentially the test used to assess entitlement, they are 
directly intertwined with market access. In other words, an airline from State A 
can be designated by State A to enjoy the market access privileges granted by 
State B pursuant to an air services agreement between State A and State B. To 
do so, an airline from State A must satisfy the ownership and control 
conditions under the said air services agreement as well as the national law of 
State A. (Ownership and control issues will be separately discussed in Chapter 
4.) 
 
3.1.2 Direct Market Access Issues 
3.1.2.1 Carrier Designation 
A designated airline means an airline that has been designated and 
authorized in accordance with the bilateral air services agreement in question. 
151 
An airline that satisfies the ownership and control requirements in domestic 
law and the air services agreement is entitled to be a designated airline. There 
are three types of designation systems: single designation (one carrier on each 
side),
4
 dual designation (two carriers on each side),
5




Historically, the Bermuda type 1 agreement, the prototype for many 
bilateral air services agreements, adopted the multiple designation system.
7
 
However, many post-Bermuda I agreements applied the single designation 
system largely because many states had only one international carrier.
8
 States 
with a single international airline were reluctant to accept dual designation or 
multiple designation due to the fear of open competition with countries with 
several international air carriers such as the US.
9
 
The US traditionally insisted on a system of multiple designation by 
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using the language ―carrier or carriers‖ in the carrier designation provision.10 
Even though the language did not limit the number of designated carriers per 
se, many states interpreted the words to mean a maximum of two, and the US 
government continued to designate only as many US carriers as there were 
foreign carriers operating in the relevant bilateral market.
11
 The US 
deregulatory initiative in 1978 clarified the carrier designation provision by 
changing the relevant language to ―as many airlines as it wishes,‖ which more 
clearly indicates unlimited multiple designation.
12
 
As many states started to have more than two international carriers over 
this time period, it was necessary to switch from single designation to dual or 
multiple designation. Since unlimited multiple designation removes a 
fundamental market entry barrier for new entrants, it is one of the most 
important characteristics of market access liberalization. 
 
3.1.2.2 Route Designation 
Most bilateral agreements only have one article in the main text of the 
agreement dealing with the exchange of rights about routes and leave all the 
crucial details to an annex labelled ―Route Schedule.‖13 While the article in 
the main text typically grants the first freedom (overflight) and second 
freedom (technical landing), the remaining freedoms are typically enumerated 
in the annex and an accompanying Memorandum of Understanding, which is 
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The traditional approach limits air transport services to cities named on 
specified route(s).
15
 Departing from the restricted approach, there are various 
approaches to liberalizing the designation of routes, thereby increasing the 
level of market access. Route designation can provide for open entry for the 
third and fourth freedom traffic;
16
 open entry for the fifth freedom traffic; 
explicitly include unlimited sixth freedom;
17
 open seventh freedom for all-
cargo services;
18
 open seventh freedom for passenger services and limited 
cabotage;
19
 and open eighth and ninth freedom rights to parties in both 
international and domestic markets.
20
  
Although air services agreements seldom explicitly use the aviation 
jargon ―freedoms of the air,‖21 these freedoms are conceptually embedded in 
route designation. Since route designation specifies routes (or opens entry to 
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 Ibid. 
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all routes) on which the designated carriers are allowed to operate, it 





3.1.2.3 Capacity and Frequency 
Capacity in air transport is the supply of passenger seats and cargo space 
by airlines, and it can be expressed in the total number of seats or volume of 
cargo space.
23
 Broadly speaking, capacity embodies frequency, the number of 
flights flown over a given time period. Frequency specifically refers to the 
number of flights per day (usually on heavily traveled short-haul routes) or per 
week (usually for less traveled long-haul routes).
24
 There are three types of 




Predetermination is the least liberalized but most widely used type of 
capacity regulation.
26
 It is often called ―Bermuda II type,‖ referring to the air 
services agreement that the US and the UK adopted in 1977, once again, in 
Bermuda. After the UK denounced the Bermuda I Agreement of 1946 due to 
its dissatisfaction over capacity provisions under the agreement, the US and 
the UK reached a new agreement (Bermuda II) that, among other changes,
27
 
specifically limits capacity. Peter Haanappel noted the significance of Article 
                                           
22
 See Figure 1-1 The Nine Freedoms of the Air in Chapter 1  
23




 For details, see ICAO, Policy and Guidance Material on the Economic Regulation of 
International Air Transport, 2008, ICAO Doc 9587. 
26
 See ICAO, ―Template Agreement‖, supra note 4 at 32. 
Article 16 Capacity [Traditional – Predetermination] 
27
 See Brian Havel, Beyond Open Skies: A New Regime for International Aviation (Alphen 
aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International: 2009) at 116 -119. [Havel, ―Open Skies‖]. 
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11, Paragraph 5, of the Bermuda II agreement,
28
 which requires states to 
avoid overcapacity.
29
 Article 11 of the Bermuda II agreement was essentially 
designed to prevent Pan Am and TWA (American carriers that are now both 
defunct) from exercising their traffic rights to a much greater extent than 
British Airways in the North Atlantic market.
30
 
Under a predetermination capacity article, designated airlines may offer 
capacity based on predetermination in which both states jointly agree in 
advance on the total capacity to be offered on each route.
31
 Predetermination 
typically aims to equal competition exactly by splitting capacity fifty-fifty.
32
 
Bermuda 1, as the name suggests, originally comes from the Bermuda 1 
agreement between the US and UK in 1946. Under Bermuda 1, designated 
airlines determine their capacity individually based on the capacity principle 
                                           
28
 Article 11 paragraph 5 of Bermuda II agreement 
(5) The Contracting Parties recognize that airline actions leading to excess capacity or to the 
under provision of capacity can both run counter to the interests of the travelling public. 
Accordingly, in the particular case of combination air services on the North Atlantic routes 
specified in paragraph (1) of Annex 2, they have agreed to establish the procedures set forth in 
Annex 2. With respect to other routes and services, if one Contracting Party believes that the 
operations of a designated airline or airlines of the other Contracting Party have been 
inconsistent with the principles set forth in this Article, it may request consultations pursuant 
to Article 16 (Consultations) for the purpose of reviewing the operations in question to 
determine whether they are in conformity with these principles. If such consultations there 
shall be taken into consideration the operations of all airlines serving the market in question 
and designated by the Contracting Party whose airline or airlines are under review. In the 
Contracting Parties conclude that the operations under review are not in conformity with the 
principles set forth in the Article, they may decide upon appropriate corrective or remedial 
measures, except that, where frequency or capacity limitations are already provided for a 
route specified in Annex 1, the Contracting Parties may not vary those limitations or impose 
additional limitations except by amendment of this Agreement. 
29
 Peter Haanappel, ―Bilateral Air Transport Agreements – 1913-1980‖ (1980) 5 International 




 See ICAO, ―Template Agreement‖, supra note 4 at 33.  
Article 16 Capacity [Traditional – Predetermination]  
32
 Havel, ―Open Skies‖ supra note 27 at 118; See also Havel & Sanchez, ―Aviation Law‖, 
supra note 9 at 103 (explaining that ―[T]he notion that an airline has the primacy claim on the 
custom of its own national is part of a ―managed trade‖ mindset in the supply of international 
air transport services…Managed trade is the use of protectionist artifices such as preset 
restrictions on imports by or from a foreign supplier to favor proportionally the weaker 
domestic supplier.‖). 
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that both states have adopted subject to ex post facto review by both states.
33
 
The capacity principle under the Bermuda 1 agreement states that an airline‘s 
capacity should be primarily determined by traffic demand between the two 
states (third and fourth freedom traffic) and that fifth freedom traffic should be 
only a secondary consideration.
34
 
Compared to many later agreements of the fifty-fifty predetermined type, 
Bermuda 1 could qualify as liberal.
35
 That is, Bermuda 1 initially allows each 
airline the freedom to determine its own capacity based on its analysis of 




Free determination is widely found in open skies agreements. Under a 
free-determination capacity provision, designated airlines can choose what 
capacity to offer without government approval or intervention. Free 
determination is a market-oriented approach, and genuine market access 
liberalization is only possible with this type of capacity provision. 
Indeed, carrier designation, route designation, and capacity (and 
frequency) are three issues that directly determine market access liberalization, 




                                           
33
 See ICAO, ―Template Agreement‖, supra note 4 at 33.  
Article 16 Capacity [Transitional – Bermuda I]  
34
 See Dempsey, ―Air Law‖, supra note 8 at 524; see also Barry Diamond, ―The Bermuda 
Agreement Revisited: A Look at the Past, Present and Future of Bilateral Air Transport 
Agreements‖ (1975) 41 J. Air L. & Com 419 at 444-447.  
35
 Havel, ―Open Skies‖ supra note 27 at 112. 
36
 See ICAO, ―Template Agreement‖, supra note 4 at 33.  
Article 16 Capacity [Transitional – Bermuda I] 
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3.1.3 Indirect Market Access Issues 
For air carriers, the issues of constraints on airport capacity, restrictions 
on airspace use and visa policies are as important for their operation as issues 
related to direct market access. Even in a legally liberalized market in which 
direct market access issues have been more or less solved, air carriers seeking 
new commercial opportunities may encounter serious difficulties due to 
indirect market access issues. 
 
3.1.3.1 Airport Capacity 
The basic problem with constraints on airport capacity is the fact that 
demand exceeds supply for airport use. As growth in air traffic surpasses the 
available runways, parking, and passenger processing capacity in terminals, 
airport slot shortage is becoming an issue in many airports around the world.
37
 
Airport slots are defined as ―specific time periods allotted for an aircraft to 
land or take off at an airport.‖38 
More specifically, airport capacity can be divided into ―airside‖ capacity 
and ―landside‖ capacity. Airside capacity generally refers to the number of 
aircraft operations (takeoffs and landings) that the airport and the supporting 
                                           
37
 ICAO, Slot Allocation, ICAO Doc. ATConf/6-WP/11 (10 December 2012) at 1-2 (noting 
that ―[A]ccording to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the total number of 
capacity constrained airports that have been labelled as a fully-coordinated or Level 3 
Airport(airports where the demand for runway and gate access exceeds the capacity of the 
airport, resulting in the need for slots to be allocated to airlines through the IATA Schedule 
Coordination System) subject to slot allocation under the IATA Schedule Coordination 
System continues to increase: 136 in 2000, 155 in 2010, and by 2012, the number is expected 
to reach 159 (104 in Europe, of which 92 are in the 27 EU Member States, 43 in Asia Pacific, 
and the remaining 11 scattered in the Middle East, North America, and South Africa). In 
addition, 121 airports across the world are experiencing some level of congestion. If traffic 
volumes continue to increase at a pace faster than investment in capacity expansion, it is 
expected that many of these 121 airports experiencing congestion will become fully-
coordinated or Level 3 airports.‖), online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp011_en.pdf >. 
[ICAO, ―Slot Allocation‖]. 
38
 Ibid. at 1. 
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air traffic control (ATC) system can accommodate in a unit of time, while 




Clearly, the fundamental solution to capacity shortage is to increase 
capacity. However, expanding airport infrastructure is by no means an easy 
project, and it requires a long-term approach. Furthermore, since many of the 
world‘s highest-demand airports are in dense urban areas, expanding these 
airports significantly is even more problematic.
40
 Therefore, in the short term, 
a more realistic question is how slots can be allocated effectively and fairly. 
In brief, slots are negotiated with airport authorities, and the incumbent 
airlines at the airport normally act as slot coordinators. Thus, airport 
authorities and government regulators are faced with the dilemma of striking a 
balance between the interests of incumbents that have spent years investing to 
establish their presence and the interests of new airlines.
41
 
Many problems caused by slot shortage have been identified
42
 (the slot 
shortage issue and its implications for Northeast Asia will be separately 
discussed in section 3.2 below), and various approaches to reducing these 
problems have been suggested.
43
 Since the issue of slot allocation is also 
related to restricting night flights (also known as the airport curfew),
44
 it must 
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 U.S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Airport and Air Traffic Control System 
(1982) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982) at 101. 
40
 Havel & Sanchez, ―Aviation Law‖, supra note 9 at 116. 
41
 Isabella H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law, 9th ed. revised by Pablo 
Mendes de Leon (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2012) at 89. 
42
 See generally, ICAO, Slot Allocation, ICAO Doc. ATConf/6-WP/11 (10 December 2012) at 
7, Appendix B Present and Future Airport Capacity Constraints, online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp011_en.pdf >.  
43
 See generally, ICAO, Regulatory Implications of the Allocation of Flight Departure and 
Arrival Slots at International Airports, ICAO Circular 283 (2001); Achim Czerny et al eds., 
Airport Slots: International Experiences and Options for Reform, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008). 
44
 See ICAO, Night Flight Restriction, ICAO Doc. ATConf/6-WP/8 (10 December 2012) at 2 
(noting that ―[A]s of mid-2012, approximately 250 domestic and international airports 
159 
be balanced with the issue of aircraft noise at the airport as well. In fact, slot 
allocation is a vast legal and economic topic, and a detailed analysis is outside 
the scope of this thesis.  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the insufficiency of slots affects 
the ability of air carriers to exercise market access rights granted to states 
under air services agreements.
45
 Even though slot issues are typically not 
dealt with in bilateral air services agreements, which determine market access 
rights, slot shortage has also been adduced as a barrier to opening market 




3.1.3.2 Airspace Use 
One of the most important principles in international air law is Article 1 
of the Chicago Convention (1944), which states that ―[T]he contracting States 
recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air 
space above its territory.‖ Thus, state sovereignty over airspace means that air 
transport is subject to permission or consent from the governments of the 
states from which a flight takes off or lands or that it overflies.
47
 
In protecting the sovereignty of their national airspace, most countries 
seek to strike a balance between the freedom enjoyed by various types of civil 
aviation and military activities by the national air force, ranging from training 
flights to real emergencies.
48
 However, some states have disproportionately 
                                                                                                              




 ICAO, ―Slot Allocation‖, supra note 37 at 2.  
46
 See e.g. the Philippines‘s position at section 2.3 and China‘s position at section 3.2.  
47
 Henri Wassenbergh, Principles and Practices in Air Transport Regulation (Paris: Institut du 
Transport Aérien, 1993) at 82. 
48
 Alan Williams, Contemporary Issues Shaping China’s Civil Aviation Policy: Balancing 
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demarcated their airspace for military activity, creating serious operational 
limitations for airlines that are scheduled to depart, land, or overfly. For 
instance, the military controls some 80 percent of China‘s total national 
airspace,
49
 which is an enormous obstacle to market access for all airlines 
flying from, to, or over China, including the Chinese airlines themselves. (The 
problems related to China‘s congested airspace will be further discussed in 
section 3.2.2.3 Managing Airspace Better.) 
Another market access issue relating to airspace use has to do with 
charging royalties for overflight. The Russian Federation has been openly 
accused of illicitly collecting money from foreign airlines in exchange for 
granting them the right to overfly Russian territory along the trans-Siberian 
route.
50
 Even though charging money for overflight is a breach of Article 15 
of the Chicago Convention,
51
 this improper practice has continued. 
A fundamental reason for charging a fee for the trans-Siberian route is 
presumably to protect Russian carriers, especially Aeroflot. However, it is not 
even clear whether this money is being used to shore up Aeroflot‘s bottom line. 
Indeed, it was reported in 1999 that about USD 600 million of overflight fees 
charged by Aeroflot had been laundered and transferred to the Swiss bank 
accounts of former Aeroflot executives.
52
  
Russia has argued that since Russian carriers should have the same 
                                                                                                              
International with Domestic Priorities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009) at 194. 
49
 Ibid. at 196. 
50
 See e.g. Michael Milde, ―Some question marks about the price of ‗Russian air‘‖ (2000) 49 
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht (ZLW) 147, [Milde, ―Russian Air‖]; Jahannes Baur, 
―EU-Russia Aviation Relations and the Issue of Siberian Overflights‖ (2010) 35 Air & Space 
L. 225. 
51
 Chicago Convention Article 15  
―…No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely 
of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a 
contracting State or persons or property thereon.‖ 
52
 Milde, ―Russian Air‖, supra note 50 at 148. 
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rights for flights between Europe and Northeast Asia (even though those 
flights do not touch down on Russian soil and have no direct link to the 
Russian market), Russian carriers must be compensated for not using these 
rights.
53
 If Russian carriers use their traffic rights to a lesser extent than 
European and Northeast Asian airlines, those carriers can pay to ―borrow‖ 
unused rights from Russian carriers.
54
 
This bizarre position has indirectly affected the level of market access 
that is legally allowed by air services agreements between the states of the EU 
and of Northeast Asia, whose airlines must overfly Russian airspace to 
exercise traffic rights under these agreements. According to the assessment of 
the Association of European Airlines (AEA), European carriers paid 
approximately USD 430 million on overflight royalties to Russian airlines in 
2008.
55
 Thus, European and Northeast Asian carriers must take into account 
the additional operating cost—a substantial amount of money—when they 
plan to operate routes between Europe and Northeast Asia.  
In addition, alternatives to Siberian routes can push up airlines‘ fuel 
costs. For instance, one European airline said that avoiding Siberian 
airspace—for example, by flying further south over Kazakhstan—would add 
30 minutes to eastbound flights and 45 minutes to westbound ones.
56
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 Baur, supra note 50 at 226. 
54
 Ibid. at 227. 
55
 Ibid. at 230. 
56
 Andrew Parker, ―Moscow kickback set to squeeze western airlines‖ Financial Times (6 
August 2014).  
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3.1.3.3 Visa Openness  
The relationship between air transport and tourism is an ―intrinsic 
symbiosis.‖57 Since visa policies are among the most important formalities 
influencing tourism, visa openness constitutes an indirect market access issue 
in international air transport. For instance, the visa restrictions on Chinese 
wanting to travel to the US have been identified as the main reason why China 
is not interested in an open skies agreement with the US.
58
 Li Jiaxiang also 




On a global level, gradual progress has been made in the area of visa 
relaxation. Overseas travel used to be heavily impacted by customs regulations 
and visa formalities. According to the study by the United Nations World 
Tourism Organization (UNWTO) in 2014, 19% of the world‘s population is 
not required to obtain a visa at all when traveling for tourism purposes while 
another 19% of the population can apply for either an electronic visa (eVisa) 
or a visa on arrival.
60
 Nonetheless, 62% of the global population still needs to 
obtain a visa before traveling overseas.
61
 
UNWTO categorizes the functions of visas as follows: ―to ensure 
security; to control immigration and limit the entry, duration of stay, or 
                                           
57
 Taleb Rifai (Secretary General, United Nations World Tourism Organization), Keynote 
Address to the Sixth ICAO Worldwide Air Transport Conference, 18 March 2013), online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/ATConf-6_Speech_UNWTO_en.pdf>. 
58
 Jay Boehmer, ―Slots, Visas Stymie U.S.-China Open Skies‖, Business Travel News (11 
April 2011), online: 
<http://www.businesstravelnews.com/article.aspx?id=20338&ida=Airlines&a=btn>. 
59
 Li Jiaxiang, Route to Fly (Beijing: China Machine Press, 2007) at 177 [translated by Jolyn 
Hong]  
60





 Ibid. at 6. 
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activities of travelers; to generate revenue and apply measures of reciprocity; 
and to ensure a destination‘s carrying capacity is not exceeded and control 
tourism demand.‖62 Compelling or legitimate as these rationales may be, 
travelers generally see visas as an inconvenient formality. Due to visa-related 
inconveniences, some potential travelers decide not to make a particular 
journey or end up choosing an alternative destination. 
In contrast, visa facilitation leads to the growth of the tourism market 
and, as a natural consequence, the aviation market as well. For instance, after 
the US expanded its visa waiver program in November 2008 to include the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Korea, 
arrivals from these countries collectively grew 46% over the following three-
year period.
63
 To meet the surge of Korean passengers wanting to go to the 
US, and in particular tourist destinations such as Hawaii, Korean Air and 
Asiana Airlines increased their frequencies and Hawaiian Airlines started to 
operate in Korea. 
According to research jointly conducted by UNWTO and the World 
Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC), easing visa requirements causes tourist 
arrivals from the affected market to increase from 5% to 25% per year.
64
 Thus, 
visa policies restrain the actual demand of consumers, and relaxing visa 
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 Ibid. at 3. 
63
 UNWTO & World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC), The Impact of Visa Facilitation in 
ASEAN Member States (January 2014) at 15, online: < http://www.wttc.org/-
/media/files/reports/policy%20research/impact_asean.pdf >.  
64
 Ibid. at 8.; In the study of ASEAN market, the potential gain in international tourism 
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by improving visa facilitation, the APEC region stands to gain 38 to 57 million international 
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see World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) & World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC), The 
Impact of Visa Facilitation in APEC Economies (Madrid: Centro Español de Derechos 
Reprográfico, 2013) at 21, online: <http://www.wttc.org/-
/media/files/reports/policy%20research/the_impact_of_visa_facilitation_in_apec_economies_
high_res_2oct13.pdf> at 5-6. 
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processes and policies indirectly but significantly affects the aviation market. 
Northeast Asian states are in the process of relaxing their visa policies 
toward their neighbors‘ nationals. The table below shows the status of visa 
requirements among the three countries and their nationals. 
    Destination 
 
Nationality  
China Japan Korea 
Chinese  Visa Required Visa Required 
(except Jeju 
Island) 
Japanese No Visa 
Required 
 No Visa Required 
Korean Visa Required  No Visa 
Required 
 
Table 3-1 Visa Status between Three Countries and Their Nationals 
Among the six scenarios above, three options are already open (that is, 
no visa is required) and the remaining three options are when 1) Chinese enter 
Japan; 2) Chinese enter Korea; and 3) Koreans enter China. It should be noted 
that it is not too inconvenient for Koreans to obtain a Chinese visa. 
Interestingly, both Korea and Japan are in the process of relaxing visa 
requirements for Chinese visitors. In addition to adding China to Korea‘s visa 
waiver program for Jeju Island in 2006, Korea started to provide multiple-
entry visas to select demographics of Chinese citizens and double-entry visas 
allowing Chinese citizens to enter the country twice within a set period of time 
for tourism purposes.
65
 In a similar fashion, Japan announced a series of 
reforms for Chinese visitors in October 2014.
66
 
                                           
65
 APEC, Ibid. at 21. 
66
 See CAPA, ―Japan relaxes Chinese visas to stimulate visitor & airline growth, following 
Southeast Asia success‖ (13 January 2015), online: 
<http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/japan-relaxes-chinese-visas-to-stimulate-visitor--
airline-growth-following-southeast-asia-success-204156>.   
―(1) Requirements for multiple-entry visa for applicants with a short-term business purpose, 
and for cultural or intellectual figures will be partially relaxed. 
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3.2 National Policies on Market Access in Northeast Asia 
3.2.1 Overview 
As explained in previous chapters, this thesis principally deals with the 
architecture of international treaties with respect to economic air transport. 
Undeniably, however, there are considerable national policy aspects that also 
affect international treaties. Indeed, it has been argued that much of the 
substance of air services agreements is a matter of policy based on economic 
considerations. 
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that economic analysis of 
international law, or the ―law and economics‖ methodology,67 has received 
special attention in the area of international law.
68
 In particular, adherents to 
rational choice theory in the law and economics school insist that ―states are 
assumed to be rational, self-interested, and able to identify and pursue their 
interests‖69 and ―states only enter into agreements when doing so makes them 
                                                                                                              
(2) The financial requirement will be relaxed for individual tourists applying for multiple-
entry visas for Okinawa and three prefectures in Tohoku, who have travel record to Japan in 
the last three years. 
(3) For individual tourists, a new multiple-entry visa without the requirement of visiting either 
Okinawa or one of three prefectures in Tohoku will be introduced, for those applicants with 
substantially high incomes.‖ 
67
 See Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed., under the word ―law and economics.‖ 
―Law and Economics is a discipline advocating the economic analysis of the law, whereby 
legal rules are subjected to a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether a change from one 
legal rule to another will increase or decrease allocative efficiency and social wealth. 
[Although it is] originally developed as an approach to antitrust policy, law and economics is 
today used by its proponents to explain and interpret a variety of legal subjects.‖  
68
 See generally, Eric Posner & Alan Sykes, Economic Foundations of International Law 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); For summary of the methods of international 
law, see generally Steven Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, ―Appraising the Methods of 
International Law: a Prospectus for Readers‖ (1999) 93 Am. J. Int‘l L. 291 at 294 (noting that 
―Law and Economics is a discipline advocating the economic analysis of the law, whereby 
legal rules are subjected to a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether a change from one 
legal rule to another will increase or decrease allocative efficiency and social wealth. 
[Although it is] originally developed as an approach to antitrust policy, law and economics is 
today used by its proponents to explain and interpret a variety of legal subjects.‖).  
69
 Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
at 17. 
166 
better off.‖70 Since international air transport entails economic and other 
national interest implications, rational choice theory is helpful in 
understanding the relevant international legal framework.
71
 
Defining the national interest is within the ambit of national policy. 
States (or their policy makers) determine their national interest on their own, 
and the power of international law is limited when national interest is at 
stake.
72
 Obviously, however, once policies turn into international treaties, 
contracting states to these treaties are bound by the rules set out in them. 
The process by which a policy becomes international law and the 
outcome of such a process require in-depth legal analysis. In the same vein, 
the relationship between policy and international law demands wide-ranging 
discussion. Although these theoretical questions are not within the scope of 
this thesis, a relevant assumption is that policies are generally perceived as 
paths of a political nature because they are produced outside the legal world 




In other words, national policies are rooted in different political 
backgrounds with the natural consequence that policy on international air 
transport varies from state to state. Understanding the national air transport 
policies of China, Japan, and Korea and their policy priorities is essential for 
further analyzing the impediments to and opportunities for Northeast Asian 
open skies. Since national policy is not always static and can change even 
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 Ibid. at 121. 
71
 Havel & Sanchez, ―Aviation Law‖, supra note 9 at 10. 
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 Guzman, supra note 69 at 125.  
73
 Mauro Zamboni, The Policy of Law – A Legal Theoretical Framework (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007) at 115-117. 
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during a short period, it should be noted that the views here reflect the three 
countries‘ national policies as of 2015. 
 
3.2.2 China 
3.2.2.1 Protecting the “Big Three” Airlines 
The central pillar of China‘s aviation policy on international air transport 
is to protect its ―big three‖ state-owned airlines: Air China, China Southern, 
and China Eastern. This policy has remained in place since 2002, when the 
Chinese government restructured nine air carriers and consolidated them into 
these three groups.
74
 This market consolidation essentially led to geographical 
market allocation of China‘s three primary hubs: Beijing to Air China, 
Shanghai to China Eastern, and Guangzhou to China Southern. This market 
allocation was solidified when the Chinese government stopped accepting 
applications for new airlines in 2007.
75
 In 2013, however, China lifted the ban 
on establishing new airlines (see the next section 3.2.2.2). 
The government-driven market consolidation had two motivations. First, 
a number of small airlines were facing various difficulties including the 
possibility of imminent collapse due to a combination of several factors such 
as the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, unsatisfactory safety issues, and 
                                           
74
 See Alan Williams, Contemporary Issues Shaping China’s Civil Aviation Policy: Balancing 
International with Domestic Priorities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009) at 87.  
―Air China Group, formerly Air China (based in Beijing), China Southwest (based in 
Chengdu), and CNAC (based in Hong Kong);  
China Southern Group, formerly, China Southern (based in Guangzhou), China Northern 
(based in Shenyang), and China Xinjiang (based in Urumqi);  
China Eastern Group, formerly China Eastern (based in Shanghai), China Yunnan (based in 
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 Joanne Chiu, ―China‘s Air Regulator Will Consider Ways to Boost Budget-Carrier Market‖ 
The Wall Street Journal (29 July 2013), online: 
<http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323854904578634920047272886>. 
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lack of management skill.
76
 Second, China hoped to have super-carriers in 
order to compete with large international rivals.
77
 
China has been protecting its aviation industry by maintaining strict 
control of market access. The Civil Aviation Authority of China (CAAC), the 
regulator of civil aviation in China as well as the government body responsible 
for negotiating air services agreements with foreign countries, has followed 
three principles in protecting the national airlines. 
First, it applies the ―one route, one carrier‖ rule.78 Usually, only one 
Chinese carrier and one foreign carrier have been designated to minimize 
competition on a particular international route. This dovetails with the 
geographical allocation of the three major hubs to the Big Three, as explained 
above. The ―one route, one carrier‖ principle has been watered down for short-
haul routes. Yet, the general practice is that only one Chinese carrier can fly a 
long-haul international route.  
Nonetheless, Air China has been observed to receive special treatment, 
such as Air China‘ flights from Shanghai to Frankfurt, Milan, Paris and 
Sydney.
79
 In other words, Beijing-based Air China can fly long-haul routes 
from Shanghai but China Eastern (Shanghai-based) cannot fly long-haul 
routes from Beijing.
80
 It is important to recall that Air China is the country‘s 
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only official flag carrier although all three are state-owned.
81
 As the ―favorite 
child‖ of the Chinese government,82 special treatment for Air China is an 
established practice. 
Second, fifth freedom rights are not generally granted to foreign 
carriers.
83
 China has traditionally emphasized the strict reciprocity principle 
based on the actual market share of national carriers
84
 and equal participation 
of national carriers in the air transport market.
85
 By their very nature, fifth 
freedom operations by foreign carriers are generally viewed by most states as 
a threat to their own airlines
86
 (see section 2.4.2 Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC)‘s Initiative (that is, MALIAT) for the aero-political 
aspect of the fifth freedom), and consequently China only sees fifth freedom 
rights as an obstacle to the participation of the big three airlines. 
Exceptions are made for sizeable markets. China made its only 
significant agreement for fifth freedom exchange of passenger traffic with 
India. In early 2008, following a trip by then Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh to China, the two countries announced they would relax 
their air services agreement to allow fifth freedom exchanges.
87
 Subsequently, 
India‘s Jet Airways launched a daily Mumbai-Shanghai-San Francisco service 
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(although it was later terminated for commercial reasons).
88
 
A somewhat less significant fifth freedom exchange was made in the 
ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement Protocol 2 in 2013.
89
 Since the 
ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement Protocol 2 only opens up 10 Chinese 
cities (excluding Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou) as ASEAN carriers‘ fifth 
freedom intermediate points,
90
 it is unclear whether fifth freedom operations 
here would actually be possible (or profitable). 
Third, third-party code sharing (a commercial agreement in which an 
airline code is shared between an airline of the bilateral partners and an airline 
other than the bilateral partners) is prohibited. For instance, American Airlines 
cannot codeshare with Japan Airlines on the route between Tokyo‘s Narita 
Airport and Beijing Capital Airport, on which Japan Airlines operates, because 
this would be a third-party code share. In other words, foreign carriers 





3.2.2.2 Promoting LCCs 
Even though LCCs would normally be considered a threat that could 
upset China‘s carefully calibrated policy of protecting the big three airlines, 
there are signs of a paradigm shift in China‘s aviation policy, suggesting that 
China is considering (or has already started) promoting LCCs. Above all, it is 
noteworthy that China lifted a six-year ban on setting up new independent 
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airlines in May 2013.
92
 Table 3-2 shows the list of established Chinese 
airlines (most of which are planning or likely to have 100 aircraft by 2020).
93
  
Airline Fleet Size  
China Southern 457 
China Eastern 350 
Air China 316 
Shenzhen Airlines  139 
Hainan Airlines 120 
Xiamen Airlines 103 
Tianjin Airlines 84 
Sichuan Airlines 83 
Shanghai Airlines 74 
Shandong Airlines 72 
Spring Airlines 40 
Juneyao Airlines 34 
Okay Airways 24 
West Air 13 
Joy Air 8 




In addition to those incumbent airlines, about 20 new Chinese airlines 
(most of them LCCs) have launched or are planning to launch between 2013 
and 2015.
95
 Table 3-3 shows some of these airlines.  
Airline Status 
Donghai Airlines  Launched in March 2014 
Guilin Airlines  Waiting 
Hefei Airlines  Waiting 
Jiangxi Airlines Waiting 
Jiu Yuan Airlines  Waiting 
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 Updated from CAPA, ―13 Chinese airlines could each have a fleet of over 100 aircraft by 
2020‖ (26 May 2014), online: <http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/13-chinese-airlines-
could-each-have-a-fleet-of-over-100-aircraft-by-2020-169778>. 
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Loong Airlines  Launched in December 2013 
Qingdao Airlines  Launched in April 2014 
Ruili Airlines Launched in May 2014 
Sutong Airlines  Waiting 
Urumqi Airlines Launched in August 2014 




Since Spring Airline (China's largest and earliest LCC) achieved great 
success in China,
97
 other Chinese private airlines have been seeking to 
establish LCCs.
98
 In July 2014, China Eastern converted its Shanghai-based 
subsidiary China United Airlines into an LCC partly because of China‘s new 
policy of supporting LCCs, and this venture may encourage Air China and 
China Southern to follow suit with their respective subsidiaries.
99
 
China is also gradually allowing foreign LCCs into both major and 
medium-sized airports.
100
 Foreign LCCs‘ market access into China is 
expected to grow, especially in non-hub Chinese airports that are not 
congested and of secondary importance to the three major hubs of Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou.  
However, China‘s priority will continue to be the Big Three airlines. A 
commonly accepted industry view is that ―an influx of new LCCs competing 
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aggressively with the big three is unlikely to be the government's vision.‖101 
Although protecting the big three airlines continues to be the central pillar of 




It was largely of symbolic importance when CAAC deputy director Xia 
Xinghua publicly said that ―China will roll out a series of policies to 
encourage the development of LCCs‖ on 5 November 2013 during the 
ICAO/CAAC Symposium on LCCs held in Beijing.
103
 The government‘s 
policy does encourage the development of LCCs and the increasing number of 
Chinese LCCs means more market penetration is in progress. (See the figure 
3-1) 
 
Figure 3-1 LCCs‘ Penetration in China104 
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3.2.2.3 Managing Airspace Better 
The most notable challenge to China‘s market access in international air 
transport is the lack of airspace resources, which has resulted in a bottle neck 
impeding the growth of civil aviation.
105
 Not only do the four major airports 
(Beijing Capital Airport, Shanghai Hongqiao Airport, Shanghai Pudong 
Airport, and Guangzhou Baiyun Airport) suffer severe shortages of airspace, 
but it is also reported that 17 other airports face similar problems as they 
approach the saturation point for usable airspace resources.
106
 
The main challenge for Chinese airports lies in airside capacity issues 
rather than landside capacity issues (see section 3.1.3.1 Airport Capacity for 
the difference between these two terms). Since the airspace that commercial 
airlines can use is highly limited, busy airports in megacities cannot 
sufficiently support airlines‘ on-time performance (that is, on-time departures 
and arrivals). As a consequence, Chinese airports were ranked as the world's 
worst in terms of on-time departures and arrivals. 
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The Civil Aviation Act 1995 provides the civil aviation and military 
authorities with a framework for joint control of Chinese airspace, and the 
Chinese military has indeed turned over increasing numbers of air corridors to 
civilian management.
108
 However, just 20% of Chinese airspace is open to 
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 FlightStats, On-time Performance Report – June 2013 (15 August 2013), online: 
<http://www.flightstats.com/go/story.do?id=1061>. 
108
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commercial carriers compared to 80% in the US.
109
 Although China 
acknowledged that a new approach to airspace management is necessary for 
sustainable growth, cooperation between the CAAC and the Chinese military 
has been slow.110 
China‘s airspace shortage creates serious operational delays for many 
airlines, but it affects Chinese airlines the most since they nearly always use 
Chinese airspace (except fifth freedom operations). In fact, China's major 
airlines fared poorly compared with their regional and global counterparts in 
regard to on-time operation.
111
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 Chuck Thompson, ―China airports world's worst for on-time performance‖ CNN (12 July 
2013), online: < http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/12/travel/china-airport-performance/>.  
177 
 




Far-reaching changes are taking place in China. The fact that China‘s 
major airports, and especially the Beijing Capital Airport, have reached their 
capacity is currently a major challenge to developing air transport in China.
113
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Li Jiaxiang, head of China‘s Civil Aviation Administration, once said that ―it is 
now impossible to add even one more flight to the tight daily schedule of the 
capital airport.‖114 
Although the airside capacity shortage is an extremely serious problem 
due to the lack of airspace for civil aviation, the landside shortage issue 
remains a major problem, too. Although Beijing Capital Airport‘s yearly 
capacity was raised to 82 million passengers in 2008 with the opening of 
Terminal 3, it has already exceeded its capacity, handling 83.7 million 
passengers in 2013.
115
 Furthermore, annual traffic at Beijing Capital is 
expected to reach 90 million passengers by 2015.
116
 
In order to overcome this obstacle, the idea of a new airport in Beijing 
was proposed in 2008 and finally approved in 2012.
117
 The new Beijing 
Airport, located south of the city in Daxing and scheduled to open in late 2018, 
will have eight runways and an initial capacity of 40 million, which is 








 John Walton, ―New airport for Beijing: "impossible to add even one more flight" to current 











 CAPA, ―Asia leads the field in airport construction but privatisation opportunities are few‖ 









Interestingly, China is considering a low-cost terminal in Beijing's new 
airport.120 If all goes according to plan, the LCC terminal at China‘s capital 
will be another meaningful step in promoting LCCs. It would provide great 
opportunities to Northeast Asian LCCs that are eager to fly to Beijing. 
However, better management of airspace is a prerequisite. Increasing 
landside capacity would be nearly futile if there is no corresponding increase 
in airside capacity. The fact that only 20% of Chinese airspace is open to 
commercial carriers is a severe constraint.  
Indeed, political pressure for cooperation between civil and military 
authorities with regard to Chinese airspace has been increasing on an 
international level. In June 2013, the ICAO Asia and Pacific Regional Sub-
Office (APAC RSO) was inaugurated in Beijing. The strategic goals for the 
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Civil Aviation Resource Net (6 November 2013), online: 
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sub-office include ―enhanc[ing] airspace capacity and efficiency to 
accommodate Asian aviation growth‖ and ―optimiz[ing] Air Transport 
Management (ATM) operations via collaborative management of traffic 
flow.‖121 
One of the first major events that the sub-office organized was the 
APAC Civil-Military Cooperation Lecture-Seminar, which aimed to raise 
awareness of the high priority and benefits of civil-military cooperation.
122
 
Although cooperation between the CAAC and the Chinese military has been 
slow,123 the interests of Chinese airlines and external pressure from ICAO and 
neighboring states will hopefully improve the airspace shortage problem. 
 
3.2.3 Japan 
3.2.3.1 Policy Transformation through the“Asian Gateway Initiative” 
Japan‘s aviation policy has long been criticized for its protection of 
national carriers.
124
 However, a complete transformation was made when a 
new comprehensive policy package, the ―Asian Gateway Initiative,‖ was 
endorsed by Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in May 2007. The Council 
for the Asian Gateway Initiative,
125
 consisting of politicians, academics, and 
industry experts, prepared the initiative, which covers various policy priorities 
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Conceptually, the Asian Gateway Initiative is rooted in Japan‘s re-
evaluation of Asia. The initiative replaced the old perception of ―Japan and 
Asia‖—which had emphasized the difference between the two127—with a de 
facto declaration that Japan is a part of Asia.
128
 Throughout the ―lost decades‖, 
Japan has witnessed a drop in global market share in many industries, and its 
position as an Asian hub has also been weakened with the rise of more 
competitive Asian hubs. Against this background, a newly elected Prime 




Considering Japan‘s geography, the Asian Gateway Initiative seemed a 
reasonable policy direction. Located at the northeastern extremity of Asia, 
Japan has the great geographical advantage of being the gateway between Asia 
and the Americas.  
The Council for the Asian Gateway Initiative viewed aviation as the 
most crucial sector for achieving the objectives of the initiative because 
enhancing the aviation network is a prerequisite to Japan's becoming an Asian 
gateway.
130
 In fact, ―form[ing] a strategic international aviation network 
                                           
126
 The ten major policy priorities are: 1) Change in aviation policy to achieve ―Asian Open 
Skies‖; 2) Implement a program for streamlining trade measures; 3) Restructure policy for 
foreign students in order for Japan to serve as a hub for a human resource network in Asia; 4) 
Further open up universities to the world; 5) Create a financial and capital market attractive to 
Asian Customers; 6) Transform agriculture into a successful growth industry during the time 
of globalization; 7) Create an ―Asian Gateway Special Zone‖; 8) Implement concrete policies 
in line with a comprehensive strategy for ―creative industries‖; 9) Promote Japan‘s 
attractiveness overseas; 10) Strengthen Japan‘s central role in promoting regional study and 
cooperation for solving common problems.  
127
 The Council for the Asian Gateway Initiative, ―Asian Gateway Initiative‖ (16 May 2007) 
at 7, online: <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/gateway/kettei/070516doc.pdf>. 
128
 The Japanese government unconventionally released the plan in English, Chinese, and 
Korean. See online: <http://japan.kantei.go.jp/gateway/index_e.html>. 
129
 Personal communication between the author and Dr. Akira Mistumasu. 
130
 The Council for the Asian Gateway Initiative, ―Asian Gateway Initiative‖ (16 May 2007) 
182 
through aviation liberalization (―Asian Open Skies‖)‖ was designated as one 
of the policy‘s priorities. 131  Under this priority, several sub-tasks were 
introduced, some of which are listed below: 
 
Change the traditional aviation policy in order to strategically promote the 
rapid liberalization of aviation (―Asian Open Skies‖); 
Promote aviation liberalization in order to remove restriction on carriers, 
entry points, and the number of both passenger and cargo flights; and 
Start liberalization negotiations with China and other Asian countries 
(give high priority to Asia). 
 
Within three months of the proclamation of the Asian Gateway Initiative, 
Japan signed an open skies agreement with Korea (the first open skies 
agreement in history by the Japanese government
132
), followed by several 
other Asian states as promised, including Hong Kong, Macau, Vietnam, 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. However, the Tokyo Metropolitan Airports 
(Narita Airport and Haneda Airport) were excluded from the open skies 
agreements until slot shortage problems were improved. 
 
3.2.3.2 Increasing Airport Capacity in the Tokyo Area 
Established and new airlines operating to and from Tokyo had long been 
anticipating an expansion of the international networks in the Tokyo 
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metropolitan area for better market access. Both Haneda Airport, located 15 
km south of Tokyo Station, and Narita Airport, located 60 km east of Tokyo 
Station, have long suffered from capacity shortage.  
 
 




Haneda Airport was Tokyo‘s main airport until Narita Airport opened in 
1978. After the completion of Narita Airport, Haneda became a predominantly 
domestic airport as international traffic was diverted east to Narita.
134
 
Reflecting Japan‘s rapid growth and extraordinary economic success in the 
1980s, demand increased significantly, and interim or partial efforts to 
increase capacity at Haneda and Narita Airports could not keep pace with 
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 Patrick M. Cronin, Taking Off Civil Aviation, Forward Progress and Japan’s Third Arrow 










More substantial changes have been made since 2010. By significantly 
expanding runways and building new terminals, the Japanese authorities have 
increased the number of slots at the two airports (Narita and Haneda). 
 
Year Narita Haneda Narita + Haneda 
International International Domestic International 
2009 200,000 303,000 200,000 
2010 220,000 60,000 311,000 280,000 
2011 235,000 60,000 330,000 295,000 
2012 250,000 60,000 330,000 310,000 
2013 270,000 60,000 330,000 330,000 
2014 270,000 90,000 357,000 360,000 
2015 300,000 90,000 357,000 390,000 
Table 3-4 Annual slot changes at Tokyo Haneda and Tokyo Narita airports
137
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 Based on the following sources: CAPA, ―Japan awards international Tokyo Haneda 
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Because of the slot increase, Japan did not necessarily have to exclude 
Tokyo when it adopted an open skies agreement. Japan‘s first full-fledged 
open skies agreement that included Tokyo was the US-Japan open skies 
agreement in 2010. Japan has also continued to re-negotiate air services 




A recent dynamic caused by creating more slots at Haneda airport is a 
competition between Narita and Haneda airports for international flights. As 
slots at Haneda airport increased, some airlines (e.g., Delta, United Airlines, 
and American Airlines) have shifted some of their operations from Narita 





3.2.3.3 Promoting LCCs 
New market access rights triggered by the Asian Gateway Initiative and 
successful relaxation of indirect market access (capacity expansion at the 
Tokyo metropolitan airports) have provided a suitable platform for the 
development of LCCs. It was rightly anticipated that the post-2010 period 
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would be a ―big bang‖ for Japanese aviation, as the significant capacity 
expansion at Tokyo‘s airports would enable LCCs to snap up new slots at 
Tokyo airports, providing a fresh surge in competition.
140
 
In 2012 alone, three new low-cost airlines were established in Japan as 
subsidiaries of JAL and ANA: JAL's Jetstar Japan, a joint venture with 
Australia's Jetstar; ANA's Peach, minority held with Hong Kong interests 
involved; and AirAsia Japan, a joint venture between ANA and AirAsia. 
AirAsia Japan ceased operations in October 2013 due to a managerial conflict 
between ANA and AirAsia. Soon after, ANA established its own LCC, Vanilla 
Air. The new AirAsia Japan, a JV between Malaysia‘s AirAsia and Japanese 
investors (majority owners with no airline experience), is planning to launch 
its joint venture in 2015. (See Section 4.2.3 Japan) 
In addition to the three LCCs in which Japanese airlines own a share and 
partially (or wholly) control, Spring Airlines Japan, a JV between China‘s 
Spring Airlines and Japanese investors (majority owners), began its Japanese 
operations in 2014. (This will be discussed in Chapter 4: Ownership and 
Control Issues in Northeast Asia.) 
 
3.2.4 Korea 
3.2.4.1 Prioritizing Northeast Asia 
Promoting open skies agreements with Northeast Asian countries is a 
key item on the agenda of Korean aviation policy.
141
 As a strategically located 
country with a competitive aviation infrastructure, Korea has a strong 
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incentive to bring about Northeast Asian regional liberalization. Korea‘s 
domestic aviation market is only the 22
nd
-largest in the world (behind the UK 
but above Vietnam),
142
 compared with China (2
nd





 In addition, it has a formidable rival: namely, the KTX high-speed 
rail line. 
For instance, the Seoul-Busan route (Busan being the second largest city 
in Korea), the most popular inland route in Korea, was materially affected by 
the introduction of KTX. While a flight between the two cities takes fifty 
minutes, KTX only takes two and a half hours. In addition, train stations are 
conveniently located downtown, while airports are located on the outskirts of 
Seoul and Busan. Effectively, the three routes in the table below are the 
commercially viable domestic routes. 
 
 




Number of Flights 66,402 69,622 75,116 
 Number of Passenger 10,307,531 11,039,071 12,058,614 





Number of Flights 19,746 18,734 18,666 
 Number of Passenger 2,319,215 2,167,253 1,990,366 
Average Load Factor 66.9 70.0 70.4 
Jeju-Busan 
(Gimhae) 
Number of Flights 16,638 17,802 18,461 
 Number of Passenger 2,589,974 2,664,567 2,801,853 
Average Load Factor 80.1 80.2 82.4 
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 Based on data from http://www.airportal.go.kr  
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Thus, Korea would want to promote open skies regimes internationally, 
especially with China and Japan.
145





 freedom) market on its own as well as a population 
approaching 50 million. 
According to the Korean government‘s Basic Plan for Aviation Policy 
released in August 2012, building a single aviation market in Northeast Asia 
consisting of China, Japan, and Korea as core members plus Taiwan and 
Mongolia is a long-term goal for Korea.
146
 The plan proposes a Korea-China 
open skies agreement as the short-term goal, a Korea-China-Japan single 
market as the mid-term goal, and expansion of the market to include other 
states (including Taiwan and Mongolia) as the long-term goal.
 
 




Focusing on the 6
th
 freedom (connecting traffic) is a common interest for 
the Korean government, Incheon airport (Korea‘s hub airport), and Korean 
legacy carriers (Korean Air and Asiana Airlines). Incheon Airport‘s connecting 
ratio (the ratio of transfer passengers to the total number of arriving passengers) 
of 16% is much lower than its competitors (Hong Kong 28%, Narita 21%, and 
Changi 31% in 2011), a problem which the Korean Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and Transport (MLIT) and Incheon Airport Authority are 
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Geographically, Korea is well-positioned as many types of commercial 
aircraft can operate non-stop flights to the US market (something that cannot 
be done from Southeast Asia). The shorter distance from Korea to the US 
allows smaller aircraft to be efficiently used for thinner points, or routes where 
current demand would be insufficient to fill a larger aircraft.
148
 With the dual 
advantages of geography and market access (the US-Korea open skies 
agreement had been adopted since 1998), Korean Air was able to establish 
itself as the largest Asian airline with operations to the US both in terms of 




3.2.4.3 Promoting LCCs 
Korean aviation policy towards LCCs can be described as controlled 
liberalization. In economic theory, the simultaneous occurrence of the birth of 
new airlines and the disappearance of weaker airlines through bankruptcies or 
mergers is regarded as an acceptable outcome of liberalization.
150
 However, 
there has been a tendency in Korea to view the bankruptcy of a national airline 
as a social loss for which the government is in part responsible. Thus, policy 
makers are cautious about the level of competition posed to the established 
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In recent years, there has been a marked change in policy toward LCCs. 
Indeed, the Korean government has been cautiously shifting the focus of its 
aviation policy priorities from legacy carriers to LCCs by adopting the explicit 
policy goal of ―supporting the growth of LCCs.‖152 Mr. Ken Choi, CEO of 
Jeju Air, Korea‘s third largest airline and its strongest LCC, acknowledged the 
Korean government‘s recent efforts when he said that ―2014 is the first year 
where the Korean Government has really supported LCC development.‖153  
The emergence of Korean LCCs has a lot to do with the open skies 
agreement with Japan. Soon after this agreement took effect in 2007, a number 
of Korean companies showed an interest in establishing international air 
carriers targeting short-haul international routes, mainly in the Japanese 
market. Indeed, four out of five Korean low-cost carriers were established 
after the 2007 Japan-Korea open skies agreement: Jeju Air (June 2006), Jin Air 
(July 2008), Air Busan (October 2008), Eastar Jet (January 2009), and T‘way 
(August 2010). All these LCCs started their international operations to 
Japanese points.  
However, the Korean government‘s focus is on promoting Korean LCCs. 
It, together with the Korean carriers, have opposed the efforts of foreign LCCs 
(namely Tiger Air and AirAsia) to establish joint ventures in Korea. (Since this 
issue is more related to ownership and control restrictions, it will be discussed 
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 Jeong-Ho Choi (Deputy Minister for the Office of Civil Aviation, The Korean Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport), ―Keynote address to the 52th Conference of the Korea 
Society of Air & Space Law and Policy‖ (23 May 2014) (He mentioned that the Korean 
government researched the question of whether the number of LCCs in Korea should be 




 CAPA, ―Jeju Air: 2014 is first year where Korean Govt has really supported LCC 
development‖ (13 October 2014), online:<http://centreforaviation.com/news/jeju-air-2014-is-
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in Chapter 4: Ownership and Control Issues in Northeast Asia.) 
 
3.3 Bilateral Positions on Market Access 
3.3.1 China-Japan 
China and Japan concluded their first air services agreement in 1974. 
Since then, there has been a gradual increase in destinations, flights, 
passengers carried, and volume of cargo. Chinese air carriers have expanded 
their operations between the two countries more aggressively than Japanese air 




In addition to the expansion of regular routes, an agreement on shuttle 
services between airports with good access to the downtown centers of the 
major cities of Shanghai (Hongqiao Airport) and Tokyo (Haneda Airport) was 
adopted at the air services consultation meeting held in June 2007. The two 
countries had first agreed on this shuttle service when Wen Jiabao, Prime 
Minister of China at the time, visited Japan in April 2007. His visit to Korea 
around the same time also helped to establish shuttle services between Gimpo 
in Seoul and Hongqiao in Shanghai. 
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 In 2006, for example, 12 designated Chinese air carriers operated from 18 Chinese cities to 
17 Japanese cities, with 336 passenger flights per week and 41 cargo flights per week. In 
contrast, 3 designated Japanese air carriers provided services from 4 Japanese cities to 10 
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Aviation Administration of China, ―中日民航会谈在武汉举行‖ (13 March 2007), online: 
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In August 2012, China and Japan reached a considerably liberalized air 
services agreement allowing their designated carriers to operate unlimited 
numbers of passenger and cargo flights between any Chinese and Japanese 
cities except for the metropolitan centers of Beijing, Shanghai, and Tokyo. 
While liberalization of market access between secondary cities was significant 
on the surface (although major cities like Osaka were also included), more 
commercial importance came from the substantial increase in ―shuttle 
services‖.155 Because of the increased number of slots at Tokyo Haneda 
airport, the number of services from Haneda to Shanghai and Beijing 
increased by four services per day.
156
 (See section 3.4.1 Shuttle Services 
among Major Cities in Northeast Asia.)  
However, soon after this agreement, the China-Japan market was 
profoundly affected by a political dispute in September 2012 concerning a 
series of islands in the East China Sea called Diaoyu in Chinese and Senkaku 
in Japanese.
157
 Due to the political tensions, the aviation market between the 
two countries lost nine years of growth, with the situation lasting much longer 
than the airlines had initially expected.
158
 
Market access liberalization between secondary cities on both sides is 
starting to materialize through LCC operations, albeit slowly. For instance, in 
addition to the launch of Spring Airlines Japan (which will be discussed in 
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 CAPA, ―China-Japan traffic bottoms out but faces massive challenge; Spring Airlines to 






Chapter 4), China‘s Spring Airlines is fostering a strategic partnership with 
Japan‘s Ibaraki Airport, 80 km from downtown Tokyo, to launch direct 





In the four decades since the 1st Air Services Consultation took place in 
Tokyo in May 1967, the frequency and capacity of flights between Japan and 
Korea have steadily increased. A major step forward was taken in February 
2006 when the two states decided to exempt visas for Korean nationals who 
wish to enter Japan and Japanese nationals who wish to enter Korea for a 
period of 90 days or less.
160
 This visa facilitation was a significant stepping 
stone to an open skies agreement between the two states in 2007. 
In August 2007, the two countries signed an open skies agreement 
permitting unlimited third and fourth freedom passenger and cargo flights for 
all designated points except airports in Tokyo. The reason for excluding 
Tokyo was the lack of slots at Narita Airport and Haneda Airport.
161
 
Nevertheless, there was an increase in frequency between Gimpo Airport in 
Seoul and Haneda Airport in Tokyo pursuant to the shuttle service 
arrangement involving capital airports. In addition, the two countries agreed to 
expand fifth freedom operations. 
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 Jonathan Hutt (Strategy and Branding Director at Spring Airlines), ―Spring Airlines 
International Expansion from China into North Asia‖ (Presentation material to the CAPA 
LCCs & New Age Airlines, Seoul, 4 September 2013. 
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 See Embassy of Japan in Singapore, ―Visa Exemption For Nationals Of The Republic Of 
Korea‖, online: <http://www.sg.emb-japan.go.jp/visa_korea.htm>; Jung Kwon-hyun, ―Korea-
Japan Visa Waiver‖ Chosun-ilbo (7 February 2006), online: < 
http://www.chosun.com/national/news/200602/200602060370.html>. 
161
 Narita Airport is a gateway airport to Japan, while Haneda Airport is considered a 
secondary airport. However, Haneda Airport is more accessible to people living in Tokyo: 
Narita is located 60 km east of Tokyo Station, while Haneda is located 15 km south of Tokyo 
Station. See Figure 3-5 Distance of Tokyo Area Airports from Downtown Tokyo. 
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The open skies agreement was directly related to Japan‘s new aviation 
policy. As already noted, Japan maintained a protectionist stance until 2007. 
Indeed, when trilateral open skies were openly discussed for the first time in 
June 2006,
162
 Japan‘s position was even more protectionist than China‘s.163 
But in April 2007, the Japanese government unveiled the Asia Gateway 
Initiative, which was designed to remove restrictions on foreign air carriers‘ 
access to its airports
164
 and to put the emphasis on improving links with 
neighboring countries. 
While market access was significantly liberalized by the 2007 agreement, 
the limited slots at Haneda and Narita airports delayed the genuine effect of 
open skies. Japan has since solved this problem by significantly expanding 
runways and building new terminals at both airports. Once the shortage of 
slots at these airports had been resolved, Japan and Korea agreed at the air 
services consultation held in Seoul in December 2010 to add 14 flights on the 
Korea–Narita routes starting in March 2011 and to remove restrictions on 
frequency on the same routes starting in March 2013. Eventually, Narita 
airport was opened up entirely in March 2013, and Haneda airport was made 
more accessible by significant slot increases.  
The real game changer in this market has been LCCs. The fact that 
LCCs could not fly to and from Tokyo was a huge drawback restricting LCCs‘ 
market penetration. Now that LCCs can fly between Tokyo‘s Narita airport 
and Seoul‘s Incheon airport without market access restrictions (although there 
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 The 1st International Symposium on Liberalizing Air Transport in Northeast Asia (see 
section 2.5.1 History). 
163
 Personal communication between the author and the Symposium committee member (Prof. 
Lee Yeong Heok) 
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 Tae Hoon Oum, ―Liberalization and Future Developments in Asia-Pacific Air Transport, 
Networks and Policy‖ (Presentation material to the 3rd Conference on International Air 
Transport Cooperation, Seoul, May 2010)  
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are still capacity restrictions at Haneda airport and Gimpo airport, which 
provide better access to downtown Tokyo and Seoul, respectively), Japan and 
Korea are witnessing robust growth in LCC operations that focus on the 
Japan-Korea market. Obviously, the Japan-Korea market is an attractive 
market for LCCs because of the strong demand, short flight time, low 




The first air services consultation between China and Korea took place 
in Beijing in July 1994 when China began adopting an open market policy 
across the board. Since then, air services consultations have taken place quite 
often—approximately once every two years—leading to increased flight 
frequency and capacity between the two countries.
165
 The results of the air 
services consultation in June 2006 were particularly remarkable. 
First, the two countries agreed to open the Korea–Shandong Province 
and the Korea–Hainan Province markets immediately with respect to 
unlimited third and fourth freedom passenger and cargo flights. In fact, China 
had already opened Hainan up through a policy of unilateral liberalization. In 
2003, the CAAC and Hainan provincial government decided to unilaterally 
open up Hainan to unlimited 3rd, 4th and 5th traffic rights so as to promote the 
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 Between 1994, when China and South Korea concluded their first air services agreement, 
and 2006, when they agreed to fully liberalize the market by 2010, annual growth had been 
about 20% in the passenger market and 25% in the cargo market. See J.H. Park, A Study on 
the Effects of Air Transport Liberalization on Air Transport Markets, (PhD Thesis, 
Department of Logistics Management, University of Incheon, 2011) (in Korean) 
[unpublished]. 
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development of local tourism and the overall economy.
166
 
Opening up Shandong was a meaningful step forward. It was in fact 
proposed by the Chinese government (despite strong opposition from Chinese 
carriers) because Shandong province is geographically close to Korea and 
many joint ventures between China and Korea were located in the province.
167
 
As a result of this partial liberalization, the market between Seoul, Korea, and 
Shandong Province (the location of the cities of Qingdao, Jinan, Weihai, and 
Yantai) has grown by about 72% in the number of flights, 38% in passengers 




Second, the two governments agreed to expand passenger and cargo 
operations, which included increasing frequency on existing routes and 
adopting new routes. 
Year Flights 
 


















2004 38,658 37,260 1,398 5,288,252 280 22 14 8 36 34 2 
2005 47,869 44,731 3,138 6,573,175 354 16 12 4 37 37 0 
2006 61,804 56,912 4,892 7,321,391 413 20 12 8 37 37 0 
2007 86,622 77,177 8,115 9,442,477 535 31 19 12 41 41 0 
2008 81,294 72,285 9,009 7,963,624 528 24 14 10 43 43 0 
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 Yeong Heok Lee, ―The Effects of Open Sky and its Prospects in NE Asia‖ (Presentation to 
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 Jae Woon Lee, ―Chapter 13 Regional Liberalization in Northeast Asia (China, South Korea, 
and Japan)‖ in David Timothy Duval, ed., Air Transport in the Asia Pacific (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2014) 217 at 225. 
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 However, there were rather restrictive rules involving the designation 
of carriers. In terms of passengers, China and Korea agreed to limit the 
number of designated airlines as follows: one airline each for routes with no 
more than 11 flights per week, two airlines each for routes with between 11 
and 14 flights per week, and three or more airlines each for routes with 15 or 
more flights per week.
170
 
Third, the two sides agreed to increase fifth freedom flights, albeit on a 
limited basis. Interestingly, China and Korea agreed to preferential relaxation 
of market access involving the 5
th
 freedom. This stipulates that designated 
Chinese airlines are entitled to operate up to 21 weekly frequencies with 5
th
 
freedom traffic rights through Korean points for passenger and cargo services. 
However, designated Korean airlines are entitled to operate up to 13 weekly 
frequencies with 5
th
 freedom traffic rights through Chinese points, among 
which seven weekly frequencies could only be exercised three years after the 
use of 5
th
 freedom traffic rights by designated Chinese airlines. The remaining 




In fact, preferential relaxation of market access was used in the Canada-
US open skies agreement of 1995. After the agreement was reached, Canadian 
carriers could immediately access any point in the US from any point in 
Canada. However, there was a three-year transition period before US carriers 
could access Toronto/Pearson and a two-year transition period before they 
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 J.H. Park, A Study on the Effects of Air Transport Liberalization on Air Transport Markets, 
(PhD Thesis, Department of Logistics Management, University of Incheon, 2011) at 99 
[unpublished] (noting that ―on the cargo side, the ‗one route, one carrier‘ rule was abolished in 
2006.‖). [translated by the author] 
171
 Memorandum of Understanding to the Air Services Agreement between China and Korea 
in 2006 [mimeo. restricted] 
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could access Montreal/Dorval and Vancouver International.
172
 This 
preferential relaxation of market access was an attempt to help Canadian 
carriers, which were less competitive than American carriers, by imposing a 
transition period. 
In a similar fashion, preferential relaxation of market access gave 
Chinese carriers (which were less competitive than Korean airlines in 2006) 
lead time to gain a market advantage. This method has major implications for 
Northeast Asian open skies as an incentive for China, the key state in 
Northeast Asian open skies. (See Chapter 6: Towards Northeast Asian Open 
Skies: Liberalization by the Airline Industry and States.) 
Fourth (and most significantly), China and Korea signed a memorandum 
of understanding permitting unlimited third and fourth freedom passenger and 
cargo flights for all designated points between the two countries starting in 
2010. In the air services consultations between the two countries in 2008, 
however, China switched its position on open skies with Korea from full 
liberalization to moderate liberalization. Since then, negotiations have hovered 
around the status quo and not changed much except for limited increases in 
some flights. In response to the change in China‘s stance on open skies, Korea 
has been pursuing unlimited third and fourth freedom passenger and cargo 




The drive to reach full liberalization by 2010, which China and South 
Korea had agreed to in 2006, did not go according to plan. Although China has 
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not returned to rigid protectionism, it seems unlikely that full liberalization of 
the aviation market between the two countries will be achieved in the near 
future. 
As discussed in section 2.5.3 Barriers, China‘s aero-political position 
significantly affects the future of its air transport relationship with Korea. For 
three key reasons—namely, different geographical locations, the varying 
competitiveness of their national carriers, and diverse market sizes—the 
Chinese interpretation of full liberalization of the aviation market between 
China and Korea is still an ―I lose-you win‖ game. 
Nevertheless, since tourism, investment and trade between the two 
countries are gradually increasing, there will be a need for greater supply and 
progressive liberalization in the aviation market as well. 
 
3.4 The Prospect of Liberalizing Trilateral Market Access 
Except for regularly held negotiations and conferences for Northeast 
Asian open skies, China, Japan, and Korea have not made much progress 
through trilateral cooperation. The only thing achieved by the trilateral 
approach thus far is the shuttle service arrangement among the down airports 
of the three major cities – Shanghai, Tokyo and Seoul. However, the 
emergence and development of LCCs in Northeast Asia have been remarkable, 
and LCCs have the potential to move the liberalization agenda forward. The 
role of LCCs in the context of market access liberalization cannot be 
underestimated. The other significant development in Northeast Asia is lively 
discussion of bilateral and trilateral free-trade agreements (FTAs). Even 
though FTAs have traditionally not covered aviation, which has always been 
200 
reserved for separate negotiations, these FTAs could potentially accelerate 
liberalization of market access in air transport, especially in the cargo sector. 
 
3.4.1 Shuttle Services among Major Cities in Northeast  
Shuttle services between airports with good access to the respective 
downtown areas in the three major cities of Shanghai, Seoul and Tokyo 
(Hongqiao, Gimpo, and Haneda Airports, respectively) started in 2007. Given 
that the three airports have hitherto been considered ―domestic‖ airports in 
their respective countries, triangular shuttle services among them was 
recognized as a positive sign for the future of regional liberalization in 
Northeast Asia.
174
 Some commentators also noted that the shuttle program 
between Seoul‘s Gimpo Airport and Tokyo‘s Haneda Airport was a 
―preparatory step‖ towards overall liberalization between Korea and Japan.175 
It can be said that the shuttle service had its conceptual origin in the 
BESETO (Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo) cooperative scheme that was initially 
proposed in 1991 as a model for cooperation among the three Northeast Asian 
mega-cities.
176
 In the post-Cold War era, capital cities in Northeast Asia 
inevitably began to assume a regional role due to increasing interdependency 
among the three states.
177
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In early 2007, the BESETO Corridor Vision was specifically proposed 
by a joint study carried out by three government research institutes in China, 
Korea, and Japan.
178
 While identifying air transport as an essential sector for 
building the BESETO corridor, this joint study strongly recommended setting 
up air shuttle service among mega-cities in Northeast Asia.
179
 
In China, Shanghai was chosen to be the shuttle destination instead of 
Beijing. Since Shanghai is the business capital of China (while Beijing is its 
political and administrative capital), there is naturally more business traffic to 
and from Shanghai than Beijing, and it is such traffic that would benefit more 
from having an airport closer to downtown. Another reason is that Shanghai 
could offer the other Northeast Asian partners Hongqiao Airport, which has 
better access to downtown Shanghai than Pudong Airport, the main 
international airport in Shanghai. 
Beijing Nanyuan Airport (the secondary airport in Beijing) is closer to 
downtown Beijing than Capital Airport. However, Nanyuan Airport has not 
been offered for shuttle services mainly because it is a major military air base. 
Although Japan and China reached a basic agreement on opening charter 
services between Haneda Airport and Beijing Nanyuan Airport in 2007, these 
plans were later scrapped.
180
 To paint a more complete picture of shuttle 
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services among the major cities in Northeast Asia, the following tables have 
been provided. 
 
 Route Downtown 
To Airport 
 









20 m 3 h 20 m 30 m 4 h 10 m 
Pudong – 
Narita 






30 m 2 h 40 m 
 
3 h 10 m 
Narita – 
Incheon 






40 m 1 h 50 m 20 m 2 h 50 m  
Incheon - 
Pudong 
1 h 10 m 1 h 50 m 1 h 4 h  
Table 3-7 Comparison of Travel Times among the Major Cities in Northeast 
 Asia (Downtown Airports vs. Main International Airports)  
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4 (Korean Air, 
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2 (China Eastern 
and Shanghai 
Airlines) 










 2 (Korean Air and 
Asian Airlines) 
Table 3-8 Summary of Airlines Operating Shuttle Services 
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3.4.2 The Role of LCCs 
It is patently obvious that the liberalization of market access has 
facilitated the development of LCCs. Indeed, this trend has been observed 
globally. Led by Southwest Airlines, US LCCs have grown with domestic air 
transport deregulation while European LCCs including Ryanair and EasyJet 
have flourished under the three liberalization packages promulgated by the 
European Commission. 
In ASEAN, the deregulation of the domestic markets initially paved the 
way for the birth of LCCs, and several liberalized bilateral air services 
agreements between ASEAN states further enabled the emergence of LCCs in 
international routes.
181
 In Northeast Asia, the 2007 open skies agreement 
between Korea and Japan triggered the establishment of most Korean LCCs. 
The addition of Narita airport to the Korea-Japan open skies agreement in 
early 2013 was another golden opportunity for Korean and Japanese LCCs 
that had been launched in 2012. 
At the same time, it is crucial to understand the bi-directional 
relationship between LCCs and liberalization. Although liberalization of 
market access has evidently facilitated the growth of LCCs, LCCs themselves 
also promote policy reform and liberalization.
182
 Peter Forsyth, John King and 
Cherry Lyn Rodolfo rightly observed the pressure from LCCs in 2006 when 
the idea of ASEAN regional liberalization was ripening: 
 
The rapid development of LCCs in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
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Thailand is now resulting in pressure on regulators for access to more 
international routes… ASEAN internal routes, with short to medium 
hauls and low to moderate density are very suited to the LCCs… These 





Indeed, ASEAN member states adopted the Multilateral Agreement on 
Air Services (MAAS) in 2009, with emerging LCCs serving as one of the 
main drivers for this development.
184
 The significant air traffic growth by 
LCCs and the success of LCCs (particularly AirAsia) prompted the ASEAN 
states to push for greater regional liberalization.
185
 
Northeast Asia still lags well behind Southeast Asia in terms of LCC 
penetration, but the door is opening to LCCs in the region. As noted, all of the 
Northeast Asian states are now witnessing the development of LCCs.  
 
Figure 3-7 LCCs‘ Capacity Share within Northeast Asia186 
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Similar to the ASEAN experience—in which pressure from rapidly 
growing LCCs helped break down restrictions to market access
187—Northeast 
Asian LCCs will likely press the aviation authorities in China, Japan, and 
Korea to move forward with regional liberalization. 
 
3.4.3 Developing a China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement  
A free trade agreement is an agreement between two or more countries 
pursuant to which they give each other preferential conditions for market 
access rather than the non-discriminatory most-favored-nation treatment.
188
 
After a long period of preparation including a trilateral summit, a joint study 
by state-run research institutes, ministerial meetings, and working-level 
consultations, China, Japan, and Korea launched the trilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (CJK FTA) talks in March 2013.
189
 Most recently, the 7
th
 round of 
CJK FTA negotiations was held in Seoul in May 2015.
190
 
As an FTA aims to cut trade (or transaction) costs, efficient air transport 
networks and cost-effective air transport are directly correlated to the goals of 
an FTA. Thus, it follows that air transport liberalization should go hand in 
hand with discussion of an FTA. For instance, when the ASEAN-China FTA 
talks were set up in 2002, they were immediately followed by an air transport 
cooperation initiative and the formation of a ministerial-level coordinating 
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In the process of discussing Northeast Asian open skies, several 
commentators have suggested a link between FTAs and air services 
agreements for cargo air transport.
192
 Although there is a structural difference 
in their positions (that is, some supported incorporating market access 
conditions for cargo into the FTA discussions
193
 while others argued that air 
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Make the option open of incorporating bilateral airfreight traffic rights negotiations into 
negotiations for the trade liberalization in broader goods and services. That is, aviation sector 
may be part of the large negotiations for establishing ―Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation‖ 
or a Northeast Asian FTA. In this way, there will be a bigger room for a give-take bargaining 
over traffic rights. In addition, several issues of key importance to air carriers can be 
addressed relatively easily. For example, customs clearance procedures for transshipments can 
be dealt with under the trade facilitation program of an FTA, whereas restrictions on inter-
modal and airport handling rights fall under the market access program.‖). 
193
 See e.g. Zhang, ibid.   
207 
transport discussions should be kept separate from FTA negotiations),
194
 it 
was repeatedly acknowledged that liberalization of market access in the air 
cargo business was important for the success of the FTA.  
As seen in Chapter 2, it has been easier to liberalize cargo service than 
passenger service.
195
 Indeed, states have traditionally shown far more 
willingness to provide market access for foreign carriers carrying cargo than 
passengers. For instance, the ASEAN Single Aviation Market approach has 
shown that the cargo market is more flexible than the passenger market. The 
reason why cargo liberalization tends to be less controversial for states and 




After all, the participation of foreign carriers in freight transport can help 
lift exports from a particular State. Freight carriers often develop so-
called ―milk runs‖ between destinations which strengthen their overall 
viability by accessing a series of markets. The presence of 7th freedom 
cargo carriers may even be welcome if the State‘s own carriers lack 
cargo capacity. 
 
Now that not only bilateral FTAs but also a trilateral FTA are being 
                                           
194
 See e.g. Kim & Lee, supra note 192 at 402 (noting that ―[T]he best recourse would be 
viewing NEA‘s air transport policy separately from that of any FTA. An FTA‘s air transport 
agenda will entail another time-consuming policy-making process for the formulation of an 
integrated market frame; immediate liberalization of the air cargo sector is the best solution 
for the three NEA countries.‖). 
195
 ICAO, Liberalization of Air Cargo Services, ICAO ATConf/6-WP/14 (13 December 2012) 
(Presented by ICAO Secretariat) at 1 para 1.2, online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp014_en.pdf>. 
(noting that ―[A]s at the end of October 2012, of the 400 plus open skies agreements 
concluded by States, more than 100 granted Seventh freedom for air cargo or all cargo 
services, thus providing greater opportunity for the growth of such services.‖). 
196
 Ian Thomas, David Stone, Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Andrew Drysdale, & Phil McDermott, 
Developing ASEAN’s Single Aviation Market and Regional Air Services Arrangements with 
Dialogue Partners (Final Report, June 2008, REPSF II Project No. 07/003) at 72. 
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widely discussed, it is likely that liberalization of the cargo sector in Northeast 
Asia will bear fruit in the near future. More specific suggestions will be 
discussed in Chapter 6: Towards Northeast Asian Open Skies: Liberalization 
by the Airline Industry and States. For now, however, it is unlikely that the 
momentum for FTAs will affect passenger air services, largely because 
passenger air services cannot easily be disentangled from traditional aero-
political calculations.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
The object of this chapter has been to provide a detailed description and 
analysis of market access issues in international air transport for the three 
Northeast Asian states. After identifying direct market access issues (carrier 
designation, route designation, and capacity and frequency) and indirect 
market access issues (airport capacity, airspace use, and visa openness), I have 
discussed national policies on market access in Northeast Asia. 
 Although there are various legal and political barriers to market access 
liberalization, positive steps toward Northeast Asian open skies have been 
observed on national, bilateral, and trilateral levels. The next chapter (Chapter 
4: Ownership and Control Issues in Northeast Asia) will provide an in-depth 




















Chapter 4: Ownership and Control Issues 
in Northeast Asia 
  
4.1 Ownership and Control Restrictions in International Air Transport 
4.1.1 Overview 
Recognizing that the liberalization of air transport depends very much 
on the level of market access, Chapter 3 delved into market access issues from 
various angles with a particular emphasis on Northeast Asia. The other pivot 
on which liberalization rests is the relaxation of ownership and control 
restrictions, the key theme of this chapter. 
Although ownership and control restrictions are closely related to market 
access restrictions, states do not necessarily coordinate their positions on these 
two legal pivots. For instance, although the United States has been proactive in 
liberalizing market access (as discussed in Chapter 3), US domestic law lays 
down stricter ownership rules than in most states (see the section below). In 
addition, the traditional ownership and control requirements are entrenched in 
the US open skies agreement model. 
From the outset, it is necessary to note that ownership and control 
restrictions are more difficult to interpret than market access issues. Generally 
speaking, the level of market access is stipulated in air services agreement in 
clear language. Pertinent questions include 1) how many air carriers from each 
state are allowed to fly, 2) which routes will be allowed, and 3) how many 
flights will be operated per day or week. Since those questions are not 
ambiguous to interpret, market access issues are implemented in a relatively 
straightforward manner. 
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In contrast, interpreting ownership and control restrictions is not a 
simple process. Essentially, ownership and control restrictions are embedded 
in an internal lock (domestic law) as well as an external lock (the air services 
agreements).
1
 The complexity of the ownership and control restrictions not 
only entails a multilayered regulatory structure but also implies that they are 
expressed in an opaque manner. Consequently, this requires a more detailed 
analysis, which may be accomplished by subdividing ownership and control 
restrictions into the following matrix: 
 








Table 4-1 Subdivision of Ownership and Control Restrictions 
 
Substantial ownership restriction by way of domestic law (Subdivision 
A) is a quantitative restriction that sets a limit on foreign shares in national air 
carriers. While domestic laws in many jurisdictions generally provide that the 
majority share of national carriers must be held by nationals, meaning that 
foreign shares must not exceed 50 percent, some states have more rigid 







and the Philippines, 40 percent
4
).  
                                           
1
 Brian Havel, Beyond Open Skies: A New Regime for International Aviation (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2009) at 135 and 165. [Havel, ―Open Skies‖]. 
2
 See Lucas Braun, ―Liberalization or Bust: A Double Step Approach to Relaxing the Foreign 
Ownership and Control Restrictions in the Brazilian Aviation Industry‖ (2014) 39 Air & Space 
L. 343 at 348. (noting that ―Article 181 of the Brazilian Aeronautic Code (Law No. 7565/86) 
provides that, in order for an aviation company to be authorized to engage in air transportation 
services within Brazil, the following conditions must be met: (i) it must have its principal 
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Effective control restriction by way of domestic law (Subdivision B) is a 
qualitative restriction that focuses on ―who controls‖ national air carriers. 
Evaluating effective control is trickier than assessing substantial ownership 
since it is not a mathematical question. Although some national laws provide 
rules including, inter alia, restrictions on the nationality of the chairperson and 
the members of the board,
5
 it is inevitable that the relevant government body 
must exercise wide discretion in interpreting effective control. In brief, the 
practical importance of such restrictions is defined by government policy. 
                                                                                                              
place of business in Brazil, (ii) 80 percent of its voting stock must be held by Brazilians, and 
(iii) its overall management (direção) must be entrusted exclusively to Brazilians.‖). 
3
 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)  
(15) ―citizen of the United States‖ means— 
(A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States; 
(B) a partnership each of whose partners is an individual who is a citizen of the United States; 
or 
(C) a corporation or association organized under the laws of the United States or a State, the 
District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States, of which the president 
and at least two-thirds of the board of directors and other managing officers are citizens of the 
United States, which is under the actual control of citizens of the United States, and in which 
at least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned or controlled by persons that are citizens of 
the United States. 
4
 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Article XII  
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a 
public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or 
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose 
capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be 
exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise 
or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, 
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall 
encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of 
foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their 
proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such 
corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. See also Metropolitan Cebu 
Water District (MCWD) v. Margarita A. Adala, [2007] (the Philippines Supreme Court 
Decision) stating that ―[A] ―public utility‖ is a business or service engaged in regularly 
supplying the public with some commodity or service of public consequence such as 
electricity, gas, water, transportation, telephone or telegraph service.‖, online: 
<http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/jul2007/gr_168914_2007.html>. 
5
 The EU, for example, provides a somewhat explicit definition of ―effective control.‖ Article 
2(g) of Council Regulation No. 2407/92 defines ―effective control‖ as follows:  
Effective control means a relationship constituted by rights, contracts or any other means 
which, either separately or jointly and having regard to the considerations of fact or law 
involved, confer the possibility of directly or indirectly exercising a decisive influence on an 
undertaking, in particular by: (a) the right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking; (b) 
rights or contracts which confer a decisive influence on the composition, voting or decisions 
of the bodies of an undertaking or otherwise confer a decisive influence on the running of the 
business of the undertaking. 
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Substantial ownership restriction by way of air services agreements 
(Subdivision C) is a reciprocal restriction. On routes governed by an air 
services agreement between two states, a substantial ownership restriction in 
the agreement requires that a state party designate only carriers that are 
substantially owned by its own nationals. This effectively restrains national air 
carriers of one state from attracting sizeable foreign investment.  
The concern of the airline seeking foreign investment is that its traffic 
rights can be revoked or suspended by the other state if it ceases to be 
substantially owned by its own nationals. The difficulty rests in the definition 
of what constitutes ―substantial ownership.‖ Although states generally 
interpret ―substantial‖ as ―majority‖ in practice, there is no accepted definition 
of what is considered to be ―substantial ownership‖ in most air services 
agreements. Thus, evaluating Subdivision C is more complicated than 
Subdivision A, as the latter sets a specific limit on ownership restriction in 
domestic law. 
Havel and Sanchez indicate the ambiguity of the ―substantial ownership‖ 
restriction by positing a hypothetical situation: if Lufthansa were merely to 
acquire a 25 percent stake in Air Canada, the US could assert that Lufthansa 
had acquired enough leverage to allow the US to revoke Air Canada‘s right to 
fly to the US based on the air services agreement between the US and 
Canada.
6
 This scenario is not unrealistic because the US could conceivably 
reference its own domestic requirement that limits foreign ownership of US 
airlines to 25 percent of voting stock. 
                                           
6
 Brian Havel & Gabriel Sanchez, ―The Emerging Lex Aviatica‖ (2011) 42 Geo. Int‘l L.J. 639 
at 650-651. [Havel & Sanchez, ―Lex Aviatica‖]. 
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Finally, effective control restriction by way of air services agreements 
(Subdivision D) is also a reciprocal restriction. Just as Subdivision B was 
more complicated than Subdivision A, Subdivision D is also more difficult to 
interpret than Subdivision C, since interpreting ―effective control‖ varies by 
state. As there is room for each government‘s discretionary power to come into 
play in negotiations, state parties to an air services agreement do not 
necessarily have a fixed definition of ―effective control‖. 
Using the same Air Canada example above, if there were various 
indicators of Lufthansa‘s corporate intervention in Air Canada‘s management 
and operations that implied that Lufthansa has acquired leverage to exercise 
―effective control‖ of Air Canada, the US could revoke Air Canada‘s right to 




4.1.2 Internal (Domestic Law) Restrictions  
Substantial ownership and effective control restrictions have origins in 
US domestic law. The US Air Commerce Act of 1926 was the first law that 
required US air carriers to maintain 51 percent of voting stock under US 




In 1925, the US Congress initiated the citizenship requirement to assure 
the availability of aircraft for national defense purposes.
9
 At the time, the US 
Congress and the head of the US military believed that it was necessary to 
have ―government intervention in commercial air carrier development for the 
                                           
7
 Ibid. at 651. 
8
 See Constantine Alexandrakis, ―Foreign Investment in U.S. Airlines: Restrictive Law is 
Ripe for Change‖ (1993-1994) 4 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 71 at 73-74. 
9
 See ibid. at 73. 
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dual purpose of training a reserve corps of pilots and maintaining an auxiliary 
air force.‖10 Given the historical backdrop (the First World War only ended in 
1918), it is understandable that the country‘s political and military leaders did 
not disassociate the commercial and military roles of aviation. Essentially, 
commercial pilots were potential military pilots, and commercial aircraft 
constituted a reserve air fleet in the event of war. 
In the 1930s, economic protectionism provided another justification for 
the ownership and control restrictions in US domestic law.
11
 During the Great 
Depression, the US often chose protectionism as the principal means of 
strengthening the US economy.
12
 Accordingly, The Civil Aeronautics Act of 
1938 increased from 51 percent to 75 percent the amount of an airline's voting 
stock that must be in US hands for the carrier to qualify as a US operator.  
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 further narrowed the ownership and 
control restrictions by specifically defining what ―citizen of the United States‖ 
meant. This act was first amended as the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 
and these amendments were later codified in separate sections of US Code 
(USC): Title 49 – Transportation. Specifically, paragraph 15 of 40102(a) in 
the 49 USC provides that: 
                                           
10
 James E. Gjerset, ―Crippling United States Airlines: Archaic Interpretations of the Federal 
Aviation Act's Restriction on Foreign Capital Investments‖ (1991) 7 American University 
Journal of International Law and Policy173 at 180-181. 
11
 Although some commentators argue that economic protectionism replaced the national 
defense justification (e.g. Alexandrakis supra note 8 stating that ―[M]ilitary protectionism was 
replaced by economic protectionism during the New Deal era in the 1930s.‖), it is safe to say 
that the national defense justification remained valid at least until the 1950s. See Gjerset, ibid. 
at 182 (noting that ―[W]ith the advent of the Great Depression and New Deal Legislation, 
however, the justification for the citizenship requirement changed from strict national security 
goals to protecting developing industries from foreign competition.).  
12
 See Bimal Patel, ―A Flight Plan Towards Financial Stability - The History and Future of 
Foreign Ownership Restrictions in the United States Aviation Industry‖ (2008) 73 J. Air L. & 
Com. 487 at 490; See also Isabelle Lelieur, Law and Policy of Substantial Ownership and 
Effective Control of Airlines: Prospects for Change (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2003) at 
32. 
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―[C]itizen of the United States‖ means— 
(A) an individual who is a citizen of the United States; 
(B) a partnership each of whose partners is an individual who is a citizen 
of the United States; or 
(C) a corporation or association organized under the laws of the United 
States or a State, the District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of 
the United States, of which the president and at least two-thirds of the 
board of directors and other managing officers are citizens of the United 
States, which is under the actual control of citizens of the United States, 
and in which at least 75 percent of the voting interest is owned or 
controlled by persons that are citizens of the United States. 
 
The 25 percent cap on foreign voting equity in US airlines is still in 
effect as a substantial ownership restriction. On the issue of what constitutes 
effective (or actual) control, the US Department of Transportation (US DOT) 
principally focuses on the question of whether a foreign interest will be able to 
substantially influence the carrier‘s activities.13 The US DOT also stated that 
controlling factors broadly include substantial ownership ties, financial 
arrangements, or managerial affiliations while emphasizing that each 
citizenship case presents its own set of facts.
14
 Despite these explanations, it 
is evident that the control test is flexible enough to give the US DOT the 
discretion to determine whether effective control is in the hands of US 
nationals.  
                                           
13
 U.S., Department of Transportation, Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holdings, 
Inc. (Order 89-9-51) (29 September 1989) at 5. 
14
 U.S., Department of Transportation, DHL AIRWAYS, INC. n/k/a ASTAR AIR CARGO, INC. 
(Docket OST-2002-13089) (10 May 2004) at 8, online: < 
http://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.dev/files/docs/2004-5-10.pdf >.  
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Indeed, the US DOT‘s decisions show that the application of the control 
test remains unsettled.
15
 While the DOT‘s DHL/ASTAR decision (2004)16 
favored DHL‘s US domestic supplier (ASTAR) without creating many 
difficulties for the applicant, Virgin America had to pass much stricter foreign 
control criteria.
17
 Brian Havel succinctly noted that the US DOT‘s citizenship 
review process is clouded by ―the unpredictability of the ad hoc, 
impressionistic – and unabashedly aeropolitical – analysis which DOT 
regulators have continued to apply.‖18 
Although ownership and control restrictions under domestic law 
originated in the US, US domestic law is not unique in this regard. In fact, 
many states have laws with the ownership restriction. (See Table 4-2 for the 
foreign ownership restriction in selected countries.) 
Country Maximum percent of foreign ownership  
in selected countries 
Australia • 49 percent for international airlines 
• 100 percent for domestic airlines 
Brazil • 20 percent of voting equity 
Canada • 25 percent of voting equity 
• The maximum holding in Air Canada by any single 
investor is limited to 15 percent 
Chile • The only requirement for designation as a Chilean 
carrier (domestic or international) is principal place of 
business 
China • 49 percent 
Colombia • 40 percent 
India  • 26 percent for Air India  
• 49 percent for privately-owned domestic carriers  
                                           
15
 Havel, ―Open Skies‖, supra note 1 at 141. 
16
 U.S., Department of Transportation, DHL AIRWAYS, INC. n/k/a ASTAR AIR CARGO, INC. 
(Docket OST-2002-13089) (10 May 2004). 
17
 See Havel, supra note 1 at 143-155. Havel noted that the DOT‘s strict ―actual control‖ 
analysis yielded positive results for Virgin America. For instance, Virgin America removed 
Frederick Reid as CEO of Virgin America (although Mr. Reid was the preferred choice of 
Virgin Group CEO Richard Branson) and cut the Virgin Group‘s board representation from 
three to two. See ibid at 153. 
18
 Ibid. at 146-147. 
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Indonesia • Airlines designated under bilateral agreements must be 
substantially owned and effectively controlled by the 
other party 
Israel • 34 percent 
Japan • 49 percent 
Kenya  • 49 percent 
Korea • 49 percent 
Malaysia • 45 percent for Malaysia Airlines, but the maximum 
holding by any single foreign entity is 20 percent 
• 49 percent for other airlines 
Mauritius • 40 percent 
New Zealand • 49 percent for international airlines 
• 100 percent for domestic airlines 
Peru  • 49 percent 
Philippines  • 40 percent 
Singapore • The only requirement for designation as a Singapore 
carrier is principal place of business 
Taiwan • One third 
Thailand • 49 percent 
US • 25 percent of voting equity 




Australia and New Zealand are unique in that they have liberalized 
foreign ownership in domestic airlines. New Zealand removed the foreign 
ownership restriction in 1988,
20
 and Australia relaxed the ownership rules in 
1999. This means that ―any foreign person including a foreign airline can 
                                           
19
 Based on Chia-Jui Hsu & Yu-Chun Chang, ―The Influences of Airline Ownership Rules on 
Aviation Policies and Carriers‘ Strategies‖ (2005) 5 Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society 
for Transportation Studies 557 at 558, online: <http://www.easts.info/on-
line/proceedings_05/557.pdf>. However, I have made updates and corrections for China, 
Japan, and Korea. 
20
 See ibid. at 565 (noting that ―[I]n June 1986, the New Zealand Government amended the 
Air Services Licensing Act (1983) removing specific restrictions on overseas investments in 
domestic airlines. In policy guidelines issued to the Overseas Investment Commission (OIC), 
it was stipulated that up to 50 percent investment by foreign airlines was acceptable. In 
February 1988, the Government approved a temporary increase in Ansett Australia‘s 
shareholding in Ansett New Zealand to 100 percent, provided a return to 50 percent occurred 
within two years if a suitable New Zealand shareholder could be found. Seven months later, 
the Government decided to remove the previous 50 percent limit on investment by foreign 
airlines. The OIC was thereby able to approve 100 percent investment by any foreign carrier 
in a domestic airline and as such New Zealand became the first country in the world to remove 
foreign ownership restrictions on domestic carriers.‖). 
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acquire up to 100 percent of the equity of an Australian domestic airline, 
unless it is deemed to be contrary to the national interest.‖21 
The lifting of the foreign ownership cap was particularly significant in 
the creation of low-cost carriers.
22
 Virgin Blue (now Virgin Australia), a 
subsidiary of the Virgin Group, was established in 2000 with 100 percent UK 
capital, and Tiger Airways Australia had been a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Singapore‘s Tiger Airways Holdings Limited since its creation in 2007.23 
It is very rare for ownership and control to be fully liberalized in a 
country‘s domestic law like this. In the vast majority of states, a foreign carrier 
cannot establish its own airline, either a new airline or a subsidiary or buying 
over an existing airline, in a domestic market due to these internal restrictions. 
 
4.1.3 External (Air Services Agreement) Restrictions  
The Chicago Conference was the first time that the issues of ownership 
and control restrictions were raised in international discussions.24 Since US 
officials wanted to assure the safety of US airspace, the US sought the right to 
prohibit carriers from operating there if substantial ownership and effective 
control raised questions of a political nature or a threat to national security.25 
                                           
21
 Jeffrey Goh, The Single Aviation Market of Australia and New Zealand (London: 
Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at 72.  
22
 Hsu & Chang, supra note 19 at 566. 
23
 In 2014, Tiger Airways Australia became a fully owned subsidiary of Virgin Australia. See 
CAPA, ―Virgin Australia CEO John Borghetti interview: dual-brand strategies, Asia & being a 




 Alexandrakis supra note 8 at 74. 
25
 See ibid. See also Proceedings of the International Conference on Civil Aviation, Chicago, 
1 November – 7 December 1944 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1948) vol. II at 1283. During the Chicago Conference 1944, the US Delegate once 
spoke that ―we would not care to have a group of Germans go abroad and use their ill gotten 
gains to purchase aircraft and utilize rights we might have accorded a friendly state to fly into 
the Unites States.‖ 
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For the US, the then-war enemies Germany and Italy were the main targets of 
these sentiments, particularly because they had extensive ties to Latin 
American airlines operating within the US sphere of influence.
26
 
Although these restrictions were not included in the Chicago Convention 
(1944), both the Transit Agreement (1944) and the Transport Agreement 
(1944) provided for such restrictions.
27
 The identical wording was inserted in 
the ―Standard Form of Agreement for Provisional Air Routes‖ as a model for 
future bilateral agreements.
28
 More importantly, the first bilateral agreement 
between the US and the UK in 1946 (Bermuda type 1 Agreement) modeled 
the language for substantial ownership and effective control of air carriers.
29
 
The majority of states have followed the Bermuda type 1 as a standard 
bilateral air services agreement, and the notion of ―flag carrier‖ defined here 
has long been the norm in worldwide aviation policy.
30
 The current practice is 
not very far from the agreements made in the 1940s. In 2006, it was reported 
that substantial ownership and effective control clauses were found in 90 
                                           
26
 Alexandrakis supra note 8 at 74. 
27
 Article 1 Section 5 of the Transit Agreement and Article 1 Section 6 of the Transport 
Agreement: 
Each contracting State reserves the right to withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an 
air transport enterprise of another State in any case where it is not satisfied that substantial 
ownership and effective control are vested in nationals of a contracting State, or in case of 
failure of such air transport enterprise to comply with the laws of the State over which it 
operates, or to perform its obligations under this Agreement. 
28
 Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO, 2d ed. (Utrecht: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2012) at 91. 
29
 Article 6 of the Bermuda 1 Agreement 
Each Contracting Party reserves the right to withhold or revoke the exercise of the rights 
specified in the Annex to this Agreement by a carrier designated by the other Contracting 
Party in the event that it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of 
such carriers are vested in nationals of either Contracting Party, or in case of failure by that 
carrier to comply with the laws and regulations referred to in Article 5 hereof, or otherwise to 
fulfil the conditions under which the rights are granted in accordance with this Agreement and 
its Annex. 
30
 Peter P.C. Haanappel, ―Airline Ownership and Control and Some Related Matters‖ (2001) 
26 Air & Space L. 90 at 90. 
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percent of bilateral air services agreements.
31
 One example is Article 3, 
paragraphs 2 and 3, of the China-Korea air services agreement: 
 
Article 3 (Airline Designation and Authorization) 
(2) The substantia1 ownership and effective control of the airlines 
designated by each Contracting Party shall remain vested in such 
Contracting Party or its nationals. 
(3) The aeronautical authorities of the other Contracting Party may 
require the airlines designated by the first Contracting Party to satisfy to 
them that they are qualified to fulfil the conditions prescribed under the 
laws and regulations normally and reasonably applied by the said 
authorities to the operation of international air services. 
 
Article 4, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a), of the Agreement also pertains 
to this issue: 
 
Article 4 (Revocation, Suspension and Imposition of Conditions) 
(l) Each Contracting Party shall have the right to revoke or suspend the 
operating authorization granted to the designated airline(s) of the other 
Contracting Party or to impose such conditions as it may deem necessary 
on the exercise by the said designated airline(s) of the rights specified in 
Article 2 of this Agreement, in any of the following cases: 
                                           
31
 WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review 
(QUASAR): Part B: PRELIMINARY RESULTS, S/C/W/270/Add.1 (2006) at 33, para 61, 
online: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/transport_e/quasar_partb_e.pdf>.  
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(a) where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective 
control of that airline is vested in the other Contracting Party or its 
nationals. 
 
A very important feature of this external restriction is the fact that the 
language of the nationality provision in air services agreements is rather 
flexible. Indeed, the nationality provision is framed as a right to revoke, 
implying that there is an implicit right not to revoke.
32
 In other words, states 
are not obliged to invoke the nationality clause even if they believe that the 
nationality conditions are not met.
33
 For instance, the US did not suspend the 
traffic rights of Aerolineas Argentinas even though the airline was 85 percent 
owned by a Spanish holding company backed by Iberia (Spanish carrier).
34
 
Instead, the US required that American Airlines be granted additional market 
access rights between points in the US and Buenos Aires.
35
 
This flexible articulation carries considerable implications for 
liberalizing external restrictions. Since states can decide whether or not to 
challenge the ownership and control of a foreign carrier, legal reform is not 
necessary for liberalization. In other words, State A can be silent about 
sizeable foreign investment in the national air carriers of State B. Thus, one 
possibility is de facto liberalization that does not necessarily require revision 
of air services agreements. Many Latin American governments appear to have 
followed this practice. For instance, although LAN Chile owned an 80 percent 
                                           
32
 Havel & Sanchez, ―Lex Aviatica‖, supra note 6 at 662. 
33
 Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO, 2d ed. (Utrecht: Eleven International 
Publishing, 2012) at 91 
34
 Havel, ―Open Skies‖, supra note 1 at 165. See also Pablo Mendes de Leon, ―A New Phase 
in Alliance Building: The Air France/KLM Venture as a Case Study‖ (2004) 53 Z.L.W. 359 at 
362. 
35
 Mendes de Leon, ibid. at 362. 
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share in LAN Argentina in 2006
36
, there was no meaningful opposition from 
the other Latin American states. 
Nevertheless, there have been various attempts to de jure liberalize the 
long-established substantial ownership and effective control restrictions 
through different levels of reforms, namely, multilateral/plurilateral regulatory 
reform, regional reform, bilateral preferential concessions, and unilateral (and 
voluntary) relaxation. (See section 4.3 Options for Liberalization of 
Ownership and Control Restrictions.) 
Clearly, there are barriers to such reform. ICAO has summarized the 
rationale for the nationality clause, namely: 1) the ―balance of benefits‖ policy 
for the airlines involved, 2) preventing ―free riders‖, 3) identifying the country 




It would be fair to say that the argument of security and national defense 
is not convincing anymore.
38
 Most countries now rely on their military for 
national security and defense without needing their national airlines for that 
purpose.
39
 In addition, ensuring safety and security oversight can be achieved 
by the ―effective regulatory control‖ test rather than the ―effective economic 
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37
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(10 December 2013) at 1, para. 1.2., online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp012_en.pdf>. 
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 Milde, supra note 33 at 92; But some national defense agencies strongly support the 
nationality clause. The view of the U.S. Department of Defense, for example, is that the US 
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, a wartime readiness program established in 1952, 
still ―ensure(s) quantifiable, accessible, and reliable commercial airlift capability to augment 
Department of Defense (DOD) airlift.‖ See United States Transportation Command, Civil 
Airlift Programs, USTRANSCOM Instruction 24-9 (13 October 2011); See also Havel supra 
note 1 at 48 (noting the DOD‘s concern that ―[i]f a U.S. carriers were bought by foreign 
investors, it could no longer be relied on to honor its CRAF commitments.‖). Havel, however, 
noted that ―[I]n the maritime equivalent of CRAF (the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift 
Agreement, VISA), the Department of Defense already allows participation by foreign-owned 
commercial ships that qualify as ‗U.S. citizens‘ under martime law.‖. See ibid. 
39
 Braun, supra note 2 at 357. 
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control‖ test. It is important to distinguish the two concepts. While ―effective 
regulatory control‖ ensures optimal compliance with safety, security, and 
other important regulatory matters
40, ―effective economic control‖ is about 
who manages the airline in question. (See section 4.3.1 Multilateral Approach 
for a more detailed explanation.) 
Preventing ―free riders‖ is an important consideration. The following 
hypothetical situation proposed by Havel and Sanchez is useful for 
understanding the reciprocal and exclusive nature of ownership and control 
restrictions in air services agreements: 
 
If the United States, pursuing market access privileges for its airlines in 
East Asia, exchanges liberal reciprocal concessions with, for example, 
South Korea, it would not want investors from a more restrictive state, 
such as neighboring Japan, to "free ride" these market access privileges by 
either acquiring or establishing an air carrier in South Korea. Japan's 
incentive to offer new market concessions to U.S. carriers would be 
correspondingly diminished in such a scenario.
 41 
 
―Balance of benefit‖ policies are the strongest barrier to this reform. 
Many states still prefer implementing a ―balance of benefit‖ policy for the 
airlines involved, referring to a policy of calculating economic details such 
that neither party receives a bigger benefit from the agreed international air 
                                           
40
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 It is obvious that a rigorous insistence on a ―balance of benefits‖ is 
opposed to free competition in the market.
43
 
In addition, it is noteworthy that some labor groups, especially US 
airline employees, have strongly opposed liberalizing foreign ownership rules 
because they believe that this could decrease the quality of working conditions 
and reduce the workforce.
44
 Compelling as these arguments may be, the 
economic disadvantages resulting from the protectionist effects of ownership 
and control restrictions cannot be disregarded. From an airline‘s perspective, 
foreign capital flow is interrupted and normally permissible forms of corporate 
restructuring (such as mergers) are prohibited by the ownership and control 
restrictions.
45
  From a consumer‘s perspective, it is perfectly reasonable to 
ask why ―who can perform transport services most efficiently is secondary‖ 
and why ―what matters is whether [that person] is a foreigner or a national.‖46  
In the following section, the national law and policy of the Northeast 
Asian states with regard to ownership and control restrictions will be 
examined. After introducing the relevant legislation in these three countries, I 
will review past precedents dealing with ownership and control tests to 
understand how each of these governments has interpreted the restrictions, and 
in particular, effective control inquiries. 
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 Jürgen Basedow, ―Verkehrsrecht und Verkehrspolitik als Europäische Aufgabe‖ in Gerd 
Aberle ed., Europaische Verkehrspolitik (Tübingen, Paul Siebeck: 1987) 1 at 7 (cited in Havel 
& Sanchez, ―Lex Aviatica‖, supra note 6 at 649) [Havel's translation]. 
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4.2 National Law and Policy on Ownership and Control Restrictions in 
Northeast Asia 
4.2.1 Overview 
Using the matrix discussed in section 4.1.1 Overview, the three countries 
in Northeast Asia have rigid legislation involving Subdivision A (substantial 
ownership restriction in their domestic laws). China permits a maximum of 49 
percent foreign ownership (up to 25 percent for one person); Japan, a 
maximum of 1/3 foreign voting rights; and Korea, no more than 50 percent 
foreign ownership. The three countries do not have detailed criteria for 
examining Subdivision B (effective control restriction by domestic law) in 
their national laws. Nonetheless, past precedents provide ample evidence for 
deducing each nation‘s policy on effective control, which will be discussed in 
the following sections. 
However, there is not enough information publicly available to 
determine how flexibly (or rigidly) the three countries interpret Subdivision C 
(substantial ownership restriction by air services agreements) and Subdivision 
D (effective control restriction by air services agreements). One way to look at 
this is to ask whether they have officially invoked the nationality clause and 
revoked the permit of foreign airlines whose ownership and control structures 
are dubious. For example, most AirAsia‘s joint ventures are majority owned 
by local investors with minimal expertise in the aviation industry. 
Country/ 
Territory 




Indonesia Indonesia AirAsia Pin Harris – 
20% and 
Sendjaja 






Berhad) – 49% 
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(PTKAP) – 51% 
AirAsia X Berhad 
– 49% 
Thailand Thai AirAsia X  
 
Tassapon 
Bijleveld  – 
41% and Julpas 
Kruesopon – 
10% 
AirAsia Berhad – 
49%;  
Japan Japan AirAsia 
(Scheduled to launch 
services in 2015) 
Octave Japan 
Infrastructure 
Fund – 19%; 
Rakuten Inc. –  
18%; Noevir 
Holdings Co. 
Ltd. – 9%  and 






Berhad) – 49%  









Berhad) – 49% 












Berhad) – 40%; 
Philippines AirAsia Zest AirAsia Inc. 
(Philippine 
AirAsia) – 49% 
and Alfredo Yao 
– 51%  
 
 Table 4-3 The Ownership and Control Structure of AirAsia LCC joint 
 ventures 
 
Thus, questions have been raised about whether these joint ventures are 
effectively controlled by local investors or by the holding company in 
Malaysia. For obvious reasons, it would be quite hard to determine whether 
airline companies have confidential agreements vesting actual and full control 
to foreign interests. Based on AirAsia Berhad‘s corporate filings and that of its 
associates, it is standard procedure to execute in all its JVs the following: (1) a 




; (2) another agreement in which AirAsia Berhad binds itself to 
provide technical, operational, and commercial support on an arms-length 
basis to the JV carrier to ensure commercial, operational, branding, and 
service-level uniformity throughout existing AirAsia Berhad operations
48
; and 
(3) a brand license agreement, which permits the JV carrier to use ―AirAsia‖ 
as a ―trade name for business operation, access to market knowledge, and 
customer services.‖49   
It must also be noted that all JVs entered into by AirAsia Berhad are 
considered its associates. As stated in its financial disclosures, associates are 
corporations wherein AirAsia Berhad exercises significant influence but not 
control.
50
 Significant influence is defined in the disclosure as ―the power to 
participate in the financial and operating policy decisions of the associates but 
not the power to exercise control over those policies.‖51 Despite this language, 
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 See Bursa Malaysia Announcement, ―AirAsia Japan Joint Venture‖ (21 July 2011), online: 
<http://announcements.bursamalaysia.com/EDMS/edmswebh.nsf/all/482576120041BDAA48
2578D4001D24CD/$File/AirAsia%20Japan%20Joint%20Venture.pdf>. See also Ellis Taylor, 




 Asia Aviation Public Company Limited, ―Annual Report 2012‖ at 95, online: 
<http://aav.listedcompany.com/misc/AR/20140624-aav-ar2012-en-02.pdf>.  
50






 Jae Woon Lee & Michelle Dy, ―Mitigating ―Effective Control‖ Restriction on Joint Venture 
Airlines in Asia: Philippine AirAsia Case‖ (2015) 40 Air & Space L. 231 at 251; See also 
Braun, supra note 2 at 353; Similarly, see CAPA, ―Jetstar Hong Kong‘s local investor reflects 
HK‘s new attitude, learning from Hong Kong Airlines‖ (18 June 2013) (noting that 
―[c]ountries have turned a blind eye to where management control is exercised, so long as on 
paper there is local ownership. It is quietly accepted that Jetstar Australia exerts considerable, 
to say the least, influence over Singapore-based Jetstar Asia while AirAsia Berhad (Malaysia) 
has similar influence over affiliates in countries including Indonesia and Thailand.‖), online: 
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Although most of AirAsia Berhad‘s business partners and CEOs 
appointed to the JVs are nationals of the country where the JV carrier was 
organized, their lack of previous experience in the airline industry is public 
knowledge.
53
 For instance, Marianne Hontiveros, the CEO of Philippine 
AirAsia, previously worked for Tony Fernandes when the latter was still the 
vice president of Warner Music Southeast Asia.
54  
The two other major 
shareholders, Romero and Cojuangco, were co-owners of the Philippine 
Patriots basketball team.
55
 These facts raise a doubt that these executives are 
merely pawns of AirAsia Berhad, with the management team in Malaysia 
actually running the show.
56
  
AirAsia‘s joint ventures are operating in China (e.g. Thai AirAsia flies 
between Guangzhou and Bangkok based on the China-Thailand air services 
agreement), Japan (e.g. Thai AirAsia X flies between Tokyo-Narita and 
Bangkok based on the Japan-Thailand air services agreement), and Korea (e.g. 
AirAsia Zest flies between Seoul-Incheon and Manila based on the Korea-
Philippines air services agreement). 
Given the ownership and control structure of AirAsia‘s joint ventures, it 
would seem that China, Japan, and Korea have sufficient legal grounds to 
argue that those joint venture airlines do not meet the designation criteria set 




 For instance, Tassapon Bijleveld (CEO, Thai AirAsia) and Sendjaja Widjaja (Former CEO, 
Indonesia AirAsia) have no prior experience in the airline industry. They were in the music 





 See Mary Ann LL. Reyes, ―Fernandes, ‗Tonyboy‘ team up for AirAsia Phils‖, The 





 Lee & Dy, supra note 52 at 251.  
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forth in the relevant air services agreements. However, none of them have 
moved to revoke the joint ventures‘ operations on the grounds of effective 
control, at least according to publicly available sources. 
This fact suggests that the three countries do not proactively go into 
effective control restriction by way of air services agreements (Subdivision 
D).
57
 Indeed, ownership and control restrictions are generally used as ―a 
source of leverage‖ during negotiations for air services agreement whilst 
market access restrictions had long been the norm.
58
 A classic example is that 
the US required a grant of additional market access rights in exchange for 
allowing Aerolineas Argentinas to continue its services between the US and 






The history of national legislation about ownership and control in China 
reveals a general trend of gradual relaxation of such restrictions. However, the 
traditional 51:49 structure remains unchanged. Also, it is noteworthy that 
China‘s position has varied according to whether the airline in question is a 
passenger airline or a cargo airline. 
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 Havel and Sanchez provide a convincing explanation of this. See Havel & Sanchez, ―Lex 
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From the early 1990s, China started to draw foreign investors‘ attention 
arising from its policy of opening up. Accordingly, the Civil Aviation 
Authority of China (CAAC) and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC) promulgated the Circular on Relevant Policies on 
Foreign Investment in the Civil Aviation Industry in 1994.
60
 The Circular 
limited a foreign investor‘s contribution to an airline to 35 percent and the 
foreign representative‘s voting rights on the board of directors to 25 percent.61 
Subsequently, Hainan Airlines announced a $25 million investment from 
American Aviation and became China‘s first carrier to utilize foreign 
investment in 1995.62 
Later, the Regulation of the People‘s Republic of China on the 
Nationality Registration of Civil Aircraft (State Council Order No. 232) in 
1997 formalized these ownership and control restrictions as national law. 
Article 2 of the Regulation is as follows: 
 
Article 2 
The following civil aircraft shall enter into nationality registration 
pursuant to these Regulations: 
(1) civil aircraft of state institutions of the People's Republic of China; 
(2) civil aircraft of a corporate enterprise established in accordance with 
the laws of the People's Republic of China; the registered capital of the 
corporate enterprise constitutes contributions from foreign businesses, the 
                                           
60
 Zang Hongliang & Meng Qingfen, Civil Aviation Law in the People's Republic of China 
(The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2010) at 38. 
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 Ibid. at 38-39. 
62
 Jane Pan, ―ANALYSIS: The role of foreign investment in Chinese airlines‖ Flightglobal 
(21 Nov 2012), online: <http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/analysis-the-role-of-
foreign-investment-in-chinese-379324/>. 
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percentage of foreign businesses in the registered capital or paid-up 
capital of the said corporate enterprise does not exceed 35 percent, the 
right to vote of their representatives on the board of directors and the 
shareholders'  conference (shareholders' meeting) does not exceed 35 
percent, and a Chinese citizen serves as the chairman of the board of 
directors of the said corporate enterprise; 
(3) other civil aircraft the registration of which is approved by the 




Thus, the caps on foreign shares and voting rights were officially set at 
35 percent by the 1997 Regulation of the People‘s Republic of China on the 
Nationality Registration of Civil Aircraft. A more substantial change was 
made in 2002 through the Regulation on Foreign Investment in the Civil 
Aviation Industry (CAAC Order No. 110), effective as of 1 August 2002. 
Article 6 of the Regulation provides the following: 
 
A foreign-invested public air transport enterprise shall be controlled by 
the Chinese party or parties, and the contribution of any foreign investor 
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 Regulations of the Nationality Registration of Civil Aircraft (1997) (Asian Legal 
Information Institute), online: <http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/rotnroca596/>. 
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 Hongliang & Qingfen, supra note 60 at 121; see different versions of the translation by 
Asian Legal Information Institute (stating that ―[W]here foreign investors invest in public air 
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The above provision is understood to have increased the cap on foreign 
investment from 35 percent to 49 percent.
65
 Although the number 49 does not 
actually appear in the provision, the Chinese phrase xiangduikonggu 
―相对控股‖ (which means ―relative controlling shares‖) implies that the 
shareholding percentage of the Chinese party has to be greater than any of its 
foreign partner(s).
66
 There is also a specific mention of the numeric restriction 
of 25 percent for any single investor. Thus, although foreign investors can own 
up to 49 per cent in sum, no single investor can own more than 25 percent. 
Some commentators argued that China‘s decision to restructure its 
aviation market in a way that gave foreign investors greater access had to do 
with the country‘s admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001.
67
 Although China did not undertake any specific commitment to 
liberalizing its air transport industry as a condition of membership in the 
WTO,
68
 it is reasonable to conjecture that foreign investment became more 
common in China after it joined the WTO. 
In practice, China‘s relaxation of ownership and control restrictions 
shows two completely different pictures. In the cargo market, China has 
actively embraced liberalization. For instance, Jade Cargo International 
became China's first air cargo joint venture, bringing in investment from 
Shenzhen Airlines (51 percent), Lufthansa Cargo (25 percent) and German 
                                           
65
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International with Domestic Priorities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009) at 85. 
66
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September 2001), online: <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm>. 
234 
Investment and Development (24 percent) in 2004.
69
 Grandstar Cargo was 
another joint venture, with stakes held by Sinotrans, China‘s logistic company 
(51 percent), Korean Air (25 percent) and two Korean investment companies, 
Hana Capital (13 percent) and Shinhan Capital (11 percent).70 Interestingly, 
China has allowed foreigners to be appointed as CEOs at both joint ventures. 
Mr. Frank Naeve, a German citizen, was a CEO for Jade Cargo, and Mr. 
Kwang-Sa Lee, a Korean citizen, was a CEO for Grandstar Cargo. 
In contrast to its remarkably liberal approach to cargo airlines, China has 
been highly protective in the passenger market. On the surface, most 
passenger airlines have showed little interest in furthering their financial ties 
with foreign investors.
71
 More accurately, however, the Chinese government 
appears to have actively blocked foreign investment in Chinese passenger 
airlines in line with its policy of protecting the big three airlines (see above 
section 3.2.2.1). 
For instance, when China Eastern announced that it would sell a 26 
percent stake to Singapore Airlines and Temasek Holdings (a Singapore state-
owned investment company) in 2007, China National Aviation Holding (Air 
China's parent company) proposed a counter offer that was 32 percent higher 
than that of Singapore Airlines at the completion stage, which ultimately 
blocked the deal.
72
 An exception was made for the cross ownership of Air 
China and Hong Kong‘s Cathay Pacific. Air China has a 30% stake in Cathay 
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Pacific, and Cathay Pacific holds a roughly 20% stake in Air China.
73
 It can 
be assumed that the special relationship between China and Hong Kong made 
this flexible approach possible. 
 
4.2.3 Japan 
Japan‘s domestic legislation regarding ownership appears to be 
protective. However, it has recently liberalized its policy on assessing 
effective control without legislative reform. Article 4 and Article 101 of the 
Civil Aeronautics Act (Act No. 231 of 1952) provide the following: 
 
Article 4 (Requirement for Registration) 
(1) Any aircraft owned by any person who falls under any of the following 
items shall not be eligible for registration. 
(i) Any person who does not have Japanese nationality 
(ii) Any foreign state or public entity or its equivalent in any foreign state 
(iii) Any juridical person or body established in accordance with the laws 
and ordinances of any foreign state 
(iv) Any juridical person of which the representative is any one of those 
listed in the preceding three items or of which more than one-third of the 
officers are such persons or more than one-third of voting rights are held 
by such persons 
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Article 101 (Licensing Standards) 
(1) The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism shall, 
when there has been an application under the preceding article, examine 
whether it conforms to each of the following: … 
(v) Any applicant shall not fall under any of the following categories: 
(a) Any person listed in any item of Article 4 paragraph (1)…75 
 
Thus, foreigners cannot hold more than one-third of the voting rights in 
a Japanese air carrier.
76
 If the total holdings by foreigners exceed one-third of 
the voting rights, the aircraft in question is automatically unregistered
77
 or the 
license of the air transport service is invalidated.
78
 These ownership and 
control provisions have never been changed since their enactment in 1952. 
However, the Civil Aeronautics Act does not put restrictions on non-
voting shares. It is the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (1949) that 
restricts total foreign ownership of Japanese airlines.
79
 Under the Foreign 
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 Yamazaki, supra note 76 at 53. The relevant provisions are 26 and 27 of the Foreign 
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Exchange and Foreign Trade Act and associated ordinances, the civil aviation 
industry falls into specified business sectors that require advance notice and 
careful examination for foreign investment. In brief, if foreigners own more 
than half of the total shares of an airline, these strict restrictions apply.
80
  
The ownership structure of the first AirAsia Japan (a joint venture 
between All Nippon Airways and AirAsia that operated from August 2012 to 
October 2013) offers an eloquent illustration of these restrictions. While ANA 
held 67 percent and Air Asia 33 percent of voting shares, ANA held 51 
percent and AirAsia 49 percent of the total capital.
81
 Thus, the Japanese can 
be said to follow the US model of splitting shares into voting and non-voting 
stock, placing stricter requirements on voting stock. 
Interestingly, Japanese domestic law (Article 129 of the Civil 
Aeronautics Act) reconfirms Subdivision C (substantial ownership restriction 
by air services agreements) and Subdivision D (effective control restriction by 
air services agreements).
82
 Thus, any change in the foreign carrier‘s 
ownership and control structure carries the risk that the carrier‘s service into 
Japan will be suspended under Japanese domestic law. However, similar to the 
nationality clause in air services agreements, revocation is not automatic since 
                                                                                                              
Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (1949). A rough translation can be found at 
<http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/FTA.pdf >. 
80
 Yamazaki, ibid. at 53. 
81
 AirAsia, Press Release, ―ANA and AirAsia to form ‗AirAsia Japan‘‖ (21 July 2011), online: 
<http://www.airasia.com/my/en/press-releases/ana-and-airasia-form-airasia-japan.page >. 
82
 See Article 129-5 (Suspension of Services and Revocation of License) 
The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism may, when any foreign 
international air carrier falls under any of the following cases, order the foreign international 
air carrier to suspend its services for a certain period or revoke the license. 
(i) When any foreign international air carrier has violated the provisions of this Act, any 
disposition under relevant laws and regulations, or any conditions attached to any license or 
approval under relevant laws and regulations 
(ii) When the substantial ownership of shares or equity of any foreign international air carrier 
or the substantial control of air transport services operated by any foreign international air 
carrier is no longer vested in the state to which the said foreign international air carrier 
belongs or its nationals., online: <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/caa.pdf>. 
238 
the government is permitted, but not obligated, to suspend the service of the 
foreign carrier in question. 
More significantly, Japan has taken a flexible approach on Subdivision 
B (effective control restriction by domestic law). The first AirAsia Japan 
originally raised the question of how the Japanese government would interpret 
―control‖ since AirAsia was effectively trying to run AirAsia Japan despite its 
minority share.
83
 More obvious examples are Spring Airlines Japan and the 
second Air Asia Japan. 
Spring Airlines Japan, an LCC joint venture airline in Japan, 
commenced operations in July 2014. Spring Airlines owns 33 percent of 
Spring Airlines Japan, and the rest of the shares are owned by various 
Japanese investors in the private-equity, travel, and IT industries.
84
 Clearly, 
since none of the investors are Japanese airlines, it is uncertain that Spring 
Airlines Japan is effectively controlled by the Japanese non-airline investors 
rather than Spring Airlines. In addition, although local investors are not fully 
disclosed (except JTB, Japan‘s largest travel agency), Spring Airlines appears 
to be the largest investor. 
AirAsia Japan is expected to begin operations in 2015. This second 
AirAsia Japan is a joint venture between AirAsia (49 percent share but 33 
percent voting rights) and various Japanese investors (Octave Japan 
Infrastructure Fund 19 percent, Rakuten 18 percent, Noevir Holding 9 percent, 
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 Joanne Chiu, ―Japan Approves Spring Air's Low-Cost Venture‖ The Wall Street Journal (27 
December 2013), online: 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303799404579283503425437022 >. 
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and Alpen 5 percent).
85
 Like Spring Airlines Japan, none of the investors are 
Japanese airlines, and AirAsia is the largest shareholder in AirAsia Japan.  
In response to an inquiry about whether the Japanese partners are willing 
to accept the AirAsia business model, an AirAsia spokeswoman emphasized 
that ―we are the only airline in this partnership so yes, we expect the 
relationship to be completely different this time,‖ recalling the company‘s 
experience with the first AirAsia Japan.
86
 
With this specially designed ownership structure and its experience in 
the first AirAsia, it is conceivable that AirAsia would try to control the new 
AirAsia Japan. In fact, AirAsia would be strategically better off with partners 
that are ―more passive and will let them [AirAsia] run the airline and apply 
their model.‖87 
The fact that the Japanese government granted Spring Airlines Japan and 
the second AirAsia Japan operating licenses as Japanese domestic carriers 
shows that Japan is not too strict about Subdivision B (effective control 
restriction by domestic law). At the same time, it is worth noting that Japan 
has not necessarily given up the effective control test. While Japan is currently 
taking a flexible stance on effective control, it could still raise concerns about 
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4.2.4 Korea 
Korean legislation on ownership restrictions adheres to the traditional 
51:49 structure. However, unlike Japan, Korea has taken a strict approach to 
effective control inquiries. Articles 6 and 114 of the Korea Aviation Act 
outline the legal principles of ownership and control as shown below: 
 
Article 6 (Restrictions on Registration of Aircraft) 
(1) No aircraft may be registered that is owned or leased by a person who 
falls under any of the following sub-paragraphs. However, this shall not 
apply when a national or juridical person of the Republic of Korea has 
leased, or is otherwise entitled to use, that aircraft. 
1. a person who is not a citizen of the Republic of Korea; 
2. a foreign government or foreign public organization; 
3. a foreign corporation or organization; 
4. a corporation in which a share equal to or exceeding 50% is held by a 
person who falls under any of subparagraphs 1 through 3, or a 
corporation whose operations are effectively controlled by such a person. 
5. a corporation whose representative is a foreigner, or half or more of 
whose officers are foreigners. 
(2) No aircraft having a foreign nationality may be registered 
 
Article 114 (Disqualification, etc. for License) 
(1) The Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs shall not grant 
a license for domestic or international air transportation business to a 
person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs: 
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Thus, foreign investment in Korean air carriers cannot exceed 50 percent 
while similarly the number of foreign board members cannot exceed 50 
percent. Like Japan, Korean domestic law (Article 150 of the Aviation Act) 
reconfirms Subdivision C (substantial ownership restriction by air services 




Korea has applied the effective control restrictions more strictly than 
Japan. In 2008, the Korean government rejected a joint venture to be called 
Tiger Incheon that Tiger Airways (originally set up by Singapore Airlines) 
sought to form with a Korean local partner, Incheon Metropolitan City (in 




The government‘s rationale for rejecting this joint venture was that Tiger 
Incheon would have been effectively controlled by Tiger Airways (i.e. 
nationals of Singapore) given that the Korean local shareholders and board of 
directors did not have any experience in aviation. Indeed, the decision was in 
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 The Aviation Act (The Korean Ministry Government Legislation). 
89
 See Article 150 (Revocation, etc. of Permission)  
1) If a foreign international air transportation businessman falls under any of the following 
subparagraphs, the Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs may revoke the 
permission, or order him to suspend the business with a period not exceeding six months fixed: 
Provided, That if he falls under subparagraph 1 or 21, the Minister of Land, Transport and 
Maritime Affairs shall revoke the permission: 
… 
(18) Where the substantial ownership or effective control belongs no longer to the country in 
which the foreign international air carrier holds the nationality, or nationals of such country; 
However, in case air services agreement that Korea signed with a country (including 
association of nations or economic union) determines otherwise, the air services agreement 
prevails.   
90
 See CAPA, ―Korea steps back into the dark. Airline protectionism flourishes in Seoul‖ (28 
August 2008), online: <http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/korea-steps-back-into-the-dark-
airline-protectionism-flourishes-in-seoul-3619 >. 
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line with a petition that Korean LCCs (namely, Air Busan, Yeongnam Air 
(now defunct), Jeju Air, and Jin Air had filed with the Korean Ministry of 
Transport.
91
 The CAPA report harshly criticized the decision: ―The request 
from several vested interests - worded in clear aviation nationalism overtones - 
was designed solely to protect local airlines from added competition.‖92 
However, the decision was technically in compliance with Korean domestic 
law, which examines not only majority ownership but also the question of 
effective control of the airline in question. 
Ownership and control restrictions are deeply entrenched in the national 
laws of most jurisdictions (Subdivision A and Subdivision B), and Northeast 
Asia is no exception. However, there have been various efforts to liberalize 
ownership and control restrictions, particularly the external restrictions 
(Subdivision C and Subdivision D). 
 
4.3 Options for Liberalizing Ownership and Control Restrictions 
As the global airline industry became privatized and deregulated in the 
1980s and 1990s, the industry became more competitive and new air carriers 
entered a market that had previously been restricted to a small number of 
players. Indeed, privatization significantly challenged the rationale for 
ownership and control restrictions in the airline industry, as Andrew 
Harrington explains: 
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 See e.g. Xiaowen Fu, Tae Hoon Oum & Anming Zhang ―Air Transport Liberalization and 
Its Impacts on Airline Competition and Air Passenger Traffic‖ (2010) 49:4 Transportation 
Journal. 24 at 36-37.  
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 CAPA, ―Korea steps back into the dark. Airline protectionism flourishes in Seoul‖ (28 
August 2008), online: <http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/korea-steps-back-into-the-dark-
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In the period prior to the 1980‘s, flag carriers were in most cases wholly 
State-owned. As such it was commonplace for them to enjoy a high level 
of protectionism (in some cases a legislative prohibition on competition) 
and state support (in the form of subsidies, interest free loans and other 
fiscal incentives). As the 1980s and 1990‘s arrived and privatization or 
corporatization was implemented as part of an economy wide policy of 
economic rationalism, these flag carriers were able to rely less and less 




Not only private investments from domestic investors but furthermore 
transnational investments became common in the airline industry. In order to 
address regulatory and market changes, ICAO started to discuss the 
liberalization of ownership and control restrictions in international fora. 
 
4.3.1 The Multilateral Approach 
As an international organization, ICAO has been reluctant to push for 
reforming national law and policy in regard to ownership and control 
restrictions (Subdivision A and Subdivision B). Instead, ICAO has focused on 
relaxing ownership and control restrictions in air services agreements 
(Subdivision C and Subdivision D). 
The Fifth ICAO Air Transport Conference in 2003
94
 proposed 
regulatory reform of the issue of air carrier ownership and control and made 
recommendations about air transportation liberalization. Specifically, the 2003 
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 Andrew Harrington, ―Foreign Ownership and the Future of the National Airline‖ (2013) 38 
Ann. Air & Sp. L. 123 at 130-131. 
94
 The ICAO has held six Air Transport Conferences in 1977, 1980, 1985, 1994, 2003 and 
2013. 
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Conference called upon members to consider replacing the traditional criteria 
of ―substantial ownership and effective control‖ with ―principal place of 
business and effective regulatory control‖ in their respective agreements.95 
ICAO defined ―principal place of business‖ and ―effective regulatory control‖ 
as below: 
 
Evidence of principal place of business is predicated upon: the airline is 
established and incorporated in the territory of the designating Party in 
accordance with relevant national laws and regulations, has a substantial 
amount of its operations and capital investment in physical facilities in 
the territory of the designating Party, pays income tax, registers and 
bases its aircraft there, and employs a significant number of nationals in 
managerial, technical and operational positions.
96
 
Evidence of effective regulatory control is predicated upon but is not 
limited to: the airline holds a valid operating licence or permit issued by 
the licensing authority such as an Air Operator Certificate (AOC), meets 
the criteria of the designating Party for the operation of international air 
services, such as proof of financial health, ability to meet public interest 
requirements, obligations for assurance of service; and the designating 
Party has and maintains safety and security oversight programmes in 




                                           
95
 Paul Dempsey, Public international air law (Montreal: Institute of Air and Space Law, 
2008) at 563. [Dempsey, ―Air Law‖]. 
96
 ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions, Model Clauses, Recommendations and Declaration. 





In fact, on a multilateral level, the idea of using regulatory reform to 
replace the ―substantial ownership‖ restriction with the ―principal place of 
business‖ condition first attracted attention in MALIAT, which was adopted in 
2001. While MALIAT maintains the effective control requirement, it does not 
require that an airline be substantially owned either by the state designating it 
or the citizens thereof.
98
 Instead, it replaces this with the ―principal place of 
business and incorporation‖ criterion. As previously discussed (see section 
3.4.4), however, MALIAT does not have practical impact due to its low 
acceptance. 
However, the ambitious recommendations made by the 2003 Conference 
were largely ignored by states. For instance, provisions for principal place of 
business were found in only 6 percent of sampled bilateral air services 
agreements (100 air services agreements involving 50 parties) when WTO 
conducted the study in 2006.
99
 Although more recent statistics are not 
publicly available, it is difficult to say that ―principal place of business and 
effective regulatory control‖ has replaced the traditional criteria of ―substantial 
ownership and effective control.‖ 
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 See MALIAT Article 3 (2) 
2. On receipt of such a designation, and of applications from the designated airline, in the 
form and manner prescribed for operating authorizations and technical permissions, each 
Party shall grant appropriate authorizations and permissions with minimum procedural delay, 
provided that: 
a. effective control of that airline is vested in the designating Party, its nationals, or 
both; 
b. the airline is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in the territory 
of the Party designating the airline; 
c. the airline is qualified to meet the conditions prescribed under the laws, regulations, 
and rules normally applied to the operation of international air transportation by the 
Party considering the application or applications; and 
d. the Party designating the airline is in compliance with the provisions set forth in 
Article 6 (Safety) and Article 7 (Aviation Security).  
99
 WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review 
(QUASAR): Part B: PRELIMINARY RESULTS, S/C/W/270/Add.1 (2006) at 33, para 61, 
online: WTO <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/transport_e/quasar_partb_e.pdf>.  
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The Sixth ICAO Air Transport Conference in 2013 once again took the 
initiative. It suggested that the organization explore the option of developing 




Generally speaking, two options were suggested. The first option is a 
―waiver of the nationality clause‖ on the basis of reciprocity. In this formula, 
parties to the agreement would waive the application of the nationality clause 
in existing air services agreements with respect to designated airlines and 
investors‘ nationalities.101 
In fact, this formula has its origins in the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA)‘s ―Agenda for Freedom‖ initiative.102 In 2009, seven 
states (Chile, Malaysia, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab 
Emirates and the US) took coordinated action by signing a ―Statement of 
Policy Principles Regarding the Implementation of Bilateral Air Services 
Agreements‖103 through the platform of the IATA‘s ―Agenda for Freedom‖ 
initiative. The Statement of Policy aims to liberalize key aspects of regulatory 
practice in international air transport, including airline ownership and control, 
by waiving the nationality clause ―on the basis of reciprocity.‖104  
                                           
100
 See ICAO, Liberalization of Air Carrier Ownership and Control, ICAO Doc ATconf/6-
WP/12 (10 December 2012), online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp012_en.pdf>.  
101
 Ibid. at 4 para 3.5.  
102
 Ibid. at 4 para 2.3. 
103
 Statement of Policy Principles regarding the Implementation of Bilateral Air Services 




 ICAO, Liberalization of Air Carrier Ownership and Control, ICAO Doc ATconf/6-WP/12 
(10 December 2012) at 4 para 2.3, online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp012_en.pdf>. 
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The second way to develop a multilateral international agreement is to 
accept and apply relatively relaxed criteria for airline designation, such as the 
―principal place of business and effective regulatory control.‖105  
Although the 2013 Conference recommended that ―ICAO should initiate 
work on the development of an international agreement to liberalize air carrier 
ownership and control,‖106 there is a long way to go before a new multilateral 
agreement that would liberalize the ownership and control restrictions can be 
made. And even if a new multilateral agreement that either waives the 
application of the nationality clause or accepts relaxed criteria for airline 
designation is eventually adopted, it is unlikely that such an agreement would 
be ratified by a large number of states. As discussed in section 1.2 Multilateral 
Air Law Treaties, in the history of the ICAO, multilateral economic treaties 
related to air transport have never received support from most states. 
Nevertheless, the ICAO‘s multilateral approach has had one meaningful 
contribution. As a result of these efforts, more states have become less 
obsessed with strict restrictions on substantial ownership and effective control 
and have begun adopting principal place of business and effective regulatory 
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 ICAO, Report on Agenda Item 2.2 (summary report of the Air Transport Conference), 
ICAO ATConf/6-WP/104 (22 March 2013) at para 2.2.4, online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/FinalReport/ATConf6_wp104-2-2.pdf >. 
107
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September 2004) (Presented by Singapore) at para 2.2 (noting that ―[I]n line with ICAO‘s 
recommendation endorsed at the Fifth Worldwide Air Transport Conference, Singapore 
initiated proposals to move away from the ―substantial ownership‖ and ―effective control‖ 
criterion, by amending the airline designation clause in a number of our ASAs to one based on 
―principal place of business‖ and ―effective control‖. To date, Singapore has managed to 





4.3.2 The Regional Approach 
Arguably, the regional approach has produced the most remarkable 
achievements over the past two decades. In essence, the regional method of 
reforming ownership and control restrictions is the adoption of ―community 
carriers.‖ Chapter 2: Comparative Analysis of Regional Liberalization Models 
shows that the EU, ASEAN, and the League of Arab States have adopted the 
concept of a community carrier in their respective regions. 
Community carriers have liberalized, though not completely, the internal 
restrictions on ownership and control (Subdivision A and Subdivision B). 
Community member states grant an air carrier an operating license when that 
air carrier is majority owned and effectively controlled by community member 
states or their nationals. Thus, it is a paradigm shift from ―national‖ ownership 
and control to ―community‖ ownership and control. 
The community carrier concept allows majority ownership to be spread 
out among community interests as long as effective regulatory control remains 
with the country in which the airline is based. Thus, the state only requires 
―effective regulatory control‖ rather than traditional ―effective economic 
control.‖ In other words, not only is substantial national ownership given up, 
but effective economic control as well. EU Regulation 2407/92 on the 
licensing of air carriers is the first to prescribe that, so long as an air carrier 
meets safety requirements (issues involving ―effective regulatory control‖) and 
is majority-owned and effectively controlled by EU member states and/or their 
nationals (issues involving ―effective economic control‖), EU member states 
may grant the air carrier an operating license. 
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As indicted in the previous section, effective control can be divided into 
effective economic control and effective regulatory control. In the interest of 
liberalization, effective economic control need not reside with the designating 
state or its nationals, as long as effective regulatory control (encompassing 
safety, security, and other technical matters) remains with the designating state. 
Liberalizing the external restrictions (Subdivision C and Subdivision D) 
through the regional approach would be more difficult because it requires the 
consent of third countries outside of the grouping. Among several regional 
groups, only the EU has consistently demanded that the nationality clause be 
replaced with a community clause.
108
 The European Commission officially 
received authorization from the Council of the European Union to enter into 
so-called ―horizontal agreements‖ with non-EU states on 29 March 2005.109 
Since then, these horizontal agreements have led non-EU states to recognize 
the EU ―community carrier‖ designation clause instead of the traditional 
nationality clause in all the bilateral air services agreements between EU 
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 See EU Commission, Commission Decision on approving the standard clauses for 
inclusion in bilateral air service agreements between Member States and third countries 
jointly laid down by the Commission and the Member States, COM(2005)943 (29 March 
2005), online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/doc/standard_clauses_en.pdf>; 
see also Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, The Principles and Practices of International 
Aviation Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 97-98. [Havel & Sanchez, 
―Aviation Law‖]. 
110
 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, ―Singapore‘ New Air Services Agreements with the E.U. and The U.K.: 
Implications for liberalization in Asia‖ (2008) 73 J. Air L. & Com. 351 at 354. [Tan, 
―Singapore‘s Agreements‖].  
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4.3.3 The Bilateral Approach 
The bilateral approach is the most effective way to liberalize the external 
ownership and control restrictions (Subdivision C and Subdivision D) as most 
air services agreements are bilateral treaties. 
Bilateral preferential concessions can relax the ownership and control 
restrictions on an exceptional basis. The US has widely adopted this approach. 
While maintaining the prohibition on foreign nationals owning more than 25 
percent of a corporation‘s voting equity under domestic law, the first EU-US 
Open Skies aviation agreement (2007) permits EU nationals to own up to 49.9 
percent of total equity and holds open the possibility that they could be 
allowed to own more than 50 percent of total equity.
111
 
In fact, the US DOT has shown a willingness to ease this restriction 
either on the basis of reciprocity or where US interests are not jeopardized by 
a higher percentage of foreign ownership.
112
 Havel and Sanchez note that 
since the late 1990s at least, the US has selectively waived the nationality 




As noted, provisions for principal place of business were found in only 6 
percent of sampled bilateral air services agreements (100 air services 
                                           
111
 See U.S.-EU Air Transport Agreement of April 30, 2007, Annex 4 Concerning Additional 
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 Havel & Sanchez, ―Lex Aviatica‖, supra note 6 at 655; See also WTO, Council for Trade 
in Services, Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review (QUASAR): Part B: PRELIMINARY 
RESULTS, S/C/W/270/Add.1 (2006) at 34, para 68 (noting that ―[T]he effective control 
prerequisite, are often waived in practice. Aerolineas Argentinas, for instance, was never 
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<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/transport_e/quasar_partb_e.pdf>.  
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agreements involving 50 parties) in a 2006 WTO review.
114
 Although a 
comprehensive review of publicly available sources has not been conducted 
more recently, some states are making an effort to liberalize the ownership and 
control restrictions in their air services agreements. 
In particular, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Egypt, Indonesia, Switzerland, 
and Vietnam reported at the 2013 ICAO World Air Transport Conference that 
they are in the process of replacing traditional substantial ownership and 
control restrictions with ―principal place of business and effective regulatory 
control‖ in their air services agreements.115 However, it should be noted that 
this replacement is not a simple process because their bilateral partners must 
agree with the change. 
 
4.3.4 The Unilateral Approach 
By its nature, the unilateral approach entails liberalizing ownership and 
control restrictions by way of domestic law and policy (Subdivision A and 
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Subdivision B). Among others, Australia, Chile, Columbia, and New Zealand 
have substantially liberalized ownership restrictions through their domestic 
legislation. 
In 1999, the Australian Government amended the Australian Foreign 
Investment Review Board guidelines to permit foreign persons (including 
foreign airlines) to acquire up to 100 percent of equity in Australian domestic 
airlines.
116
 An Australian domestic airline refers to ―an Australian-domiciled 
airline that does not have internationally scheduled services departing from 
Australia.‖117 For international services, the traditional 51:49 structure still 
applies.
118
 An important point here is that ―what Australia offers is a right for 
foreign nationals to establish commercial airlines within its territory for the 
sole purpose of serving domestic routes,‖ not cabotage rights to foreign 
carriers.
119
 At the same time, these airlines cannot operate international routes 
since in that case the restrictions in the relevant air services agreements would 
kick in. 
Chile has worked to eliminate the nationality requirements since 1979, 
and, as a consequence, the nationality of a Chilean air carrier is determined by 
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 The Australian Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), ―Civil Aviation‖, online: 
<http://www.firb.gov.au/content/other_investment/sensitive/aviation.asp?NavID=51 >. It is 
worth noting that Australia treats Qantas differently. FIRB noted that ―[F]oreign persons 
(including foreign airlines) can generally expect approval to acquire up to 49 per cent of the 
equity in an Australian international carrier (other than Qantas) individually or in aggregate 
provided the proposal is not contrary to the national interest. In the case of Qantas, total 
foreign ownership is restricted to a maximum of 49 per cent in aggregate, with individual 
holdings limited to 25 per cent and aggregate ownership by foreign airlines limited to 35 per 
cent. In addition, a number of national interest criteria must be satisfied, relating to the 
nationality of Board members and operational location of the enterprise.‖  
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 Havel & Sanchez, ―Aviation Law‖, supra note 109 at 85 (noting that ―[B]y requiring 
foreign-owned carriers to have a substantial legal and commercial presence within its territory, 
Australia is able to exert the same regulatory control over the airline‘s operations that it does 
not over its ―indigenous‖ air carriers such as Qantas. If, however, Australia were to concede 
cabotage access under its Air Services Agreements, its regulatory control over foreign airlines 
utilizing those privileges might be compromised.‖ 
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its principal place of business rather than the nationality of its owners.
120
 
Colombia abolished its foreign ownership limit (up to 40 percent) in 1991 and 
has allowed unlimited foreign investment in its airlines since 1991.
121
 In 1988, 
New Zealand removed the foreign ownership restriction for domestic airlines.  
The unilateral approach of these states is highly exceptional compared to 
the vast majority of states, which have maintained strict ownership restrictions 
in their national law. In addition, the impact of the unilateral approach is not 
significant because it only affects domestic services. Nonetheless, these 
exceptional cases imply that the assumption that internal restrictions must be 
maintained on ownership, an assumption influenced by two World Wars, has 
begun to weaken. 
Similarly, states have started to relax inquiries into effective control. 
This trend has been noticed in many Asian states. Indeed, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, and India appear to be 
relaxing the effective control test when permitting the operation of a joint 
venture LCC between an experienced foreign air carrier and local stakeholders 
with little, if any, aviation experience (for more, see section 4.4.3 Joint 
Ventures). 
It is fundamentally important that this trend is not based on legislative 
reform. In other words, although legal restrictions have not changed per se, 
some governments have unilaterally turned a blind eye to the effective control 
test so long as there is local ownership on paper.
122
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Overall, regulatory changes to liberalize the ownership and control 
restrictions are occurring on multilateral, regional, bilateral, and national 
levels. In spite of this new trend, however, the level of liberalization led by 
states is simply not enough for airlines seeking more and better business 
opportunities. Thus, airlines are making their own efforts to liberalize the 
industry. 
 
4.4 Airlines’ Response to Ownership and Control Restrictions 
4.4.1 Overview (Merger vs. Alliance) 
The greatest impact of ownership and control restrictions is the fact that 
it limits the right of establishment in the airline industry. Havel and Sanchez 
define the right of establishment as follows: 
 
In the context of aviation, a right of establishment would allow foreign 
investors not only to take majority ownership and control of domestic 
carriers, but also to set up new airlines or subsidiaries of foreign airlines 
in a domestic market as well as (if compatible with bilateral air services 




Indeed, even though a cross-border merger is normally an option in 
other industries, this structural change is not allowed in the airline industry. 
The prohibition on cross-border mergers is one of the key reasons that airlines 
form alliances. (Airlines‘ motivations for alliances will be extensively 
                                                                                                              




 Havel & Sanchez, ―Aviation Law‖, supra note 109 at 53.  
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discussed in Chapter 5: Airline Alliances in Northeast Asia). 
However, mergers and alliances are distinctly different. From a legal 
perspective, a merger leads to a single entity, while an alliance does not affect 
legal ownership, with each partner company remaining independent.
124
 From 
a business perspective, although both mergers and alliances have the same 
goal (achieving maximum efficiency), mergers achieve efficiency more 
quickly since they allow full consolidation, while the level of integration in 
alliances is inherently limited.
125
 
Joint ventures fall somewhere between mergers and alliances. However, 
it is necessary to underline the difference between ―incorporated‖ joint 
ventures and ―unincorporated‖ joint ventures. While an incorporated joint 
venture forms a separate (legally incorporated) company, an unincorporated 
joint venture does not create a new single entity. (This will be further 
examined in 4.4.3 Joint Ventures). 
Figure 4-1 shows where mergers and joint ventures are located based on 
level of integration. In the section below, cross-border mergers and 
incorporated joint ventures are discussed with a focus on how they circumvent 
ownership and control restrictions.  
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Figure 4-1 Spectrum of Airline Integration (from Merger to Alliance) 
 
4.4.2 Cross-Border Merger through Holding Company 
Generally, a holding company is a company that is formed for two main 
purposes: to hold investment in subsidiaries and to enjoy tax benefits.
126
 
However, holding companies have also been used in the airline industry to 
circumvent the substantial ownership and effective control restrictions. 
Until the Air France-KLM merger of 2004, it was assumed that 
ownership and control restrictions forbade cross-border mergers. But in 2003, 
Air France and KLM created a ―complicated structure designed to match the 
commercial interests of the two companies with traditional nationality 
(ownership and control) requirements.‖127 This arrangement was approved by 
the European Commission in 2004, and the holding company, called ―Air 
France-KLM S.A.‖ was established. This merger was possible because the EU 
had already established the common market and ―compatibility with the 
common market‖ had been a deciding factor in the EU merger regulations.128 
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Technically, the Air France-KLM arrangement of 2004 is not a complete 
merger since there is a safeguard provision that instantly increases the Dutch 
government‘s capital and voting rights in the company to 50.1 percent if 
KLM‘s traffic rights are challenged by third-party states under the Netherlands‘ 
bilateral air services agreements.
129
 That said, this arrangement was ―the first 
merger in [the aviation] sector between two national airlines with different 
cultures.‖130 
The current ownership structure of Air France-KLM is rather simple. 
Private shareholders own 81.4 percent (with former Air France shareholders 
holding 37 percent and former KLM shareholders holding 21 percent), while 
the French government only owns 18.6 percent.
131
 However, it is worth 
reviewing how Air France and KLM sought to circumvent the substantial 
ownership and effective control restrictions in 2004. Pablo Mendes de Leon 
summarizes the structure of the undertaking in 2004 as follows:  
 
- The holding company (Air France-KLM S.A.)‘s shares consist of 81 
percent of former Air France shares and 19 percent of former KLM 
shares. 
                                                                                                              
concentrations between undertakings (now, Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 
January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings) (the EC Merger 
Regulation). 
Article 6 Examination of the notification and initiation of proceedings 
1. The Commission shall examine the notification as soon as it is received. 
… 
(b) Where it finds that the concentration notified, although falling within the scope of this 
Regulation, does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market, it 
shall decide not to oppose it and shall declare that it is compatible with the common market. 
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 Brian Havel & Gabriel Sanchez, ―Restoring Global Aviation‘s ―Cosmopolitan Mentalité‖‖ 
(2011) 29 B.U. Int‘l L.J. 1 at 30. [Havel & Sanchez, ―Cosmopolitan Mentalité‖]. 
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 Jean-Cyril Spinetta, Chairman’s Message in Air France – KLM, Reference Document 
2004-05 (2005) at 3.  
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 Mark Toner & Edward Willis, ―Foreign Ownership and Control of International Airlines: A 
New Agenda for Reform‖ (2012) 24 Air and Space Law at note 9.  
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- Air France-KLM S.A. holds two operating companies: Air France and 
KLM. 
- On the Air France side, ownership and control are 100 percent retained 
by the French. 
- KLM is majority owned by the Dutch (the Dutch government and two 
Dutch foundations) and 49 percent owned by Air France-KLM S.A. 
- The principal place of business of KLM remains in Amstelveen, 
Holland. 
- The parties set up a Strategic Management Committee (SMC), which 
is responsible for the overall group strategy and makes binding 
recommendations to Air France and KLM. 
- The SMC will consist of four representatives from Air France and four 
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Evidently, the question of who effectively controls KLM remains, at 
best, unclear. The role and governing structure of SMC make it doubtful that 
KLM is actually controlled by the Dutch. However, this cross-border merger 
through a holding company has been operating successfully without being 
seriously challenged by third party states.  
Based on publicly available sources, the only time that a cross-border 
merger has been meaningfully challenged by a third party state was when 
India challenged Swiss International Air Lines (SWISS) and Austrian Airlines 
(both owned by Germany‘s Lufthansa Group). 134  India‘s Civil Aviation 
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Ministry raised concerns that the two airlines violated substantial ownership 
and effective control clauses under existing bilateral air services 
agreements.
135
 However, India ultimately did not take further action as it had 
threatened, such as by revoking SWISS and Austrian‘s operating rights.136 
Both SWISS and Austrian Airlines currently fly to India.
137
 
LATAM Airlines Group S.A. was created through a similar process. In 
June 2012, the merger between Chilean carrier LAN and Brazilian carrier 
TAM was completed, creating a mega carrier that is expected to control more 
than 40 percent of the Latin American air passenger market.
138
 In order to 
circumvent ownership and control restrictions, a rather complicated corporate 
structure was invented (see Figure 4-3). 
 






 See SWISS homepage, online: <http://www.swiss.com/cn/EN/book/where-we-fly/route-
network >; Austrian Airlines‘ homepage, online: 
<http://www.austrian.com/?sc_lang=en&cc=AT>.  
138









Essentially, TEP Chile is a holding company with a substantial 
investment in Brazil‘s TAM and Chile‘s LATAM. Although the corporate 
structure of LATAM has similarities with that of Air France-KLM, LATAM 
in addition had to deal with Brazil‘s onerous domestic legal restrictions on 
ownership (80 percent of voting shares must be held by Brazilians). Even if 
LATAM‘s corporate structure formally complies with the 80 percent 
restriction, it is still doubtful whether overall management of TAM is 
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 Braun, supra note 2 at 356. 
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Avianca Holdings S.A. is another cross-border merger (Avianca and 
TACA Airlines) that utilized a holding company to circumvent ownership and 
control restrictions. Avianca is one of the oldest airlines, founded in 1919, and 
the flag carrier of Colombia.
141
 TACA (Transportes Aereos del Continente 




The complicated corporate structure (see Figure 4-4) essentially allows 
Avianca Holdings in Panama to control many subsidiaries including TACA 
Peru (incorporated in Peru) and Tampa Cargo (incorporated in Colombia).
143
 
Thus, the question can be raised about whether TACA Peru is actually 
Peruvian under the traditional ownership and control restrictions.
144
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Overall, these cross-border airline mergers were only possible because 
they took place in regions where regional cooperation, liberalization, and 
integration were already in progress. In other words, ―effective control‖ 
inquiries were not strictly conducted, or even if they were, not strictly 
enforced. It is doubtful that the same mergers would have been possible if a 
totally foreign carrier (e.g. a US carrier) had proposed similar mergers to the 
local governments. 
It is also important to emphasize that the international community did 
not express any meaningful opposition to these cross-border mergers.
146
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Although questioning the effective control of the partner airline is inherently 
discretionary rather than obligatory under air services agreements, it is worth 
noting that states tend to acquiesce in this issue particularly if they involve 
airlines from friendly or partner states. 
 
4.4.3 Joint Ventures 
Generally speaking, there are multiple advantages to establishing joint 
ventures including, but not limited to, cutting costs, sharing risk, expanding 
the customer base, and gaining entry to emerging economies.
147
 In the airline 
industry, however, ownership and control restrictions remain the principal 
reason for establishing joint ventures. 
Joint ventures can be broadly divided into incorporated joint ventures 
and unincorporated joint ventures. An incorporated joint venture is a ―full-
function‖ joint venture that ―is established by the parties with the intent that it 
should have its own employees, assets, facilities, funding and markets and 
generally carry on business as an autonomous economic entity.‖148 In the 
aviation industry, many Asian LCC carriers have adopted this business 
structure. The likes of AirAsia, Lion Air, Jetstar, Spring Airlines, Tigerair, and 
VietJet have managed to establish a business presence in jurisdictions outside 
their own through JV arrangements with local investors. 
An unincorporated joint venture is a ―limited-function‖ joint venture that 
―is not an autonomous or independent unit but one which [is] designed to 
carry out a more specific and limited role under the direct control of its 
                                           
147
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parents.‖149 Unincorporated joint ventures in the aviation industry will be 
separately discussed in Chapter 5: Airline Alliances in Northeast Asia. 
Examples of these unincorporated joint ventures include American Airlines-
Japan Airlines JV and United Airlines-All Nippon Airways (ANA) JV. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the EU aviation market presents a highly 
exceptional case. The progress made toward liberalization and integration in 
the region has enabled EU carriers to have subsidiaries in other EU member 
states. For instance, Lufthansa‘s (LH) subsidiaries include Swiss International 
Air Lines (SWISS), based in Zurich and Geneva but wholly owned by LH; 
Austrian Airlines, based in Vienna but wholly owned by LH; and Air Dolomiti, 
a regional Italian airline that is wholly owned by LH.
150
 In addition, the EU‘s 
horizontal agreements help these carriers effectively deal with ownership and 
control restrictions in their international operations in non-EU member states. 
From a commercial perspective, the more remarkable fact is that 
unlimited seventh freedom is allowed for EU carriers after the implementation 
of the third package in 1992.
151
 Thus, it is not necessary for air carriers to 
establish a new airline in other countries within the EU. Rather, the air carrier 
itself can operate the routes it wishes to fly while using the seventh freedom. 
This explains how Ryanair, an Irish carrier, can operate a network covering 40 
bases, with some 155 destinations over 1,100 routes in 26 countries (mostly 
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In Asia, both the wholly owned subsidiary strategy and the business 
opportunities based on unlimited seventh freedom rights are forbidden by law.  
Under the circumstances, many incorporated joint ventures with local interests 
were developed in Asia so as to circumvent ownership and control restrictions. 
In doing so, most airlines chose local investors who were not airline 
companies or had no prior business experience in the airline industry. Alan Tan 
explains how the above business model is permissible and why foreign 
carriers prefer a non-airline company as a partner in the context of ASEAN: 
 
[T]he related requirement of local ―effective control‖ has taken on a 
much looser meaning. Most ASEAN member states gloss over the 
requirement and appear satisfied when their national is appointed as 
CEO. Whether effective control truly resides locally could be 
questionable since many of the joint venture airlines are run as 
integrated operations alongside their parent foreign carriers, using 





Indeed, joint venture airlines whose local shareholders are not airline 
companies have been established in many Asian states. The following table 
lists Asian joint venture airlines whose local shareholders have minimal 
business experience in the airline industry: 
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Local Shareholder(s) Foreign 
Shareholder(s) 





of AirAsia Berhad) 
(49%) 
Indonesia Indonesia AirAsia 
X  
 
PT Kirana Anugerah 
Perkasa (PTKAP) 
(51%) 
AirAsia X Berhad 
(49%) 
Thailand Thai Lion Air 2 Thai businessmen 
(names undisclosed) 
(51%) 
Lion Air Group 
(49%) 
Thailand Thai AirAsia X 
 
Tassapon Bijleveld 




Singapore Jetstar Asia Westbrook 












(24.5%) and China 
Eastern Airlines 
(24.5%) 










 Octave Japan 
Infrastructure Fund 
(19%); Rakuten Inc.   
(18%); Noevir 
Holdings Co. Ltd. 
(9%) and Alpen (5%) 
AAIL (wholly-
owned subsidiary 
of AirAsia Berhad) 
(49%) 





of AirAsia Berhad) 
(49%) 




Table 4-4 Joint Venture Airlines Whose Local Shareholders Are Not Airline 
 Companies  
 
Table 4-4 enumerates the joint venture LCCs whose local shareholders 
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 It is scheduled to begin service in 2015. 
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hail from various industries outside of aviation such as music recording, 
entertainment, aerospace, leasing, hospitality, land and water transportation, 
consumer products, tourism, agriculture, and trading, among others. 
There is reason to believe that foreign carriers prefer having non-airline 
companies as partners instead of other airlines because of the concern that the 
two airline partners could fail to cooperate well on critical managerial or 
operational decisions. For instance, ANA and AirAsia failed to harmonize their 
views on management policy with the first AirAsia Japan. Having only one 
airline shareholder in the joint venture ensures that the operational standards 
and commercial strategies are identical across all joint venture airlines in 
different territories. Otherwise, it can be harder to maximize the advantages 
that an interconnected network can offer. 
Nevertheless, it is important to reiterate that governments still have the 
right to inquire about effective control. The fact that the governments in 
question approved the aforementioned JVs (between investor-foreign carriers 
and non-airline local companies) certainly does not mean that they have given 
up effective control.  
Hence, investor-foreign carriers still need to be careful about the JV 
structure. This is the main reason why foreign carriers sometimes opt to 
partner with local air carriers or their subsidiaries. It is relatively easy for such 
JVs to pass the effective control test since the majority of their shares are 
owned by a local airline staffed by personnel who would understand the 
aviation business. The following table lists Asian joint venture airlines whose 







Local Shareholder/s Foreign 
Shareholder/s 
Thailand NokScoot Nok Mangkang Co. 
Ltd. (wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Nok 
Airlines) (49%) and 
Pueannammitr Co. 
Ltd. (2%) 
Scoot Pte. Ltd. 
(49%) 
Thailand Thai AirAsia  
 
Asia Aviation (55%)  AirAsia Investment 
Limited (wholly-
owned subsidiary 
of AirAsia Berhad) 
(45%) 
Thailand Thai Vietjet 
Air  





F&S Holdings (16%); 
TNR Holdings (16%); 
Alfredo Yao (13%) 





of AirAsia Berhad) 
(40%) 
Philippines AirAsia Zest AirAsia Inc. 
(Philippine AirAsia) 
(49%) and Alfredo Yao 
(51%)  
- 
Malaysia Malindo Air National Aerospace 
and Defence Industries 
(51%)  
Lion Air (49%) 
 
Vietnam Jetstar Pacific Vietnam Airlines 
(69%) and Saigon 




Japan Jetstar Japan Japan Airlines 
(45.7%); Mitsubishi 
Corporation (4.3%) 






China Airlines (90%)  Tigerair (10%) 




In contrast, when foreign carriers collaborate with local majority 
shareholders who do not have aviation experience, it is doubtful that the local 
majority shareholders really manage and control the airline, which is a highly 
sophisticated business. Indeed, it is likely that the foreign carriers have de 
facto control of the airline in question. Again, this business strategy is only 
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possible if the local government relaxes effective control inquiries 
(Subdivision B). 
Despite the general trend toward gradually relaxing effective control 
restrictions, an external variable must be noted. In its application to the 
regulatory authorities for an air operator‘s license, Jetstar Hong Kong has had 
to revise its bid more than once to convince Hong Kong regulators that the 
company‘s leadership and governance at the board level rest with local 
shareholders and not with Qantas (the parent group of Jetstar).
156
 The public 
hearing by the Hong Kong authorities regarding the evaluation of Jetstar Hong 
Kong ended on 14 February 2015.  
On 25 June 2015, the Hong Kong Air Transport Licensing Authority 
delivered its decision rejecting Jetstar Hong Kong‘s license application. This 
decision was quite surprising since the language of Hong Kong‘s Basic Law is 
ostensibly less protective than that of other states. While remaining silent on 
substantial ownership and effective control restrictions, Hong Kong‘s 
domestic law only requires that a Hong Kong carrier be incorporated and have 
Hong Kong as its principal place of business.
157
 (See above in section 4.3.1 
The Multilateral Approach for a discussion of the principal place of business). 
 However, in the Jetstar Hong Kong decision, the Hong Kong Air 
Transport Licensing Authority interpreted the meaning of ―principal place of 
business‖ as being nearly the same as ―effective control.‖ In this decision, the 
Authority stated that the following would satisfy the requirement of ―principal 
place of business‖ in Hong Kong: 
                                           
156
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The airline has to have independent control and management in Hong 
Kong, free from directions or decisions made elsewhere. The nerve 
centre has to be in Hong Kong. By nerve centre, the Panel looks at 





Thus, the Hong Kong Air Transport Licensing Authority concluded that 
Jetstar Hong Kong‘s nerve center is not in Hong Kong159 and that Jetstar 
Hong Kong cannot make its decisions independently from that of the two 




A much more important question is whether this decision will have an 
impact on other parts of Asia. Alan Tan noted that ―the very public acrimony 
over Jetstar Hong Kong may actually restore the primacy of the local control 
requirement that has become all but forgotten in much of Asia.‖161 The CAPA 
report also noted that ―at worst, it sends a hopeful message to those who 
would seek to protect the status quo.‖162 No doubt, how other states react to 
the ruling will show whether Asian states had inadvertently overlooked the 
control requirement or had intentionally relaxed inquiries into effective control. 
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 CAPA, ―Jetstar Hong Kong licence application rejected: Hong Kong becomes an island of 




Overall, both cross-border mergers through holding companies and 
incorporated joint ventures have managed to establish new companies that 
either effectively control foreign carriers or operate as new airlines in foreign 
markets. Although these new entities appear to comply with ownership 
restrictions, the question of effective control remains. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
The object of this chapter has been to provide an analytical perspective 
on ownership and control restrictions in Northeast Asia. Although rigid 
ownership restrictions are still in place in the region according to domestic 
laws and air services agreements, I have drawn attention to the fairly flexible 
policy approaches that are taken on the issue of control restrictions. This 
liberalization of policy will contribute to the discussion of Northeast Asian 
open skies. 
Toward the end of this chapter, I briefly touched on the relationship 
between legal barriers (ownership and control restrictions) and airline 
alliances. In short, cross-border mergers and incorporated joint ventures are 
airlines‘ direct response to the ownership and control restrictions. This 
approach can be described as ―step-down‖ (from forbidden merger to merger-
like integration). In the next chapter (Chapter 5: Airline Alliances in Northeast 
Asia), airline alliances will be reviewed as a ―step-up‖ approach (from low-
level alliances to high-level alliances). In particular, Chapter 5 will focus on 










Chapter 5: Airline Alliances in Northeast Asia 
 
5.1 Conceptual Analysis of Airline Alliances 
Chapter 5 begins with two fundamental questions: what are airline 
alliances and why do airlines form these alliances? The term ―alliance‖ is used 
very loosely in the aviation industry.
1
 Indeed, airline alliances can refer to any 
kind of inter-airline cooperation. Thus, a more accurate question is why 
airlines cooperate. After investigating the factors that motivate airline alliances, 
I will discuss the various types of airline alliances that can be categorized 
based on the level of integration. 
 
5.1.1 Motivating Factors for Airline Alliances 
Broadly speaking, legal barriers and economic incentives are the two 
primary reasons why airlines form alliances. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, 
legal barriers refer to the restrictions on market access and on ownership and 
control that are entrenched in air services agreements and domestic laws. The 
economic reasons for alliances can generally be divided into three categories: 
increasing revenue, cutting costs, and reducing competition. That said, airlines 
rarely form alliances for one reason alone. In other words, airline alliances are 
typically driven by a combination of factors. 
 
5.1.1.1 Circumventing Legal Barriers 
One simple but crucial fact about the airline industry is that airlines 
cannot determine their markets (that is, their routes) solely on a commercial 
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basis. From a commercial perspective, for instance, Air China would like to 
offer at least a few flights from Beijing to Seoul and then on to Jeju Island. 
Many Chinese tourists want to visit both Seoul and Jeju, and the Seoul-Jeju 
route is one of the most popular air routes in the world.
2
 Thus, Air China 
would take not only Chinese passengers originating from Beijing but also 
Korean passengers originating in Seoul to Jeju if it could. Alternatively, Air 
China would want to establish a Korean subsidiary that could operate between 
Seoul and Jeju or take over a small Korean LCC. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the market access restrictions 
resulting from protective air services agreements limit even basic third and 
four freedom traffic, not to mention the cabotage restriction, which prevents 
an airline from operating domestic routes in other countries (such as Air China 
for the Seoul-Jeju route in the example above). Similarly, in Chapter 4, we 
saw how internal and external restrictions on ownership and control prevent 
airlines from establishing wholly- or majority-owned subsidiaries or acquiring 
local airlines in foreign markets. 
Given these legal challenges, commercial arrangements between airlines 
(that is, airline alliances) are a practical option and indeed a wise choice. 
Airline alliances can help to overcome the constraints that hinder the ability of 
individual airlines to enter and expand into foreign markets.
3
 For instance, Air 
China could virtually enter and expand into the Korean market through a code-
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 with Korea‘s Asiana Airlines, which can operate between 
Seoul and Jeju without legal restrictions. (Both airlines are in the same global 
alliance, Star Alliance. The issue is discussed further in section 5.1.2.2 Non-
equity Alliance.)  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that airline alliances are not 
completely free from legal barriers. Market access and ownership and control 
restrictions are not the only provisions in air services agreements relating to 
airline alliances. Normally, there is a separate and specific provision regarding 
airline alliances in air services agreements. The relevant provision typically 
refers to ―cooperative arrangements,‖ ―code-sharing,‖ or ―commercial 
opportunities.‖ Some states prefer to address code-sharing in the annex (route 
schedule) to the air services agreement.
5
 While an open skies agreement 
provides open opportunities for code-sharing,
6
 a protective air services 
agreement places tight restrictions on it. Under a protective air services 
agreement, code-sharing is allowed only on certain routes.  
Even under an open skies agreement, national air carriers are required to 
submit their cooperative service agreements with other carriers to the relevant 
government authorities for review before (or after) they implement those 
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Article 8 Commercial Opportunities 
7. In operating or holding out the authorized services under this Agreement, any airline of one 
Party may enter into cooperative marketing arrangements such as blocked-space, 
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a. an airline or airlines of either Party; 
b. an airline or airlines of a third country; [and 
c. a surface transportation provider of any country;] 
provided that all participants in such arrangements (i) hold the appropriate authority and (ii) 




 The authorities review these cooperative agreements to ensure 
that they are in line with the relevant air services agreements. They also 
examine the cooperative agreements to ensure that they are not harmful to the 
public or anti-competitive. (This will be discussed in section 5.2 Competition 
Law Analysis of Airline Alliances.) 
 
5.1.1.2 Increasing Revenue 
Airline alliances play a key role in increasing revenue in airlines‘ 
existing markets through the extra traffic generated by foreign alliance 
partners. For instance, the alliance between KLM and Northwest, the first 
―modern airline alliance,‖8 increased KLM‘s traffic by 150,000 passengers 
and its revenue by USD 100 million while increasing Northwest‘s traffic by 
200,000 passengers and its revenue by USD 125-175 million in 1994, the first 
year of full cooperation.
9
 This growth in revenue was largely due to the 
increase in the airlines‘ load factors. Taking advantage of Northwest‘s hubs in 
Boston, Detroit, and Minneapolis and KLM‘s hub in Amsterdam, KLM could 
codeshare with Northwest on routes between Northwest‘s three hubs and 88 
US cities while Northwest could codeshare with KLM on routes between 
Amsterdam and 30 cities in Europe and the Middle East.
10
 These new routes 
greatly increased traffic into each other‘s network. 
Airline alliances can also enable airlines to expand into new markets, 
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thus boosting their airlines ticket sales. For instance, although Singapore 
Airlines does not directly fly to Sapporo in Japan from its home market 
(Singapore), it can still sell tickets to passengers who want to go from 
Singapore to Sapporo by suggesting two connected flights on separate airlines: 
one with Singapore Airlines from Singapore to Tokyo-Narita and the other 
with ANA (Singapore‘s alliance partner) from Tokyo-Narita to Sapporo. 
Another substantial economic incentive for alliances (and in particular, 
global alliances such as Star Alliance, Skyteam and Oneworld) are the benefits 
of their marketing activities, which ultimately increase passenger and cargo 
traffic, thereby increasing revenue. Generally, alliances‘ marketing advantages 





5.1.1.3 Cutting Costs 
Achieving greater economies of scale
12





 has been cited as a motive for forming airline 
alliances.
15
 Although some commentators argue that airline alliances yield 
economies of scale and economies of density only in limited circumstances,
16
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economies of scope are regarded as a highly significant benefit that can be 
easily enjoyed through alliances.
17
 The synergies that can be achieved through 
economies of scope include shared labor and shared capital equipment.
18
 
Indeed, the synergies arising from airline alliances allow alliance 
members to reduce costs by weeding out redundant operations. Given that the 
airline industry is very capital-intensive with high fixed costs, cost 
management is crucial for airlines. The cost structure of an airline is 
traditionally divided into operating and non-operating (or fixed) costs
19
, with 
the fixed costs generally representing more than 50 percent of the airline‘s 
total costs
20
, which include aircraft financing (lease and loan payments) and 
airport facility rental charges. 
Alliance partners can share facilities (e.g. sales offices and passenger 
lounges) as well as labor (e.g. ground handlers and check-in agents). Swissair 
and Austrian were the first alliance partners to successfully establish joint 
ticketing and sales offices in many parts of the world, thereby reducing the 
number of offices and staff required.
21
 
In addition, alliances can help members cut their costs by enabling them 
to share purchases in many areas including aircraft, fuel, and amenities. For 
instance, Star Alliance members are reported to generally enjoy a 5 to 7 
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includes very tight and restrictive labour contracts… In an alliance, this type of economies 
[economies of density] can only be realized if the coordination and feed between partners is 
optimized or if one airline gives up the route and leaves its operation to its partner. This type 
of cooperation therefore requires high degrees of partner integration, which in turn are costly 
to establish and maintain.‖). 
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 Vasigh et al, supra note 12 at 90. 
19
 See e.g. Rogéria de Arantes Gomes Eller & Michelle Moreira, ―The Main Cost-related 
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5.1.1.4 Reducing Competition 
This factor is the most controversial characteristic of airline alliances. 
Essentially, alliances enhance member airlines‘ ability to exercise market 
power and reduce the level of competition as airlines that previously competed 
on a route decide to cooperate instead.
23
 
It is important to note that not all forms of airline alliances fall into this 
category. Generally, alliance members remain competitors until the middle 
stage of cooperation, such as code-sharing.
24
. Since a high degree of alliance 
cooperation has the potential to become anti-competitive, governmental 
intervention is required. (This will be fully examined in section 5.2 
Competition Law Analysis of Airline Alliances.) 
 
5.1.2 Spectrum of Airline Alliances 
The two main methods of forming airline alliances are the bilateral 
approach and the multilateral approach. What began with bilateral code-
sharing progressed to bilateral joint ventures and then to multilateral branded 
global alliances and multilateral joint ventures within global alliances.25 
 
 Star Alliance Skyteam Oneworld 
Members  
*as of 2015 
27 20 15 
                                           
22
 Ibid. at 78. 
23
 Iatrou & Oretti, supra note 3 at 5. 
24
 See Figure 1-6 Spectrum of Alliance Cooperation in section 1.6.2 Antitrust Immunity 
25
 CAPA, Airlines in Transition report, Part 1: The natural history of airline alliances (16 
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Table 5-1 Global Branded Airline Alliances  
 
As much as global alliances play a pivotal role for many international air 
carriers, bilateral inter-carrier agreements, which reflect the needs of the 
individual airline rather than the alliance as a whole, are another key factor in 
airline operations. As mentioned earlier, bilateral inter-carrier agreements are 
the foundation of the multilateral alliances mentioned above. 
Once an airline joins one of the global alliances, that airline ―exclusively‖ 
belongs to the alliance. In other words, dual membership is not allowed. 
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However, it is still within an airline‘s discretion to make a bilateral inter-
carrier agreement with an airline that is not a member of the alliance or even 
an airline that is a member of a different alliance. Each global alliance has a 
rule on non-member relationships that restricts an airline in one alliance from 
developing codeshares with a partner in a major rival alliance.
26
 Reportedly, 
Star Alliance restricts activity the most, Oneworld is the most liberal of all the 
alliances, and Skyteam is in between, having recently relaxed its prohibition 
on cooperation with airlines from other alliances.
27
 
Given the various types of airline alliances, several commentators have 
proposed ways of categorizing them. For instance, Paul Dempsey and 
Laurence Gesell divide airline alliances into ―marketing alliances‖ and ―equity 
alliances‖28; Angela Cheng-Fui Lu divides them into ―merger & acquisition 
model,‖ ―investor model,‖ and ―strategic and tactical alliances‖ 29 ; Rigas 
Doganis into ―commercial alliances‖ and ―strategic alliances‖30; and Kostas 
Iatrou and Mauro Oretti into ―marketing alliances‖ and ―strategic alliances.‖31 
However, since the terms ―commercial,‖ ―strategic,‖ and ―marketing‖ lack 
clear definitions, the aforementioned distinctions are inevitably arbitrary. 
When employed by different commentators, the same terms (e.g. marketing 
alliances and strategic alliances) do not necessarily fall into the same 
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 ed. (Chandler: Coast Aire Publications, 2012) at Chapter 14 Alliances. 
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 See Angela Cheng-Fui Lu, International Airline Alliances (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) at 56-63. 
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 See Doganis, supra note 11 at Chapter 4 Alliance.  
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A more objective method of categorization is to ask whether or not 
airline cooperation involves equity (that is, financial investment). Thus, the 
categories used here are ―equity alliances‖ and ―non-equity alliances.‖ In a 
nutshell, equity alliances involve airlines owning shares in other airlines. 
While most equity alliances are based on an investor-and-receiver 
relationship,
33
 some equity alliances are based on cross-ownership (e.g. Air 
China-Cathay Pacific: Air China has a 30% stake in Cathay Pacific while 
Cathay Pacific holds a roughly 20% stake in Air China). 
 
5.1.2.1 Equity Alliances 
Paul Dempsey and Laurence Gesell drew an analogy in which they 
compared equity alliances to marriages: 
 
A marketing alliance [non-equity alliance] is the equivalent of dating: if 
the relationship sours, the parties are free (within specified contractual 
limits) to break it off. An equity investment is the equivalent of marriage: 
if the relation sours, the investor cannot easily extricate himself from his 
investment. In dating, one cannot easily extricate himself from his 
investment. In dating, one can afford to be less discriminate in the 
appearance or health of one‘s partner. Selecting a marital partner, 
however, is a more serious endeavor. For example, one would not 
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 For example, although Iatrou and Oretti‘s definition of ―strategic alliances‖ includes equity 
alliances, Doganis‘ definition does not. 
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ed. (Chandler: Coast Aire Publications, 2012) at 672-685. 
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Indeed, just like marriage, the equity alliance has been used as a 
―symbolic reassurance that an alliance is solid and long-term.‖35 However, the 
marriage analogy does not adequately reflect current trends in airline 
alliances.
36
 The swift evolution of alliances has shown airlines that they can 
work together without equity investments.
37
 
Today, the equity alliance per se is not necessarily an indication of truly 
integrated inter-airline cooperation. Nonetheless, equity alliances are very 
often accompanied by a high degree of integrated non-equity alliances 
(regardless of whether they are labeled, for example, a marketing alliance, 
commercial alliance, or strategic alliance). Although these alliances involve 
the same partners, they are separate contracts (the former is an investment 
contract and the latter is a commercial contract, such as code-share agreement). 
Indeed, current equity alliances are ―a part of strategy to strengthen and 
expand market access‖.38 
Abu Dhabi-based Etihad has been referred to as the airline that makes 
the most effective use of equity alliances. As of 2015, Etihad has eight equity 
alliance members: Air Serbia (the national airline of Serbia), Air Seychelles 
(the national airline of the Seychelles), Etihad Regional (formerly Darwin 
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Airline, a Swiss regional airline), Air Berlin (Germany‘s second largest carrier 
after Lufthansa), Jet Airways (a major Indian carrier), Virgin Australia 
(Australia‘s second largest carrier after Qantas) and Aer Lingus (an Irish 
carrier). Most recently, Alitalia (the largest carrier in Italy) became an Etihad 
equity alliance member when the Etihad-Alitalia deal received the approval of 
the European Commission in November 2014.
39
 The stake holdings of Etihad 
can be displayed as follows:  
 




A convincing rationale for equity alliances lies in the ownership and 
                                           
39
 European Commission, Press Release, ―Mergers: Commission approves Etihad's 
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control restrictions. Just as with cross-border mergers and incorporated joint 
ventures, an equity alliance can be a smart response to legal barriers for an 
airline. By making a sizeable investment in foreign carriers (though these 
typically must be below 50% to satisfy the nationality requirements in the air 
services agreements), a foreign investor airline can gain de facto control of the 
carriers in question. 
In fact, regulators in Europe are in the process of investigating whether 
Etihad effectively controls the European carriers in which it has equity 
stakes.
41
 In response to the allegation that ―Etihad is using the investment to 
buy control,‖42 Etihad argues that the real motivations for equity alliances are 
good network integration and opportunities to cut costs.
43
 CAPA‘s analysis 
touches on the practical role of Etihad‘s equity investment: 
 
Etihad‘s increased European footprint has been achieved through 
commercial codeshare arrangements; equity investments are not in 
themselves a part of this. However, in the case of airlines that were 
struggling financially, Etihad‘s investment has been very important in 
keeping the partner solvent and thereby in maintaining the viability of 
the codeshare agreement… [T]he investment means codeshares can be 
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Therefore, regardless of the original purpose of the equity alliances, 
code-sharing agreements between Etihad and its equity alliance partners—
which are separate commercial agreements—have played a more important 
role in the development of Etihad. In fact, code-sharing has been the jewel of 
the crown in airline alliances as discussed in the following section. 
 
5.1.2.2 Non-equity Alliances 
There is a wide spectrum of non-equity alliances (referred to simply as 
―alliances‖ in this section). Although it is difficult to fit the manifold varieties 
of specific airline cooperation into neat categories, the spectrum of alliances 
can be roughly captured as shown below: 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Spectrum of Non-equity Airline Alliances  
 
The starting point of an alliance is interlining. From the consumer‘s 
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perspective, interlining is buying ―a single ticket for an itinerary on two or 
more independent airlines.‖ 45  From the airline‘s perspective, interline 
agreements are agreements between airlines with regard to the sale, 
endorsement, and acceptance of each other‘s tickets.46 In essence, interlining 
is a simple process of linking two separate flights on two different airlines for 
the convenience of the traveling customer. 
While interlining is normally cheaper than the sum of available fares on 
the individual segments, fares for code-shared flights are typically cheaper 
than for interline flights.
47
 This is because, under an interlining relationship, 
each airline would set its fares to maximize profit on its own segment 
regardless of how this might affect demand for the other airline‘s segment.48 
In other words, interlining does not require a special partnership between the 
air carriers. A real partnership begins with code-sharing. 
In a code-sharing relationship, there is one operating carrier and one or 
more marketing carriers. The operating carrier is the one that actually operates 
the aircraft, while the marketing carrier just assigns its airline code onto the 
flight without operating the aircraft. Code-sharing enables airlines to offer 
consumers more convenient service through coordinated scheduling, close 
proximity of gates for connecting passengers, access to lounges, and frequent 
flier programs.
49
 For code-sharing, the way a partner airline is chosen changes 
fundamentally. While almost any airline can be an interlining partner, airlines 
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become highly selective when they look for code-sharing partners.  
Some airlines are not fully satisfied with a simple code-sharing 
relationship as they hope to directly coordinate market-related matters, 
including prices. At this stage, alliances start to entail price-fixing. Although 
this type of alliance violates competition law, in principle, it is allowed if the 
competition authorities grant antitrust immunity. (This will be discussed in the 
next section.) 
Furthermore, some carriers launch highly integrated joint ventures 
(unincorporated joint ventures) in specific markets. Unincorporated joint 
ventures are the most intensive form of alliance. While still operating as two 
independent legal entities, the airlines cooperate as closely as possible. This 
form of cooperation is effectively ―a close substitute to a merger because it 
typically involves full coordination of the major airline functions on the 
affected routes, including scheduling, pricing, revenue management, 
marketing, and sales.‖ 50  Due to the scope of business activities, 
unincorporated joint ventures are subject to competition law. 
 
5.2 Competition Law Analysis of Airline Alliances 
5.2.1 General Principles 
First and foremost, it is worth noting that the terms ―competition law‖ 
and ―antitrust law‖ can be used interchangeably, meaning that there is no 
substantial difference between the two terms. In general, competition law is a 
more generic term, since antitrust law typically refers to a set of US federal 
                                           
50
 The European Commission and the United States Department of Transportation, 
Transatlantic Airline Alliances: Competitive Issues and Regulatory Approaches (16 November 
2010) at 8, online: < 
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and state laws covering competition law issues.
51
 
Competition law is a relatively new discipline of law. Although the US 
established an antitrust law regime in the 19
th
 century, many states did not 
enact competition laws until the late 20
th
 century. Since 2000, competition law 
has grown at a phenomenal rate. In 2001, there were only about 80 systems of 
competition law in the world, but by 2012, more than 120 systems could be 
found on every continent and in every type of economy.
52
 In 2008 alone, 
competition laws came into force in the gigantic economies of China and 
India.
53
 Today, several other states are deliberating the idea of adopting their 
own systems. 
Due to the diverse levels of economic development and widely varying 
legal cultures in states with competition laws, it would be rash to presume that 
all these systems are identical in their goals and concerns.
54
 Generally, 
however, competition law consists of ―rules that are intended to protect the 
process of competition in order to maximize consumer welfare.‖55 Although 
the term ―competition‖ has a wide variety of connotations, this explanation by 
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the UK Competition Commission is especially cogent: 
 
Competition is a process of rivalry as firms seek to win customers‘ 
business. It creates incentives for firms to meet the existing and future 
needs of customers as effectively and efficiently as possible—by cutting 
prices, increasing output, improving quality or variety, or introducing 
new and better products, often through innovation; supplying the 




Essentially, competition law seeks to promote rivalry among firms (that 
is, competitors). Nonetheless, the ultimate goal of competition law is not 
protecting the competitive process itself but rather protecting the interests of 
consumers.
57
 The importance of setting clear goals cannot be overemphasized, 
especially when exploring antitrust immunity, which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
Above all, competition law prohibits anti-competitive agreements 
(agreements that have the object or effect of restricting competition). Anti-
competitive agreements can be divided into horizontal agreements 
(agreements between competitors) and vertical agreements (agreements 
between companies at different levels of the market). 
Horizontal agreements include agreements that directly or indirectly 
relate to prices, agreements to restrict output or capacity, and dividing up the 
market. An agreement among competitors to fix prices is a classic horizontal 
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agreement that is strictly prohibited in every country that has competition laws. 
Vertical agreements involve setting prices that suppliers can charge their 
own customers, forcing customers to buy products they do not want, and 
preventing customers from dealing with other competitors. It is generally 
thought that horizontal agreements are more likely to interfere with 
competition than vertical agreements.
58
 
Airline alliances generally take the form of inter-carrier agreements, 
which quite often are agreements between competitors. Thus, most airline 
alliances can be seen as illegal horizontal agreements, at least on the surface. 
For instance, Korean Air and Japan Airlines are competitors in the Korea-
Japan market. Nevertheless, Korean Air and Japan Airlines share lounges at 
Gimpo Airport and Haneda Airport. Japan Airlines passengers can use Korean 
Air‘s lounge at Gimpo Airport, and Korean Air passengers can use Japan 
Airlines‘ lounge at Haneda Airport. In so doing, the two airlines do not need to 
rent a lounge facility in the other airline‘s country and can therefore cut costs. 
When costs increase for an airline, it tends to charge passengers more for their 
tickets. Thus, the fact that the two airlines can cut their costs is, at least in 
theory, beneficial to passengers. 
Similarly, Korean Air and Japan Airlines have widely utilized a 
codeshare agreement. As noted, although they belong to different global 
alliances (Korean Air is a founding member of Skyteam and Japan Airlines is 
a member of Oneworld), airlines are allowed to make bilateral codeshare 
agreements with airlines in different alliances. Korean Air and Japan Airlines 
codeshare on thin routes where demand is still limited to no more than one 
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daily flight for a narrow-body aircraft, such as Incheon to Niigata, Komatsu, 
Shizuoka, and Kagoshima, and thick routes with more schedules, such as 
Incheon to Narita and Gimpo to Haneda. Overall, passengers can benefit from 
the improved connectivity and more non-stop services provided by the 
codeshare agreement. 
In other words, the crucial question is not whether an agreement is in 
place between competitors. Rather, it is whether that agreement has the object 
or effect of restricting competition. Thus, when an airline alliance is assessed 
by competition law, the details of that alliance must be carefully reviewed. 
Generally, interlining and low-level alliances (e.g. sharing facilities) do 
not have the effect of restricting competition. It can be problematic to 
generalize too much about code-sharing. In fact, code-sharing requires a 
careful analysis of competition law since the details of code-sharing can vary. 
The European competition authorities summarized their findings about code-
sharing agreements as follows: 
 
"Does the code-sharing agreement (CSA) fall under competition law or not?" 









- agreement between non-
competitors  
- airlines cannot 
independently carry out the 
air transport services made 
possible by the CSA  
 
 
- the object of the CSA is 
to restrict competition by 
means of price fixing, 
output limitation, market 
sharing or customer 
sharing 
- the CSA is part of a 
fully-fledged alliance 
 
- CSAs that belong to 
neither the first nor the 
second category 
- requires an 
assessment of the 
circumstances and the 
restrictive effects of 
the CSA in question  
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This table suggests that direct coordination and unincorporated joint 
ventures clearly fall under competition law (the 2
nd
 category above). Direct 
coordination and unincorporated joint ventures are, in principle, illegal 
horizontal agreements that have the effect of restricting competition. Hence, 
they should be prevented. However, if the benefits that an airline alliance 
provides consumers outweigh its anti-competitive effects, the competition 
authorities may make an exception, which is known as antitrust immunity. 
Once again, the goal of competition law is not protecting the competitive 
process but promoting the interests of consumers. 
At the same time, the peculiarities of the airline industry vis-à-vis 
competition law must be emphasized. The first peculiarity is the prohibition on 
cross-border mergers due to ownership and control restrictions found in 
domestic law and bilateral air services agreements. Since cross-border mergers 
are not allowed in the airline industry (unlike most other industries), 
governments have been much more tolerant of cooperation between airlines. 
The second peculiarity has to do with the high entry barriers and small 
number of market players (that is, airlines) for which the airline industry is 
well-known, especially in relation to the ―efficiencies‖ argument. To borrow 
Richard Whish‘s system of categorization, efficiencies in the context of 
competition law can be divided into ―allocative efficiency,‖ ―productive 
efficiency,‖ and ―dynamic efficiency.‖60 With regard to a competition law 
analysis of airline alliances, productive efficiency is the most relevant. 
Airlines typically argue that alliances can increase productive efficiency by 
reducing costs, providing new schedules, and improving service quality. (For a 
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detailed discussion of these arguments, see section 5.2.2.3 Challenges to 
Antitrust Immunity). 
Just as efficiencies are an important justification for regulating 
mergers,
61
 they have also been referred to in many airline antitrust immunity 
decisions.
62
 In the view of government agencies, some form of airline 
cooperation must be tolerated because efficiencies cannot otherwise be created 
in the high-cost and few-player environment of the airline industry. 
 
5.2.2 Antitrust Immunity 
5.2.2.1 Origin  
The US has played a pioneering role in antitrust law. The history of 
antitrust law in the US began in 1890 with the Sherman Act, the country‘s first 
antitrust statue. The Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
which were both enacted in 1914, also form the basis of US antitrust law. 
Since air carriers are explicitly exempt from the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act are the only relevant laws for 
antitrust issues involving airlines.
63
 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act defines the fundamental principle of 
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competition law: ―[E]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.‖64 Since this message 
has been echoed in many other jurisdictions, the Sherman Act is considered 
the ―mother of all competition laws.‖65 
The US has also helped pioneer the system of antitrust immunity for 
airlines. The origin of aviation antitrust immunity is found in the US Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938. In brief, with the approval of the US Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB), an inter-carrier agreement can be granted antitrust 
immunity according to Sections 412 and 414 of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
66
 
It is important to emphasize that the CAB process of granting antitrust 
immunity was fairly simple. Essentially, 1) agreements between air carriers 
affecting air transportation had to be filed with the CAB; 2) the CAB was 
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order. [emphasis added]. 
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directed to approve all agreements except those that it found to be adverse to 
the public interest; and 3) the CAB‘s approval conferred automatic immunity 
from the antitrust laws.
67
 This practice continued until 1978 when the US 
adopted the Airline Deregulation Act. Under the Airline Deregulation Act, 
antitrust immunity was no longer automatic and required more thorough 
investigation by the CAB.
68
 
The CAB‘s jurisdiction over antitrust immunity was transferred to the 
US Department of Transportation (DOT) in 1985. At the DOT, granting 
antitrust immunity involves a two-step analysis: the first step is approving the 
alliance agreement and the second is granting antitrust immunity.
69
 
Accordingly, the DOT may approve alliance agreements: 
 
1) if it finds that the alliance agreements are not adverse to the public 
interest; 
2) if the agreements are necessary to meet a serious transportation need 
or to achieve important public benefits; and 
3) if that need or those benefits cannot be met or achieved by reasonably 




The second step for granting antitrust immunity requires two more 
questions as to whether:  
1) The parties to such an agreement would not otherwise go forward 
without it; and 
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2) DOT finds that the public interest requires a grant of antitrust 
immunity.71 
 
The DOT granted its first antitrust immunity to the KLM-Northwest 
alliance in 1993. Two facts are particularly important in this case of antitrust 
immunity.  
First is the fact that KLM and Northwest originally wanted a merger. 
Due to US domestic law on ownership and control, however, a non-merger 
alliance remained the only viable alternative for far-reaching inter-carrier 
cooperation that would allow KLM and Northwest to enjoy the advantages of 
a merger without actually becoming a single enterprise.
72
  
Second is the fact that antitrust immunity for the KLM-Northwest 
alliance was part of the US‘s first open skies agreement, which it negotiated 
with the Netherlands in 1992.
73
 (This will be separately discussed below in 
section 5.2.2.2 Correlation with Open Skies Agreements.) 
Interestingly, when antitrust immunity was granted to KLM and 
Northwest by the US DOT, the Netherlands did not even have competition 
legislation in place, not to mention legislation for antitrust immunity.
74
 This 
illustrates how the US introduced antitrust laws and a system of antitrust 
immunity much earlier than other states. 
Indeed, competition law is still new in many states, and there are a fair 
number of states that have enacted competition law without establishing a 
system of antitrust immunity. This is mainly because antitrust immunity is by 




 toe Laer, supra note 63 at 289-290. 
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definition an ―exception‖ to the principles of competition law. In part, some 
governments do not have the capacity to assess how consumers can be 
benefited by giving airline alliances antitrust immunity.  
For airlines, commercial advantages provide an incentive to seek 
antitrust immunity. Antitrust immunity effectively allows partner airlines to 
fix prices for interline itineraries within the alliance, therefore inducing 
alliance partners to maximize joint profits.
75
  
For governments, the key question is whether granting antitrust 
immunity to an airline alliance is necessary to bring about airline cooperation, 
which is beneficial for consumers.
76
 (See section 5.2.2.4 for a discussion 
about whether antitrust immunity always works for the benefit of consumers.) 
But in addition to economic motivations, the US has also employed antitrust 
immunity for policy reasons. 
 
5.2.2.2 Correlation with Open Skies Agreements 
The US pioneered the system of antitrust immunity for airline alliances, 
and it has applied that system aggressively for its policy goal of advocating an 
open skies regime. As discussed in Chapter 1, the US has been at the vanguard 
of the ―free market‖ approach to international air transportation since the 
inception of air travel. Although the US has conservative restrictions in place 
for ownership and domestic cabotage, it has consistently advocated 
liberalizing international market access, both bilaterally and multilaterally. 
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When the US first openly advocated its open skies policy, however, the 
prevailing view in the rest of the world was that the ultimate purpose of this 
policy was to secure a greater market share by flooding international markets 
with strong US airlines.
77
 Indeed, at the time, the US aviation market was by 
far the most active in the world. Even into the 1980s, air traffic inside the US 
was equal to that of the rest of the world put together.
78
 
The US was fully aware of the hostility felt by other countries and the 
challenge it faced in advocating an open skies regime. The US‘s concerns and 
its response to this challenge were alluded to in the 1995 Statement of United 
States International Air Transportation Policy: 
 
We recognize that considerable time and effort will be required to 
achieve an open aviation regime worldwide. We can get there by making 
a concerted effort to eliminate the obstacles to that regime and by taking 





One example of this ―strategic and long-term approach‖ was the divide-
and-conquer strategy. This refers to the strategy of breaking up an existing 
power structure into smaller sections that have less power on their own and 
then overpowering these individual sections one at a time. Although the term 
has been used in the military, political, and economic arenas, it was 
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specifically used to describe the US‘s approach to aviation diplomacy vis-à-vis 
the states of the EU.
80
  
This divide-and-conquer strategy is also called the strategy of 
encirclement. Brian Havel defines the encirclement strategy as ―using a model 
liberal aviation agreement that the United States, in effect, would ‗export‘ on a 
country-by-country basis and use as a lure to entice larger geographical 
neighbors (fearful of loss of traffic, for example, over the EU‘s porous borders) 
into similar liberalized relationships.‖81 
The US government saw liberal bilateral agreements as a means of 
putting pressure on recalcitrant governments in Europe.
82
 Obviously, the US‘s 
divide-and-conquer strategy is based on a series of open skies agreements. 
However, granting antitrust immunity was the other component of this 
strategy. 
Indeed, approval for antitrust immunity has been the reward that the US 
DOT offers in exchange for liberalizing markets through bilateral open skies 
air transport agreements. In fact, the US-Netherlands open skies agreement 
and the order granting antitrust immunity for joint activities between KLM 
and Northwest that was issued shortly thereafter became the template for 
future US aviation policy.
83
 The Memorandum of Consultation between the 
US and the Netherlands (the essential document for the US-Netherlands open 
skies agreement), which was signed on 4 September 1992, specifically 
declares that: 
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[It is the intent of the Parties] to give sympathetic consideration, in the 
context of the Open Skies agreement, to the concept of commercial 
cooperation and integration of commercial operations between airlines 
of the United States and the Netherlands through commercial 
agreements… and to provide fair and expeditious consideration to any 





Setting aside the diplomatic motivations for the US‘ use of antitrust 
immunity, there are eminently logical reasons why antitrust immunity and 
open skies agreements should go hand in hand. Under protectionist air services 
agreements, the number of airlines that can operate the agreed service is 
limited (normally to one or two airlines on each side), and the capacity and 
frequency (caps on the number of passengers and amount of cargo carried and 
the number of flights flown) are predetermined. Thus, as illustrated in the 
figure below, antitrust immunity for airline alliances in a market governed by 
a protectionist air services agreement would effectively reduce the number of 
market players and likely allow the airlines in the alliance to occupy a 
dominant position in that market.
85
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Figure 5-3 Conceptual Description of Market Change by Antitrust Immunity 
 under a Protectionist Air Services Agreement   
 
Antitrust immunity for airline alliances can be pro-competitive given an 
open skies agreement under which market entry barriers for new entrants have 
already been removed (see above section 3.1.2.1 Carrier Designation). Also, 
airlines in the said market should be able to choose what capacity to offer 
without government approval or intervention (that is, free determination; see 
section 3.1.2.3 Capacity and Frequency).  
In a nutshell, market access restrictions (both direct and indirect) must 
be removed in a market in which antitrust immunity has been granted to an 
airline alliance, as shown in the figure below. Hence, it is not at all unusual 
that indirect market access issues such as slot issues are also discussed when a 
competition agency grants antitrust immunity to an airline alliance.
86
 
                                                                                                              
dominance, which is still used: ―[the dominant position] relates to a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
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Figure 5-4 Conceptual Description of Market Change by Antitrust Immunity 
 under an Open Skies Agreement 
 
5.2.2.3 Challenges to Antitrust Immunity 
At this juncture, it is important to recall that competition law is a 
national law.
87
 As a result, antitrust immunity functions differently from state 
to state. In other words, the responsible institution, the granting process, and, 
most importantly, the permitted scope of activity are different. As a result, the 
privileges of airline alliances on the identical international routes can be 
treated differently in different jurisdictions. 
For instance, Delta Air Lines and Korean Air received antitrust 
immunity from the US government and the Korean government (the 
responsible institution and the process of granting antitrust immunity in Korea 
will be discussed below in section 5.3.2.3 Korea) in 2002. However, the scope 
of the antitrust immunity they received was different. While the US DOT 
allowed the two airlines to coordinate in any business area including pricing, 
the Korean government only allowed the two airlines to coordinate in specific 
areas such as scheduling and marketing. In particular, Delta and Korean Air 
cannot coordinate prices in any case under the antitrust immunity granted by 
the Korean government. 
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Indeed, the fact that states have not established uniform international 
standards for antitrust immunity for airline alliances was raised at the Sixth 
ICAO Air Transport Conference in 2013.
88
 Although it was proposed that the 
ICAO establish a working group to discuss coordinating antitrust immunity for 
airline alliances, the proposal did not receive meaningful support from 
member states.
89
 In fact, many of the 1,100 total delegates from 131 states 
seemed to be unfamiliar with the concept of antitrust immunity.
90
 
Thus far, the only meaningful effort to harmonize the different 
approaches has been made by the US and the EU. According to Annex 2 of the 
EU-US Air Transport Agreement 2008, the EU Commission and US DOT 
must cooperate with respect to competition issues in the air transport industry. 
In a joint report (Transatlantic Airline Alliances: Competitive Issues and 
Regulatory Approaches), the two authorities recognize ―the importance of 
continuous cooperation on remedies with the view to avoiding, where possible, 
conflicting or unnecessarily duplicative remedies in the case of parallel 
reviews of the same transaction.‖91  
In fact, calls to coordinate national competition laws with respect to 
transactions in international markets have received wide support due to the 
high likelihood of inconsistent results.
92
 In reality, however, it is not easy to 
achieve substantial convergence in this area.  Although soft harmonization 
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has occurred (knowledge-sharing, for example), substantive changes are less 
likely in mature competition jurisdictions since each jurisdiction has selected 
an approach that is suitable for itself.
93
 
While this ―external‖ challenge (that is, different results from different 
national competition bodies) should not be overlooked, the ―internal‖ 
challenge is a more significant problem. The internal challenge refers to 
discontent about antitrust immunity within the country in question. Since 
antitrust immunity represents a legal exception to the principles of competition 
law, it is only natural that the competition authority would want to see the 
justifications for antitrust immunity prior to and subsequent to granting it. 
Airlines that seek antitrust immunity typically argue that an immunized 
alliance would enhance competition and achieve efficiencies.
94
 For instance, 
member airlines of Oneworld stated that:  
 
With its own immunized alliance and joint venture, oneworld could 
provide the traveling and shipping public with a wide range of valuable 
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benefits, including: lower fares on more itineraries between city-pairs; 
accelerated introduction of new routes; additional flights on existing 
routes; improved schedules; reduced travel and connection times, and 
product and service enhancements that can provide full reciprocal access 
to their networks. The proposed alliance, if approved, would also allow 
the alliance partners to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and strengthen 




The consideration of immunity for an alliance can be divided into two 
parts. One is collaboration to provide seamless services on markets between 
smaller cities, requiring an interline trip that crosses the networks of the 
alliance partners (for instance, Osaka to Denver can be operated by ANA on 
the Osaka-LA route and by United Airlines on the LA-Denver route). The 
other is for non-stop travel between the alliance partners‘ hub cities, where 
overlapping services allow the trip to be taken with either airline (for instance, 
Tokyo-LA).
96
 Although there are factors that will lower fares and increase 
service for interline passengers, the effect of overlapping hub-to-hub services 




Indeed, the competition authorities must conduct a robust economic 
analysis of whether competitive alternatives are available in the said market 
(that is, on each route). For instance, if indirect options are available with 
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other airlines or if there is strong competition from sixth freedom carriers in 
the market (such as the EU-ASEAN market, in which there is fierce 
competition for both sides‘ carriers posed by Middle Eastern and Turkish 




But compared to trans-continental routes, there are natural limitations on 
alternatives in the trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific markets. Some remedial 
measures have been developed to prevent hub-to-hub services from having an 
anti-competitive effect, one of which is a ―carve-out.‖ A carve-out prohibits 
collaboration in hub-to-hub price setting when granting antitrust immunity, 
while allowing cooperation in other markets.
99
 For example, when the DOT 
granted immunity to the United-Lufthansa alliance in 1996, it carved out the 




Slot concession is another remedial measure. As a slot is an element of 
indirect market access (see section 3.1.3.1 Airport Capacity), a combination of 
a slot shortage and cooperation among carriers has the potential to impede 
competition. For example, a trans-Atlantic JV between British Airways, 
American Airlines and other Oneworld members was required to give up some 
slots at London Heathrow Airport and New York JFK Airport.
101
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Despite these remedial measures, a fundamental question remains. Put 
simply, it is not always clear that antitrust immunity has been directly 
beneficial for the consumer. Indeed, some respected aviation economists have 
raised questions about the effects of antitrust immunity. Bilotkach and 
Hüschelrath asserted that ―[A] significant part of the efficiencies realized by 
airline cooperation are not immunity-specific, as they can in fact be realized 
by interline or code-share agreements already.‖102  Gillespie and Richard 
questioned that ―[T]he evidence in fact shows that, within the major alliances, 
antitrust immunized arrangements have not allowed the JV partners to reduce 
fares… below those sold under non-immunized arrangements.‖103  
These misgivings are particularly strong in the US because of the 
divergence between the Department of Justice (DOJ) (the principal body 
responsible for antitrust law) and the DOT (the body exceptionally endowed 
with the authority for antitrust immunity for airline alliances). After assessing 
nearly 40 applications for antitrust immunity and subsequently granting it to 
most of the applicants,104 the DOT was criticized for its lax approach by the 
DOJ and certain members of Congress, who felt that it had led to reduced 
competition.
105
 It is in this context that metal neutrality, a new requirement 
for antitrust immunity, was developed. 
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5.2.3 Metal Neutrality: New Requirement for Antitrust Immunity 
It is worth emphasizing that when the DOT granted its first antitrust 
immunity to an airline alliance (KLM-Northwest in January 1993), it was a 
metal neutral alliance. As previously noted, metal neutrality means that the 
alliance partners are indifferent to which operates the ―metal‖ (that is, the 
aircraft) when they jointly operate market services. Metal neutral operations 
essentially ―allow hitherto competing players on a particular route to co-
operate and engage in joint marketing and revenue-sharing.‖106  
Because KLM and Northwest‘s original objective was a merger that was 
prohibited by US domestic law (ownership and control restrictions), the 
carriers tried to achieve maximum integration, closely approximating a 
merger.
107
 The result was metal neutrality, which implies merger-like 
integration.  
The DOT notes the benefits of metal neutrality as follow: ―(1) reduction 
in fares through elimination or reduction of double marginalization on routes; 
(2) maintaining and expanding nonstop service; (3) an increased network with 
enhanced online service; (4) better access to lower fares; (5) frequent flyer 
program cooperation; and (6) reduced costs from consolidation and other 
efficiencies.‖108 
Metal neutrality was available to alliances that received antitrust 
immunity from the US DOT. Interestingly, however, airline alliance partners 
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did not take advantage of operating as though the partners were one airline.
109
 
Indeed, airlines in an alliance continued to operate separately rather than 
jointly within a framework of loose cooperation, meaning that antitrust 




Meanwhile, the DOJ questioned whether antitrust immunity benefits 
consumers, arguing that non-immunized alliances provide the same public 
benefits through code-sharing, joint marketing programs, and operational 
cooperation.
111
 Considering the fact that no alliance had achieved the merger-
like joint venture except the original KLM-Northwest alliance and the strong 
challenge from the DOJ, the DOT tightened its position (that is, the 
requirement of metal neutrality.) 
In 2006, the DOT denied a request for antitrust immunity from Delta Air 
Lines and Air France due to insufficient information about their planned 
integration. However, after the two airlines demonstrated their plans to 
integrate using the concept of metal neutrality, the DOT approved a second 
application in 2008.
112
 Also, recent developments, including antitrust 
immunity for Star Alliance in July 2009
113
 and for Oneworld in July 2010
114
, 
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show that the DOT is now insisting on binding agreements that require the 
sharing of revenue between marketing carrier and operating carrier. 
Previously, the requirement of metal neutrality for antitrust immunity 
was an important consideration mainly in the transatlantic market. However, 
recent developments show that antitrust immunity and metal neutrality are also 
affecting the trans-Pacific market, and specifically Northeast Asia.  
After examining how airline alliances are regulated and how antitrust 
immunity is given to airline alliances in Northeast Asia (section 5.3 Airline 
Alliances and Competition Law in Northeast Asia), I will discuss metal neutral 
joint ventures in the context of Northeast Asian open skies (section 5.4 Metal 
Neutral Joint Ventures in the Trans-Pacific Market and section 5.5 Impact of 
Metal Neutral Joint Ventures in Northeast Asia). 
 
5.3 Airline Alliances and Competition Law in Northeast Asia 
5.3.1 Airline Alliances in the Northeast Asian Market 
In the Northeast Asian market, airline alliances have not advanced 
beyond code-sharing. No antitrust immunity has been granted to alliances 
among Northeast Asian air carriers, so all kinds of coordination are prohibited. 
Hence, unincorporated joint ventures are not permitted at present. This 
contrasts with the joint ventures that have been set up between Northeast 
Asian carriers and American carriers in the trans-Pacific market. (This will be 
discussed in section 5.4 Metal Neutral Joint Ventures in the Trans-Pacific 
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(Northeast Asia-US) Market.) 
As previously noted, airline alliances can be broadly categorized into 
two types: multilateral branded global alliances and bilateral inter-carrier 
agreements. The Northeast Asian carriers in multilateral branded global 
alliances are listed in Table 5-3: 
 
 Star Alliance Skyteam Oneworld 








ANA  Japan Airlines 
Korea 
 
Asiana Airlines Korean Air  
Table 5-3 Member Airlines in Global Alliances (China, Japan, and Korea) 
 
Just as cooperation among global alliance members is crucial in the 
modern airline industry, bilateral inter-carrier agreements are another key 
factor in airline operations. While multilateral branded global alliance 
members tend to cooperate for the interest of the alliance members as a whole, 
bilateral inter-carrier agreements reflect the specific needs of the two 
individual airlines. 
Although carriers are not allowed to have dual membership in the global 
alliances, they still have the prerogative to make bilateral inter-carrier 
agreements with airlines that are not members of their alliance or even with 
airlines that are members of a different alliance. For instance, Korean Air, a 
member of Skyteam, and Japan Airlines, a member of Oneworld, have widely 
used code-sharing agreements. Both China Eastern and China Southern, 
members of Skyteam, exercise broad commercial agreements with Japan 
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Airlines. Also, Asiana Airlines, a member of Star Alliance, enjoys a code-
sharing relationship with China Southern. The relationships between airline 
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Code-sharing  Code-sharing  
China Eastern 
(Skyteam) 
Code-sharing   
Shenzhen Airlines 
(Star Alliance) 
 Code-sharing  
Xiamen Airlines 
(Skyteam) 
Code-sharing   
Shandong Airlines  Code-sharing  
Shanghai Airlines Code-sharing   
Table 5-6 Airline Alliances in the China-Korea Market 
 
Two important developments are expected in the near future. The first 
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development will be new alliances between new airlines. With LCCs booming 
in Northeast Asia, we are likely to see an alliance between LCCs. China‘s 
Spring Airlines and Korea‘s Eastar Jet used to have an inter-carrier agreement, 
though this is now defunct. There will obviously be cooperation between 
Spring Airlines and a joint venture between that airline and Japanese investors 
called Spring Airlines Japan. The second development will be more integrated 
alliances between existing airlines. This change will likely require antitrust 
immunity. Thus, it is necessary to briefly review the competition laws relating 
to airlines alliances in China, Japan and Korea. 
 
5.3.2 Competition Law Regimes Relating to Airline Alliances  
in Northeast Asia 
The competition laws in the three states in Northeast Asia are at 
different stages of development. In addition, the states do not have uniform 
systems of antitrust immunity for aviation. While China only recently enacted 
competition laws and does not have antitrust immunity on the surface, Japan 
has well-established competition laws and a concrete system for antitrust 
immunity for airline alliances. Although Korea does not have explicit 
provisions for antitrust immunity, it has granted antitrust immunity in the past. 
The table below provides a snapshot of how airline alliances are handled by 
competition law in Northeast Asia. 
  China Japan Korea 
Is there a national competition law? o o o 
Are there explicit ATI provisions in the national law? x o x 
Has the government granted ATI in practice to airlines? x o o 
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Has the government granted ATI allowing metal neutrality? x o x 
Table 5-7 Competition Law Regimes Relating to Airline Alliances  
in Northeast Asia 
 
5.3.2.1 China 
Today, competition law is a ―universal regulatory impulse in developing 
and globalizing economies.‖115 Despite this, the law is at different stages in 
different economies. This contrast is evident when we compare the two 
biggest economies in the world: the US and China. While US antitrust law was 
first established in 1890, China did not enact its first comprehensive 
competition law, the Antimonopoly Act, until 2007, with the law taking effect 
in 2008. 
Though many jurisdictions have adopted competition laws in the 21
st
 
century, none of these laws has received the same level of interest as China‘s 
Antimonopoly Act.
116
 Several factors for this include the sheer scale of 
China‘s markets, the vast amounts of foreign investment in China, and the 




Another reason for this global attention is related to the law‘s 
surprisingly long history. Though the law was added to China‘s national 
legislative plan in 1994, it took thirteen years before it was finally 
promulgated.
118
 During this preparatory period, key Chinese government 
agencies including the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and 
                                           
115
 Salil K. Mehra & Meng Yanbei, ―Against Antitrust Functionalism: Reconsidering China‘s 
Antimonopoly Law‖ (2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law. 379 at 385. 
116
 H. Stephen Harris Jr, ―The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law 




 Mehra & Yanbei, supra note 115 at 397. 
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Reform Commission, and the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce received numerous comments and support from international 
organizations and competition law agencies in major jurisdictions.
119
 
Despite the years spent drafting the Antimonopoly Act and the 
substantial support it received, China will need more time to enhance this 
competition law. Indeed, the law is viewed as ―an ongoing process of Chinese 
reform in competition law.‖120 There are many aspects of the law that need 
improvement. One particular criticism is that it fails to provide answers to key 
questions, such as whom to regulate, what to regulate, and who will 
regulate.
121




The three Chinese antitrust regulators have yet to complete the process 
of building their capabilities. These regulators are the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM, responsible for merger control), the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC, responsible for non-merger enforcement, and 
in particular non-price-related conduct), and the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC, responsible for price-related non-merger 
conduct).
 123
 In the meantime, the NDRC announced China‘s first ever 
prosecution of an international price-fixing cartel in January 2013, signaling 
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 ―Lessons from Four Years of Antitrust Enforcement in China‖ Jones Day (September 
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 Ibid.  
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 ―Antitrust Alert: China Takes First Enforcement Action against International Price Fixing 
Cartel‖ Jones Day (January 2013), online: <http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--china-
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The same institutional ambiguity applies to the question of which 
governmental agencies in China have jurisdiction over airline antitrust 
issues.
125
 Since the NDRC is given broad competence over all matters relating 
to price-fixing, monopolies, and general anti-competitive conduct, the NDRC 
can take the lead in dealing with airline antitrust cases.
126
 Another relevant 
agency is the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which also has broad 
jurisdiction over matters relating to consumer protection, market competition, 
and bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
127
 At the same time, because 
the Civil Aviation Authority of China (CAAC) is the agency responsible for 
air transport matters, China‘s antitrust regulators will eventually seek the 
views of the CAAC.
128
 
With regard to antitrust immunity, the most relevant provision is Article 
15 of the Antimonopoly Act.
129
 This provision states that an agreement 
                                                                                                              
takes-first-enforcement-action-against-international-price-fixing-cartel-01-06-2013/>. 
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 Alan Khee-Jin Tan, ―Antitrust Immunity for Trans-Pacific Airline Alliance Agreements: 
Singapore and China as ‗Beyond‘ Markets‖ 38 Air & Space L. 275 at 285. [Tan, ―Antitrust 
Immunity‖]. 
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 Ibid. at 286. 
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 Article15 of Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China 
An agreement among business operators shall be exempted from application of articles 13 and 
14 if it can be proven to be in any of the following circumstances: 
(1) for the purpose of improving technologies, researching and developing new products; 
(2) for the purpose of upgrading product quality, reducing cost, improving efficiency, unifying 
product specifications or standards, or carrying out professional labor division; 
(3) for the purpose of enhancing operational efficiency and reinforcing the competitiveness of 
small and medium-sized business operators; 
(4) for the purpose of achieving public interests such as conserving energy, protecting the 
environment and relieving the victims of a disaster and so on; 
(5) for the purpose of mitigating serious decrease in sales volume or obviously excessive 
production during economic recessions; 
(6) for the purpose of safeguarding the justifiable interests in the foreign trade or foreign 
economic cooperation; or 
(7) other circumstances as stipulated by laws and the State Council. 
Where a monopoly agreement is in any of the circumstances stipulated in Items 1 through 5 
and is exempt from Articles 13 and 14 of this Law, the business operators must additionally 
prove that the agreement can enable consumers to share the interests derived from the 
agreement, and will not severely restrict the competition in relevant market, online, Ministry 
of Commerce, People‘s Republic of China 
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among business operators for the purpose of improving efficiency can be 
exempted from the law‘s regulations.130 However, it is not clear whether 
airline alliances are eligible for this exemption, and no explanation is provided 
about how the exemption process would apply in practice. 
As of 2015, China has never granted antitrust immunity to an airline 
alliance. Although Japan Airlines/American Airlines and ANA/United 
Airlines have asked the NDRC to approve their metal neutral joint ventures, 
the agency has yet to issue a decision.
131
 The main reasons that there have 
been few developments could be that the NDRC has no airline expertise.
132
  
If the NDRC (or any other competition agency) decides to review 
antitrust immunity for the Japan Airlines/American Airlines and ANA/United 
Airlines alliances (or any other airline alliance) in the future, it will likely seek 
the views of the Civil Aviation Authority of China (CAAC).
133
 As previously 
discussed (see section 5.2.2.2 Correlation with Open Skies Agreements), 
governments need to coordinate their policies about antitrust immunity for 
airline alliances and open skies agreements. Thus, the CAAC‘s input on 






Japan has a relatively long history of competition law. The first 




 See ibid Article 15, paragraph 2 of Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China 
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Antimonopoly Act (formally called the Act Concerning Prohibition of Private 
Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade) was passed in 1947.
135
 This act 
provided for the establishment of the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC). 
However, the Antimonopoly Act of 1947 was not produced independently by 
Japanese society; rather, it was imposed on it by the US during its occupation 
of the country.
136
 Kenji Suzuki describes Japan‘s understanding of 
competition in the 19
th
 century as follows: 
 
Traditionally, the concept of ―fair competition‖ was not the norm in the 
Japanese market. There is a story about public officials in the mid-
nineteenth century who had difficulty even in translating the word 
―competition‖ into Japanese, since it was neither ―battle‖ nor 
―cooperation.‖137 
 
After the Second World War, Japanese policy makers wished to pursue a 
command-and-control economy that disregarded the value of competition.
138
 
In contrast, the view of the US (the occupying forces) was that Japan‘s 
economy had been largely under the control of a few great business 
organizations (known as zaibatsu in Japanese) which had received preferential 
treatment from the government. This monopoly-oriented economy, the US 
                                           
135
 Kenji Suzuki, Competition Law Reform in Britain and Japan (London: Routledge , 2002) 
at 19.  
136




 See Harry First, ―Antitrust In Japan: The Original Intent‖ (2000) 9 Pacific Rim Law and 
Policy Journal 1 at 16 (noting that ―[F]air and free competition alone cannot be the sole 
solution [to] Japan‘s economic problems]… Planned and fairly strict state control of the 
economy [will be] required in the process of Japan‘s economic democratization‖). 
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believed, should be changed.
139
 Eventually, the proposal made by the US 
occupying forces was adopted.
140
 
Over the past seven decades, this competition law has been localized. 
Since the original Antimonopoly Act of 1947, which was modeled on the US 
antitrust law system, was too stringent for Japan, Japan substantially amended 
the Act in 1953.
141
 Since then, the Antimonopoly Act has been gradually 
strengthened, including a revision in 1977 that increased the administrative 
fines and guidelines issued by the JFTC.
142
 
Japan‘s Aviation Act contains explicit provisions about antitrust 
immunity for airline alliances. The relevant provisions are Article 110 
(Exception from Application of the Act concerning Prohibition of Private 
Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade), Article 111 (Approval of 
Agreement), Article 111-2 2 (Order for Alteration of Agreement and 




Essentially, antitrust immunity can be granted to airline alliances if it 
offers benefits to consumers and if it is necessary for the alliance. One 
interesting part is the relationship between the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
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Transport, and Tourism (the MLIT) and the JFTC. While the MLIT is the 
body responsible for granting antitrust immunity, it must consult with the 
JFTC before granting it. In addition, the JFTC monitors whether alliance 
activities meet the requirements for immunity and can ask the MLIT to take 
necessary action (Article 111-3). 
In 2010, the Japanese government granted antitrust immunity to two 
airline alliances, the first time it had done so. These alliances were designated 
as metal neutral joint ventures. One was for Japan Airlines and American 
Airlines and the other for ANA and United (these agreements will be reviewed 
in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3). Subsequently, antitrust immunity was granted to 
ANA and Lufthansa in June 2011 and to JAL and British Airways in May 
2012, after which these companies initiated joint ventures. Given that Japan 
modeled its competition law on the US antitrust law system and that it has a 
formal system in place to provide airline alliances with antitrust immunity just 
like the US, it is safe to assume that Japan will continue to be flexible about 
granting antitrust immunity.  
 
5.3.2.3 Korea 
The evolution of Korea‘s competition law is closely related to Korea‘s 
business conglomerates, or chaebol. When Korea‘s Economic Planning Board 
(EPB, now defunct) drafted the Fair Trade Law in 1964, strong opposition 
from big business blocked the enactment of the bill.
144
 Although the Price 
Stabilization and Fair Trade Act (PSFT Act) was enacted in 1975, it was 
effectively toothless due to the lack of a culture of competition law and 
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The real history of Korean competition law began in 1980. In October of 
that year, the Korean Constitution was revised to include a provision about 
competition that states, ―Abuse of monopoly shall be appropriately regulated 
and corrected.‖146 In December of the same year, the Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act (MRFT Act) was enacted, coming into force in April 1981. 
Later, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) was founded under the 
MRFT Act. 
Youngjin Jung and Seung Wha Chang offer a succinct summary of the 
background of the MRFT Act: 
 
[T]he Korean government aggressively pursued an intensive growth 
strategy throughout the 1960‘s and 1970‘s. In doing so, it relied heavily 
on industrial policy while virtually disregarding the notion of 
competition policy. This strategy succeeded in recording phenomenal 
economic growth, but at significant political and social costs. The advent 
of competition law in 1981 was a manifestation of the Korean 
government‘s desire to address this problem in its economic policy-




Since 1981, Korea‘s competition law and policy have significantly 
matured, and the KFTC has become a powerful regulatory body.
148
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Korean law does not provide clear-cut provisions for antitrust immunity 
for airline alliances. This is different from Japan, which provides for explicit 
exemption from competition law in its Aviation Act. Although Article 121 of 
the Korea Aviation Act
149
 broadly deals with alliance agreements and requires 
ex ante consultation with the KFTC for their approval, there is no explanation 
about immunity from competition law. 
However, de facto antitrust immunity for an airline alliance was actually 
granted for the Delta-Korean Air alliance in 2002.
150
 In addition, the Korean 
government publicly confirmed that ―[I]n the Republic of Korea the authority 
for granting antitrust immunity is vested in both the Ministry of Land, 
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Transport, and Marine Affairs and the Korean Fair Trade Commission‖151 at 
the Sixth ICAO Air Transport Conference in 2013. 
Nevertheless, the scope of antitrust immunity allowed by the MLIT and 
the KFTC is inherently limited under current Korean law. This is because, 
according to Article 121, Paragraph 2, airline alliances cannot substantially 
limit the competition among air carriers under any circumstances.
152
 Put 
differently, blanket immunity for airline alliances is not permitted under 
Korean law. This explains why Korean Air and Delta Airlines only received 
limited immunity for certain activities. 
In other jurisdictions with systems for antitrust immunity, the 
competition authorities compare how the business activities in question will 
benefit consumers with how they will limit competition. If they conclude that 
the benefits an airline alliance provides consumers outweigh its anti-
competitive effects, the competition authorities may grant a legal exception. 
In Korea, however, this is not the case. In other words, even antitrust 
immunity does not guarantee unrestricted coordination for pricing between 
airlines. These strict legal regulations make complete metal neutral joint 
ventures impossible because price coordination is inevitable in the 
unincorporated joint venture model. (This will be further discussed in section 
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5.4 Metal Neutral Joint Ventures in the Trans-Pacific (Northeast Asia-US) 
 Market 
5.4.1 US Policy on Open Skies and Antitrust Immunity in Asia 
In section 5.2.2.2 Correlation with Open Skies Agreements, I examined 
how antitrust immunity and open skies agreements are interconnected. A basic 
rationale for this correlation is to maintain fair competition. Accordingly, 
pursuant to U.S. DOT policy, only after an open skies agreement is 
implemented that provides other airlines with unrestricted access to the market 
can antitrust immunity be granted to a particular airline alliance. 
The other reason is a policy objective that the US has been pursuing 
since the 1990s. Indeed, the US‘s divide-and-conquer strategy, which 
combines open skies agreements with granting antitrust immunity, proved 
highly successful in the EU.
153
 In 1995 alone, the US reached open skies 
agreements with Belgium, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Luxembourg, 
Austria, Iceland, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic.
154
 
After 1992, when the US and the Netherlands reached an open skies 
agreement and the KLM-Northwest alliance received antitrust immunity, an 
increasing number of German passengers bound for the US started to fly 
through Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (using KLM‘s sixth freedom services) in 
the Netherlands instead of Frankfurt Airport. Due to the drain of passengers 
and revenue from Lufthansa‘s network, Germany signed a transitional 
                                           
153
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agreement toward open skies with the US in 1996.
155
 
By 1997, about 40 percent of US-Europe traffic was flying under open 
skies.
156
  France, another major economy in Europe, signed an open skies 
agreement with the US in 2001. The US‘s open skies with Germany and 
France resulted in antitrust immunity for Lufthansa and United and for Delta 
Airlines and Air France.
157
 Clearly, the availability of US antitrust immunity 




The ultimate target of the strategy, the UK, refused to reach a bilateral 
open skies agreement with the US for several more years. Presumably, since 
the UK is geographically closer to the US than EU members on the 
continent—that is, since passengers flying from the UK to the US or vice 
versa would have to backtrack if they wanted to use European hubs—the US‘s 
divide-and-conquer strategy did not have as big an impact on the UK as it did 
on Germany and France. Eventually, however, open skies came into effect 
between the US and the UK through the 2007 US-EU Air Transport 
Agreement, to which the UK is a party. 
For the US, the open skies agreement with Germany reached in February 
1996 meant the opening of a large aviation market on the European continent. 
Soon after the agreement, the US started to shift the focus of its international 
aviation policy to Asia, announcing the US open skies initiative in Asia in the 
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In January 1997, Singapore became the first state in Asia to sign an open 
skies agreement with the US. In the press release about the US-Singapore 
open skies agreement, US Transportation Secretary Federico Peña made it 
clear that the US was seeking a series of open skies relationships with Asian 
countries just as it was doing in the EU.
160
 In the following month, Taiwan 
signed an open skies agreement with the US.  
A greater impact was exerted by the open skies agreement between the 
US and Korea in June 1998. In fact, the US‘s open skies agreement with 
Korea was directly connected with Japan since the US had consistently 
associated its Korean aviation policy with its Japanese policy. In 1978, two 
decades before this open skies agreement was adopted, Korea had become the 
first Asian country to conclude a relatively liberal bilateral agreement with the 
US, which explicitly allowed an unlimited number of carriers to be designated 
in exchange for opening more routes from Seoul to US cities.
161
 This 
agreement was clearly intended to put pressure on Japan, which had been 
refusing to accept unlimited designations.
162
 
Likewise, Korea was a key part of the US plan to reach an open skies 
agreement with Japan, given its proximity to the country and its relatively 
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liberal attitude on international air transportation issues.
163
 Just as the US 
approached the Netherlands as part of its plan to pressure Germany into 
signing an open skies agreement, the US‘s successful open skies agreement 
with Korea was largely aimed at forcing Japan to change its aviation policy. 
While Japan was still resisting the US‘s open skies proposal, some 
Japanese experts believed that the US divide-and-conquer strategy would not 
succeed in Northeast Asia because of the large size of China and Japan, which 
would prevent the threat of traffic diversion from working as it had in 
Europe.
164
 But contrary to expectations, a significant traffic diversion has 
occurred through Korea. In particular, Korean Air has been ―the quiet achiever 
in the North America-Asia transfer market,‖165 picking up a large portion of 
traffic in that market. The CAPA report articulates the comparative advantages 
of Korean Air as follows: 
 
Korean Air holds an advantage for its geography (unlike Hong Kong or 
Taipei), hub airport not being constrained by slots (unlike Beijing, Hong 
Kong and Tokyo) and being permitted to cater, albeit in a limited way to 





Indeed, Japanese passengers traveling abroad increasingly used Incheon 
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Airport in Korea instead of Haneda and Narita airports in the 2000s.
167
 
Subsequently, the US achieved its long-standing goal of open skies with Japan 
in October 2010, 12 years after signing an open skies agreement with Korea. 
Although the impact of Korea (that is, the drain of US-bound Japanese 
passengers to flights departing from Incheon International Airport in Korea) 
was not the only reason for the agreement, it was a significant factor. 
There were two other reasons—distinct from but related to the US‘s 
divide-and-conquer strategy—that led Japan to sign an open skies agreement 
with the US. The first (and more fundamental) reason was national policy 
reform in Japan. In April 2007, the Japanese government unveiled its ―Asia 
Gateway‖ plan, which was designed to remove restrictions on foreign air 
carriers‘ access to Japanese airports and to have its airports become 
international hubs, as the name suggests. (See section 3.2.3.1 Policy 
Transformation through the Asian Gateway Initiative)  
Secondly, the US DOT guaranteed it would provide antitrust immunity 
to Japanese carriers and US partner carriers if Japan signed the open skies 
agreement. As had happened many times before, antitrust immunity for Japan 
Airlines and American Airlines (―JL/AA‖) and for All Nippon Airways, 
Continental Airlines, and United Air Lines (―NH/CO/UA‖ or ―ANA/United‖) 
was an incentive for Japan to reach an open skies agreement with the US. 
Because the US DOT had made metal neutral joint ventures a new 
requirement for antitrust immunity in 2008, these two alliances were 
established as unincorporated joint ventures. 
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5.4.2 American Airlines-Japan Airlines JV 
On 11 December 2009, the US and Japan signed an MOU promising to 
establish an open skies relationship. Two months later, on 12 February 2010, 
Japan Airlines (JL) and American Airlines (AA) applied to the US DOT for 
antitrust immunity.
168
 Their application described plans to launch metal 




Interestingly, during this two-month period, there was a bitter fight 
between two leading US airlines (American Airlines and Delta Air Lines) over 
who would be partners with Japan Airlines. American Airlines was the 
original alliance partner with Japan Airlines (both are Oneworld members) and 
Delta Airlines was the challenger. Indeed, Delta Airlines pulled out all the 
stops, even offering financial aid, to establish an alliance with JAL when JAL 
was going through bankruptcy proceedings in January 2010.
170
 
In fact, the battle had begun in October 2008 when Delta merged with 
Northwest Airlines, which had operated a Narita hub for many years, flying 
from several US gateways to Tokyo before continuing on to about 10 other 
Asian cities.
171
 Although Asia was a minor concern for pre-merger Delta, 
usually accounting for only two percent of Delta‘s total passenger revenue172, 
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Northwest‘s strong presence in Asia helped Delta realize the enormous 
potential of the trans-Pacific market. 
Despite considerable efforts by Delta, Japan Airlines eventually chose 
on 2 February 2010 to keep its ties with American Airlines, which was a major 
blow for Delta.
173
 After Japan Airlines and American Airlines applied for 
antitrust immunity, the US DOT issued the show cause order on 6 October 
2010, which tentatively granted antitrust immunity to the JL/AA alliance.
174
 
On 25 October 2010, the US and Japan officially signed an open skies 
agreement in Tokyo.
175
 Soon after, on 10 November 2010, the US DOT 
released the final order, which officially granted antitrust immunity to the 
JL/AA as well as the ANA/UA alliances (see below).
176
 Both the show cause 
order and the final order made it clear that the US-Japan open skies agreement 
was a precondition for these orders taking effect.
177
 Also, the DOT‘s approval 
for antitrust immunity specifically stated that the two airlines would have to 
start metal neutral joint ventures in the trans-Pacific market within eighteen 
months of the final order being issued.
178
 
American Airlines and Japan Airlines also sought antitrust immunity 
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from the Japanese government. Japan Airlines applied to the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism of Japan (MLIT), seeking antitrust 
immunity with American Airlines on 18 June 2010
179
, and the MLIT approved 
the application on 22 October 2010.
180
 This was Japan‘s first ever application 
for airline antitrust immunity.
181
 
 American Airlines Japan Airlines 
Global Alliance  Oneworld  Oneworld 
Hub Airports Dallas, Chicago, and Miami Tokyo (Narita and Haneda) 
Fleet 627 162 
Destinations 330 destinations in 50 states 80 destinations in 20 states 
Table 5-8 Snapshot of American Airlines and Japan Airlines  
 
In April 2011, Japan Airlines and American Airlines commenced their 
joint venture on the following routes.
182
 
Operating Carrier Route 
AA Narita <=> Dallas/Fort Worth, New York, Chicago,  
Los Angeles 
Haneda <=> New York 
JAL Narita <=>New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Vancouver 
Haneda <=> San Francisco 
Table 5-9 Routes on the Metal Neutral Joint Venture between AA and JAL
183
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 Japan Airlines, Press Release, ―Japan Airlines Submits Antitrust Immunity Application for 
a Tighter Cooperation with American Airlines on the Trans-Pacific Routes to the Ministry of 




 American Airlines, Press Release, ―American Airlines and Japan Airlines Announce Joint 






5.4.3 United Airlines-All Nippon Airways (ANA) JV 
Compared to the Japan Airlines-American Airlines joint venture, the 
path to a joint venture for United Airlines (United) and All Nippon Airways 
(ANA) was smooth and uneventful. While Japan Airlines was initially unsure 
about global branded alliances and did not join Oneworld until 2007, ANA 
was more proactive and joined Star Alliance in 1999. Since then, ANA has 
maintained a close relationship, including wide code-sharing, with United 
Airlines, a founding member of Star Alliance. 
On 23 December 2009, immediately after the US and Japan signed an 
MOU for an open skies agreement, ANA, United Airlines, and Continental 
Airlines applied for antitrust immunity.
184
 At that time, United Airlines and 
Continental Airlines were in the process of discussing a merger. During the 
DOT‘s review period, United Airlines‘ parent company, UAL Corporation 
(UAL), and Continental announced on 2 May 2010 their intention to merge 
operations. Although the merger was completed on 1 October 2010, the US 
DOT considered United and Continental to be separate entities in its order.
185
 
On 6 October 2010, the US DOT issued the show cause order, which 
tentatively granted antitrust immunity to the United-ANA alliance.
186
 Shortly 
after the US and Japan officially signed the open skies agreement in Tokyo
187
, 
the US DOT issued the final order, granting antitrust immunity to the 
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ANA/UA alliance on 10 November 2010.
188
 
The ANA/UA alliance application for antitrust immunity was reviewed 
in parallel with the JAL/AA application. Indeed, the US DOT granted 
approval of and antitrust immunity for the two separate applications in one 
consolidated order titled ―U.S.-Japan Alliance Case.‖ 189  Furthermore, in 
reaching this conclusion, the UD DOT opined that the applications influenced 
each other, noting that ―inter-alliance competition would likely be 
strengthened in U.S.-Asia and U.S.-Japan markets as a result of immunizing 
the Star applicants and the oneworld applicants.‖190  
 
 United Airlines All Nippon Airways  
Global Alliance  Star Alliance  Star Alliance 
Hub Airports Chicago, Denver, and LAX Tokyo (Narita and 
Haneda) 
Fleet 705 211 
Destinations 373 destinations in 60 
states 
72 destinations in 18 
states 
Table 5-10 Snapshot of United Airlines and All Nippon Airways 
 
United Airlines and ANA also sought antitrust immunity from the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism of Japan (MLIT) 
which granted it on 22 October 2010.
191
 In April 2011, ANA and United 
started their joint venture
192
, which featured more routes on trans-Pacific 
routes than the JAL/AA joint venture. 
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Operating Carrier Route 
United Narita <=> Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, 
 Houston, Chicago, New York (Newark), 
 Washington, D.C., Honolulu, Denver  
Osaka <=> San Francisco 
ANA Narita <=> Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago,  
New York (JFK), Washington, D.C.,  
Honolulu, San Jose, Seattle 
Haneda <=> Los Angeles, Honolulu 





In November 2014, United Airlines and ANA filed a separate application 
for antitrust immunity to enable the two airlines to create a more 
comprehensive business network for trans-Pacific air cargo.
194
 This joint 
venture for trans-Pacific cargo (the first of its kind between the US and 
Asia)
195
 hints that cooperation between the two carriers has been going 
smoothly. 
Only a few decades ago, the current dynamic would have been nearly 
unimaginable. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the aero-political tensions 
between the US and Japan may well have been higher than between any other 
trans-Pacific countries. But now the two countries enjoy one of the strongest, 
and mostly deeply strategic, trans-Pacific partnerships.196 
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5.4.4 Proposed Delta-Korean Air JV 
Among the trans-Pacific airline partnerships (that is, between US 
carriers and Asian carriers), the alliance between Delta Airlines and Korean 
Air was the first to receive antitrust immunity. In 2002, Delta Airlines and 
Korean Air filed an application for antitrust immunity with the US DOT as 
part of the Skyteam joint application for antitrust immunity. 
Given that the US and Korea reached an open skies agreement in 1998, 
antitrust immunity for Delta and Korean Air seemed less relevant to the 
agreement between the two countries. To be sure, antitrust immunity would 
not have been possible if the US-Korea open skies agreement had not been in 
place, but it cannot be seen as a direct incentive for that agreement. 
Even though Delta and Korean Air received antitrust immunity, the level 
of their cooperation did not exceed code-sharing. First of all, the US DOT‘s 
policy on antitrust immunity did not include metal neutrality as a condition for 
the partnership in the early 2000s. In addition, it is unlikely that the Korean 
Fair Trade Commission would have allowed a highly integrated joint venture 
because of the strict law (Article 121 of the Korea Aviation Act). As noted 
earlier, Asia had barely been on Delta‘s radar prior to its merger with 
Northwest in 2008.
197
 But the situation changed dramatically after the merger 
and Delta‘s painful failure to partner with Japan Airlines in 2009. 
Korean Air was Delta‘s obvious choice for the trans-Pacific market. 
Both the airlines were founding members of Skyteam and both had already 
received antitrust immunity. Just like Japan, Korea is strategically located for 
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traffic between China and Southeast Asia and North America. Korean Air‘s 
map of destinations in the Asia-Pacific region sheds some light on the 
geographical advantages that Korea and Japan enjoy in the trans-Pacific 
market. 
 
Figure 5-4 Korean Air Route Map 
 
Considering that the two major Japanese carriers are already partners 
with Delta‘s competitors (American Airlines and United Airlines), Delta hopes 
today that a fully immunized metal neutral joint venture with Korean Air will 
help it compete with the other metal neutral joint ventures. 
On the other hand, Korean Air appears to be satisfied with continuing 
code-sharing with Delta without stepping up their relationship. This is because 
Korean Air already has an established presence in the US market. Despite 
Korea's small size, Korean Air is the Asian airline with the most passenger 
services to the US - to 11 destinations in total (Los Angeles, New York, 
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Honolulu, Houston, Las Vegas, San Francisco, 
Seattle, and Washington Dulles).
198
 The US market has been a main source of 
                                           
198
 CAPA, ―Korean Air seeks new markets after betting the house on N America, seemingly 
without SkyTeam support‖ (30 September 2013), online: 
<http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/korean-air-seeks-new-markets-after-betting-the-house-
339 
revenue for the airline for over a decade, accounting for about a third of total 
passenger revenue.
199
 The CAPA offers a concise summary of Korean Air‘s 
competitiveness on trans-Pacific routes: 
 
Korean Air has a number of advantages: generally solid geography that 
often places Seoul on the shortest flight path between Asia and North 
America, a lower cost base than Japanese peers ANA and JAL, early 
open skies with the US, and relatively extensive access to China as a 
sixth-freedom source market.200 
 
In response to Korean Air‘s inertia, Delta has eliminated Korean Air 
flights from earning miles in its frequent flyer programme and cut code-shares 
between the two. Delta argues that Korean Air has been able to divert China-
US traffic to its hub of Incheon to the detriment of non-stop carriers like 
Delta.
201
 Logically, Delta would prefer to have a direct joint venture with a 
Chinese carrier, but the lack of open skies between the US and China negates 
this possibility (This will be further discussed below.) Also, a joint venture 
with a Japanese carrier is no longer a possibility since the two large Japanese 
carriers (JAL and ANA) already have arrangements with American and United 
Airlines, respectively. 





 CAPA, ―North Pacific airline route development: Part 1 - Market growth and the Asian 
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For Korean Air, a metal neutral joint venture is a new form of airline 
cooperation and an unfamiliar business model. This contrasts with the rich 
experience that Delta (and previously Northwest) have had in this kind of 
cooperation in the trans-Atlantic market. Moreover, Korean Air has little 
reason to launch a joint venture in the US market, where it is already 
profitable. There are also regulatory concerns. It is unclear whether the Korean 
Fair Trade Commission would grant antitrust immunity, and if it did, what the 
extent of this immunity would be. Since a metal neutral joint venture is 
beyond the scope of any antitrust immunity that Korean Air has hitherto 
received, Korean Air must seek new immunity if it decides to initiate a joint 
venture with Delta. 
Despite these challenges, Delta and Korean Air could explore closer 
cooperation, including the establishment of a joint venture, in the near future. 
Their direct competitors continue to cooperate more closely together, and 
Delta‘s network in the US market is important for Korean Air. As an 
illustration, Korean Air used to have more than 100 code-sharing routes 
(domestic US, US-Canada, selected South American service) with Delta until 
Delta scaled back its codeshare partnership in July 2013.
202
 
Meanwhile, Korean Air (KE) and American Airlines (AA) recently 
agreed to codeshare on flights between Dallas/Fort Worth and Seoul.
203
 A 
media report speculated that Korean Air‘s limited pact with American Airlines 
comes against ―the backdrop of a seemingly deteriorating relationship between 
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Korean Air and SkyTeam partner Delta.‖204 Although the scope of the KE-AA 
codeshare agreement is limited (only for flights between Dallas/Fort Worth 
and Seoul), it signals that the joint venture deal between Korean Air and Delta 
cannot be easily achieved. Thus, it will be interesting to see whether Delta and 
Korean Air will mend their differences in the near future and eventually 
establish a joint venture in the trans-Pacific market. 
 
5.4.5 Possibility of a JV between a Chinese Airline and a US Airline 
A more interesting scenario in the trans-Pacific market is the possibility 
of Chinese carriers entering into joint ventures with US alliance partners. In 
the long run, it is undisputed that the China-US aviation market will be the 
most lucrative in the world. The US and China represent the world‘s two 
largest domestic aviation markets, and Chinese carriers continue to increase 
their share of the global market. While China‘s domestic market is currently 
only half the size of the US domestic market, it is projected to overtake the US 
market by 2031.205 
Media reports have confirmed that China Southern Airlines has offered 
to form a joint venture with Delta. For now, though, China Southern‘s offer is 
not tenable because the US DOT only grants antitrust immunity to joint 
ventures when open skies agreements are already in place.
206
 
The ties between Delta and China Eastern are growing stronger as well. 
According to another media report, Delta and China Eastern are working 
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206
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closely to address a problem bedeviling airlines in both the US and China, 
namely, the sense that US and Chinese carriers do not benefit enough from the 
US-China market.
207
 According to Delta‘s calculations, national carriers 
usually control 85 percent of the air traffic between the US and other nations, 
but US and Chinese airlines only control about 60 percent of the traffic 
between the US and China.
208
 In other words, 40 percent of total passengers 
between the two countries use third-country hubs, mostly Incheon, Narita and 
Hong Kong. 
At present, Delta and China Eastern are focusing on lower-level airline 
cooperation, including reducing connecting times, providing premium 
customer service and high-quality lounges, and boosting the reliability of 
transfers.
209
 However, their partnership cannot evolve into joint operations, 
which would require antitrust immunity, because the US and China do not 
currently have an open skies agreement. Paul Mifsud predicts that Delta could 
bring to bear its experience with metal neutral joint ventures if its Chinese 




Indeed, Mr. Edward Bastian, president of Delta Airlines, said, ―[J]oint-
venture is the model for international collaboration. Hopefully, with the 
Chinese, we can get there as well,‖ predicting that the US and China would 
reach a deal on open skies between 2018 and 2023.
211
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5.5 Impact of Metal Neutral Joint Ventures in Northeast Asia 
5.5.1 Analysis of US-China Aviation Market 
At this juncture, it is worth reviewing a few facts: 1) the US and Japan 
already have an open skies agreement; 2) the US and Korea already have an 
open skies agreement; 3) Japan and Korea already have an open skies 
agreement; 4) US carriers and Japanese carriers received antitrust immunity 
after meeting metal neutrality requirements; 5) a US carrier and Korean carrier 
have received antitrust immunity and are discussing a joint venture; 6) China 
does not have an open skies agreement with the US, Japan, or Korea; and 7) 
Chinese carriers cannot form joint ventures with US carriers.  
Analyzing the imbalance that China has unwittingly created raises 
questions about the scope of the US-China aviation market and the 
implications for that market: how the US-China aviation market is defined; 
whether the US‘s close aviation relationship with Japan and Korea affects the 
US-China aviation market; and whether China should be concerned about the 
US‘s close aviation relationship with Japan and Korea. These questions are 
taken up below. 
 
5.5.1.1 Market Definition: “Relevant Market” in the Context of  
Competition Law 
Market definition is a critical stage in the structural analysis employed in 
many antitrust cases, including but not limited to cases involving mergers and 
acquisitions, to help assess actual or potential market power.
212
 The US DOJ 
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provides a formal distinction between ―market‖ and ―relevant market‖ in its 
Merger Guidelines: 
 
A market is defined as a product or group of products and a geographic 
area in which it is produced or sold such that a hypothetical profit-
maximizing firm, not subject to price regulation, that was the only 
present and future producer or seller of those products in that area likely 
would impose at least a ―small but significant and non-transitory‖ 
increase in price, assuming the terms of sale of all other products are 
held constant. A relevant market is a group of products and a geographic 




More specifically, the European Commission opined that a relevant 
market is composed of a relevant product market and a relevant geographic 
market. The EU Commission defined those concepts as follows: 
 
A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services 
which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer 
by reason of the products' characteristics, their prices and their intended 
use; 
A relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the firms 
concerned are involved in the supply of products or services and in 
which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous.
214
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The EU Commission made it clear that the key concept in identifying 
the relevant product/service market is substitutability. Put simply, whether one 
product or service can be replaced by another is a prime consideration in 
determining the relevant market for that product or service. Pertinent questions 
include what methods customers have for acquiring the desired product; what 
alternatives they have to that product; and whether those are good 
alternatives.
215
 Thus, substitutability concerns the possibility of a customer 
switching to alternative products that are already available on the market.
216
 
The relevant geographic market, the other component of defining a 
relevant market, is one in which external enterprises are unable to swiftly 
begin operations and customers are unable or unwilling to switch suppliers 
located outside the given area.
217
 While the relevant market in the context of 
competition law is usually defined both in terms of product and geography, 
these two dimensions are so closely related in the case of air transport that 
they are rarely discussed separately.
218
 Needless to say, the product/service of 
air transport is transporting passengers or cargo by aircraft from point A to 
point B. 
 
5.5.1.2 Relevant Market of Passenger Air Transport 
With respect to passenger air transport, the relevant market is 
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traditionally defined as each individual route connecting a point of origin to a 
point of destination (O&D city pair).
219
 When the US DOT uses traditional 
antitrust analysis to define relevant markets and measure concentration, it 
regards city pairs as relevant markets.
220
 This market definition reflects the 




The question of whether the traditional demand-side approach to 
defining the relevant market is still appropriate has been tested by the EU 
Commission.
222
 Essentially, the argument is that network effects (such as 
competition between airline hubs and between alliances) should be given more 
consideration in defining the relevant market.
223
 However, the EU 
Commission concluded that network competition was not sufficient to modify 
its traditional demand-based approach mainly because consumers continue to 
ask for transport service between two points.
224
 In addition, the demand-based 
O&D city pair approach has been applied in recent EU antitrust and merger 
cases as well as in EU Court decisions.
225
 Thus, it is safe to say that the 
relevant market for passenger air transport is still defined by the demand-
based O&D city pair. 
Shippers, too, send their cargo based on the O&D city pair formula. 
However, the relevant market for the air transport of cargo is different from 
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that of passengers for a number of reasons, including the fact that 1) cargo 
(except for perishable goods) is less time-sensitive than passengers, 2) 
physical inconvenience (e.g. the number of stops and the length of layovers) is 
not an important consideration, and 3) multi-modal transportation (e.g. 
combining air transport with trucking, train transport, and ship transport) is 
well-developed. Thus, the relevant market for the air transport of cargo is 
much wider than that of transportation of passengers.
226
 In a nutshell, in the 
air transport of cargo, various alternatives can substitute for each individual 
route connecting a point of origin to a point of destination. 
For the air transport of passengers, the alternatives are inherently limited. 
While cost (airfare) is an important consideration for both passengers and 
shippers, passengers are uniquely sensitive to total flight duration, 
convenience of departure/arrival times, the frequency of flights (and therefore 
flexibility in schedule), frequent flyer programs and corporate promotions, and 
quality of service (including airline reputation, presence of a flight bed, and so 
on).
227
 The scope of the relevant market can also be affected by the type of 
passenger (time-sensitive passengers versus price-oriented passengers) and 
airport substitutability (only one airport in a catchment area versus two or 
more airports serving the relevant point of origin or point of destination). 
Some one-stop flights that can compete with non-stop flights are 
included in the relevant market for long-haul flights. The European 
Commission provided specific conditions for being part of the relevant market, 
in particular a connection time of no longer than 150 minutes: 
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With respect to long-haul flights the Commission has found … that 
indirect flights constitute a competitive alternative to non-stop services 
under certain conditions in particular when they are marketed as 
connecting flights on an origin and destination (O&D) pair in the 
computer reservation systems, they operate on a daily basis and they 





Along with the connection time, the direction of flight is obviously 
crucial to ensure that the total traveling time of a one-stop flight is only 
marginally longer than the flight time of the non-stop flight. In the case of a 
joint venture among British Airways, American Airlines, and Iberia Líneas 
Aéreas de España (BA/AA/IB case), the European Commission, which was 
examining trans-Atlantic routes to and from London, concluded that one-stop 
services via continental European hubs were only remote substitutes for non-
stop services because they required backtracking.
229
 Accordingly, it is safe to 
say that daily one-stop flights that do not substantially deviate from the 
direction of the non-stop route with less than 150 minutes of connection time 
can be included in the relevant market of passenger air transport. 
 
5.5.1.3 China-US Market for Passenger Air Transport 
Considering that relevant markets in air transport are defined for each 
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 European Commission, Case COMP/39.596 – BA/AA/IB (14 July 2010) at 6, online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39596/39596_4342_9.pdf >.  
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individual route, it is essential to know which routes (that is, city pairs) are the 
major markets in the larger China-US market and to see whether there are one-
stop flights that can be included in the relevant market. The largest China-US 
O&D markets are Shanghai-Los Angeles, Beijing-San Francisco, Shanghai-
San Francisco, Beijing-Los Angeles, Beijing-New York (JFK), and Shanghai-
New York (JFK).
230
 Interestingly, the four largest China-US O&D markets 
have competitive indirect flights via Korea or Japan, which can be regarded as 
relevant markets. In other words, the geography of Korea and Japan means 
that no backtracking and less than 150 minutes of connection time are required 
for passengers traveling the four largest China-US O&D markets. 
Route US and Chinese 
Non-Stop Carriers 
on China-US Routes 
Korean and Japanese 
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Table 5-12 The Largest China-US O&D Markets (2015 Winter Schedule)  
It is likely that more competitive one-stop flights on China-US routes 
will be arranged in the future. Benefiting from larger combined networks and 
passenger pools and more attractive pricing, AA/JAL and United/ANA (as 
well as possibly Delta/KAL) could strengthen their competitiveness in the 
China-US market to the possible detriment of Chinese carriers.
231
 In addition, 
airlines that are partners in joint ventures can work together to reduce the 
connection time for Chinese passengers at their hub airports. 
All things considered, Korea and Japan are currently and will remain a 
relevant market in the context of the China-US market, and particularly in the 
US West Coast market (e.g. Los Angeles and San Francisco). Hence, as the 
US‘s closer aviation ties with Japan and Korea make one-stop flights via their 
hub airports more competitive, this will slowly but surely have an impact on 
the US-China aviation market. 
 
5.5.2 Impact on Chinese Aviation Policy 
Generally, in order for the divide-and-conquer strategy to work 
effectively, two conditions are required: 1) the smaller state that made the open 
skies agreement and the target state must be in the relevant market, and 2) the 
smaller state should be able to provide direct substitutes rather than remote 
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For instance, since Germany and the Netherlands are in the relevant 
market for transatlantic routes to and from Frankfurt, Amsterdam Airport 
Schiphol is a direct substitute. However, for non-stop services between the UK 
and the US, Schiphol and Frankfurt are only remote substitutes because of 
their geographical disadvantage. These factors could explain why it took only 
four years for the US to convince Germany to agree to an open skies 
agreement after reaching an open skies agreement with the Netherlands, its 
first in Europe, in 1992, while it took 15 years to do the same with the UK. 
Looking at trans-Pacific routes to and from China, it is clear that Korea 
and Japan are in the relevant market and provide direct substitutes. In these 
circumstances, China cannot ignore the fact that the US has closer aviation ties 
with Japan and Korea. Through open skies agreements with Japan and Korea 
as well as joint ventures with Japanese carriers and Korean carriers involving 
substitutable one-stop flights, US carriers can capture a larger portion of the 
US-China air passenger market than they currently do with their limited direct 
third/fourth freedom flights. Indeed, there is limited capacity under the current 
US-China bilateral agreement.
233
 Not only are the US-Japan and US-Korea 
markets both enormously important in their own right, both states are also 
strategically located for the US-China air passenger market. 
At the same time, the US‘s close aviation relationships with Japan and 
Korea give Chinese carriers an incentive to establish joint ventures with US 
carriers. Conceivably, US carriers‘ trans-Pacific joint ventures with Japanese 
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and Korean partners could be part of the US government‘s plan to use the 
divide-and-conquer approach to induce China to accept an open skies 
agreement. 
Given the circumstances, China has three possible courses of action. 
First is doing nothing, taking a wait-and-see approach. On 25 December 2014, 
CAAC Director General Li Jiaxiang said Air China had become the largest 
carrier in the China-US market, ending the "domination" of US carriers.
234
 
Although this claim was based on the number of US destinations while other 
metrics (such as frequency and capacity) showed that the US‘s United Airlines 
remains the largest carrier, it is true that the China-US market is becoming 
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Thus, China could opt not to discuss any trans-Pacific joint ventures 
while focusing on increasing its market share. China has long been sensitive to 
foreign carriers having a higher share of traffic, and this imbalance has worked 
against efforts to expand air service agreements.
237
 Now that Chinese airlines‘ 
market share is on the rise, the Chinese government may just wait until its 
carriers, and especially Air China, notice a capacity shortage before agreeing 
to increase bilateral third/fourth freedom capacity with the US. Even then, it 
may do so on a piecemeal, incremental basis instead of agreeing to a ―big bang‖ 
open skies approach that instantly opens up all third/fourth freedom capacity. 
China‘s second option is to consider joint ventures with US carriers. 
Indeed, Alan Tan argued that Chinese carriers should enter into joint venture 
agreements with US alliance partners, since this would help to neutralize any 
competitive advantage provided by alliances between JAL and AA, ANA and 
UA, and KAL and Delta.
238
 He further predicted that consideration of joint 
venture agreements with US airlines would be the decisive catalyst in 
changing China‘s attitude toward open skies with the US.239 
Interestingly, joint ventures with foreign carriers are booming in China. 
In 2014 alone, Air China agreed to establish joint ventures with Air Canada, 
Air New Zealand, and Lufthansa, while China Eastern and Qantas agreed to 
establish one as well.
240
 The details of these new joint ventures are currently 
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 However, none of them appear to be metal neutral joint 
ventures. 
If Air China, China‘s ―favorite child,‖ sees an opportunity to establish a 
metal neutral joint venture with a US carrier (most likely its global alliance 
partner United Airlines), the CAAC may consider making an open skies 
agreement with the US in exchange for antitrust immunity for the joint venture. 
Last but not least, Chinese carriers could reconsider their relationship with 
Northeast Asian carriers. Northeast Asian carriers have never tried—or even 
considered the possibility of trying—close cooperation. Presumably, a lack of 
regional cooperation on a state level has made Northeast Asian airlines 
reluctant to explore closer relationships. 
Because of their geographical location, Japan and Korea are natural 
gateways for traffic between Asia and North America. However, and for the 
same geographical reasons, China‘s major airlines and airports are well 
positioned to be Asia‘s gateway to Europe, including connecting traffic 
originating from or destined for Korea and Japan via its major hubs (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu).
242
 Indeed, Chinese carriers have a 
stronger service network to Europe than their Japanese and Korean 
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Number of Destinations 
in Europe 
20  7  12  
Weekly Frequency 219  88  82  
Weekly Seats 54,801  18,151  23,778  
Number of Airlines 4  2  2  




Hence, there is a way, albeit not a perfect one, to balance the 
geographical advantages and disadvantages. This approach, of course, cannot 
mean ―equal‖ benefits. The gains that Korean and Japanese carriers could 
receive from the US-China market, the most lucrative country-to-country 
aviation market in the world, would be bigger than those that Chinese carriers 
could receive from the Europe-Korea/Japan market. More importantly, there is 
much less competition on the US-China market while there is strong 
competition from formidable Middle Eastern carriers in the Europe-
Korea/Japan market. 
However, it is important to note that the Europe-Japan and the Europe-
Korea markets are very sizable. Indeed, in terms of the total number of 
passengers, the Europe-Japan market was bigger than the US-China market in 
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2014. Furthermore, the Europe-Korea market is about 60 percent of the US-
China market, which is significant given the huge population gap between 
China (1.4 billion) and Korea (50 million). In other words, it would be 
possible to offset the geographical advantages that Japan and Korea enjoy in 
the China-US market if Chinese carriers became more competitive in the 
Europe-Korea/Japan markets. The numbers of passengers in these markets are 
detailed in the table below. 
 
Market  China-US Japan-Europe Korea-Europe 
Route A China→US Japan→Europe Korea→Europe 
B US→China Europe→Japan Europe→Korea 
Number of 
passengers who 
traveled either  













Setting aside rigorous calculations about individual benefits, Chinese 
carriers could consider (and even suggest) much closer relations with their 
alliance partners in Korea or Japan. For example, the three Star Alliance 
members in Northeast Asia (Air China, Asiana Airlines, and ANA) could 
strengthen their relationship, including a revenue-sharing agreement. In this 
way, the Star Alliance partners could co-operate internally and compete with 
other alliance partners subject to the government‘s review of competition law. 
Notably, Star Alliance is the only global alliance that includes airlines from all 
three countries. 
A more commercially viable combination is China Southern and Korean 
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Air because of their hub airports (Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport and 
Incheon International Airport) that are not being constrained by slots and their 
wide networks (China Southern in India, Southern Europe, Africa, and 
Oceania and Korean Air in North America). As Skyteam partners, they have 
already built a relatively solid partnership. 
Either way, the development and impact of airline alliances in the 
Northeast Asian market will change the status quo, and China will eventually 
have to re-evaluate its view of open skies agreements with the US, Japan, and 




This chapter has explored various aspects of airline alliances. Analyses 
not only of aviation law but also of competition law were conducted to ensure 
a thorough examination of airline alliances. Throughout, a strong case has 
been made for the important role of airline alliances in the discussion of open 
skies agreements. Clearly, the ongoing development of airline alliances in the 
Northeast Asian market has an enormous potential to reshape the discussion of 
Northeast Asian open skies. 
In Chapter 6: Towards Northeast Asian Open Skies: Liberalization by 
the Airline Industry and States, the final chapter of this thesis, I will present 
my key findings and propose institutional, legal, and policy approaches for 




Chapter 6: Towards Northeast Asian Open Skies: 
Liberalization by the Airline Industry and States 
 
6.1 Theoretical Findings 
The object of this thesis has been to explore the central issues underlying 
Northeast Asian open skies from a multi-dimensional perspective. This thesis 
began with two primary goals. The first was to analyze market access and 
ownership and control restrictions in Northeast Asia and to propose the 
approaches and steps that need to be taken to achieve Northeast Asian open 
skies (a specific proposal is provided in section 6.3 Action Plans for Northeast 
Asian Open Skies). The second was to challenge the orthodox position that 
intergovernmental agreements are the sole factor determining the degree of air 
transport liberalization. 
The previous chapters contained a comprehensive discussion of market 
access and ownership and control liberalization through the regional and 
bilateral approaches with a focus on Northeast Asia. This study also alluded to 
the emerging role of airlines, arguing that they themselves can have a 
substantial impact on liberalization. Indeed, airlines have become active 
reformers of government regulations rather than merely passive subjects of 
those regulations. 
In the broader discourse of regulation, the role of private actors in 
governance powers has received special attention in recent academic literature, 
particularly in topics related to transnational private regulation (TPR).
1
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 For instance, Journal of Law and Society published a special issue on The Challenge of 
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Although an in-depth discussion of TPR is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
worth examining the thrust of TPR arguments in order to better understand the 
influence of airlines in the context of the broader discussion about the role of 
non-state actors. 
The concept of TPR emerged to express the idea of governance regimes 
that take the form of coalitions of non-state actors.
2
 The view of TPR scholars 
is that while governance powers were traditionally considered the prerogative 
of the state, those powers have shifted towards non-governmental bodies, 
including industry actors.
3
 Globalization, market liberalization, and economic 
integration have been described as powerful drivers of TPR.
4
 
TPR differs fundamentally from traditional international regulations 
mainly because rule making is not based on states‘ legislation.5 Indeed, TPR 
emphasizes the role of the state as a ―rule taker‖ as opposed to a ―rule 
maker.‖6 However, this does not mean that TPR disregards formal sources of 
rules (e.g. national legislation and international treaties). Fabrizio Cafaggi, a 
leading authority on TPR, asserts that ―when international treaties are in place, 
private regulation acts as a complement to specify rules and it tailors them to 
specific markets and formal or informal delegation take place.‖7 
TPR initially developed as regulation of a specific sector.
8
 Clearly, the 
discussion of economic air transport liberalization does not appear to be 
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 Ibid. at 42-43. 
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 The environment, financial markets, technical standards, food safety, and e-commerce are 
some areas in which the systems of TPR play important roles. See OECD, supra note 4 at 14.  
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directly connected to the scope of TPR. Nevertheless, the TPR approach 
provides a useful framework for understanding the larger picture of how 
airlines (one example of non-state actors) reform regulations, either directly or 
indirectly. 
There is at least one clear implication of TPR: namely, that the orthodox 
position that the level of deregulation (or liberalization) is solely determined 
by intergovernmental agreements is inadequate for understanding the bigger 
picture of air transport liberalization. Rather, airlines should be seen as key 
non-state actors that wield enormous power and influence over the process by 
which regulation regimes are formed. 
More concretely, there are three respects in which airlines are involved 
in reforming regulations. First is the airlines‘ ability to lobby for the 
liberalization of air services agreements. Air services negotiations can result in 
the revision of air services agreements. Although air services negotiations are, 
by definition, intergovernmental negotiations, they are normally initiated by 
one or more airlines from one or both states. When airlines feel the need to 
expand the degree of market access, they urge their respective governments to 
re-negotiate air services agreements. It is common for airlines in the same 
state to have conflicting positions. (For instance, one airline could prefer the 
status quo, while others want carriers and capacity to be expanded). However, 
if none of the national airlines want to expand market access, the air services 
negotiations are unlikely to succeed. 
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Figure 6-1 The Influence of Airlines on Liberalizing Air Services Agreements 
 
Crudely put, states typically liberalize their markets when it is in the 
benefit of their national carriers, including the traditional flag carriers and the 
newer low-cost carriers. Conversely, states generally do not open their markets 
when their carriers are not interested in liberalization. For public policy 




Although the benefits of air transport liberalization for consumers and 
the economy as a whole are widely acknowledged,
10
 its benefits for national 
airlines are still the real driver of liberalization, at least in Asia. Although 
states are becoming less defensive of national airlines in general, air services 
negotiations continue to be airline-centric.
11
 Nonetheless, a fundamentally 
important point in recent years is that national airlines include not only 
incumbent carriers but also newly established ones, and particularly low-cost 
carriers (LCCs). 
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The success of national LCCs is likely to convince self-interested 
governments that open skies agreements make their airlines better off. Strictly 
speaking, most of these LCCs are not state-owned companies (that is, the 
government holds no share in them). That said, government policy makers 
tend to regard the interest of carriers owned and operated by their nationals as 
being within the ambit of the national interest. 
As emphasized in previous chapters, the role of LCCs in Northeast Asia 
cannot be underestimated. LCCs have already been a major driving force for 
liberalizing market access and ownership and control restrictions in Southeast 
Asia, and they are beginning to do the same in Northeast Asia as well.
12
  
Indeed, the second way in which airlines reform regulations is through 
inventing new business models. Although cross-border mergers through 
holding companies that have been formed in other parts of the world have yet 
to appear in Asia, the joint venture LCC model is booming on the continent 
(see Chapter 2 and Chapter 4). 
Admittedly, this new form of business model requires the government‘s 
support in the form of mitigating effective control requirements. Despite the 
existing legal barriers (namely, market access restrictions and ownership and 
control restrictions), creative airlines have used transnational business models 
like joint ventures to acquire de facto seventh freedom and cabotage rights. 
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 See Chapter 3, sections 3.2.2.2 Promoting LCCs (For China); 3.2.3.3 Promoting LCCs (For 
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Figure 6-2 Airlines‘ New Business Model for De Facto Liberalization 
 
Alliances are the third and perhaps the most powerful way for airlines to 
reform regulations. An alliance is a private contract between airlines. This 
private law model of governance has a significant effect on air services 
negotiations. This is largely because airline alliances can be initiatives by 
national carriers from both state parties to a bilateral air services agreement. 
While aggressive efforts to liberalize a market by one airline supported by its 
government can be blocked by the other negotiating partners (the other 
government and national carriers), a campaign to liberalize the market in 
support of an integrated airline alliance for the national carriers of both states 
is likely to be welcomed. 
Indeed, Havel and Sanchez argue that ―the alliances have shifted the 
rules of the game for air services negotiations.‖13 As discussed in Chapter 5, 
airlines alliances have had a powerful impact on air services agreements. 
Antitrust immunity for airline alliances has been a strong incentive for open 
skies in the trans-Atlantic market and, more recently, the trans-Pacific market. 
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This sequence represents ―an alternative account of legal change.‖14 
 
Figure 6-3 How Airline Alliances Affect Liberalization 
 
With this new perspective on the role of airlines and particularly of 
airline alliances, section 6.2 Ongoing Regional Liberalization in Northeast 
Asia will recap the main arguments and set out the major findings of this 
thesis. Section 6.3 Action Plans for Northeast Asian Open Skies, the crux of 
this chapter, will provide prescriptive analyses of Northeast Asian open skies. 
More specifically, section 6.3 Action Plans for Northeast Asian Open Skies 
will propose short-term (2020), mid-term (2025), and long-term (2030) steps 
for achieving Northeast Asian open skies. Lastly, 6.4 Conclusion will bring 
this thesis to an end. 
 
6.2 Ongoing Regional Liberalization in Northeast Asia 
These research findings provide several justifications for regional 
liberalization. Some empirical studies have found that liberalizing air transport 
has a strongly positive impact on the economy, society, and the individual. 




Regional liberalization, which typically has closed membership for various 
reasons (such as a political and economic union, physical proximity, and so 
on), was the focus of this study, as opposed to global multilateral liberalization 
and bilateral liberalization. 
Various regional liberalization models (namely, the EU SAM, ASEAN 
SAM, the Australia-New Zealand SAM, APEC‘s MALIAT, regional 
agreements in the League of Arab States, regional and sub-regional 
agreements in Latin America, the Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement, and 
regional agreements in Africa) were discussed to explicate the similarities and 
differences of these models. In doing so, I sought to find principles that can be 
applied to Northeast Asian open skies and the lessons to be learned from these 
models of liberalization. 
The important aero-political finding is that bigger markets with less 
competitive national airlines (e.g. Indonesia in ASEAN, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia among the Arab states, Brazil in Latin America, and Nigeria in Africa) 
are resistant to the trend of regional liberalization because they have more to 
lose than to gain in their respective regional liberalization groups. Dealing 
with deeply embedded aero-political complications is a major obstacle to 
successful regional liberalization. 
Northeast Asia is no exception. It is undeniable that China (more 
precisely, Chinese airlines, and particularly the ―Big Three‖ state-owned 
airlines) has more to lose than Japan and Korea combined in the context of 
Northeast Asian open skies. In particular, China is concerned that Northeast 
Asian open skies that entail generous or unlimited third and fourth freedom 
rights  (thereby resulting in generous or unlimited sixth freedom rights) 
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would enable Japanese and Korean carriers to use Tokyo and Incheon as 
gateway hubs from China to North America and vice versa, the most lucrative 
aviation market. 
This is why regional liberalization in Northeast Asia remains at a 
preliminary discussion stage at an intergovernmental level. Although bilateral 
air services agreements among the three states have been relaxed to some 
degree, we have yet to see any compromises made or substantial results 
achieved involving Northeast Asian open skies. 
Nevertheless, there are convincing reasons to pursue open skies in 
Northeast Asia. First and foremost, China, Korea, and Japan rely heavily on 
each other‘s markets and influence each other in significant ways; second, 
aviation blocs are emerging or have already emerged in most regions of the 
world and these may form competitive threats if the three countries are not 
united on the issue; third, the three countries already have in place many 
trilateral consultative mechanisms on various matters; fourth, Northeast Asia is 
one of the few regions where a stable, developed economy coexists with 
enormous potential for economic growth; and lastly, national carriers are by 
and large becoming more competitive and LCCs are growing quickly in 
Northeast Asia. 
In addition, a multi-dimensional perspective is required to predict the 
future of Northeast Asian open skies. In particular, changes in China-US 
aviation diplomacy should be taken into consideration. There are encouraging 
signs that China will become more flexible in its negotiations with the US for 
the open skies agreement: the China-US market is becoming more balanced; 
the US is relaxing its visa rules for Chinese nationals; and joint ventures with 
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foreign carriers are booming in China, which could lead to joint ventures 
between Chinese airlines and US airlines. If China and the US adopt an open 
skies agreement, Chinese and US carriers will operate many direct flights 
between China and the US, significantly reducing China‘s concern about 
losing passengers transferring at Tokyo or Seoul.  
A more important factor is the role of airlines in the discourse of 
Northeast Asian open skies. From the perspective of traditional public law, 
regulatory changes in Northeast Asia have been markedly slow. This new 
perspective on the role of airlines, however, suggests that dynamic 
liberalization has already started in Northeast Asia. Indeed, Northeast Asian 
airlines are in the process of reforming regulations. Matched with the findings 
discussed in section 6.1, airlines‘ lobbying power, the innovative business 
model of LCCs, and airline alliances are actively promoting regional 
liberalization in Northeast Asia. 
Airlines‘ lobbying power, which leads to expanding market access, 
continues to grow in Northeast Asia. As the number of airlines in Northeast 
Asia increases, the market share of these new airlines grows. For now, newly 
established airlines can only fly on routes that are under-utilized under the 
relevant air services agreements. However, new airlines will eventually hope 
to fly new routes that can only be opened up by air services negotiations. This 
will push for liberalization of market access. 
While the Northeast Asian market has long been dominated by seven 
major airlines (namely, Air China, China Eastern, China Southern, Korean Air, 
Asiana Airlines, Japan Airlines, and All Nippon Airlines), the growth of LCCs 
is indisputable. Although incumbent airlines continue to check the 
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development of LCCs, the attitude of Northeast Asian governments toward 
LCCs (and especially their own LCCs) has shifted in their favor. Witnessing 
the success of LCCs in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asian states hope to develop 
their own LCCs (that is, LCCs that are majority-owned and effectively 
controlled by their nationals). 
In addition, from a long-term perspective, the development of LCCs 
does not necessarily conflict with sustainable growth of incumbent carriers. 
Although the media normally focuses on the market share of each airline, a 
more important factor for airlines is their actual growth. In other words, as 
long as the total pie grows, the importance of their market share is secondary. 
Even when their market share decreases, their total revenue can increase year-
on-year, provided that the volume of the total market increases. 
But regardless, the age of LCCs will come to Northeast Asia. The table 
below provides profiles of the current Northeast Asian LCCs.  
 
Table 6-1 Profiles of Northeast Asian Low-Cost Carriers
15
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Close attention should be paid to China‘s Spring Airlines, the largest 
LCC in Northeast Asia. With 41 aircraft in 2015, the airline plans to have 100 
by 2020.
16
 In January 2015, Spring Airlines became the first LCC to be listed 
in China.
17
 In addition, while the operating margins of Northeast Asia‘s LCCs 
have generally been in positive territory due to their increasing popularity in 





Figure 6-4 Selected Northeast Asian LCCs‘ Operating Margin19 
 
It is worth repeating that the rapid development of national LCCs helped 
change governments‘ mindset toward regional liberalization in ASEAN. The 
success of Malaysia-based AirAsia led to policy changes in Malaysia, which 
                                                                                                              
Liberalisation: The Case of North East Asia, Discussion Paper No 2015-03, International 
Transport Forum (Paris: OECD, 2015) at 24. 
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had been much less enthusiastic about regional liberalization.
20
 As discussed 
in section 3.4.2 The Role of LCCs, the relationship between LCCs and 
liberalization is bi-directional. While the liberalization of market access has 
facilitated the growth of LCCs, LCCs themselves also promote policy reform 
and liberalization by pressing regulators to provide access to more 
international routes. 
Furthermore, Spring Airlines is the first Northeast Asian LCC that has 
successfully managed to establish a business presence outside its own territory 
through JV arrangements with local investors (that is, Spring Airlines Japan).
21
 
As discussed in section 2.3.3 Benefits of the ASEAN SAM, these business 
models are commonplace in Southeast Asia, pioneered by the likes of AirAsia, 
Lion Air, Jetstar, Tigerair, and Vietjet. 
One interesting hypothesis is about the possibility of Spring Airlines 
launching a joint venture in Korea. As noted, the Korean government has 
applied the effective control restriction strictly, rejecting JVs proposed by 
Tiger Airways (Singapore) and AirAsia (Malaysia).
22
 But if Spring Airlines 
approaches Korea in the context of liberalization discourse, the Korean 
authorities might reach a different conclusion. For instance, if the Chinese 
government supports the idea of ―Spring Airlines Korea‖ and promises to 
liberalize market access between China and Korea, Korea may have to 
reconsider its position on effective control restriction. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the relevant government body can exercise wide discretion in interpreting 
                                           
20
 Peter Forsyth, John King & Cherry Lyn Rodolfo, ―Open skies in ASEAN‖ (2006) 12 
Journal of Air Transport Management 143 at 150. 
21
 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.3 Japan. 
22





Lastly, airline alliances are becoming a powerful way to reform 
regulations. As noted, airline alliances with various degrees of density, 
geography, and membership are appearing in Northeast Asia. While the focus 
has been on the trans-Pacific market and the Europe-Asia market, Northeast 
Asian carriers may create more sophisticated kinds of alliances among 
themselves once they become familiar with advanced forms of alliances. Such 
new alliance between Northeast Asian airlines will be a tipping point in 
Northeast Asian open skies. 
Despite the role of airlines as a regulation reformer, it must be 
recognized that it is ultimately public regulation that internalizes and 
formalizes these non-state actors‘ involvement in revising regulations from the 
bottom up. It is clear that liberalization without an institutional and legal 
framework is unstable. Liberalization led by airlines can complement, but not 
replace, liberalization implemented through the formal actions of states.  
While airline-led liberalization is an important source of air transport 
liberalization, only state-led liberalization can guarantee stable and concrete 
changes. Hence, three forms of state-led liberalization—institutional 
framework, legal reforms and policy liberalization—are needed to make 
Northeast Asian open skies a reality. 
 
6.3 Action Plans for Northeast Asian Open Skies 
6.3.1 Institutional Framework 
Comparative studies of various models for regional liberalization make a 
convincing case for the importance of institutions. The EU, a regional group 
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with strong institutions, was able to achieve liberalized market access, relax 
ownership and control regulations, and make unified external policies. In 
contrast, the fact that ASEAN does not have strong institutions led to the 
starkly different outcomes of the EU Single Aviation Market and the ASEAN 
Single Aviation Market. 
In order to make regional liberalization work, there should be either a 
central organization that coordinates and reconciles the member states‘ 
political will or, at the very least, an aviation cooperation group that can devise 
a master plan for aviation policy. Obviously, China, Japan, and Korea at 
present have neither a central organization nor an aviation cooperation group. 
Historically, there has been little cooperation among China, Japan, and 
Korea. In terms of high-level cooperation, the ASEAN Plus Three (China, 
Japan, and Korea) Summit provided a unique opportunity for the leaders of the 
three countries to meet annually. The 1st Trilateral Summit was held in 1999 
during the ASEAN Plus Three Summit. The trilateral meeting formally 
separated itself from the ASEAN Plus Three process and acquired its own 
identity in December 2008.
23
 
At the 3rd trilateral summit in Jeju, Korea, in May 2010, the three 
countries adopted the Memorandum on the Establishment of the Trilateral 
Cooperation Secretariat and decided to set up an office in Korea by the end of 
2011. After each of the three governments signed and ratified the Agreement 
on the Establishment of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in 2010, the 
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) was officially inaugurated in Seoul in 
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Unfortunately, soon after the TCS was established, relations between 
China and Japan rapidly chilled mainly due to a territorial dispute between 
China and Japan over some uninhabited islands (Diaoyu in Chinese and 
Senkaku in Japanese). The subsequent political tensions kept the trilateral 
cooperation represented by the TCS from gaining momentum. Thus far, the 
role of the TCS is limited, and the scope of trilateral cooperation under the 
TCS remains uncertain. 
Notwithstanding the fluctuating political tensions, it is undeniable that 
the three states regard each other as important economic partners and share the 
goal of promoting peace and prosperity in the region. These political tensions 
will not fundamentally reverse the movement towards cooperation. The three 
states should prepare for a cooling-off period and, in this regard, the role of the 
TCS should not be underestimated.  
The TCS is a regional organization supported by all three governments 
that is based on a treaty, namely, the Agreement on the Establishment of the 
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat.
25
 Thus, it provides a legitimate platform 
for cooperation among the three states. 
Under the Agreement on the Establishment on the Trilateral Cooperation 
Secretariat, the TCS‘s functions are, inter alia, to ―explore and identify 
potential cooperative projects among the Parties, and report those projects to 
the relevant consultative mechanisms for adoption.‖26 Furthermore, the TCS 
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aims to serve in the future as a hub for trilateral cooperation across a broad 
spectrum of sectors.
27
 Thus, as an initial stage, the TCS could discuss regional 
aviation cooperation given the cumulative impact that air transport has on 
trilateral cooperation. Moving forward, the TCS could provide an institutional 
framework for regional liberalization in Northeast Asia. 
Another potential institutional platform is the China-Japan-Korea 
Ministerial Conference on Transport and Logistics, which has been held every 
two years since 2006.
28
 Although its initial focus was maritime transport 
logistics, the scope of the conference has expanded to cover other modes of 
transportation including air transportation.  
Since the three countries share the common goals of reducing the cost of 
logistics and enhancing product competitiveness so as to promote their 
respective economic development,
29
 regional liberalization in the cargo 
market should receive relatively strong support. To make discussion more 
effective, the conference should take place more frequently (annually at least), 
and the agenda should cover not just cargo air transport but also passenger air 
transport. 
It is worth recalling that the regular meetings of the ASEAN transport 
ministers gave birth to the concept of the ASEAN Single Aviation Market, and 
the Action Plan for ASEAN Air Transport Integration and Liberalization 
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 See Northeast Asia Logistics Information Service Network (NEAL-NET), Press Release, 
―The 4th China-Japan-Korea Ministerial Conference on Transport and Logistics Held in 




2005–2015 (Action Plan for ASEAN) and the Roadmap for Integration of the 
Air Travel Sector (RIATS) were finally adopted at the 10th meeting of the 
ASEAN transport ministers in 2004.
30
  
The Action Plan set the long-term goal of ASEAN regional 
liberalization, while the RIATS identified specific goals and target dates. 
These documents laid out the broad policies that led to the eventual adoption 
of the ASEAN multilateral agreements relating to aviation: namely, the 2009 
Multilateral Agreement on Air Services (MAAS)
31
, the 2009 Multilateral 
Agreement for Full Liberalization of Air Freight Services (MAFLAFS)
32
, and 
the 2010 Multilateral Agreement for Full Liberalization of Passenger Air 
Services (MAFLPAS).
33
 In essence, MAAS, MAFLAFS and MAFLPAS are 
the backbone of the ASEAN Single Aviation Market. 
The lesson to be learned from ASEAN is that a robust framework and 
concrete timeline are necessary for Northeast Asian open skies. The fact that 
ASEAN used a concrete action plan to push ahead regional liberalization 
within an institutional framework was instrumental in achieving meaningful 
results. Needless to say, the action plan for Northeast Asian open skies can 
only be formulated by a legally binding international treaty, which is to say, an 
air services agreement of some form or other. In ASEAN regional 
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 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalisation of Air Freight Services, done at 




  ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Full Liberalisation of Passenger Air Services, done at 




liberalization, RIATS was successfully incorporated into the above-mentioned 
formal legal agreements for ASEAN member states to accept. 
 
6.3.2 Legal Reforms 
6.3.2.1 Overview 
With regard to the format of the legal reform, either the bilateral 
approach or the trilateral approach is possible because there are only three 
parties involved. The bilateral approach puts a greater emphasis on bilateral air 
service agreements among the three countries. In other words, this entails 
establishing three bilateral open skies agreements between China and Korea, 
Korea and Japan, and Japan and China. The creation of a regional 
liberalization regime on a bilateral basis could lead to the formation of 
Northeast Asian open skies if each of the bilateral agreements were similarly 
broad and ambitious.  
However, the bilateral approach lacks a systematic and coherent 
approach. If one bilateral agreement is less broad than the other two bilateral 
agreements, there would no longer be symmetry. Indeed, this is the current 
situation in Northeast Asia (that is, three separate and asymmetric bilateral air 
services agreements). 
The trilateral approach involves a centralized regional approach. This 
would require a new air services agreement to which all three states are parties. 
The trilateral approach would be more effective than the bilateral approach for 
phasing in gradual changes.  
In ASEAN, the 2009 Multilateral Agreement on Air Services (MAAS) 
provided a step-by-step approach by laying out several implementing 
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protocols that aimed to ease the liberalization of market access in the region. 
In Northeast Asia, a trilateral agreement on air services (TAAS), as I will call 
it, could be considered. If adopted, this TAAS would lay out similar 
implementing protocols that aim to ease the liberalization of market access. 
It is worth noting that the ASEAN model of agreements carries the risk 
of adopting the relevant agreements and then having to wait (often for a 
substantial amount of time) for a state to ratify them. For instance, although 
Protocol 5 on Unlimited Third and Fourth Freedom Traffic Rights between 
ASEAN Capital Cities (one of the six implementing protocols to MAAS) was 
adopted on 20 May 2009 in Manila, the Philippines (the hosting state for the 
signing of the agreement) has not ratified it yet. In addition, there was a 5-year 
gap between Singapore, which ratified the protocol first, and Indonesia, which 
ratified it the most recently (see the table below).     
No State Date 
1 Brunei Darussalam 30 March 2010 
2 Cambodia 5 May 2011 
3 Indonesia 5 June 2014 
4 Lao PDR 17 March 2011 
5 Malaysia 23 January 2010 
6 Myanmar 1 July 2011 
7 Philippines Not Ratified 
8 Singapore 3 July 2009 
9 Thailand 13 October 2009 
10 Vietnam 22 December 2009 




Notably, the Trilateral Agreement on Air Services (TAAS) would 
involve less risk of delay arising from ratifications since there are only three 
member states, unlike ASEAN, which consists of ten states. However, all three 
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of the states need to be firmly committed to the policy before they actually 
adopt the TAAS. In other words, the three states should adopt an agreement 
that each of them can and will ratify promptly. Otherwise, the TASS could also 
face a long delay by one member state. 
Indeed, a state‘s policy decisions are the key at the initial stage. The 
ASEAN MAAS was based on the goals set out in the Action Plan for ASEAN 
Air Transport Integration and Liberalization 2005–2015 and RIATS. Adopting 
the Action Plan and the RIATS was a policy decision by ASEAN member 
states based on their calculation of national interests. In other words, the 
ASEAN states, to greater and lesser degrees, believed that the ASEAN Single 
Aviation Market would make them all better off. 
Thus, the roadmap for Northeast Asian open skies must instill the 
confidence that Northeast Asian open skies will make states (more specifically, 
their national carriers and their citizens) better off. While the benefits of 
Northeast Asian open skies are clear for Korea and Japan (the Chinese market 
will provide enormous business opportunities for their carriers), China is 
worried that Northeast Asian open skies will divert more of the direct China-
US traffic through Korea or Japan, and vice versa. Indeed, it is no secret that 
Chinese suspicions about Japanese and Korean sixth freedom operations are 
the greatest impediment to Northeast Asian open skies. 
Taking into consideration China‘s reasonable concerns, one option to 
consider would be giving preferential access to Chinese carriers. In this 
scenario, Chinese carriers would be allowed market access for a certain period 
before Korean and Japanese carriers could enjoy the same rights. (See the 
following sections for proposals to give Chinese airlines a head start on 
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liberalization.) 
An idealist might object to such preferential treatment based on the 
noble idea that ―all states are equal.‖ But in the real world, aero-political 
considerations must be acknowledged. That is to say, the Chinese market is 
much bigger than that of Korea and Japan. In addition, although the principle 
of equality under international law is firmly recognized regardless of a state‘s 
size, population, or political importance, this equality does not mean that all 
states are equal in power, wealth, and capability.
35
 
Moreover, preferential relaxation of market access was used in the 
Canada-US open skies agreement of 1995 and, more recently, in the 
Memorandum of Understanding to the Air Services Agreement between China 
and Korea in 2006 with regard to the fifth freedom.
36
 In addition, it is worth 
noting that preferential relaxation of market access was discussed at the 1st 
International Symposium on Liberalizing Air Transport in Northeast Asia in 




Tae Hoon Oum, the keynote speaker at the symposium, held up the 
Canada-US open skies agreement of 1995 as a template for the preferential 
relaxation of market access and suggested negotiations focusing on sharing 
and distributing gains and losses for all parties in Northeast Asia.
38
 He added 
that creating a ―positive-sum game‖ (that is, mutually beneficial gains) is the 
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key to Northeast Asian open skies.
39
 
Although the annual trilateral symposiums ended in 2010 without 
producing solid results due to the disparities of the three countries‘ positions, it 
is important to recall that the symposium originally began as a forum for 
government authorities and academics from the three countries to meet 
together and engage in comprehensive and practical discussion.
40
 
Above is the background of the following proposal for Northeast Asian 
open skies, which includes short-term (2020), mid-term (2025), and long term 
(2030) stages. During the development of this proposal, careful consideration 
was given to the following questions: what is needed; what the barriers are; 
what factors are changing, both internally and externally; what can be done; 
and what cannot be done. 
Specifically, I suggest adopting the Trilateral Agreement on Air Services 
(TAAS), which consists of one mother treaty and four implementing protocols 
(see the table below). The details of each protocol, including the timeline, are 
explained in the following sections.  
 
Protocol Scope 
Protocol 1 On Unlimited Third and Fourth Freedom Traffic Rights 
between the three states – Passenger Services 
Protocol 2 On Unlimited Third and Fourth Freedom Traffic Rights 
between the three states – Cargo Services 
Protocol 3 On Unlimited Fifth Freedom Traffic Rights between and 
beyond the three states – Passenger Services 




 J.H. Park, A Study on the Effects of Air Transport Liberalization on Air Transport Markets, 
Department of Logistics Management. (PhD Thesis, University of Incheon, 2011) 
[unpublished]. 
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Protocol 4 On Unlimited Fifth Freedom Traffic Rights between and 
beyond the three states – Cargo Services 
Table 6-3 Implementing Protocols to the TAAS 
 
The TAAS should be the basic framework for trilateral air transport 
liberalization. However, the TAAS per se does not have to contain details 
about market access liberalization. Just as the ASEAN‘s MAAS consists of 
―[the] Agreement (MAAS), its Annexes and its Implementing Protocols and 
any amendments thereto‖41 and leaves all the crucial details to protocols,42 
the TAAS can have one symbolic article dealing with market access exchange 
and leave all the crucial details to protocols. The real value of the TASS will 
be formalizing a trilateral agreement on air services. 
Three important principles must be applied in the TAAS and the 
protocols. First, the TAAS and each implementing protocol must be legally 
separate and independent treaties. This means that states have to ratify the 
protocols separately while or after ratifying the original TAAS. This step-by-
step scheme allows Northeast Asian governments and airlines to adopt 
regional liberalization gradually, similar to ASEAN‘s step-by-step approach. 
Second, the TAAS and each protocol will be effective only when all three 
states have ratified them. In other words, the TAAS must be a truly trilateral 
agreement rather than a supplement to existing bilateral air services 
agreements. Lastly, a related but separate principle is that the TAAS and the 
protocols must supersede the previous bilateral air services agreements. 
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6.3.2.2 Roadmap for Northeast Asian Open Skies by 2020 
Protocol 1 to the TASS would introduce unlimited third and fourth 
freedoms for passenger air transport between all cities in the three states. At 
the same time, China would be allowed to opt out of three cities—most likely, 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. The basic goal, then, would be to 
liberalize all secondary Chinese cities, all Korean cities, and all Japanese cities.  
 
Protocol Scope Deadline  
Protocol 1  
to the 
TAAS 
Unlimited third and fourth 
freedoms between all cities in the 
three states with three opt-out 
choices for China – Passenger 
Services 
2020 
(All three states 
should ratify by 
2020) 
Table 6-4: Protocol 1 to the TAAS  
 
This degree of liberalization is both necessary and feasible. The needs of 
Northeast Asian carriers and consumer demand both call for this change. 
There are also factors favoring the success of Protocol 1. First of all, China‘s 
airport capacity and airspace shortage problems will be much improved by 
2020,
43
 especially with the new airport in Beijing and reform of the 
government‘s airspace control.44 Secondly, the visa application process will 
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either be substantially simplified or waived altogether for Chinese tourists, 
which will give another boost to Chinese tourists who want to visit Korea and 
Japan. Third, the competitiveness of Chinese airlines, which has been 
considered a major barrier to reaching any open skies agreement,
45
 will have 
improved over this time period. Last but not least, Northeast Asian LCCs have 
significant potential to move the liberalization agenda forward. 
Most LCCs in Northeast Asia will look to grow quickly. It has been 
observed that many Northeast Asian LCCs focus on domestic markets for a 
time but soon shift to neighboring markets.
46
 The partner Northeast Asian 
states are obvious targets because of enormous demand, short flight times, and 
low operating cost. This, of course, requires more liberal air services 
agreements among the three states. At the very least, LCCs would want 
unlimited third and fourth freedoms even if there are some opt-outs at an 
initial stage of market access liberalization.  
At the same time, it should be noted that China will need additional time 
to fully adapt to the increase of capacity. More importantly, the central pillar 
of China‘s international aviation policy, protecting the ―Big Three‖ airlines, 
must be taken into consideration. Although the level of protectionism will 
have diminished somewhat by 2020, it will not have disappeared entirely. 
Thus, recognition should be given to the geographical market allocation of 
China‘s three primary hubs—Beijing to Air China, Shanghai to China Eastern, 
and Guangzhou to China Southern—in order to soften the three airlines‘ 
resistance to Protocol 1. In brief, Protocol 1 to the TAAS should provide 
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China with three opt-out choices. 
However, these opt-outs should not continue indefinitely. For a more 
balanced approach, there should be a mandatory link between Protocol 1 and 
Protocol 3 on unlimited fifth freedom operations. That is, when Protocol 3 to 
the TAAS takes effect, the opt-outs in Protocol 1 should expire. (For more 
discussion, see the next section on Protocol 3.) 
A critic may object that China could reject Protocol 1 because its 
unlimited third and fourth freedoms, even excluding the three major Chinese 
cities, would effectively create unlimited sixth freedom benefits for Korean 
and Japanese carriers in the China-US market. However, it is worth repeating 
that the bilateral air services agreement between China and Japan already 
allows unlimited third and fourth freedom flights except to Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Tokyo (thus, Guangzhou is included). Although China‘s concern about the 
sixth freedom is understandable, the high demand for traffic within Northeast 
Asia (thus, third and fourth freedom traffic) must be fully recognized. In 
addition, China may take advantage of unlimited sixth freedom opportunities 
in the context of the Northeast Asia-Europe market. (See section 5.5.2 Impact 
on Chinese Aviation Policy.) 
Turning to Protocol 2 to the TAAS, it is important to note that there will 
be stronger momentum for the cargo side than the passenger side. In many 
regional models, cargo service has been easier to liberalize than passenger 
service. Indeed, cargo air transport is less complex than passenger air transport, 
with nationalism playing a less significant role, and it provides speedy and 
efficient access to supply chains that reduce logistical costs. In short, it helps 
exports. 
385 
Protocol 2 to the TAAS would introduce unlimited third and fourth 
freedoms for cargo air transport between all cities in the three states. Protocol 
2 is likely to be ratified by the three states earlier than Protocol 1. While 
passenger air services have been closely associated with traditional aero-
political calculations, cargo air services are less affected by these calculations. 
Accordingly, the opt-out choices do not need to be incorporated in Protocol 2. 
 
Protocol Scope Deadline 
Protocol 2  
to the 
TAAS 
Unlimited third and fourth freedom 
flights – Cargo Services 
2020 
(All three states 
should ratify by 
2020) 
Table 6-5: Protocol 2 to the TAAS 
 
The fact that there is wide discussion of bilateral FTAs and a trilateral 
FTA among China, Japan, and Korea (see section 3.4.3 Developing a China-
Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement) cannot be underestimated. In the process 
of discussing Northeast Asian open skies, Chinese commentators have 
suggested a link between FTAs and air services agreements for cargo air 
transport, e.g. ―a liberalized bilateral ASA may be signed after the conclusion 
of the bilateral FTA‖ 47  and ―there is a need for the integration of air 
transportation after the economic integration comes to a high degree of the 
free trade area.‖48  
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 All in all, it is likely that efforts to liberalize the cargo sector in 
Northeast Asia will bear fruit in the near future, leading to the successful 
implementation of Protocol 2 to the TAAS.  
 
6.3.2.3 Roadmap for Northeast Asian Open Skies by 2025 
Protocol 3 of the TAAS would provide unlimited fifth freedom traffic 
rights for passenger air transport between and beyond the three states. 
However, Chinese carriers would enjoy a head start on this liberalization. 
More specifically, designated Chinese airlines would be entitled to operate 
unlimited fifth freedom traffic rights on passenger service through Korean 
points and Japanese points. Designated Korean airlines and Japanese airlines, 
however, would have to wait five years after Chinese carriers commence 
operations. Then, they could enjoy the same unlimited fifth freedom traffic 
rights through Chinese points.  
The fifth freedom traffic rights described above entail not only internal 
fifth freedom flights (that is, operations that cover only Chinese, Korean, and 
Japanese cities without touching any external points, such as a Beijing-Seoul-
Tokyo route by a Chinese airline) but also external fifth freedom flights (that 
is, operations involving points external to the three states, such as a Beijing-
Seoul-LA route by a Chinese airline).
49
 Of course, the external fifth freedom 
flights must be allowed by the air services agreements with the relevant third 
countries. In other words, the above Beijing-Seoul-LA route by a Chinese 
airline would be permitted by Protocol 3 to the TAAS, but the China-US air 
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services agreement would need to separately permit traffic rights for the 
Chinese carrier between Seoul and LA. 
 
Protocol Scope Deadline 
Internal 5
th
 freedom External 5
th
 freedom 




freedoms for Chinese 
carriers via Korea and 
Japan (for five years) – 
Passenger Services 
Unlimited fifth freedoms 
for Chinese carriers via 
Korea and Japan for 
external points outside the 
three countries (for five 







Korean airlines and Japanese airlines could only 
enjoy the same unlimited fifth freedom traffic rights 
through Chinese points five years after the use of 
fifth freedom traffic rights by Chinese airlines 
Table 6-6 Protocol 3 to the TAAS 
 
This change would likely be fiercely resisted by Korean and Japanese 
legacy carriers flying to North America. Unlimited fifth freedom would mean 
that Chinese carriers could take Korean passengers from Seoul to Los Angeles 
(on a flight originating and terminating in Beijing) or take Japanese passengers 
from Tokyo to New York (on a flight originating and terminating in Shanghai) 
without capacity restrictions. Korean and Japanese LCCs would also be 
affected by Chinese fifth freedom operations between the Korea and Japan 
market (e.g. a Guangzhou – Busan – Osaka operation). It would effectively 
mean that Chinese carriers could operate unlimited fifth freedom flights 
between Seoul and Tokyo.  
Despite the expected resistance, preferential access for Chinese carriers 
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is necessary to overcome the Chinese aero-political imbalance connected with 
Northeast Asian open skies. The potential of Northeast Asian open skies will 
eventually convince the parties concerned of the need for preferential access.  
However, China‘s opt-out of three cities—most likely, Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Guangzhou—under Protocol 1 should expire with the implementation of 
Protocol 3. Otherwise, the whole trilateral liberalization picture would be 
substantially imbalanced. With the opt-outs, Chinese carriers could fly Seoul-
Tokyo routes without capacity limits on their fifth freedom market while 
Korean carriers and Japanese carriers would still face capacity limits on their 
third and fourth freedom markets (e.g. Seoul-Beijing and Seoul-Shanghai (for 
Korean carriers); Tokyo-Beijing and Tokyo-Shanghai (for Japanese carriers)).  
Hence, it is necessary that the opt-out choices under Protocol 1 should 
be automatically lifted when Protocol 3 takes effect (that is, when it is ratified 
by the three states). In brief, the second stage of liberalization (with a deadline 
of 2025) would provide unlimited third and fourth freedoms (with no 
exceptions) on passenger services while giving Chinese carriers preferential 
relaxation of the fifth freedom market access. 
Turning to the cargo side, Protocol 4 to the TAAS would provide 
unlimited fifth freedom traffic rights on cargo services between and beyond 
the three states. 
Protocol Scope Deadline 
Protocol 4  
to the 
TAAS 
Unlimited fifth freedoms – Cargo 
Services 
2025 
(All three states 
should ratify by 
2025) 
Table 6-7 Protocol 4 to the TAAS  
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Protocol 4 to the TAAS could be implemented without significant 
difficulties. By 2025, bilateral FTAs and a trilateral FTA among China, Japan, 
and Korea will likely be in place, creating the need for liberalized air services 
agreements for cargo air transport. In essence, Protocol 4 will provide more 
efficient access to global and regional supply chains that can reduce logistical 
costs. 
It is also worth noting that there has been an attempt to develop a new 
multilateral agreement specifically for air cargo services. ICAO suggested 
developing a specific international agreement to facilitate further liberalization 
of all cargo services at the ICAO Sixth Worldwide Air Transport Conference 
in 2013,50 and the Conference made the following official recommendation: 
 
ICAO should take the lead in the development of a specific international 
agreement to facilitate further liberalization of air cargo services, taking 
into account past experiences and achievements, views of States on 




During the discussion at the Conference, the International Air Cargo 
Association (TIACA) argued that the fifth freedom is key to viable route 
structures for a cargo airline‘s network since very few products fly round trip 
(the third and fourth freedoms) the way passengers do.
52
 Indeed, air cargo 
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 ICAO Secretariat, Liberalization of Air Cargo Services, ICAO Doc ATConf/6-WP/14 (13 
December 2012) at 2 para 2.5, online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp014_en.pdf> 
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 ICAO, the Report on Agenda Item 2.1(summary report of the Air Transport Conference), 
ICAO Doc ATConf/6-WP/104 (22 March 2013) at para 2.1.8.C. 
52
 ICAO, Needed: Rapid Liberalization of Air Cargo Services Through a New Multilateral 
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If the new multilateral all-cargo agreement involving unlimited third, 
fourth, and fifth freedom operations is adopted and ratified by the three 
Northeast Asian states over the next ten years by 2025, there is no reason not 
to ratify Protocol 4 to the TAAS. 
 
6.3.2.4 Roadmap for Northeast Asian Open Skies by 2030 
The third stage of liberalization (with a deadline of 2030) would 
complete the transition to Northeast Asian open skies by allowing unlimited 
third, fourth, and fifth freedoms for passenger and cargo services on an equal 
and unconditional basis. By this stage, five years after 2025, when Chinese 
airlines began to enjoy fifth freedom traffic rights, Korean and Japanese 
airlines could enjoy the same unlimited fifth freedom traffic rights through 
Chinese points. This means the TAAS and all four protocols would be 
implemented by 2030. 
 
Scope Deadline 
Unlimited third, fourth and fifth freedom flights – 
Passenger and Cargo Services 
2030 
Table 6-8 Roadmap for Northeast Asian Open Skies by 2030 
 
                                                                                                              
Approach, ICAO Doc ATConf/6-WP/96 (7 March 2013) (Presented by The International Air 




 ICAO, Liberalization of Air Cargo Services, ATConf/6-WP/14 (13 December 2012) 
(Presented by ICAO Secretariat) at 2 para 1.3, online: 
<http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wp014_en.pdf>. 
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This optimistic outlook is supported by the following factors. First, it is 
likely that China and the US will have adopted an open skies agreement by 
2030. For instance, Mr. Edward Bastian, president of Delta Airlines, once 
predicted that the US and China would reach a deal on open skies by 2023.
54
 
Although Bastian‘s view can be interpreted as a rather ―hopeful‖ view since 
US carriers like Delta have wanted an open skies agreement with China for 
many years, China will definitely be more flexible in its negotiations with the 
US for an open skies agreement over the next fifteen years.  
If China and the US adopt an open skies agreement, Chinese and US 
carriers will operate many direct flights between China and the US. As a 
consequence, China‘s concerns about losing passengers transferring at Seoul 
or Tokyo will be significantly reduced. 
Another important factor is that China‘s domestic market, which is 
currently only half the size of the US domestic market, will overtake the US 
domestic market by 2030.
55
 In other words, China will become the world‘s 
largest passenger market by 2030. This growth will subsequently lead Chinese 
airlines to improve their management ability and service quality. Thus, by 
2030, Chinese airlines will have become so competitive that ―protecting the 
major carriers at this stage [will be] akin to ‗treating Giants as Babies.‘‖56 
One thought-provoking possibility is that Chinese carriers may 
eventually want more open skies just as Gulf carriers do. CAPA hinted at the 
potential of sixth freedom traffic for Chinese carriers as follows: 
                                           
54
 See Jeffrey Ng, ―Delta Shifts Focus From Japan as Trans-Pacific Hub‖ The Wall Street 
Journal (10 February 2014), online: 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303874504579375670306517530 >.  
55
 See ―China‘s Power Change and Airline Impacts‖ Airline Leader 15 (October 2012) 28 at 
30; See also ―Is it time for China-US Open Skies?‖ Global Travel Industry News (9 April 
2015), online: <http://www.eturbonews.com/57422/it-time-china-us-open-skies>.  
56
 Fu & Oum, supra note 15 at 29. 
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In addition to their home market, Chinese carriers have been growing 
sixth freedom traffic from China to other parts of Asia, a far more 
populous catchment area than the US carriers can target beyond the US. 
Air China even looks at US-China-India traffic flows, and with time 




Returning to Northeast Asian open skies, since we have already 
considered the question of what can be done, we should also consider the 
question of what cannot be done. Indeed, it is premature to discuss liberalizing 
market access beyond the fifth freedom in the context of Northeast Asian open 
skies. Liberalization of the seventh, eighth, and ninth freedoms (much more 
liberalized freedoms) would be hard to predict at this stage. Accordingly, a 
genuine single aviation market in Northeast Asia can only be imagined in the 
distant future. 
Neither will legal reform of ownership and control restrictions be 
feasible for the foreseeable future. Although the community carrier concept, as 
found in other single aviation markets, can be taken into consideration, any 
proposal that requires domestic legislative changes would face severe 
difficulties. Nevertheless, it is worth considering the possibility of a Northeast 
Asian community carrier. 
The ASEAN model of the community carrier concept
58
 allows majority 
ownership to be spread out among community interests as long as effective 
                                           
57
 CAPA ―Chinese airlines overtake US carriers across the Pacific. The big dilemma: US-
China open skies?‖ (4 May 2015), online< https://centreforaviation.com/analysis/chinese-
airlines-overtake-us-carriers-across-the-pacific-time-for-us-china-open-skies-222454>. 
58
 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.2 Ownership and Control for the explanation about Article 
3(2)(a)(ii) of MAAS. 
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regulatory control remains with the country in which the airline is based. The 
success of Northeast Asian community carriers would ideally take the form of 
new regional LCCs owned by nationals of the three countries. For instance, 
the ownership of a hypothetical LCC that might be called Air Northeast Asia 
could consist of a 33 percent Chinese stake, a 33 percent Japanese stake, and a 
34 percent Korean stake. 
The success of Northeast Asian community carriers could contribute 
significantly to Northeast Asian open skies. However, the concept of Northeast 
Asian community carrier is complicated by domestic legislation about 
ownership restriction that requires nationals to hold a majority share in airlines. 
Thus, policy liberalization, rather than legal reforms, would be a more realistic 
way of relaxing ownership and control restrictions.  
 
6.3.3 Policy Liberalization 
Throughout this thesis, the importance of policy liberalization has been 
emphasized. Although this thesis principally deals with the architecture of 
international treaties and domestic laws with respect to economic air transport 
in Northeast Asia, there are considerable policy aspects that affect the law. 
To be sure, the term ―policy‖ is used in diverse disciplines with 
significantly or subtly different meanings. While surveying various legal 
theories about policy, Mauro Zamboni concluded that ―the vast majority of 
contemporary legal scholars and practitioners tend to conceive of policies in a 
similar way: political standards that can penetrate and have a (direct and 
indirect) relevancy for the making and applying of legal categories and 
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concepts.‖59 In short, policy affects legal actors both when they are making 
laws and when they are applying them.
60
 The application of a law is the use of 
that law in a particular situation.  
In the context of Northeast Asian open skies, the application of 
ownership restrictions is a simple process since the relevant law is 
mathematical (e.g. no more than 50 percent foreign ownership). Hence, 
liberalizing ownership restrictions entails legislative reform that either entirely 
removes the limit on foreign ownership or increases that limit by reducing the 
minimum share that must be owned by nationals. Numerical restrictions on 
foreign ownership can be replaced by the ―principal place of business‖ 
formula, an approach that has been endorsed by the ICAO and adopted by 
some more liberal states (e.g., Chile and Singapore). 
However, legislative reform of ownership restrictions is and will be a 
difficult task in the vast majority of states, including those in Northeast Asia. 
This inertia is largely due to economic protectionism and partly due to 
outdated security concerns. Even relatively small-scale changes often face 
major hurdles.  
A classic example of this difficulty is the impasse in the second-stage 
open skies agreement between the EU and US. The EU and US reached a 
second-stage open skies agreement in March 2010 that allows further 
liberalization of airline ownership and control subject to legislative changes in 
the US.
61
 That is, when the US changes its legislation to allow EU investors 
                                           
59
 Mauro Zamboni, The Policy of Law – A Legal Theoretical Framework (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2007) at 117. 
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 Ibid. at 119. 
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 See European Union Press Release, ―FAQs on the Second Stage EU-US ―Open Skies‖ 
Agreement and Existing First Stage Air Services Agreement‖ (March 25, 2010), online: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-103_en.htm?locale=en>. 
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majority ownership of US airlines by increasing the limit on foreign 
ownership beyond the current level of 25% of voting equity, the EU will 
reciprocally allow US investors to have majority ownership in EU airlines.
62
 
However, though this reform has been in the hands of US Congress for the 
past five years
63
, it has yet to take any action. 
Although China and Korea have relaxed foreign ownership restrictions 
in the past (China and Korea have increased the cap on foreign investment 
from 35 percent to 49 percent in 2002
64
 and from 20 percent to 49 percent in 
1998
65
, respectively), it is highly unlikely that they will reform the 51/49 
ownership structure (that is, majority ownership by nationals) in the 
foreseeable future. As discussed in section 4.1.3 External (Air Services 
Agreement) Restrictions, any change in the 51/49 structure could affect the 
rights of all airlines from all three states to fly to destinations outside those 
three states. 
In contrast with the application of ownership restrictions, the application 
of control restrictions makes space for policy, which plays a key role in the 
application of the law. A policy, to borrow the words of Roy Brooks, is ―a 
community‘s values, culture or expectations.‖ 66  Thus, a nation‘s values, 
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culture, and expectations can influence the application of control restrictions, 
even if they have not been solidified into new laws. In other words, 
liberalizing control restrictions does not necessarily require legal reform. Even 
without legal reform, policy liberalization can effectively contribute to 
Northeast Asian open skies. 
There are indications of policy liberalization in Northeast Asia. Granting 
the application of China‘s Spring Airlines Japan was a telltale sign that control 
restrictions are being relaxed in the region. Down the road, we may see new 
joint venture airlines, which could conceivably include ―Spring Airlines Korea‖ 
(from China), ―Jin Air Japan‖ (from Korea), and ―Vanilla Air China‖ (from 
Japan). In time, AirAsia-type pan-regional airlines with subsidiaries in other 
states could emerge, the first being Spring Airlines. As noted, this business 
model is widely used in Southeast Asia. More Northeast Asian airlines will 
pursue the benefits of integrated operations.  
The joint ventures between Northeast Asian airlines and investors in 
other Northeast Asian countries will show whether and to what extent airline-
led liberalization and national policy-led liberalization will succeed in 
Northeast Asia. If the liberalization efforts turn out to be successful, we may 
see a pan-Northeast Asian carrier in the near future. 
This de facto liberalization can come to Northeast Asia if governments 
adopt more liberal policies. In sum, ownership and control restrictions, the 
main hurdle for Northeast Asian open skies along with restrictions on market 





Liberalization has become an unassailable doctrine in international air 
transport over the past two decades. However, international air transport is still 
beset by two major legal impediments: market access and ownership and 
control restrictions. Amid these legal restrictions, airlines of the past carried on 
their business within the exact scope that governments explicitly permitted. 
Such airlines were simple entities that governments tightly regulated and 
strictly controlled. 
Because of the nationalism that is deeply rooted in airlines, the 
relationship between governments and national airlines was a special one. This 
close bond was strengthened by the fact that airlines tended to be state-owned 
and that there were few national airlines, and sometimes only one. But as the 
global airline industry was privatized and deregulated in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the industry became more competitive. In the 2000s, competition increased 
between full-service carriers, while new air carriers—most of them LCCs—
entered a market that had previously been restricted to a small number of 
players. Today‘s airlines strive to survive in a much more competitive market. 
Northeast Asia, which once was an extremely protective market, is 
slowly becoming liberalized. The increased competition resulting from this 
liberalization has made Northeast Asian airlines more competitive. Moreover, 
the number of airlines in Northeast Asia has increased significantly, mainly 
because of LCCs. In fact, the most significant development in the post-
liberalization period has been the emergence and growth of LCCs in many 
parts of the world, and Northeast Asia was no exception. 
In this era of greater competition, Northeast Asian airlines are no longer 
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(and should not be) the passive subjects of government regulation. They are 
(and should be) active regulation reformers. Indeed, change is already in the 
air. With their strong lobbying power, innovative business models, and airline 
alliances, airlines are actively promoting liberalization in Northeast Asia. In 
this sense, airlines have already begun the push for Northeast Asian open skies. 
Although airline-led liberalization is fundamentally important, only the 
actions of states can guarantee stable and concrete changes. The most 
important prerequisite is for the three states to recognize that Northeast Asian 
open skies are already on the way. Along with this recognition, the states 
should focus on what they can do to benefit their airlines and consumers. In 
this regard, the three pivots of state-led liberalization—institutional framework, 
legal reforms, and policy liberalization—can make Northeast Asian open skies 
a reality. 
A robust institutional framework is necessary for the success of 
Northeast Asian open skies. The Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) is an 
ideal platform for the initial discussion. Alternatively, the China-Japan-Korea 
Ministerial Conference on Transport and Logistics could provide a framework 
for regional liberalization in Northeast Asia. Currently, neither is an 
adequately robust institution, but both of these frameworks have great 
potential for building capacity. 
Legal reforms are the key to Northeast Asian open skies. The proposal 
offered in this chapter for short-term (2020), mid-term (2025), and long term 
(2030) stages of liberalization by the TAAS and its implementing protocols 
offer a feasible target. Taking into account aero-political considerations and 
changes in direct and indirect market access elements, the goals of this 
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proposal are modest and realistic, incorporating aero-political concessions 
such as according China the right to exclude its three largest cities. 
Policy liberalization has already started through the mitigation of control 
restrictions in Northeast Asia. It must continue. Airline-led liberalization can 
flourish as states support them through policy liberalization. Equally 
importantly, policy liberalization lays the groundwork for governmental legal 
reforms.  
This thesis ends with the key messages I have sought to deliver 
throughout. Change has begun, liberalization is inevitable, and progress is 
achievable. Airlines have already started moving toward Northeast Asian open 
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